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 Foreword and Acknowledgements
This book stems from a research project funded by the European Research 
Council (Starting Grant 283870) entitled ‘Territories, Communities and 
Exchanges in the Kham Sino-Tibetan Borderlands’. The project called for an 
understanding of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands in their historical, geographi-
cal, and multi-ethnic complexities, and in a relational sense of boundaries 
of identity re-construction between neighbouring Tibetans and Chinese. 
The two worlds (Tibetan and Chinese) have mingled to some extent, while 
the cultural and ethnic divide have been maintained, and the process has 
involved at different levels many diverse local communities who may at 
varying degrees have recognized themselves – or not – in either of these 
two large categories of identity. In exploring the extent to which the region 
of eastern Tibet called Kham can be said to be ‘Sino-Tibetan’, we thought 
it worthwhile to highlight its connected features, its relational nature as a 
nexus of power. This volume aims to explore the intertwined questions of 
place-making, identity, and socio-political transformations that constitute 
Kham’s convoluted historical trajectory and influenced its becoming as a 
regional formation.
A f irst outcome of the research project was the edited volume entitled 
‘Worlds in the Making: Interethnicity and the Processes of Generating 
Difference in Southwest China’ (Gros, ed. 2014). It set out to compare a 
variety of visions and conceptualizations of people and places located at 
the crossroads between the conventional cultural areas of Southwest China, 
Southeast Asia, and Tibet and we addressed, among other topics, issues of 
Otherness and identity building. Contributors thereby sought to go beyond 
the pervasive dichotomy that often leads to a depiction of encounters in 
terms of acculturation, absorption by the other, or resistance to the other. 
While at different historical moments particular categories of identity have 
certainly been mobilized and the boundaries between them hardened, 
the volume explores various ways in which identity results from evolving 
relations and transactions.
A second edited volume, ‘Frontier Tibet: Trade and Boundaries of Au-
thority’ (Gros, ed. 2016), derived from the realization that within the f ield 
of Sino-Tibetan frontier studies, there was still little in-depth scholarly 
discussion about commerce, trade, and the people who facilitated these 
activities. Examining such activities was also of primary importance for the 
period of transition between the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and the Republic 
of China (1912-1949), when eastern Tibet became an exemplary case of 
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frontier expansion and state building, a process during which this region 
underwent state-led political integration. The present volume builds on 
these earlier efforts and achievements, and takes as its challenge what 
C. Patterson Giersch (2016) called for in his Afterword: ‘using local Kham 
history to push the boundaries of global borderlands studies’. We do so with 
contributions from both historians and anthropologists.
A growing literature now offers a healthy critique of traditional histo-
riographies of China’s frontier zones by approaching them as liminal or 
interstitial areas where economic and cultural exchanges take place along 
processes of ethnic formation. These are not marginal places; borderlands 
have their own logics and integrity – not only in relation to a centre as an 
expression of a spatial dichotomy but also in relation to particular histories. 
Scholarship has been increasingly challenging centrist views and their 
peripheralizing gaze to uncover the borderlands’s own centrality. Such 
studies have prompted a reconsideration of the centre-periphery paradigm 
as a historical construct.
Particularly relevant to the time-frame of this volume is the substantial 
revision of the history of the Qing Empire in China and Inner Asia that falls 
under the heading ‘new Qing history’ (e.g. Waley-Cohen 2004) which, by 
reconsidering the Manchu’s contribution and relationship to Chinese culture, 
challenges the received wisdom of the Sino-centric model of Confucian 
cultural unity (Crossley 1999, Dunnell and Millward 2004, Di Cosmo and 
Wyatt 2003, Elliot 2001, Perdue 2005, Rawski 1996). This body of literature has 
productively enacted the necessary dialogue between history and anthropol-
ogy with greater attention to the intricacies of the local and effective use of 
the notion of ethnicity. Influential volumes have also combined historical 
and anthropological perspectives and have highlighted (dis)continuities in 
the political and cultural processes of articulating territorial integration 
and multicultural rule (e.g. Brown 1996, Faure and Ho 2013, Harrell 1995, 
Lary 2007, Rossabi 2004).
Comparable approaches have informed more nuanced views of Tibetan 
diversity across the plateau, challenging a unitary history of the Tibetan 
people. Several authors have shown how premodern Tibet developed its 
own Buddhist civilizing mission at the frontier of the state (Samuel 1993, 
Goldstein 1998, Huber 2011, Tuttle 2011), and that the Tibetan world is also 
characterized by internal diversity and the related dynamics of ethnicity 
(Kolås and Thowsend 2005, Shneiderman 2006, Klieger 2006). Some approach 
‘borders as liminal spaces’ that are intrinsically ambivalent and unstable 
(Tenzin 2014, xiv), or focus on barely visible ‘interstitial populations’ (Roche 
2014) in the context of porous and labile ethnic, linguistic, and territorial 
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boundaries (see Gros 2014). Increasingly, and across the disciplinary divide of 
Sinology and Tibetology, our understanding of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands 
in their diversity and connections with larger dynamics, is being reshaped.
Some of the f irst studies about Kham were for some time dominated by 
an interest in the history of religious institutions and charismatic f igures 
(Smith 1968, 1969, 1970). As many have pointed out with due reason, religious 
history is of primary importance for understanding Kham’s history in its 
cultural, political, and economic dimensions. The religious diversity and 
the contemporary forms of religious revival are essential local dynamics 
in Kham (see Germano 1998). Following in the footsteps of Elliot Sperling’s 
(1976) seminal article on Zhao Erfeng’s (Chao Er-feng) role in late Qing 
China’s colonial expansion, many historians have examined the policies 
aimed at taking control of this increasingly contested space, focusing on 
particular locales and time periods of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Along the same lines, Western language publications have focused 
on questions such as: imperial expansion and Sichuan leaders’ shifting 
strategies of colonization (Coleman 2014; Dai 2009; Ho 2008; Relyea 2015a, 
2015b, 2016, 2017; Wang 2011); Sino-Tibetan relations during the Guomindang 
rule and the provincialization of the frontier (Jagou 2001, 2006; Lawson 
2013; Leibold 2005; Lin 2006; Rodriguez 2011; Tuttle 2005); or development 
of self-rule and resistance in Kham (Angdrugtsang 1973; Norbu 1986; Peng 
2002; McGranahan 2006, 2007). This Foreword cannot do justice to all 
contributions that would fall within ‘Kham studies’: this expanding literature 
is discussed in the introductory chapter and by each author according to 
their thematic focus.
Since the 1990s, under the leadership of Tibetan researchers in China and 
in exile, several series of publications on the history and cultural traditions 
of Kham have appeared, most notably the important set of publications 
from the project initiated by Tashi Tsering of the Amnyen Machen Institute. 
Contributions in both Tibetan and Chinese languages regarding Kham’s his-
tory, culture, and contemporary economic development are now extremely 
numerous in China where there is a growing interest in local histories, 
from individual monasteries or former chieftains to specif ic regions. Two 
edited volumes of the proceedings of the International Association of 
Tibetan Studies have laid the ground for the development of studies of 
eastern Tibet and Kham in particular (Epstein 2002, van Spengen and Jabb 
2009), and many have been published in China (e.g. Ze Po and Ge Lei 2004, 
Luobu and Zhao 2008, among others) where emphasis is often laid on the 
period of transition from empire to nation (see Shi 2011). In the Chinese 
academic context ‘Kham(pa) studies’ (Ch. Kang(ba) xue) has emerged as a 
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new disciplinary f ield. Its development can hardly be totally neutral and 
calls for attention to its ethico-political implications.
One key development in recent studies of Kham or other locales of the 
Sino-Tibetan borderlands is the emphasis on a history from below and 
increased attention to alternative histories that are not to be found in official 
records (see Hayes 2014, Holmes-Tagchungdarpa 2014, Kang and Sutton 2016, 
Tsomu 2015, Ptáčková and Zenz 2017). This volume contributes to this new 
trend, while also acknowledging the continuous relevance of an in-depth 
analysis and a critique of processes of expansion that progressively led to 
the integration of ‘Tibet’ into the People’s Republic of China. For this reason, 
there is still a strong Chinese studies component in this book and its title 
can also be understood as a provocation. For it is clear that if this edge of the 
Tibetan plateau remains a frontier from a Sino-centric perspective, many 
of the chapters attest to the different ways some places have kept their own 
centrality in the eyes of their inhabitants, albeit with new parameters. These 
are part of the patterns of change explored in these pages.
The reader no doubt understands that this book does not attempt to sum 
up our knowledge of Kham and this particular part of the Sino-Tibetan bor-
derlands. Contributors were invited to reflect, through their own historical 
or ethnographic material, on the relevance of Kham for borderland studies 
and no theoretical framework was imposed. There still are, of course, many 
gaps to be f illed. Needless to say, none of us speaks on behalf of the Khampa. 
In fact, Kham is used as a heuristic to explore collective and individual 
trajectories at crucial historical conjunctures and to demonstrate that Kham 
is highly relevant for the study of Asian borderlands and our understanding 
of ‘Tibet’ in its relationship to ‘China’, both understood as contingent entities 
with shifting territorial imprints. This book calls for a regional approach 
across the divide between history and anthropology, while not taking for 
granted the character of the region. Indeed, the challenge is to write a 
regional history that speaks to the complexity of the lived experiences of 
place, territory, sovereignty, and agency.
As with all projects, especially when they are collaborative in nature, 
many debts have been accumulated over the years. First of all, my deep 
gratitude goes to Yudru Tsomu for the meaningful discussions and exchanges 
we had during the preparation of this manuscript, and for the comments 
she offered on the other chapters including my introduction. Most contribu-
tions to this volume were presented during the international conference 
‘Territories, Communities, and Exchanges in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands’ 
that took place on 18-20 February 2016, at the Cité Universitaire Interna-
tionale de Paris. My thanks go to Rémi Chaix, Lara Maconi, and Kunsang 
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Namgyal-Lama who helped co-organize the event. In the run-up to this 
conference and the present volume, there was the pleasure of exchanging 
ideas with David Atwill, Chen Bo, Paddy Booz, Keila Diehl, Dawa Drolma, 
Isabelle Henrion-Dourcy, Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Tenzin Jinba, Tom Mullaney, 
Peter Perdue, Benno Weiner, Kären Wigen, Wen-hsin Yeh, Zhang Yuan, and 
Tang Yun, to name a few.
I wish to express my gratitude to all contributors for staying on board 
this publishing project, for their patience and intellectual involvement. 
Sincere thanks go to Remi Chaix for the wonderful maps that are included 
in this volume, and to Bernadette Sellers for her language editing of several 
of the chapters including mine. The f inal phase of the preparation for this 
volume took place during my time at the University of California, Berkeley, 
where the Institute for South Asia Studies welcomed me as a visiting scholar 
in the framework of their recent Himalayan Studies Initiative; I am very 
grateful to Alexander von Rospatt, Lawrence Cohen, Munis Faruqui, and 
Puneeta Kala for the opportunity and the space it provided me to bring this 
project to completion. My stay was made possible thanks to support from 
the InSHS-CNRS in the framework of its programme ‘soutien à la mobilité 
internationale’. While at Berkeley, exchanges with Khashayar Beigi, Franck 
Billé, Kamala Russell, and William F. Stafford Jr were particularly stimulating 
and helped me shape my introductory chapter.
Last but not least, my heartfelt thanks go to all members of the Centre 
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Map 1
 Chronology of Major Events
With Particular Attention to the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands
Stéphane Gros
This chronology provides a selection of major events of global and local sig-
nificance: it foregrounds some key historical events to convey a sense of how 
eastern Tibet, and Kham in particular, has been shaped by various actors in 
conjunction with fluctuating political, economic, and cultural forces of different 
scales and intensity.1 It focuses on the period from the mid-nineteenth century, 
during which Kham became a contentious zone, to the present. The f irst 
section of the chronology, however, starts in the seventeenth century because 
of the historical importance of this period and its relevance for later events.
The Unification of Tibet, and the Manchu Protectorate (c. 1642-1911)
In the early seventeenth century, the Fifth Dalai Lama with Mongolian 
military assistance unif ied a vast territory and institutionalized a political 
system forged from a union of temporal and spiritual powers. From 1642 until 
1952 (or 1959, when the Dalai Lama left def initively for India), the central 
part of the Tibetan plateau and most of its western areas were ruled by the 
Dalai Lamas or their regents and an ecclesiastic-nobiliary government, 
the Ganden Phodrang, based in the city of Lhasa. Central Tibet’s relative 
independence from external influence came to an end in the early eighteenth 
1 This chronology aims to supplement existing chronologies with a focus on eastern Tibet 
and draws on Blondeau and Buffetrille (2002); Snellgrove and Richardson (1986); Tuttle and 
Schaeffer (2013); Travers (2009). For a general survey of Kham over history and the sources for 
such a history, Alexander Gardner’s (2003) substantial commentary on the volume edited by 
Lawrence Epstein (2002) is a vital contribution. The realization of this chronology would not 
have been possible without Yudru Tsomu’s collaboration and the many critical and constructive 
suggestions offered by David Atwill, Rémi Chaix, Carole McGranahan, and Scott Relyea. I alone 
am responsible for all remaining approximations, errors, and shortcomings.
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
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century with the rise of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) which in 1720 established 
a protectorate. Qing influence on the Tibetan plateau peaked under the 
reign of the Qianlong emperor and gradually dwindled over the nineteenth 
century. Amdo and much of Kham were not consistently ruled by Lhasa 
during this period. In fact, starting in the eighteenth century, most of the 
multiple polities (kingdoms, chiefdoms) and localities within Kham and 
Amdo, though often claimed by both Beijing and Lhasa governments, paid 
only loose and sometimes shifting allegiance to these centres of power.
In 1720, Qing forces f irst entered and garrisoned troops on the Tibetan 
plateau in response to Zunghar Mongol invasion and occupation of Lhasa. 
Soon afterwards, in 1727, a simple stone stele was erected at Bumla mountain 
pass along the main off icial road from China proper into Tibet. Geographi-
cally, the stele marked the watershed between the Drichu (Upper Yangtze) 
and Dzachu (Mekong) Rivers, and politically marked the divide between 
Central Tibet and China proper, with much of Kham falling on the Sichuan 
side of the border (see Map 1). The erection of the stele signalled the Qing’s 
political dominance with the establishment of a loose protectorate over 
Tibet manifested by the imperial envoys (ambans) in Lhasa.
The delimitation of the border by no means signified full territorial integra-
tion of the ethnically Tibetan lands to the east under direct Qing political 
rule. In 1729, only the border town of Dartsedo (Dajianlu) was accorded the 
administrative status of a sub-prefecture and with it nominal jurisdiction 
over some f ifty local rulers. Most of Kham remained a complex patchwork 
of relatively independent polities in the hands of local kings, princes, 
monasteries, and other lay rulers. Even when they had been granted tusi 
(indigenous chieftain) titles that implied a form of allegiance to the emperor, 
they remained beyond the direct administrative reach of Qing off icials in 
either Chengdu or Beijing, and equally beyond Lhasa’s direct control.
In Kham, the Gyelrong (Ch. Jiarong) region in northwestern Sichuan 
province became the theatre of major military intervention. Local Qing 
off icials in Sichuan fuelled a local conflict between some of the eighteen 
Gyelrong chieftains to such an extent that it turned into a major frontier war. 
The two so-called Jinchuan campaigns (1747-1749 and 1771-1776) became the 
most costly of all Qing military campaigns. In their aftermath the policy of 
‘substituting chieftains with state-appointed civilian off icials’ (gaitu guiliu, 
often glossed as ‘bureaucratization’) was introduced in the area. These Qing 
interventions, combined with infrastructure work such as road building, 
brought about limited Qing authority in certain parts of Kham. During this 
period the religious influence of Central Tibet over the eastern region led to 
a large number of monasteries being built or converted to the Geluk school.
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1578 Sönam Gyatso (1543-1588) receives the title of Dalai Lama from Mongol 
leader Altan Khan.
1612 The king of Tsang, Karma Püntsok Namgyel reigns over Central Tibet.
1617 Death of the Fourth Dalai Lama, Yönten Gyatso (b. 1589), a Tümed 
Mongol.
1630s-1756 Zunghar Khanate rules over much of central Eurasia, embracing 
Tibetan Buddhism.
1636-1724 Qoshot Khanate, under Gushri Khan (1582-1655) and his sons, 
rules over most of Amdo.
1639-1641 Gushri Khan defeats the Beri king Dönyö Dörjé, and places parts 
of Kham, including the easternmost kingdom of Chakla, under his 
authority.
1642 Gushri Khan defeats the king of Tsang. Beginning of the Fifth Dalai 
Lama’s rule, Ngawang Lobzang Gyatso, and the regency of Sönam 
Rapten. Beginning of the Ganden Phodrang regime which lasted until 
1959.
 The Tenth Karmapa, who was supported by the king of Tsang, f lees the 
f ighting. He f inds shelter in Lijiang (Jang Satam) and Gyelthang (1647) 
and remains in Kham until 1672.
1644-1911 Qing (Manchu) dynasty rules over China.
1644-1661 Reign of Emperor Shunzhi (b. 1638).
1645 Construction of the Potala Palace begins.
1647 End of the domination of the Naxi King of Lijiang (Jang Satam) over 
the territory of Muli (Mili).
1648 Treaty of Westphalia. European powers increasingly rely on border 
treaties to def ine the territorial sovereignty of individual states.
1652-1653 Journey of the Fifth Dalai Lama to Beijing; meets Emperor Shunzhi.
1652 The Fifth Dalai Lama supports the expansion of the monastery of 
Bathang, renamed ‘Ganden Pendeling’.
1656 Rapjampa Samten Zangpo patronizes the building of one of the three 
main monasteries in Muli, then Muli Gönchen, marking the early days 
of Geluk presence in Muli.
1661-1722 Reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi.
1666 The Qing Dynasty grants the title of Xuanwei shisi (Pacif ication com-
missioner) to the Chakla king (Mingzheng tusi), placing him under the 
jurisdiction of the Sichuan Imperial Government.
1667 The Qoshot Mongol forces make their way into Gyelthang, conquering 
the area on behalf of the Fifth Dalai Lama. Döndrupling monastery is 
built there and adherents of the Karmapa and Nyingmapa schools are 
forced to convert to the Gelukpa school.
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1674 The Naxi king of Lijiang supports an armed revolt in reaction to Geluk 
influence; it is quelled by Mongolian forces and results in the handing 
over of Gyelthang to the Dalai Lama.
1679 Construction of the large monastery of Ganden Sumtseling in Gyelthang 
on the advice of the Fifth Dalai Lama.
1682 Death of the Fifth Dalai Lama, concealed by Regent Sanggyé Gyatso 
until 1696 to consolidate the Ganden Phodrang’s rule.
1684 War with Ladakh.
1684-1692 Publication of the Kangxi edition of the Tibetan Buddhist canon 
(kangyür).
1697-1700 Lhazang Khan becomes chief of Mongol (Qoshot) forces in Tibet.
1699 Tsangsé Trinlé, the garpön/dzongpön (commissioner/magistrate) 
dispatched by the Tibetan government in Lhasa, kills the Chakla king 
and seizes areas to the east of Gyelrong Gyelmo Ngülchu (Dadu he).
1700 The Sichuan governor Tang Xishun leads troops on a punitive expedition 
against Tsangsé Trinlé and re-captures areas to the east of Gyelrong 
Gyelmo Ngülchu (Dadu he). Trokyap (one of the Gyelrong kingdoms) 
submits to the Qing.
1702 The Qing dispatches civil off icials to supervise trade between China 
and Tibet, and establishes a customs off ice in Dartsedo.
1703 The Tibetan government in Lhasa sends two depas (governors) to rule 
Bathang.
1705 Lhazang Khan, with the approval of the Manchu Emperor Kangxi (r. 
1662-1722), attacks Lhasa and kidnaps the Regent Sanggyé Gyatso (b. 1653) 
who dies in captivity. Lhazang rules Central Tibet until his death in 1717.
1706 Death of the Sixth Dalai Lama (b. 1683) following his dethronement 
by Lhazang Khan.
1706 The iron bridge in Chakzamkha (Luding) is completed.
1707 Capuchin missionaries in Lhasa.
1709 Foundation of Labrang monastery in Gansu by Jamyang Zhepa 
(1648-1721).
1716 Jesuit priest Ippolito Desideri in Lhasa.
1717 Invasion of Tibet by Zunghar Mongols and assassination of Lhazang.
1720 Tibetan and Manchu forces repel Zunghars; Seventh Dalai Lama, 
Kelzang Gyatso (1708-1757), settles at the Potala Palace.
1722-1735 Reign of Qing Emperor Yongzheng.
1722 Dechen and Lijiang areas fall under the jurisdiction of Yunnan Province 
but are still religiously led by the Dalai Lama. Most of the Kagyu and 
Nyingma school monasteries in those areas are forced to convert to the 
Geluk school.
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1723-1724 Civil war follows the withdrawal of Manchu forces in Lhasa. 
Mongols and Tibetans in Amdo rebel against Manchus but are harshly 
suppressed, and Amdo is integrated in the Manchu empire.
1727-1747 Polhané (1689-1747), a Tibetan aristocrat, rules Tibet with Manchu 
support.
1727-1735 The Seventh Dalai Lama is exiled to Kham.
1727 Erection of the Bumla (Ningjing shan) stele on the mountain pass 
marking the eastern territorial limit of Central Tibet.
1728 The Qing court establishes amban as a resident envoy in Lhasa; this 
posting lasts until 1911.
1729 Dajianlu (Dartsedo) sub-prefecture is created, and the Qing dispatches 
a sub-prefect in charge of transporting provisions and funds for troops 
stationed in Tibet, who is to be stationed in Dartsedo with a battalion 
of 200.
1729 Dergé king Tenpa Tsering builds the Dergé Printing House.
1736-1796 Reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong.
1744 Foundation of Yonghegong Gelukpa monastic university in Beijing.
1745 End of Christian mission in Lhasa.
1747-1749 First Jinchuan campaign in northwestern Sichuan’s Tibetan region 
of Gyelrong to quell internal feuds.
1747 Death of Polhané, succeeded by his son Gyurmé Namgyel. Last lay 
ruler in Tibet.
1750 Gyurmé Namgyel is assassinated; murder of ambans and further 
Manchu military expedition. Seventh Dalai Lama becomes head of state.
1757-1777 Death of Seventh Dalai Lama (1757). An ecclesiastical regent is 
appointed to ensure interregnum until the next Dalai Lama’s majority. 
First of an almost continuous series of monk regents until the 1950s.
1757-1858 British East India Company rule in India.
1771-1776 Second Jinchuan campaign; Manchu most costly military interven-
tion on its borderlands.
1788-1791 Nepalese (Gurkha) invasion of Tibet; Tibetan army defeated. 
Nepalese are pushed back by Qing army.
1792 Qianlong emperor enacts reforms of Tibetan administration and sets 
rules for selecting the Dalai Lamas. The Qing administration imple-
ments the policy of ‘substituting chieftains with state-appointed civilian 
off icials’ (gaitu guiliu) in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands. Beginning of a 
policy of excluding foreigners from Tibet.
1794 Publication of the Qianlong edition of the Manchu translation of Tibetan 
Kangyür.
1796-1820 Reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing.
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1804 Death of the eighth Dalai Lama, Jampel Gyatso (b. 1758) who reigned 
only briefly (1787-1790). Over the next seventy years, the following Dalai 
Lamas, Lungtok Gyatso (1805-1815), Tsültrim Gyatso (1816-1837), Khedrup 
Gyatso (1838-1857), up to the twelfth Dalai Lama, Trinlé Gyatso (1856-
1875), never exercise power which remains in the hands of monk regents 
supported by the Manchu emperors.
1814-1816 Anglo-Nepal War.
From Gönpo Namgyel’s Attempted Unification to Zhao Erfeng’s 
Forceful Integration (1860-1911)
As the situation in Gyelrong had shown, the independence of most of the 
Kham polities from the two distant centres, in spite of continuous com-
mercial, political, and religious ties, created a state of instability. The threat 
became even greater with the rise of Gönpo Namgyel in the 1860s. This 
local charismatic leader and f ierce warrior attempted a forced political 
unif ication of Kham’s polities from his stronghold in Nyarong, not far from 
Dartsedo. Because Gönpo Namgyel’s expanding rule over neighbouring 
polities, including the powerful kingdom of Dergé, posed a challenge to both 
the Lhasa government and the Chinese provincial authority of Sichuan, they 
endeavoured to strengthen their grip on Kham. The Qing court’s reluctance 
to make any military intervention during a period of f inancial crisis and of 
Western imperialist threats gave Tibetan central authorities the opportunity 
to send in troops who successfully defeated Gönpo Namgyel (1865) and 
allowed them to extend their administrative rule over parts of Kham by 
appointing a high commissioner (chikhyap).
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the presence of Manchu civil serv-
ants and soldiers in the border zone, especially along the main communication 
arteries, was intended to provide logistical support to representatives of the 
Qing government stationed in Tibet. These Manchu officials did not exercise 
authority over local rulers. However, Qing bureaucracy or military colonies 
were progressively taking over the frontier territories to be in a position 
to administer them directly. Not only were political structures and local 
hierarchies being dismantled but religious institutions were also challenged 
at times if not abolished, with the Qing often supporting the Geluk school of 
Buddhism (that of the Dalai Lama) and favouring it over other schools. Concur-
rently, the beginning of the twentieth century saw the growing interests of 
various Western powers in Tibet – notably the British in India who sent a 
military expedition into Lhasa (1903-1904) and forced a trading agreement.
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While in Bathang, Fengquan (?-1905), who was appointed to the off ice of 
Assistant Amban residing in Tibet in 1904, took steps towards reducing the 
power of the local chiefs and reclaiming wastelands. Violent rioting broke out 
and Fengquan was killed with some of his troops, as well as two of the French 
missionaries residing in Bathang. A punitive expedition was then led by Ma 
Weiqi (1846-1910), the commander-in-chief of Sichuan’s provincial troops. 
The Han Bannerman Zhao Erfeng (Chao Er-feng) completed the campaign 
against the city of Bathang, followed by a wave of military conquests and 
the destruction of monasteries. After his conquests, Zhao Erfeng became 
in late 1906 the f irst Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner (duban Chuan 
Dian bianwu dachen). In the following months, Zhao took measures to train 
soldiers and to clear land; replacing local chiefs by appointed off icials; 
opening mines; developing trade; and founding new schools.
1837-1865 Nyarong wars in Kham led by Gönpo Namgyel, ending with 
Manchu and Central Tibetan intervention.
1839-1842 Opium War (Nanking Treaty signed in 1842).
1844 The Qing emperor relaxes rules against the presence of Catholics. 
Western missionaries enter Tibetan areas.
1846 The Vatican establishes a parish centred around Lhasa and entrusts 
the ‘Tibet Mission’ to the Foreign Missions Society of Paris. It is renamed 
‘Dajianlu Mission’ as missionaries settle primarily in Kham.
1849 The Qing court dispatches Qi Shan to lead the Qing troops and in-
digenous soldiers of f ifteen indigenous leaders, including the Chakla 
king, Dergé king and others to f ight against Gönpo Namgyel in Nyaké 
(Middle Nyarong).
1850-1864 Taiping Rebellion.
1850-1851 Gönpo Namgyel attacks Drango and Kandzé, and occupies both 
regions.
1855 Gönpo Namgyel attacks Lithang but is defeated.
1855 Nepal-Tibet War.
1856 Gönpo Namgyel occupies Lithang, and soon attacks Bathang. Defeated 
in Bathang, he begins to invade the territory under the jurisdiction of 
the Chakla king.
1861 The Chakla king recalls his subjects from postal stations and refuses 
to perform ulag (corvée labor) to transport Qing off icials. Jing Wen, the 
newly appointed amban, is consequently unable to continue his journey 
through Chakla in the latter half of the year.
1861 British annexation of Sikkim.
1865 Tibetan military intervention to quell Gönpo Namgyel.
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 During the second half of the nineteenth century, access to Central Tibet 
is forbidden to foreigners. European Christian missionaries, of whom there 
have been many in Tibetan areas since the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, are forced to settle in peripheral regions.
1866 To secure authority over the region, the Off ice of the Tibetan High 
Commissioner (Nyarong chikhyap) is established in Nyarong.
1866-1867 The imposition of Lhasa’s authority directly over Nyarong soon 
leads to local discontent. Dagé Sepo, a local headman, incites several 
hundred local people to besiege the commissioner’s house, arguing that 
the Tibetan commissioner is collecting exorbitant taxes and levies.
1875 The Tibetan commissioner’s forceful seizure of local households in 
Lithang creates resistance. Sichuan provincial authorities dispatch of-
f icials to lead troops to attack the protestors. The Tibetan commissioner 
is dismissed from his post on the grounds that he has caused unrest in 
the region.
1889 Large-scale revolt against the Tibetan commissioner’s rule in Nyarong 
led by the people of Nyarong, under the leadership of Sala Yungdrung, 
a minor headman.
1874-1908 reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu.
1876 Birth of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tupten Gyatso.
1883 Anti-Nepalese riots in Lhasa.
1884-1908 Qing Empire governed by Empress Dowager Cixi (b. 1835).
1886-1895 Regency of Demo Khutughtu Lobzang Trinlé.
1888 Tension between Tibet and Britain in Sikkim, and f irst British invasion 
of Tibet.
1894-1895 First Sino-Japanese War.
1895 The Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tupten Gyatso, becomes head of state. The 
regent attempts an assassination.
1896 Hostility escalates between the Lhasa government and Qing frontier 
off icials. Qing troops take over Nyarong, and the Tibetan commissioner 
and his subordinates all f lee to Central Tibet.
 Sichuan Governor Lu Chuanlin proposes to introduce bureaucratization 
(gailiu) in Nyarong.
1904 Fengquan is appointed Assistant Amban to Tibet. Posted in Chamdo, 
he remains in Bathang.
 The Younghusband Expedition invades Central Tibet. Military defeat 
of the Tibetans who sign an Anglo-Tibetan treaty and agree to concede 
commercial advantages to the British, and open three trade stations at 
Yatung (Tib. Dromo), Gyantsé and Gartok. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama 
flees to Mongolia.
chronology oF ma jor evenTs 27
 Tibet is increasingly forced to give in to pressure from competing British 
and Russian commercial and political interests.
1905 Assassination of Fengquan, the assistant amban, in Bathang.
1905 Ma Weiqi launches a punitive expedition, and Zhao Erfeng leads deadly 
military campaigns and the destruction of monasteries in southern Kham 
to bring Kham and neighbouring Tibetan regions under Qing control.
1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention excludes Tibet. Britain recognizes Qing 
suzerainty over Tibet.
1906 Zhao Erfeng becomes the f irst Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner 
(Chuan Dian bianwu dachen) and proceeds to promote development 
programs.
1908 The Thirteenth Dalai Lama, still in exile, visits Beijing for an imperial 
audience.
1908-1911 Reign of infant Emperor Pu Yi (1906-1967).
1909 The Thirteenth Dalai Lama returns to Tibet.
1910 Zhao Erfeng’s troops occupy Lhasa; the Thirteenth Dalai Lama flees 
to India.
1911 Frontier Commissioner Fu Songmu (1869-1929) prepares a memorial 
proposing the creation of Xikang Province.
1911 Republican revolution and end of the Manchu Qing Dynasty. The 
Manchu garrison of Lhasa surrenders.
The Simla Convention and Its Aftermath: The Birth of a Border 
(1912-1926)
The collapse of the Qing Empire in the early twentieth century signalled the 
end of China’s imperial order and the advent of a republic. It also marked the 
loss of Outer Mongolia, which broke away in 1921 to become an independent 
political entity, and its geopolitical dislocation was accentuated further by 
Japanese military intervention in Manchuria. The f irst part of the twentieth 
century was clearly a dangerous moment of territorial dismemberment for 
China. Irreversible power struggles in the name of sovereignty, nationalism, 
and modernization took place with a direct impact on the becoming of the 
Sino-Tibetan frontier. In spite of some continuities with imperial practices, 
the advent of the nation-state introduced some irrevocable changes that 
affected territories and ethnic groupings in the way they are now conceived 
and lived. Since then these have led to competing narratives of belong-
ing and to historicizing statecraft that supports claims of identity and 
sovereignty. It is not only that China at the time did not have a modern 
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concept of Westphalian sovereignty, but also that other indigenous notions 
of sovereignty intermingled with newer forms of governmentality – an 
intermingling that continues today.
The wave of local uprisings followed by territorial conquests and reforms 
led by the Frontier Commissioner Zhao Erfeng at the end of the Qing dynasty, 
and the geopolitical tension that led to the Simla Convention (1913-1914) 
between Republican China, British India, and Tibet supposedly to settle the 
status of Tibet and border issues, all constituted a decisive turning point 
for the future of the Sino-Tibetan frontier.
1912 Return of Thirteenth Dalai Lama.
1912 Foundation of the Chinese Republic.
1913 Declaration of independence by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Tibeto-
Mongol Treaty that asserts the independence of both nations. Tibet 
acquires a f lag, a currency, and national stamps.
1914 Creation of the Sichuan Frontier Special Administrative Region (Chuan-
bian tebie xingzheng quyu).
1914 Tripartite Convention in Simla. Agreement reached but China refuses 
to sign the f inal document.
1916 Creation of the Chuanbian dao (The Circuit of the Sichuan Border).
1918 Tibetan troops progress eastwards and approach Nyarong and Bathang. 
British consul Teichman helps to negotiate a ceasefire. The Chamdo and 
Rongpatsa agreements divide Kham along the Jinsha River (Dri chu).
1920-1921 Sir Charles Bell’s mission to Lhasa to foster better relations between 
Tibet and Britain. British active aid in terms of equipment and training 
of the Tibetan army.
1924 Ninth Panchen Lama (1883-1937) goes into exile in China.
1924 Foundation of the Mongolian People’s Republic.
1924 The Sichuan Frontier Special Administrative Region becomes the 
‘Xikang Special Administrative Region’ (Xikang tebie xingzhengqu).
1927 No. 24 army commander Liu Wenhui is appointed Chief Commander 
of Chuankang Frontier Defence and concurrently Chairman of Sichuan 
Provincial Government.
Kham as Xikang Province (1928-1955)
Following the failure of the Simla Convention, each of the protagonists 
sought to increase its control of the eastern regions of Kham. The Lhasa 
government created new civil and military positions and placed governors 
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in each of the major border towns, such as Chamdo and Dergé. Nationalist 
China developed its project to create Xikang province, which built on the 
early proposal made by Zhao Erfeng following his efforts to administratively 
incorporate the territory he had ‘pacif ied’. In September 1928, warlord Liu 
Wenhui established an administrative committee for the ‘Special region of 
Xikang’. A government was set up and the western Sichuan highlands f inally 
became Xikang Province in 1939, still under the control of the militarist Liu 
Wenhui and his supporters in Sichuan. The Xikang regional administration 
relied heavily on outside subsidies and the export of opium. Finally, the 
idea of a separate province was abandoned in 1955 by the government 
of the People’s Republic of China, and Xikang’s territory was divided up 
between the Tibet Autonomous Region (T.A.R., created in 1965), Sichuan, 
and Yunnan. The shifting boundary between Sichuan and Lhasa-controlled 
Tibet during the Qing dating back to the early seventeenth century became 
f ixed, and the Drichu (Jinsha River) became the border between the T.A.R. 
and Sichuan on the new administrative map.
1928-1937 The Guomindang government of Chiang Kai-shek takes power. Es-
tablishment of the Nanjing Government (the first centralized government 
since 1911 in China) and the Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs Commission.
1928 Chinese warlord Liu Wenhui sets up the ‘Administrative Committee 
of the Special Region of Xikang’ (Xikang tequ zhengwu weiyuanhui) in 
Kangding. He occupies the Kham borderlands and his troops are pushed 
back into Sichuan.
1928 Qinghai province is created by the Guomindang and ruled by Chinese 
Muslim warlords (Ma family).
1930s Start of the ‘Khampa rule for Kham’ self-rule movement by Kelzang 
Tsering.
1932 Warlord Liu Wenhui again invades the Kham borderlands, breaking the 
armistice agreed to by Nationalists. Within f ive months Chinese troops 
push Tibetans back to the Jinsha river (Drichu) and threaten Chamdo.
1933 Death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tupten Gyatso.
1934 Radreng (Reting) Rinpoché (1911-1947) is made regent.
1934 Chinese Communist Long March enters parts of eastern Tibet.
1935 Creation of the ‘Xikang Administrative Inspection District’ (Xikang 
xingzheng ducha qu); Liu Wenhui heads the ‘Committee for the Edification 
of Xikang Province’ (Xikang jiansheng weiyuanhui).
1935 The Gara Lama (Nörla Hutuktu) launches the second ‘Khampa rule 
of Kham’ movement.
1935 Chinese and British missions in Lhasa.
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1937 The Fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso is discovered by a search 
party, in Qinghai. A Muslim warlord demands a ransom to allow the 
party to return to Lhasa.
1937-1945 Second Sino-Japanese War.
1937 Chinese central government moves to Chongqing (Sichuan) to escape 
Japanese invasion.
1939 Creation of Xikang province, to be dismantled in 1955.
1939 Foundation of the Tibetan Communist Party in Sichuan by students 
originally from annexed Kham, under the aegis of Bapa Püntsok Wangyel. 
This nationalist party aims to set up an independent and revolutionary 
Tibet. Bapa Püntsok Wangyel is banished from Tibet in 1949.
 The Khangsar family, together with the Panchen Lama’s camp, launches 
the third ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ movement, also known as the ‘Kandzé 
Incident’.
 Foundation in Kalimpong (India) of a party inspired by the republican 
ideal, the Tibetan Progressive Party, dismantled in 1946.
1940 Enthronement of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.
1941 End of the Reting Regency, forced to resign in favour of the conservative 
monk Taktra (1874-1952).
1942 The Tibetan government establishes a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1945 The government of Xikang issues an ordinance against opium.
1947 The Tibetan government represses a revolt in Lhasa led by Reting and 
his supporters.
1947 15 August, India becomes independent, marking the end of the Brit-
ish Indian Empire. End of British interests in Tibet, the British mission 
becomes an Indian mission.
1948 Tibetan trade mission visits China, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom.
1949 Fall of the Guomindang, closure of the Chinese mission in Lhasa and 
expulsion of all the Chinese from Tibet.
1949 1 October, Establishment of the People’s Republic of China.
1950 The Fourteenth Dalai Lama is made head of state at the age of f ifteen.
China’s Tibet (1951-2018)
Tibet’s incorporation into P.R.C. took place gradually in the 1950s. The 
‘Seventeen-Point Agreement’ granted Tibet internal autonomy but the 
radical intervention of communists in eastern Kham (1956) and Amdo (1958) 
highlighted their desire to impose their policies and reforms on Central 
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Tibet as well. The repression of the Lhasa uprising in March 1959 and the 
flight of the Dalai Lama to India marked the end of the traditional Tibetan 
government. Tibetan territories became autonomous administrative units, 
such as the Tibet Autonomous Region, and several prefecture- or county-level 
units in Sichuan and Yunnan. The policy of liberalization and openness 
launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 allowed a cultural and religious renewal 
in Tibet. However, the demonstrations and pro-independence protests that 
took place in Lhasa between 1987 and 1989 reflected the persistence of a 
cultural divide and strong identity claims in spite of continuous efforts 
from the Chinese government regarding economic development in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region. The wave of demonstrations that occurred in spring 
2008 in all regions of Tibetan culture in P.R.C. seemed to call into question 
the politics of differential inclusion implemented in Tibetan regions.
1951 24 October, Central Tibet is incorporated into the People’s Republic 
of China by the ‘Seventeen-Point Agreement’, in which representatives 
of the Tibetan government accept integration in exchange for internal 
autonomy.
1952 Beginning of the creation of Tibetan autonomous administrative units 
in eastern areas of the Tibetan plateau.
1954 The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama go to Beijing to meet Mao 
Zedong.
1955 Dissolution of Xikang province and incorporation of the region under its 
jurisdiction into Sichuan province. Uprisings following forced collectiviza-
tion, bombing of monasteries in Kham (1956). An influx of refugees from 
eastern Kham and from Amdo to Lhasa begins. Creation of the Voluntary 
National Army, a Khampa resistance organization.
 Eastern Kham becomes Ganzi (Kandzé) autonomous prefecture.
1956 The Chinese government sets up the Preparatory Committee for the 
Tibet Autonomous Region to replace the Tibetan government.
 Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama travel to India for the Buddha Jayanti 
celebrations (2,500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha).
1956 Beginning of Khampa resistance and coordinated f ighting. Start of 
C.I.A. aid to the resistance f ighters.
1957 Southernmost Tibetan region of Kham becomes Diqing (Dechen) 
Tibetan Autonomous prefecture which is integrated in Yunnan province.
1958 16 June, Creation of the resistance movement chushi gangdruk (‘four 
rivers, six mountains’) by Khampa of various fringes of society.
1958 Great Leap Forward and creation of the people’s communes. Massive 
rebellion in Amdo, strongly repressed.
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1959 10 March, Uprising in Lhasa and repression. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama 
flees to India, followed by about 80,000 Tibetans.
 Premier Zhou Enlai announces the abolition of the former Tibetan 
government.
 On the road to exile, the Dalai Lama founds a government and denounces 
the Seventeen-point Agreement.
 The United Nations adopts a f irst resolution on Tibet calling for respect 
for human rights and rights to cultural and religious specif icity.
1962 War between China and India over the Sino-Indian border, the so-
called ‘McMahon Line’ decided at the Simla Convention in 1914 but not 
recognized by China. The border issue is still not resolved in 2019.
1965 Creation of Tibetan Autonomous Region (T.A.R.) which includes western 
and Central Tibet and parts of western Kham.
1966-1976 Cultural Revolution leads to massive destruction of religious 
and civilian buildings. Prohibition of monastic life, re-education and 
imprisonment of a large number of lay and religious Tibetans.
1970 Creation of the Tibetan Youth Congress, the largest non-government 
political organization in exile, based in Dharamsala.
1971-1972 The visits to China by Kissinger and Nixon mark the Sino-American 
rapprochement and the shifting of U.S. C.I.A. and Department of State 
policy regarding aid to Tibetan resistance f ighters.
1976 Death of Mao Zedong.
1978 Period of relative liberalization under Deng Xiaoping and the ‘Four 
Modernizations’ policy. Release of a large number of former public serv-
ants of the traditional Tibetan government who have been imprisoned 
since 1959 or during the Cultural Revolution.
1979 Visit of the f irst delegation of the Tibetan government in exile in Tibet.
1980 Hu Yaobang visits Tibet and initiates reforms.
1988 The Dalai Lama presents his ‘Strasbourg Proposal’ to the European 
Parliament: the three Tibetan regions (Central Tibet, Kham, and Amdo) 
would be united into a ‘Greater Tibet’, in exchange for which he would 
accept autonomy within P.R.C., renouncing independence. While this 
position alienates Tibetans, the f irst condition remains unacceptable 
to the Chinese government.
1987-1989 Uprising in Lhasa and Martial Law imposed.
1989 The Dalai Lama is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
1989 Tiananmen Square events and repression.
1989 Death of the tenth Panchen Lama.
1991 Dalai Lama meets with U.S. President George H.W. Bush in Washington, 
D.C.
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1993 The Chinese government breaks off off icial relations with Dharamsala.
1995 Dispute between the Dalai Lama and Chinese authorities over the 
choice of the eleventh Panchen Lama.
1996 Large-scale campaign of patriotic re-education and denunciation of 
the Dalai Lama in T.A.R. Uprisings in Lhasa.
1997 Death of Deng Xiaoping.
2001 Zhongdian (Gyelthang) County in Yunnan off icially renamed Shangri-
La (Xianggelila) County.
2001 Start of construction of the Golmud-Lhasa (Qinghai-Tibet) railroad 
(1142 km).
2002 P.R.C. and the exiled government of Dharamsala resume relations 
interrupted since 1993.
2006 Off icial opening of the Golmud-Lhasa railroad.
2008 Tibetan riots against Chinese civilians in Lhasa.
2008 March-May Manifestations and riots of unprecedented scale in all 
regions of Tibetan culture in P.R.C. Sporadic demonstrations continue, 
as well as arrests and intensive political re-education sessions.
 8 May, the Olympic flame is carried to the top of Everest.
 12 May, a violent earthquake strikes Sichuan’s Wenchuan County, in Aba 
(Ngawa) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture.
 21 June, the Olympic flame passes through Lhasa.
2009 Beginning of a long series of self-immolation protests in Kham and 
Amdo (153 as of December 2018).
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It is quite common to conceive of China and Tibet as two distinct culturally 
bounded entities in spite of the fact that the ‘Tibet’ we generally have in mind 
is territorially part of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.). Only an internal 
administrative border separates the Tibet Autonomous Region (T.A.R.) 
from adjacent provinces, like Sichuan to the east, where today we f ind a 
signif icant number of Tibetans who make up the majority of inhabitants of 
other administrative units, such as the Ganzi (Kandzé) Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture. These current administrative divisions represent the modern 
ordering and territorialization of the so-called Sino-Tibetan borderlands, 
and the region called Kham.
On the one hand, the administrative border separating T.A.R. from 
Sichuan province does not correspond to a particularly conspicuous social 
boundary, yet the border introduces a separation that creates new dif-
ferentiations. On the other hand, older regional distinctions such as the 
one between Central Tibet (Ü) and Kham or Amdo on the eastern edge of 
the plateau are nowadays fragmented by administrative borders that cut 
through them according to a different logic from a local sense of belonging 
and attachment. In other words, throughout China’s Tibetan regions, current 
administrative divisions have implications regarding variations in policies 
and their implementations and, when combined with places’ geographical 
and historical specif icities, they have led to a high degree of diversity in 
local Tibetan societies and economies (see Hillman 2010).
The three chapters that follow take stock of the implications of this 
layered complexity of boundary-making in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands 
and offer complementary perspectives on how to conceptualize borderland 
space in relation to neighbouring historical power centres but also in its 
own terms via a necessary re-centring. This f irst section offers an opening 
onto the volume’s exploration of the intertwined questions of place-making, 
identity, and socio-political transformations that have made up Kham’s 
convoluted historical trajectory and that have contributed to the emergence 
of its internal diversity. The three chapters therefore problematize the 
boundaries of Kham, its ‘plural unity’ across time and its characteristics 
as a cultural nexus.
The introductory chapter by Stéphane Gros provides both a historical 
and anthropological discussion and a conceptual framework to suggest 
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ways of understanding the production of place in a dynamic fashion. Such 
a perspective, he argues, forces us to look at Kham, within the Sino-Tibetan 
borderlands, as exemplifying a frontier situation at different historical 
junctures. There are specif ic processes that relate to imaginaries about 
civilization and progress, the emergence of institutional order, and the 
use of resources, which are characteristic of the frontier as a particular 
political project and an epistemological distinction (see Tsing 2005). This 
introductory chapter f irmly identif ies the relevance of Kham in the f ield 
of borderland studies and reflects on the topographies of power that have 
contributed to shaping the future of this intermediary zone between China 
and Tibet. As ‘borderland’ or ‘frontier’ are existing categories for both China 
and Tibet as expansive political and civilizational centres, Kham must be 
thought of as a third space, and not exclusively as ‘Tibetan’ in a simplistic 
binary opposition to ‘Chinese’.
In her chapter, Katia Buffetrille explores the relevance of the notion 
of ‘borderlands’ in the context of Tibetan history by reviewing the ver-
nacular terminology. She posits the ‘Sino-Tibetan’ borderlands as being 
‘between power centers’ (Zartman 2010, 2) that exert their influence in a 
civilizational, politico-economic, or more generally cultural sense, but her 
chapter particularly emphasizes the dynamic relationship between Kham 
(and Amdo) and Lhasa. As Buffetrille shows, the current administrative 
structure has channelled differentiated socio-economic developments, 
which have fundamentally reconfigured the relationship between Kham 
and the traditional centre, Lhasa and Central Tibet. These changes have 
nurtured a cultural dynamism that has now given Kham a new centrality. 
As she demonstrates, the massive changes that have taken place over the 
last decades not only reveal the vitality of the borderlands but also challenge 
our conventional perception of the centre and upset established hierarchies. 
In the contemporary period, the in-betweenness of Kham further blurs the 
boundaries of distinction and the sense of belonging, lending it increased 
prominence.
Some places in particular have gained more visibility, and newer 
understandings of identity prompt us to question older and emerging 
conceptualizations of place. This is certainly the case with Gyelthang in 
southern Kham, as discussed by Eric D. Mortensen, a place that has retained 
its own centrality in the eyes of its inhabitants but has also undergone earth-
shattering transformations because it has been re-branded ‘Shangri-La’ for 
the sake of tourism development. Mortensen offers a multifaceted account 
of the sense of place inhabitants have forged in their interactions with other 
Tibetans but also with the numerous groups that surround them such as 
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the Yi, the Naxi, the Lisu, or the Bai further south. In doing so, Mortensen 
navigates along and across the various boundaries of Gyelthang, alerting 
us to their malleable character while at the same time foregrounding the 
variability of the conceptualization of place and sense of belonging. In his 
case, it is not so much the centrality of place that matters – although it 
seriously unsettles our understanding of such a place as a ‘borderland’ – but 
more crucially the issue of categorization and ordering, and of attempting 
to map the unmappable.
These inquiries force us to rethink our conventional categories and 
methodologies, and remind us that territory is not a given. The question of 
regional formation and identity raises the problem of defining boundaries, 
or borders, which makes the theorist run the risk ‘of going round in circles, as 
the very representation of the border is the precondition for any definition’, 
as political theorist Etienne Balibar (2002, 76) puts it. There are dynamics 
that cannot be contained by scaled spatial entities in any straightforward 
way. As Gros emphasizes in his introductory chapter, the dynamic process 
of interaction that animates Kham as a zone of contact is a ‘f ield of relations’ 
that is both at the edge and in the middle of territories. This, he argues, is 
the result of the constitutive role of the frontier, which creates evolving 
patterns of connection and division.
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This introductory chapter lays out the historical background and the 
conceptual framework that underlie the volume’s collective effort to 
problematize the Kham region of eastern Tibet, and, more broadly, the 
Sino-Tibetan borderlands. It discusses conventional depictions of political, 
economic, and ideological topographies of these borderlands, and brings 
to the fore frontier dynamics that lead to a topological reconfiguration in 
which Kham appears neither simply distant nor proximate and neither 
outside nor inside, and where the distance between core/periphery and 
Sino/Tibetan, become distorted.
Keywords: border, boundary, frontier, Kham, space, topology
Introduction
Places are singular concretions made up of plural experiences. They ac-
cumulate sediments of time, layers of meaning linked to the evolution of 
landscape and the multiple histories of human activities that have contrib-
uted to shaping them. They are also contested spaces subjected to internal 
and external forces that often work against each other and contribute to 
variegated place-making processes.
This book focuses on one such place that defies a straightforward charac-
terization: the eastern region of the Tibetan plateau that Tibetans call Kham. 
This name is one of several conventional divisions of the Tibetosphere, and 
seems to imply a form of regional unity. However, this eastern fringe of the 
plateau, a rugged mountainous region that has long been a frontier for both 
China-based regimes and Lhasa-based regimes, is not easily described as 
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
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a whole and the question of what makes the region cohere is left hanging. 
In this book we use Kham as a heuristic category to explore the various 
implications of the designation of this region as a Sino-Tibetan borderland.
More than half of the six million Tibetans currently residing in the 
People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) live in the eastern borderlands of the 
Tibetan plateau that span across several of the current administrative 
divisions: the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu and 
Qinghai provinces. Within this larger area, Kham is of undeniable demo-
graphic importance and we can estimate that nearly thirty per cent of all 
Tibetans in the P.R.C. live in what is known as Kham (see Ryavec 2015, 
178-180) (see  Map 1.1).
Kham is an area about three times the size of France. Until the 1950s it 
consisted of a plethora of agricultural and pastoralist societies of different 
scales, with their own sense of locality, each differentiated by variations in 
traditions and modes of authority. Politically speaking, Kham has been a very 
fragmented region where numerous principalities, chiefdoms, or tribal areas 
have coexisted, ruled by semi-independent chiefs, local kings or lamas, who 
rubbed shoulders with one another and occasionally with Tibetan or Chinese 
armies, heralding the presence of distant centres of power. Kham exhibits 
great internal diversity – whether in terms of language, culture, ethnicities, 
or historical trajectories – and it is diff icult to disentangle the region from 
external influences, from both Central Tibet and China proper, which are 
themselves far from self-evident historical entities. Our goal is not to delimit 
an ‘identity’ or to inscribe Kham in some kind of regional ‘naturalness’ that 
would take for granted the existence of bounded geographical-cum-cultural 
territories. On the contrary, by combining approaches that shed light on 
variegated processes of transformation, we emphasize change and becoming, 
and dynamic processes of place-making.
There are several reasons for focusing on the region within the Sino-
Tibetan borderlands that Tibetans call Kham. First and foremost, as a 
vernacular name for a place to which its current inhabitants, the Khampas, 
have a strong sense of belonging, it constitutes a meaningful category and a 
logical entry point into its diverse on-the-ground realities. A second reason 
is that by using Kham as a starting point for our enquiries we may be in a 
better position to recognize Kham’s own centrality and specif icity – one 
that is not strictly limited to or defined by political polarities. A third reason 
for considering Kham as a signif icant spatial unit is precisely its pivotal 
role in the history of Tibetan and Chinese expansions and resistance to 
them, and how these encounters and experiences have contributed to the 
becoming of places and peoples, whether Tibetan or not. Finally, it also 
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seems methodologically sound to delve into the particularities of a place 
before we launch into any comparison on a regional or global scale.1
In this volume, we scrutinize Kham through a sense of spatial anchor-
ing and through the nexus of relations that contributes to its vibrant life. 
The various representations and perceptions of these lands are all equally 
valuable for our scholarly endeavour, for it is at the intersection of these that 
even a partial understanding of Kham can be reached. The contributions to 
1 The emergence of a f ield of ‘Kham studies’ is to be linked to the gradual ‘regionalization’ 
of research on the Tibetan cultural area since the 1980s. The construction of these new poles 
of regional studies (‘Ladakh Studies’, followed by ‘Bhutan Studies’, and ‘Amdo Studies’) should 
not distract us from a multipolar and integrated approach to the Tibetan world. About the 
development of Amdo studies, see the recent volume edited by Ptáčková and Zenz (2017), and 
in particular the Introduction by Emilia Róża Sułek and Jarmila Ptáčková (2017).
Map 1.1  Situating Kham
sources: based on srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders extracted from gadm 
database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
author: rémi chaix
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this endeavour bridge historical investigations with contemporary ethnog-
raphies of Kham, focusing on a period of major transformations on various 
scales that started in the mid-nineteenth century. Given the involvement 
of external powers and the degree of these transformations, the notion 
of frontier dynamics seems particularly f itting and equally applicable to 
past and present patterns of change without ruling out Kham as a place in 
its own right. As anthropologists Lars Rodseth and Bradley Parker (2005, 
9) pointed out, ‘frontiers are the quintessential matrices of change’. We 
understand change as multidirectional and inherently dependent on forms 
of agency that generate hybridity as well as acculturation, social mobility 
as well as marginalization. The events and individual stories that several 
of the chapters recount are lived experiences of people who made history 
at their own level. They reveal the dynamics of exchange and interaction 
that influenced their trajectories in the complex entanglements of life at 
the frontier. As we try to capture these stories and these actors’ perceptions 
of the events as they unfold, we unavoidably encounter the frontiers of our 
own experience, the limits and complexities of knowledge production. 
There is no typical frontier pattern and no reason to consider the American 
West as the model against which to assess other frontier experiences – or 
to discard the term altogether (see Klein 1996, Imamura 2015). The ‘frontier’ 
is very much part of the political imagination of China for example and, 
as Tim Oakes (2007, 243; also 2012) puts it bluntly, ‘[t]he western frontier 
has been a def ining aspect of Chinese identity for several thousand years, 
making the U.S. version a mere blip in history by comparison’. Here, the 
common narrative of the frontier as a place facing expansive forces meets the 
metaphorical use of the term that discursively projects political imaginary 
onto the space characterized as a frontier.
This introductory chapter provides a framework for this approach to Kham 
by examining the literature and the conventional political, economic, and 
ideological topographies of the ‘Sino-Tibetan borderlands’. I particularly 
bring to the fore frontier dynamics that lead to a topological reconfiguration 
in which the distance between binaries such as core/periphery and Sino/
Tibetan become distorted. Kham as a frontier is neither simply distant nor 
proximate and neither outside nor inside. From a Chinese perspective, the 
‘Tibetan’ Other remains a vital but not absolute ‘outside’: it is intricately 
entangled, across differences, with a Chinese ‘self ’. From a Tibetan per-
spective, Kham is part of ‘Greater Tibet’ through a sense of a naturalized 
link between identity and territory, even though the exiled community 
itself constitutes a deterritorialized appendix. How has Kham managed 
to survive in spite of its spatial, administrative, economic, and political 
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reconf igurations that led to the very transformation of its conditions of 
existence and forms of renewed vitality?
Topographic Meanderings
We often use ‘Tibet’ in various ways as a macro-regional category to refer to 
three overlapping layers: the geological expanse of the Tibetan Plateau, the 
‘Land of snow’ (gang jong); the ethno-cultural entity that is conventionally 
called ‘ethnographic Tibet’; and f inally the political entity. All three layers 
encompass different places and societies, and there is generally no single 
term to describe them collectively. Before the idea of a ‘Greater Tibet’ made 
up of ‘three regions’ (chölkha sum), Ü-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham, gained 
prominence over recent years, Tibet was spatially divided into the ‘upper 
region’ of Ngari to the west, the ‘middle region’ of Ü-Tsang centred around 
Lhasa, and the ‘lower region’ of Dokham to the east (see Mills 2014, Ryavec 
2015, Weiner 2016, Yang 2016). The issue, to which I will return, is that this 
ethno-cultural complexity questions where exactly an ethnographic Tibet 
starts and ends (see Weiner 2016), and the eastern edges of the plateau 
exemplify the problem of the crisscrossing of various ecological, cultural, 
and political zones. As a matter of fact, ‘Tibet’, like ‘China’, are changing 
historical entities with evolving contours, deeply influenced and shaped 
by successive political regimes.
The overarching toponym for the so-called Sino-Tibetan borderlands 
is Dokham, meaning the ‘confluence (do) on the frontier (kham)’, and can 
be further subdivided into Amdo and Kham.2 In other words, as Katia 
Buffetrille explores in her chapter, Kham can be understood as the frontier/
border that lies on the eastern edge of Central Tibet (Ü). The central part 
of the plateau, with its capital Lhasa, is generically called Bö (Bod), which 
often stands for our ‘Tibet’. It is roughly speaking this area that corresponds 
historically to what in Chinese is referred to as Xizang (see among others 
Gruschke 2004a and b, Jagou 2010, Ren and Rdo rje 1991).
The strongly felt divide between Bö, Kham, and Amdo as spaces of respec-
tive regional attachment and belonging is key to understanding Tibetan 
diversity. Within each of these categories, it is common for the inhabitants 
2 According to the White Annals (Deb ther dkar po) by the Tibetan scholar Gedun Chopel, 
‘Kham-Amdo’ meant ‘frontier’ or ‘border’ in Tibetan, while the term ‘Amdo’, as a separate 
geographical designation, is a fairly recent invention. It is generally assumed that Kham and 
Amdo are equivalent to Dotö and Domé respectively.
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to identify themselves in reference to local toponyms or to the valley (yül) 
as a form of localized identity. This results in a fragmented landscape of 
‘homelands’ (phayül, ‘fatherland’), as Eric Mortensen discusses in his chapter 
about Gyelthang. In fact, Emily Yeh (2007) rightly points out that the sense 
of nativeness, to be ‘born of this soil and rocks’ (sakyé dokyé), is typically 
used to indicate one’s belonging to a particular village or neighbourhood, 
not on a level of a broader collective identity.
Reference to the landscape when describing Kham as a whole is, however, 
evident in the designations ‘the four rivers and six ranges’ (chushi gang-
druk) and ‘the four great valleys’ (rong chenshi). These are the deep valleys 
formed by the Yalung, the Yangtze, the Mekong, and the Salween, running 
almost parallel to each other, which over the course of history have been 
important migratory corridors and have constituted pathways allowing for 
signif icant trade and cultural links. Exchanges and communication were 
sustained eastwards and westwards, and gave birth to major routes that 
connect China and Tibet. However, they have remained constrained by the 
high elevation ranges that separate them and the disjointed landscape of a 
tortuous crisscross of mountains.3
In Chinese, the mountainous barrier that made up the marches leading 
to the plateau has generally been referred to as a border or frontier (bian), 
and the name Kang, derived from the name in Tibetan (Kham), appeared 
relatively recently.4 Viewed from the east, the high-altitude passes of this 
mountain range are both limits and connecting points. Here, like elsewhere 
on the Empire’s periphery, ‘inner lands’ (neidi) were clearly demarcated 
from lands that lay ‘beyond the pass’ (guanwai). In Kham, the town of 
Dartsedo (Dajianlu, today’s Kangding) became the gateway to Tibet from 
China proper. It constituted a ‘frontier portal’ (Millward 1998, 153) and, for 
many people, it represented the border itself; it was the main node on the 
communication channels that linked both sides. Situated within larger 
networks of roads that developed in the course of the centuries, starting 
mainly in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), it developed as a principal site for 
trade and commercial activity. Even today, ‘the Chinese still refer to travel 
3 I use conventional English names for these rivers which in Tibetan and Chinese are re-
spectively called, from east to west: Nyak chu / Yalongjiang; Dri chu / Jinshajiang; Dza chu / 
Lancangjiang; and Ngül chu / Nujiang. These great rivers, to which the Dadu River next to the 
Minyak region further east should be added, drain the area which is made up of six highland 
ranges. The mountain ranges themselves are key elements in the delimitation of the Kham region.
4 Before the Chinese term Kang came into usage, one of the f irst mentions of Kham is to be 
found, for example, in the form of ‘Kanma’ in the Yuzhi pingding Xizang bei (1724). I thank Yudru 
Tsomu for bringing this to my attention.
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beyond Dartsedo as “going beyond the pass” (dao guanwai qu), implying 
that the other side of the mountain is a totally different world’ (Tsomu 
2015, 3). This evokes the stereotypical vision of the ‘frontier’ as a contact 
zone between formerly separate populations deeply confined within their 
cultural attributes and various ecological determinisms.
These depictions still fail to render the texture of the lived space with 
all the layers and facets of the experience of place the inhabitants of these 
lands have accumulated. For various boundaries―ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, or cultural―crisscross the region and are often obliterated by 
the overriding binary of the Sino-Tibetan encounter. Regional boundaries 
are porous and therefore political and social processes move across these 
boundaries. A much needed ethno-history of toponyms would be revealing 
of the several topo-graphies: ways that people have been ‘writing the earth’ 
in their mutually constitutive relationships with the environment. These 
are stories of landscapes in their relation to human occupation, of pocketed 
communities and their sense of place, of a constellation of sacred ‘powerful 
places’, but also stories of various political reconfigurations, or expansions 
and their renaming practices.5
Frontiers, Boundaries, Border(land)s
Despite the permanence of the sense of identity Kham continues to portray, 
it is not a stable entity. It is made up of a constellation of places where 
encounters between various actors have produced a complex interweaving 
of various belongings and a nested sense of place. Given the diversity of local 
realities rendered even more complex by the contemporary context and by 
integration into the Chinese State, resulting in Kham being parcelled out 
between the Tibet Autonomous Region (T.A.R.) and several autonomous 
administrative units within Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces, it 
is unproductive to search for the unity of this region in a ‘cultural core’ 
subtracted from the centripetal and centrifugal forces that have been at 
work here. It is the combination of both its ‘relative location’ (van Spengen 
and Jabb 2009, 7) vis-à-vis China proper and Central Tibet and its own 
5 Little in-depth research on toponymy has been undertaken yet it is certainly a long-awaited 
contribution. See, however, the work carried out through the Tibetan and Himalayan Digital 
Library (THDL). For the name of ‘Tibet’, see Jagou (2010), and for toponymy in the Gesar epic, see 
Chayet (2003). Several bilingual (Tibetan and Chinese) volumes providing lists of place names 
(diming lu) have been published in China since the mid-1980s, but they are often problematic 
and seldom reliable.
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multifaceted internal composition that contribute to making Kham a locale 
where specif ic identity, territorial, economic, and social processes take 
place. Can the terms ‘frontier’, ‘boundary’, or ‘borderland’ capture some of 
these processes?
Let us briefly synthesize the spatio-temporal variation of Kham as an in-
between place surrounded by two power centres and highlight its changing 
political geography (see Maps 1.2 and 1.3). As mentioned in the historical 
account provided with the chronology of events, Chinese imperial expansion 
led to the f irst materialization of the border between China and Tibet in 
the form of a stele (1727), a single anchorage point in the mountainous 
landscape of Kham that was meant to symbolize a linear frontier of territorial 
engulfment. It was a visual marker on one of the two major trade routes, 
which was also the so-called ‘official’s road’ (Ch. guan dao, Tib. gyalam, ‘wide 
road’) connecting Sichuan to Central Tibet. It was to take two centuries for 
this stele to turn into a more clearly demarcated extended frontier zone on 
the map for the purpose of specifying, according to Western standards of 
sovereignty, the territorial distinction between China and Tibet. This led to 
drawing several borderlines, each according to competing claims put forth 
by Tibetan and Chinese authorities and mediated by the British at the Simla 
Convention (1913-1914) (see Map 1.2; see also Relyea, this volume). China’s 
claim over this transitional zone that Kham had long constituted resulted 
in the border zone (‘Sichuan border’, Chuanbian) being reconf igured as 
an administrative unit with shifting borders (redrawn in 1926 and 1939), 
which became the short-lived province of Xikang (1939-1955) (see Map 1.3). 
Here we have a good example of how China’s territorial expansion relied on 
‘imperial machineries’ that aimed at transforming these frontiers, ‘plastic 
intermediate zones’ (Crossley, Siu, and Sutton 2006, 3, 17) into ‘legible state 
spaces’ (Scott 2009). Finally, after the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (1949), Xikang province disappeared from the map, and Kham was 
divided between several provinces, mostly outside the Tibet Autonomous 
Region. The administrative boundary between T.A.R. and the province of 
Sichuan has since played a critical role in the becoming of places and the 
people it separates (see Buffetrille, E. Mortensen, and Cho, this volume).
The changes outlined above remind us of the organic metaphor that 
historian Michel Baud and Willem van Schendel (1997, 223-225) put forth 
as a developmental model of the borderlands corresponding to a f ive-stage 
life-cycle, from infancy to adolescence and adulthood, then decline and 
disappearance. However, this depiction tells us far less about the borderlands 
themselves than about the Chinese perspective and the explicit claim since 
the early twentieth century that this borderline was in fact an internal one; 
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a claim highly contested by the Tibetan government, but ‘off icialized’ by 
the Simla Convention’s use of the artif icial labels of ‘Outer Tibet’ and ‘Inner 
Tibet’. From both perspectives, on the other side of the disputed borderline 
that cut through Kham there was not an outside but an integral part of 
their respective ‘geo-body’ (Winichakul 1994). Yet, these two perspectives 
ultimately erased other indigenous knowledge of political space. The two 
frontiers clashed with each other and the borderland itself remained ‘em-
bryonic’ (Baud and Van Schendel 1997). In fact, Kham became one of these 
‘inner frontiers’ of China, discussed by Owen Lattimore (1951, 234), a quality 
it has retained to this day. The administrative border that separates the 
Tibet Autonomous Region from its adjacent Tibetan administrative units 
in Qinghai, Sichuan, or Yunnan has created a strong dichotomy in terms 
of both policies and cultural dynamism. In light of these spatio-temporal 
changes, we are now better equipped to clarify how the terms ‘borderland’, 
Map 1.2  ‘Inner Tibet’ and the limits of Central Tibet Government according to 
McMahon’s line (Simla Convention)
sources: based on richardson (1945); srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders extracted 
from gadm database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
author: rémi chaix
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‘boundary’, and ‘frontier’ equally apply to the case of Kham as they each 
refer to different specif icities. Let us clarify our lexicon in this context.6
While the word ‘borderland’ has been widely applied to various regions 
and contexts similar to frontier zones, it is, however, defined by the presence 
of an actual border. If border designates an international boundary line, 
we have seen how the drawing of such a line between ‘Tibet’ and ‘China’ 
6 The approaches are just as diverse as the def initions of these terms, and here I can only 
clarify my use of them for the purpose of the present discussion. Twenty years ago, two books 
discussed the by then already extensive literature and diversity of approaches to borders, 
frontiers, and boundaries, i.e. Donnan and Wilson (1999); Rösler and Wendl (1999); and the same 
year Adelman and Aron’s (1999) seminal article was published. See also Hall (2005) and Parker 
(2006) in particular for a discussion of the terminology. Much has therefore been written since 
then in the f ields of ‘border studies’, ‘frontier studies’, and ‘borderland studies’ and it is beyond 
the scope of this section to do justice to this very extensive literature.
Map 1.3  The borders of Xikang province as defined in 1933 and 1939
sources: based on ren naiqiang (1933), srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders 
extracted from gadm database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
author: rémi chaix
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through Kham was attempted but ultimately failed – and transformed 
into an internal one within the administrative division of the P.R.C. The 
boundary did not disappear because of the impossibility of such a border in 
the given geopolitical context at the time. This boundary not only indicates in 
spatial terms a division imposed by the topography but also refers to a more 
dynamic sociological one through processes of exclusion or incorporation 
that take place on the edges of socio-political units or between ethnicities 
for example, as the interactional approach introduced by Barth (1969) has 
long demonstrated regarding ethnic formations.
Seen from the distant centres, Kham was a frontier, a meaning that the 
name in Tibetan is said to convey. It was not a static frontier, nor was it 
reducible to a fluctuating colonization front but it was a dynamic, permeable, 
and shifting space; in other words, a ‘frontier zone’ similar to other spaces 
of imperial expansion such as those depicted by Peter Perdue in his seminal 
study China Marches West (2005). Frontiers and borderlands function in 
tandem. The Chinese word bianjiang, or the French word frontière, both 
conflate the two meanings. Katia Buffetrille (this volume) shows that in 
Tibetan the vernacular terminology ‘def ines the borderlands as places to 
be defended or to be made civilized’.7
The notions of borderland and frontier clearly overlap when understood 
as zones of contact (e.g. Pratt 1991) and of intense interactions, composed 
of various types of boundaries (i.e. geographic, political, demographic, 
cultural, and economic), and which can rapidly change according to local 
circumstances. This locally variable volatility is a special characteristic 
of frontiers and borderlands alike, where the transboundary solidarities 
and alliances that take place, often motivated by economic interest or 
livelihood strategies, become invisible if we look through an exclusively 
territorial lens of the border def ined as the ‘end of the state’, subsumed to 
the one-dimensional issue of national sovereignty. Looking at Kham as a 
7 As Mark Elliot (2014) recently discussed, the distinction between the terms in English can 
hardly be portrayed by translation into other languages, whether it be French and Chinese, or 
Manchu for that matter. It should, however, be noted that because of the nuances in the English 
terms, a coinage like jiequ is now often used in Chinese to refer to ‘borderlands’. For a very detailed 
survey of the terminology related to frontiers, borders and boundaries in Chinese historical 
texts, see Calanca and Wildt (2006). Etymologically, the French frontière originally refers to a 
military front and the extension of civilization; its different levels of meaning are more complex 
however. See for example Febvre (1928) and the constructive discussion in Jeanpierre (2010). 
I hope it is clear for the reader that my use of ‘frontier’ here is distinct from that of Frederick 
Jackson Turner (1861-1932), whose frontier thesis and Anglo-American centric def inition of the 
frontier as the ‘meeting point between savagery and civilization’ (Turner [1893] 1994, 32) has 
led many to abandon the use of the word altogether.
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frontier or a borderland should not limit us to a state-centric view: there 
are many places in Kham that could be considered as having been central 
in many different ways because of their economic, political, cultural, or 
religious role. After all, Kham saw the emergence of multiple independent 
polities, such as the powerful kingdom of Dergé that could rival with religious 
centres in Central Tibet, or that of Chakla, with its capital at Dartsedo that 
made it the gateway to Tibet from China. There were four main kingdoms 
(Dergé, Chakla, Bathang, and Lithang) in Kham, which declared allegiance 
to the Qing emperor and for this reason became known in Chinese as the 
‘four big indigenous chieftains’ (si da tusi).8
A multidimensional and relational approach to Kham is indeed neces-
sary if a thorough examination of the range of connections constitutive of 
the social fabric is to be made. Our collective investigation in this volume 
considers historically specif ic geographies of social relations and forms of 
interconnection that denote the different dimensions of space and scale, 
territory and network (see Jessop et al. 2008; also Rumford 2012; Giersch 
2016). As Lawrence Epstein pointed out in his Introduction to the seminal 
volume Khams pa Histories (2002), frontier processes are both political and 
discursive. There is a wide array of voices to be taken into account depending 
on whose perspective we adopt. We can only offer a polyphonic assemblage, 
furthermore limited by the range of archival or ethnographic sources. Thus, 
the fragmentary politico-religious landscape and complex cultural matrix 
of Kham necessarily results in ‘multivocality’. I would argue that it also 
requires us to pay due attention to its constitutive ‘multilocality’ which 
we can address, according to the anthropologist Margaret Rodman (1992, 
641), as the ‘politicized, culturally relative, historically specif ic, local and 
multiple constructions’ of places affected by influences of imperial history, 
modernity, and contemporary contexts. The chapters in this volume set out 
to explore these dimensions by considering diverse spatial entanglements 
and historical (dis)continuities.
Relational Spaces
Some regions, particularly contested frontiers, continuously defy catego-
rization in conventional terms altogether. The historians Mark Lewis and 
8 There were, however, many other smaller polities in Kham. The Qing Empire’s indirect rule 
relied on ‘indigenous chieftains’ (tusi) to levy taxes and other duties, such as quelling ‘rebellions’ 
for which they received military titles.
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Kären Wigen (1997) have provocatively challenged the limits of our spatial 
lexicons for anthropogeographical analysis and in so doing have drawn up 
four particularly productive models: the middle ground, the archipelago, the 
diaspora, and the matrix (ibid., 142-156). Each helps to grasp how cultural 
territories are increasingly being cross-cut and redefined by networks and 
mobility, as growing diasporas of merchants, migrants, and refugees around 
the world lead to mutations of conceptions of place and identity on different 
scales. But before I return to the notions of ‘middle-ground’ and ‘matrix’ 
in the context of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands and in relation to ‘frontier 
dynamics’, it is necessary to further clarify the implications of an approach 
to Kham not as a regionally confined space but as a process-oriented spatial 
formation.
In the context of a re-evaluation of area studies and borderland studies, 
Willem van Schendel’s (2002) proposal to design an unconventional regional 
area as a heuristic was a particularly powerful intervention: ‘Zomia’ (the 
land of highlanders) not only created an arena of alternative thinking about 
borderland areas where Central, South, Southeast, and East Asia meet but 
also started a new narrative of place inspired by process geographies. This 
toponymic invention has since taken on a life of its own, especially following 
the publication seven years later of James Scott’s (2009) depiction of Zomia 
as an area where people strategically keep the state at a distance, helped 
by the ‘friction of terrain’.
Much debated, Scott’s (2009) book helped shed some light on a vast terri-
tory that was overlooked by various ‘center-centric’ gazes that kept reproduc-
ing a centre-periphery paradigm without renewing an understanding of these 
peripheral zones. For all the productive discussion it triggered, Scott’s Zomia 
is, however, only one way of looking at a more general methodological and 
conceptual challenge that the region offers us, as Jean Michaud (2000, 2006, 
2010, 2017) has been particularly apt at showing. As geographical and cultural 
concepts, however, we may still wonder, as Michaud queries (2010, 212), 
whether ‘notions such as Zomia, the Southeast Asian Massif, the Himalayan 
Massif, or Haute-Asie, have [ever] been needed by the subjects themselves’. 
In our case, doesn’t Kham already stand as a categorical challenge of a 
kind – without us having to coin another Zomia-like term?
This volume complements recent interventions which for a large part 
engage the now quite inescapable notion of Zomia and take borderlands 
as an entry point into issues of agency, sovereignty, and transnational 
connections. Yet the problem remains: how can we productively think 
about Zomia as a place if it is after all a kind of borderland-cum-frontier 
zone, which should be addressed as a process? In this regard, Kham is not 
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posited in this volume as a prescribed geophysical regional framework but 
as a fragmentalized space of interconnected and interdependent locales 
and people. By looking at Kham through diverse lenses and approaching 
it on varied scales, and combining history and anthropology, the chapters 
take into account different forms of conjunctions and territorial belongings 
conceived as heterogeneous, discontinuous, and relational (e.g. Cartier 
2002, Jessop et al. 2008).
In other words, Kham is a good-to-think-with category. As we move away 
from a purely spatial definition, there is one important question that ‘Zomia-
thinking’ (Shneiderman 2010, 293) forces us to address: by operating a kind 
of topological reversal by which the borderlands (the in-between) of culture 
areas and political centres come to the foreground, it raises the question of 
self-determination and sovereignty. As the etymology of the term region 
conveys, a region is a form of spatialization of sovereignty, a spatial entity 
(regio, ‘direction, district’) where a form of control is exercised (regere, ‘to 
rule, direct’). The region as a place of otherness destabilizes and complicates 
the claims of powerful centres (Rafael 1999). Kham offers a rich historical 
and ethnographic challenge to those who want to articulate the parts and 
the whole of a regional category, and what it ‘is’ and ‘does’ (see Paasi and 
Metzger 2016) as I will further analyse in the last part of this Introduction.
Historical and contextual specif icity should certainly inform the way we 
think about regional formations. Whatever the scale, regions are not timeless 
entities but are shaped by diverse historical forces and often reorganized 
economically and politically through multiple cross-cutting influences. At 
the same time, we need not assume that any of these regions are discrete, 
continuous blocks, even when they are named and seem on the surface to 
constitute the basis of some kind of unity – whether cultural or otherwise. 
At the heart of our inquiries lies the apparent paradox of Kham as a named 
regional category and at the same time a heterogeneous frontier zone and 
nexus of power.
Archaeologies of Sovereignty
The history of Kham when regarded as a frontier zone has to be set against 
the background of geopolitical tensions between Lhasa-based regimes 
and China-based regimes, and the growing presence of Western powers.9 
Tensions arose mainly during the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth 
9 Some of this historical background is presented in the Chronology of Major Events (supra).
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centuries and revolved around issues of territorial integrity, sovereignty, 
and nationhood. The issue at stake was the definition of where the eastern 
border of the Central Tibetan polity should be in relation to the Chinese 
polity and therefore the determination of the respective territorial reach 
of the interlocutors, as alluded to above (see Maps 1.2 and 1.3). This was 
at the very least an ambiguous issue, given that imperial formations do 
not end at their geographic boundaries, and that the expansive states of 
Tibet and China similarly contributed to creating zones with overlapping 
forms of authority at their peripheries (see Lattimore 1962, McGranahan 
2003a, 2003b, 2007, Perdue 2001). But the adoption of standards derived 
from international law and the notion of sovereignty in a modern sense, 
as Scott Relyea discusses in his chapter, carried implicit recognition that 
the outside of the nation is another nation’s inside.
It should f irst be emphasized that several ‘sovereignty regimes’ (Agnew 
2005) have to be taken into account. The confrontation of the two centres 
that contributed to making Kham a site of overlapping and fragmented 
sovereignties, a ‘Sino-Tibetan’ borderland tied to larger geopolitical issues, 
is the result of the emergence in the nineteenth century of the nation-state 
as the primary vehicle of sovereign power. As Benedict Anderson (1991) 
demonstrated, this Western-born notion that was to become an international 
standard created a new spatialization of authority, which implied that 
boundaries were part of what def ine the state and its sovereign rule over a 
homogenous territory.10 At the turn of the twentieth century in the case of 
Tibet in its relation to China and British India, there was no clearly marked 
boundary. The imperative to map the territory and to identify its borders 
clearly with respect to a bounded sense of statehood became most pressing.
There were various attempts to draw a borderline in Kham, and today 
the linear demarcation is internal to the Chinese nationscape between 
T.A.R. and other provinces such as Sichuan and Yunnan. These arbitrary 
territorial and administrative divisions have been acquiring greater salience 
and verisimilitude, but as Charlene Makley has argued for Amdo further 
north, in Kham too ‘these modern boundaries are just the most recent in 
a long history of contending “maps of power” over the region’ (2003, 599).
We know of at least one attempt at an alternative geography of Kham 
that was formulated in the late nineteenth century by the polymath Jamgon 
10 European powers increasingly relied on border treaties to define the territorial sovereignty of 
individual states following the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. In its political dealings with European 
nation-states, China was forced to clarify its borders and what remained of its frontiers. European 
colonial powers forced upon China the Western concept of treaty-defined territorial sovereignty.
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Kongtrul (see Gardner 2006, 2009; Zangpo 2001). In a text entitled the 
‘Twenty-f ive holy sites of Dokham’ (Dokham né chen nyer nga), a selection 
of religious sites are drawn together to elaborate what Alexander Gardner 
(2009, 98) calls a ‘narrative map’. As Gardner shows, it was a symbolic rather 
than scientif ic and political attempt to establish the geographic existence 
of Kham through the grouping of meaningful and powerful places in the 
landscape. Signif icantly, this grouping was inclusive of Kham’s religious 
diversity – the region saw the blossoming of diverse religious sects in the 
eighteenth century – but exclusive of Geluk sites. Therefore, the spatial 
and religious unity of Kham represented by Jamgon Kongtrul’s ‘map’ was 
a reaction to the ‘looming annexation of his homeland’ by Central Tibet, 
which in 1868 he perceived as the ‘invader’ (100), even if in the end it was 
China that appropriated Kham.
If the Ganden Phodrang and Geluk domination was what constituted a 
threat to Kham’s identity in the eyes of Kongtrul, it was also at this particular 
time in history that Gönpo Namgyel strived towards a political unification of 
Kham and ‘dared to defy the authority of both centers of power’ (Tsomu 2015, 
132) until his expansion was halted by the Lhasa government. An insider’s 
perspective thus shows that external territorial threats and claims came 
from both Central Tibet and China; it also shows, perhaps more importantly, 
that there was a diverse but nevertheless resilient sense of centrality. As Amy 
Holmes-Tagchungdarpa (2011, 8) has argued, the main polities (kingdoms) 
in eastern Tibet ‘ultimately conceived of themselves as their own centres, 
even as other centres tried to define them as the periphery’ (see also Turek, 
this volume).
Kham never displayed a stable religious or political unity. However, the 
‘self-rule’ movements of the 1930s exemplify how new visions for political 
action were taking shape in response to Tibetan and Chinese nation-building 
projects, and how forms of regional autonomy were strategically devised 
(Peng 2002).11 For many eastern Tibetans the potentiality of unity resurfaced 
when invasion and military enforcement of Chinese rule made it necessary 
to have recourse to a form of national cohesion; resistance was strong in 
Kham and the rebel army (significantly named the Chushi Gangdruk) joined 
11 See in particular Duara (2003) for a discussion of imperialism and nationalism in China in the 
twentieth century. While nation-building has often been approached in terms of the influence 
of Western concepts, Tuttle (2007) makes an important contribution to the reconsideration of 
the Sino-Tibetan interface on Tibetan terms, by underlining the role that Buddhism played in 
China’s transition to a nation-state, thereby portraying the Chinese nationalist narrative as 
not purely secular. On the role of Buddhism during the national construction of the republican 
period, see also Bulag (2007, 33-40).
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forces with Tibetans in Lhasa. Kham has since become closely associated 
with its ‘warrior’ spirit and is regarded as a place of resistance (McGranahan 
2010, 61; Norbu 1986). Resistance then became a national project and it is 
in this context that the ‘three regions of Tibet’ (chölkha sum) are referred 
to as ‘provinces’ and have been given an aura of political unity (Mills 2014; 
Weiner 2016).
The Sino-Tibetan frontier was clearly not a no man’s land and there 
existed former politico-religious arrangements which, according to Geoffrey 
Samuel’s (1993) overview of Tibet’s political history, were part of a continuous 
f ield of a wide variety of political and social formations. In her discussion 
about the critical intervention of British diplomacy in the frontier dispute, 
Carole McGranahan (2003b) points out that in Tibet, ‘state organization 
operated under different principle and organizational strategies’ compared 
to the nation-state; therefore, different understandings of statehood and 
authority made the delineation of the eastern border between Tibet and 
China ‘the one issue that consistently impeded the passing of any treaty’ 
between China, Tibet, and Britain (2003b, 40; also 2010, 42ff). That such 
a clear boundary did not exist exemplif ies the fact that there remained a 
contested area with overlapping zones between the two centres’ claim to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand, and the constellation 
of polities themselves in Kham on the other hand.
This fragmented political landscape with its local models of jurisdiction 
and often competing allegiances was also made up of an intricate network 
of religious institutions belonging to different Buddhist sects. In the context 
of Tibetan areas, therefore, while it has often been pointed out that rule 
was more a matter of control over people than land, such rule also involved 
some ritualistic components linked to local territorial deities, and could rely 
heavily on monastic institutions that exercised authority over agricultural 
and nomadic land and levied taxes. In other words, access to land for sub-
sistence farming and for subsequent taxation was an important factor in 
territorial demarcations and in the political systems or patterns of relations 
within or between communities.12 One aspect that certainly complicates 
our understanding of the variations of configurations that existed and the 
diversity of indigenous notions they mobilized is the importance of the 
multi-ethnic make-up of the region and the various religious traditions. 
12 See Huber (2004, 142-143) about ritual practices (ri-khrims or ri-rgya) that entail a claim or 
control over a territory, at local community or state level, with reference to Amdo and Kham. 
Macdonald (1987) laid the ground for a comparison across the extended Himalayas of indigenous 
notions of authority that can be linked to the emergence of the state.
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Cults to mountain deities that control particular territories can, for example, 
contribute to the inhabitants’ sense of identity (Karmay 1994). Spiritual 
landscapes animate local identities and territorial deities have long played 
an important role in local notions of authority and sovereignty.
What is conventionally referred to as ‘ethnographic Tibet’ or ‘historical 
Tibet’13 is often presented as corresponding to a complex mixture of societies 
loosely connected together, each of which represented a peculiar type of 
political institution and system of authority. Among the various political 
entities in Kham under religious or secular rulers, there is also evidence 
of the limited degree to which an aristocratic or monastic estate could 
exercise its authority over its peasant tenants or nomadic clients. Some of 
these polities, however, were fairly centralized states, generally kingdoms, 
with recognized f igures of authority (kings, gyelpo) such as in Dergé or 
Chakla, estates ruled by chieftains or lords (pon), or territories headed by 
hereditary lords (depa), such as Bathang and Lithang, designated by the 
Lhasa government (the Ganden Phodrang).
One of the challenges when writing about these political formations is 
the use of Western terminology, such as ‘nation-state’ in relation to forms of 
centralized political authority and control, or more generally the application 
of notions of sovereignty or nationalism to socio-cultural realities that 
are not entirely f itted to our conceptual tools. Even more challenging and 
important, however, is to re-think notions such as (territorial) sovereignty 
and its foundational assumptions in a comparative perspective that would 
take full account of indigenous notions beyond those that come from the two 
main centres.14 When the anthropologist Edmund Leach (1960, 49-50) was 
writing about the ‘frontiers of Burma’, he rightly alerted us to the ‘dogma’ of 
sovereignty as ‘a by-product of the clash of European Imperialist interests’. 
He pointed out that in the case of Burma and adjacent regions, the political 
systems interpenetrated and that in this context their delimitation should 
not be equated with the hard line of the border between sovereign nation-
states but should be considered as ‘zones of mutual interest’. This formulation 
is also reminiscent of the work of Owen Lattimore, a prominent f igure in 
13 Historical or ethnographic Tibet encompasses both the predominantly Tibetan areas located 
in today’s Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Gansu provinces and the Tibet Autonomous Region. 
In some works, the latter is also referred to as ‘political Tibet’, see for example Goldstein (1998, 
4), and the discussion in McGranahan (2010, 48-52).
14 While the need to revisit the notion of sovereignty is even greater for the contemporary 
period, the conventional understanding of sovereignty as a state’s unlimited and indivisible 
rule over a territory and its population has been increasingly examined and challenged (see 
Biersteker and Weber 1996; Benite, Geroulanos, and Jerr 2017).
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the history of ‘Inner Asian frontiers’, who stated that ‘the linear Frontier 
never existed [in China] except in concept. The depth of the trans-Frontier, 
beyond the recognized linear Frontier, made possible a historical structure 
of zones, which varied from time to time’ (1962, 115).
Kham exemplif ied several of these ‘zones of mutual interest’ where 
overlapping forms of authority sometimes led to multiple allegiances, and as 
Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat (2006, 295) presented in their discussion 
about sovereignty, in such places and societies ‘sovereign power historically 
was distributed among many forms of local authority’. Places where borders 
have indeed crystallized at various historical moments were subjected to 
influences of varying intensity emanating from multiple centres. And so 
much so that belonging and allegiance themselves could be variable and 
multiple, favouring specif ic forms of sovereignty, anchored in the liminality 
of these zones.
Frontier Dynamics
Recent scholarship has overall signif icantly contributed to a multipolar 
social history of Chinese and Tibetan worlds and their internal diversity. 
In such works, conventional unitarian visions of ‘China’ and ‘Tibet’ are 
unsettled, opening up to the different forms of relations that existed between 
the centres of power and the various groups under their rule or influence, 
and foregrounding the diversity of frontiers themselves, away from the 
highly polarized antagonism and with closer attention to local agency.
There is now growing literature on the borderlands of China that empha-
sizes the need to include indigenous conceptions and actors in historical 
narratives of place-making.15 Most of the recent contributions about the 
histories of specific locales within the Sino-Tibetan borderlands have offered 
a thicker description of events and people in the making of these histories. 
In this endeavour, the ‘middle ground’ approach developed by Richard White 
(2011 [1991]) in his study of the processes of mutual accommodation and 
creative misunderstandings between Algonquian-speaking Indians and 
French, British, and Americans in the Great Lakes region between 1650-1815 
has proven particularly inspiring. As histories of China’s Southwest started 
to highlight border transformation mechanisms, resistance movements, 
15 Most notably all the contributions that fall within the so-called ‘New Qing history’ (see for 
an overview Waley-Cohen 2004; and more recently Wu 2016), as alluded to in the Foreword to 
this volume.
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identity processes and ethnic entanglements (e.g. Atwill 2005; Herman 
2007), C. Patterson Giersch (2001, 2006) applied the ‘middle ground’ model 
to his analysis of the negotiations between Tai polities and Qing off icials 
across Southern Yunnan province. This approach has opened avenues for 
a deeper understanding of historical agency in other parts of Southwest 
China. There is now greater attention to indigenous agency beyond the role 
of elites and more in-depth analysis of the dynamics of colonial expansion 
and the need to break out of the centre-local typology (e.g. Faure and Ho 
2013, Weinstein 2014, Lawson 2017).
Bridging studies of China’s Southwest with those of eastern Tibet, Yudru 
Tsomu (2009) distinguishes an ‘off icial’ and an ‘unofficial’ middle ground in 
her study of the Chakla kingdom of Dartsedo, notions she equally applies to 
describe the situation of other polities in Kham (Tsomu 2015). The ‘off icial’ 
middle ground corresponds to the negotiations of forms of accommodation, 
albeit limited, that took place in the political and administrative dealings 
between local Tibetan leaders and the Qing administration. The ‘unofficial’ 
middle ground corresponds to the social interactions, cultural contacts, and 
exchanges that developed through trade and economic activities, involving 
merchants and immigrants. Similarly, Patrick Hayes (2014) draws on this 
distinction in his environmental and social history of the Songpan (Zunchu) 
region of northern Kham, and shows how adaptation to ecological conditions 
is an important factor in the formation of the ‘middle ground’ at these two 
levels.
These depictions point to the diversity of experiences on the ground and 
to the need to acknowledge the reality of a felt sense of centrality of some of 
Kham’s communities at different times in their history (see also Jinba 2014; 
Holmes-Tagchungdarpa 2014; Kang and Sutton 2016). In other words, they 
raise the questions: how is our understanding of local history reconfigured 
if we ‘see like a border’ (Jinba 2017; Jonhson et al. 2011, 67; Rumford 2012, 
896) and fully acknowledge the agency of local inhabitants in processes 
of change? How can we centre the narrative more on local people’s role in 
socio-political and environmental transformations?
If Kham makes for a comparable case of continuous frontier engagement, 
like the one studied by C. Patterson Giersch in the Sino-Southeast Asian 
borderlands, it is not only for its ‘middle ground’ specif icity but also for its 
maintenance as a ‘persistent frontier’ (Giersch 2006, 9). One of the reasons 
for this persistence is precisely, as we have seen, because the border never 
materialized. It is also because the frontier remained the locus of histori-
cal dynamism, modulated by change. The comparative model proposed 
by Bradley Parker (2006) of a ‘continuum of boundary dynamics’ that 
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forms what he calls the ‘borderland matrix’ is helpful here in tracing this 
‘persistence’. For the purpose of this model, Parker def ines borderlands as 
‘regions around or between political or cultural entities where geographic, 
political, demographic, cultural, and economic circumstances or processes 
may interact to create borders or frontiers’ (81). The variations among these 
processes are conceived on a continuum from the more static and limiting 
border situation to that of the fluid and less constrained frontier situation 
(see Figure 1.1).
In Kham, the geographic (topographic, climatic) boundary was fairly 
restrictive, marking a clear border as one entered the Tibetan world. The 
political boundary similarly became an increasingly constricting one as 
attempts were made to delimit a border. The demographic and cultural 
boundaries remained porous, even if the numeric importance of immigration 
was not very signif icant until recently. But when this is set against a longer 
time period, we can see both a tendency to maintain cultural and ethnic 
distinctions and forms of ‘merger’ or ‘fragmentations’ (see Rodseth 2005, 
Gros 2014b). The economic boundary was probably the most f luid, and a 
crucial aspect of Kham’s economic dynamism, and relative political and 
cultural importance throughout history.
Overall, one interesting thing regarding this model is that it confirms that 
the different boundaries are not congruent. This way of conceptualizing the 
16 The f ive major categories of boundaries (boundary sets) are further subdivided and, for 
example, the ‘Demographic boundary’ in the f igure encompasses population density and ethnic 
composition, and the ‘Cultural boundary’ includes religious as well as linguistic boundaries.
Figure 1.1  The Continuum of Boundary Dynamics, from Parker (2006)16
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borderland is not without similitudes with what was proposed under the label 
‘Tibetan-Yi corridor’ (Ch. Zang-Yi zoulang), a designation originally coined by 
the famous Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005). Over the last two 
decades this corridor, running along the eastern edge of Kham but extending 
further north and south, has been a lively field of study across disciplines (see 
Li 2008, Shi 2005). However, this ‘ethnic corridor’, as it is also called, has never 
been clearly defined (see Gros 2014a, b) but serves as a moniker for an approach 
to the linguistic, ethnic, or cultural variability set against the historical longue 
durée. In areas that could be regarded as the edges of Kham, the borderlands 
are less clearly Sino-Tibetan and more Naxi-Tibetan or Yi-Tibetan or, as Eric 
Mortensen discusses in his chapter, not even borderlands at all.
Knowledge, Imagination, and Utopia
Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?
Those people were a kind of solution.
– C.P. Cavafy, ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’ ([1975] 1992)
As we consider various approaches to the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, it is 
worth reminding ourselves that ethnology as a discipline developed in 
China in close connection with frontier studies. Consider the year 1926: the 
famous educator and reformist Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940) published a seminal 
article that off icialized the term minzu xue to designate the ethnological 
discipline; the same year Wu Wenzao (1901-1985), then still a sociology 
student at Columbia University, promoted bianzheng xue, the ‘study of 
frontier affairs’, framed as an inclusive approach to the cultures of peripheral 
peoples that in turn influenced the development of f ield anthropology.17 
During this same period, the scholar Li Anzhai (1900-1985) who became 
17 See Cai (1962 [1926]) and Wu (1990 [1926]). Professor at Yanjing University, Wu Wenzao moved 
to Kunming where he founded the Department of Sociology at Yunnan University as well as 
the Yunnan Ethnology Society (Yunnan minzu xuehui). He became the mentor of a generation 
of ethnologists in the 1930s, including Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yaohua (1910-2000). About Wu 
Wenzao, see in particular Wang (1999, 2000). While Wu Wenzao’s approach to development in 
border regions was inspired by the methods developed for colonial administration in the United 
States, Ling Chunsheng, a student of Marcel Mauss and Marcel Granet in Paris became one of the 
main actors in the promotion and institutionalization of ethnology as applied to frontier issues 
(Brown 2008, 56-90). Field research had proven to be a necessary tool for colonial powers to 
manage and control their empires, and as Chen Zhihong (2017) recently demonstrated, a similar 
methodological shift happened in China in disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, geology, 
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one of the founding members of the study of Sino-Tibetan borderlands, 
advocated ‘social work’ and ‘frontier service’ at the borders as a project to 
modernize and promote the development of minority societies (Chen 2010, 
106-130; Rodriguez 2011; Yen 2012).
The republican period was dominated by the experience of a ‘frontier 
crisis’ (bianjiang weiji) and the question regarding the place that ethnic and 
cultural diversity could hold in nation-building. A plethora of diverse frontier 
study societies sprang up that proposed ways of developing the frontiers. ‘Go 
to the frontier’ (dao bianjiang qu) was a dominant slogan of the intellectual 
and political life of the republican era that encouraged the study and eth-
nography of these frontiers, where migrants had settled and new cultivated 
lands had been established, where agents were charged with carrying out 
cartographic and topographical surveys, and new natural resources had 
been identif ied.18 While the ‘frontier’ was reinterpreted and naturalized as 
a quintessentially national space it was also the site of ambivalent attitudes; 
‘frontier reconstruction’ remained ‘work in progress’ and contested ground 
between both scholars and off icials. The new provincial entity of ‘Xikang’ 
is a case in point. During the Sino-Japanese war, it appeared in off icial 
propaganda as an example of frontier provinces contributing to a national 
united war effort, promoted by the rising power of the warlord Liu Wenhui 
(1895-1976) who held the reins of Xikang’s construction. To extend their 
influence, Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomingdang (G.M.D.) pursued a policy 
of economic reconstruction involving large investments in transportation 
and communications, which allowed for effective penetration of the region 
and ensured the central government’s role in its development.19
After being resettled in the provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan where 
universities were displaced during the war, Chinese ethnologists or anthro-
pologists, many of whom had returned from study visits abroad, conducted 
the first f ield surveys on ethnic groups in border regions. In short, this period 
was a golden age for the development of the discipline, and the southwestern 
borders an ethnographic paradise. During this period Kham became an 
important locale for new imaginings of the nation’s geo-body. The border 
and modern geography, and ‘f ield research was linked to scientif ic spirit, and was regarded as 
an important symbol of new-style intellectuals’ (217-218).
18 See in particular Chen Zhihong’s (2008) study which rightly places this movement during 
the republican era in the broader context of modern ‘territoriality’. James Leibold (2007, 51-79) 
has demonstrated that at the political level, ‘border administration’ (bianzheng) was based on 
a genuine willingness to establish minority allegiance.
19 For example, by creating the Sichuan and Xikang economic development committee in 
March 1939. See Lin Hsiao-ting (2006).
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zone was raised to province status: a ‘New Xikang’ open for travel, discovery, 
and dreams of growth and progress (see Frank, this volume).
The promotion and idealization of these regions whose inhabitants could 
no longer be portrayed as barbarians because they were now regarded as 
co-nationals was an important component of the ‘frontier reconstruction’ 
spirit. Travellers and ethnographers were often motivated by a national-
ist impulse, a ‘crusade to reaff irm Chinese sovereignty’ over the border 
regions, so Mo Yajun (2013, 130) writes about the ethnographer-photographer 
Zhuang Xueben (1909-1984) whose work represents, she argues, a kind of 
objectif ication of his Khampa subjects, even though his work also leaves 
behind more multi-dimensional legacies (see Holmes-Tagchugdarpa 2015). 
Scholarly circles did not break free from these stereotypes, as Yudru Tsomu 
(2013) underlines with regard to the ethnologist Ren Naiqiang (1894-1989) 
and his paternalistic, erotic and exotic view of the Khampa. However, not 
all past or present descriptions of peripheral groups were derived from 
paternalism, or cultural judgment. In the 1930s Shen Congwen (1902-1988) 
was already portraying ‘barbarians’ in positive terms and exerted significant 
influence over a younger generation of artists and aspiring ethnographers, 
as Lara Maconi (2014) recently aff irmed. Today border regions inhabited 
by minorities are increasingly becoming places of spiritual renewal in the 
national discourse (Oakes 2007, 253; Ying 2014, 29).
The historically shifting boundaries of Kham’s entangled forms of al-
legiance and belonging certainly resonate in its situation today: Kham’s 
contemporary cultural politics, complicated by new factors linked to the 
global economy, tourism, and heritage discourses and practices, all converge 
to create alternative restructurings. In the words of Charlene Makley (2003, 
598), such borderlands have been and remain ‘creative grounds for the 
making and unmaking of often-competing sociocultural worlds’. Since the 
period of reform and liberalization of the late 1980s in particular, places 
have been undergoing profound changes. Pasts are being reinvented, full 
of potentialities for the present. A case in point is the town of Gyelthang 
(Ch. Zhongdian) in Yunnan province which changed its name in 2001 to 
the myth-laden Shangri-La (Ch. Xianggelila). This process of branding 
epitomizes the merging of Western and Chinese imaginings, supposedly 
infused with local culture, in order to create a new paradise for tourism 
(Hillman 2003, Kolås 2008; see Buffetrille and E. Mortensen, this volume). 
Myth turns into capital.
More recently, a much larger zone designated as the ‘Great Shangri-La 
economic zone’ (Zhongguo da Xianggelila jingji quan) was drawn on the 
map by the combined efforts of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Sichuan, and 
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Yunnan provinces – a zone whose boundaries more or less match Kham’s 
and which blurs the physical space and the representational space (Map 
1.4). In a similar fashion to what happened in Northwest Yunnan with the 
‘Great rivers project’ led by The Nature Conservancy (T.N.C.) in collaboration 
with the provincial government, the idea is to convert protected areas into 
sources of revenue. As Zinda (2014, 109) points out, the issue at stake is 
the designation of ‘a special conservation zone in the spirit of the special 
economic zones that have had a famous role in coastal China’s economic 
ascent; this would complement its unofficial designation as a special ethnic 
zone, a location of authentic Tibetan difference’.20 To paraphrase Tim Oakes 
(2000, 683) who commented on how place-based cultural traditions were 
being ‘traded in’ and replaced with provincially defined regions, an ideology 
of ‘zone’ culture is a necessary enabling device for the trade. The very idea of 
a ‘zone’ speaks directly to our concern here as a re-branding of the frontier. 
As Carolyn Cartier (2018, 468) argues, by such designations ‘the party-state 
re-maps urban and regional futures at large through targeted changes to 
subnational territory’. This is a different kind of ‘provincialization’ from 
the transformation of the borderland into Xikang province that took place 
in republican times. This time the western frontier is being turned into a 
commercial utopia (Oakes 2007, 2012) and the Shangrilaization process is 
escalating (see Yeh and Coggins 2014). It is a renewed vision of the region’s 
imagined wilderness (that of the ‘frontier’) and pristine landscape, where 
nature and culture should be preserved selectively, once again deprived of 
their agency and creativity.
As Tim Oakes (2007, 258) astutely notes, ‘the frontiers of China and 
America meet and converge in Shangri-La, and it is the commercial dimen-
sion of the frontier idea that has enabled this’. This convergence brings to 
mind the work of the artist Qiu Zhijie whose project ‘Mapping the world’ 
(Ch. shijie ditu jihua) involves creating imaginary maps by drawing inspira-
tion from various geopolitical contexts. Qiu’s maps depict geographical 
and conceptual territories placed according to his own categorization of 
knowledge and ideologies, and cartography is used as a tool to reflect on the 
naturalization of knowledge and power. On one of these maps (see Figure 
1.2) we can f ind an area where the f ifth-century poet Tao Yuanming’s Peach 
Blossom Spring encounters the Shangri-La of James Hilton’s Lost Horizon, 
a proximity that alerts us to some continuities across time and space, and 
the dynamic reconfiguring of sites enacted by the convergence noted by 
20 On ‘special economic zones’ (S.E.Z.) as ‘special ethnic zones’ see also Vasantkumar (2014, 
54-56).
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Tim Oakes. Not far from these utopian sites is the ‘city on the border’, an 
allusion to an influential novel by Shen Congwen that humanizes, if not 
romanticizes, ethnic folk of China’s southwestern frontier. In this ‘Pure 
land’ is also to be found the ‘country of women’ and the famous Lugu lake 
(nowadays a major tourist destination in Yunnan), right next to Thoreau’s 
Walden pond. This kind of cross-cultural coming together on Qiu’s very 
large maps produces a recasting of place ‘in its gathering and collusion of 
othernesses and spatiotemporal elsewheres’, to borrow Robert Oppenheim’s 
(2007, 486) formulation; they also create a visual overflow with perhaps 
irreconcilable meanings.
Beyond the ‘commercial dimension’ that contributes to the emergence 
of these new geographical formations, there is also some interplay between 
the dimensions of tradition, tourism, and politics. A site like Shangri-La – 
the town, the region, the ‘zone’ – becomes what Michel Foucault called a 
Map 1.4  The Great Shangri-La Eco-Tourism Zone
sources: based on srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders extracted from gadm 
database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
author: rémi chaix
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heterotopia, an ‘effectively enacted utopia’, both an alternative place and a 
place of alternatives, a place that ‘is capable of juxtaposing in a single real 
place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible’ (1986, 
24, 25). On a larger scale, as Peter Bishop (2001, 204) argues, Tibet itself can 
be designated as a heterotopia, because it has become ‘a plurality of often 
contradictory, competing, and mutually exclusive places simultaneously 
positioned on a single geographical location’.21
Patterns of Change and Topological Figures
Growing scholarship in the f ield of Chinese studies has been tracing the 
continuities between periods, from the late Qing to the founding of the 
P.R.C., that were often considered as radical ruptures. We must be careful 
when talking of change regarding borderland narratives that focus on the 
centrist view of radical turns, such as from Empire to nation-state. These 
21 Bishop (1999, 381) also applied the Foucauldian notion of heterotopia more specif ically to 
Lhasa and to the Potala Palace.
Figure 1.2  A detail of Qiu Zhijie’s ‘Map of the World’ series
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turning points should be assessed in light of locally rooted continuities 
even when some political, economic, and environmental transformations 
are indeed perceived as a ‘change in worlds’ (Hayes 2014). Just as historians 
of borderlands Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett (2011, 357) alert us 
to the fact that ‘[f]inding new centers for borderlands history means also 
plotting change differently’.
Speaking of borderlands necessarily implies looking at politics and its en-
tanglement with other f ields of social activity, and how they evolve through 
time and across cultures. Continuities and changes are articulated around 
a dynamic and heterogeneous process of intervention. Such interventions 
of necessity rely on new forms of thought, new ideas, and new thinkers but 
they do not exclusively refer to a contingent or exterior character that would 
be the source of change: they may be internally engendered or externally 
produced. The chapters here explore some of these interventions and how 
places are products of local histories and practices as well as relations with 
the broader environment. These interventions are, I would argue, ‘frontier 
moments’ that through a process of territorialization also become ‘spatial 
moments’ (van Schendel 2015), which can be used to examine the ‘clashes, 
negotiations, compromises, and adjustments as people construct places out 
of a range of resources, human as well as non-human, and material as well 
as discursive’ (see Siu, Tagliacozzo, and Perdue 2015, 10). These historical 
and cultural conjunctures, the issues of interpenetration, hybridity, con-
vergence, and the sense of exclusion and inclusion are addressed through 
different lenses, sketching different patterns of change that have affected 
and continue to affect people and places in Kham.
The picture of Kham I have endeavoured to draw in this Introduction is 
a kaleidoscopic view of its historical trajectories and changing territorial 
imprint, shifts that alter and shape how people are located. It points to the 
importance of taking into consideration the relations between the whole 
and its parts with their own autonomy and histories, and the merging of the 
material, the emotional, and the discursive in processes of place-making in 
order to grasp Kham’s multiplicity. This multiplicity not only raises questions 
about the ‘relations of interiority’ (properties) that are attributed to Kham as 
a category of identity, as a culture area, or even as a newly crafted ‘zone’. It 
also poses the question of the ‘relations of exteriority’ (capacities) in which 
the outside/inside divide becomes blurred and can hardly be disentangled 
from both ‘Tibet’ and ‘China’ – themselves contingent historical entities. In 
Kham, where does one end and the other start?
At the meso-level of a regional entity, Kham as a heuristic illustrates 
the complexity of experiences of commonalities and connectedness, and 
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the conundrum that multiplicity poses regarding concepts of identity and 
belonging especially in a highly politicized context (Mills 2014).22 The notion 
of ‘belonging’ is helpful here to emphasize boundary dynamics and ‘the 
shifting character of borders and frontiers, imagined and real, as well as 
the possibilities of boundary-crossing, boundary-shifting, and boundary-
blurring’ (Pfaff-Czarnecka and Toff in 2011, xiv). Kham is a reminder that 
‘there are several places in the same territorial extension’ (Feuchtwang 2004, 
10). The ‘frontier situation’ is less about reactively stressing an identity than 
crossing imposed boundaries; the ‘frontier’ is a variable-geometry notion.
By recognizing that Kham is in both Tibet and China we can perhaps 
complexify the exclusion and inclusion binary (and the domination vs. resist-
ance binary) and productively complement discussions that have so far relied 
on notions of hybridity, or more recently of symbiosis (Smyer Yu 2017) and of 
convergence (Jinba 2017). An apt reformulation of the implication for thinking 
about Kham and the Sino-Tibetan borderlands in this fashion is to move away 
from the constraints of topography and territory towards a more topological 
imagination, whereby the gap between the here and there is not so much a 
matter of actual distance than social relations, exchange, and interactions.
A topological imagination can be applied to frontiers and borders alike, 
seen as porous membranes (Slatta 1997, 32, 53), which not only constitute 
what distinguishes the inside and the outside (of a political, cultural, ethnic 
unit) but also the encounter between them. In other words, borders are 
not so much containers than ‘outer membranes’ of state territoriality, with 
varied thickness and permeability (Billé 2017). The idea of the thickness of 
the boundary conjures images of the border or frontier zone as an interface 
that mediates relations, an ‘in-between’ quality that has direct implications 
on its internal non-homogenous composition, made up of a constellation of 
diverse social formations with variable spatial imprints.
There have been many attempts to reflect on these issues using more 
unfamiliar forms of spatialization such as archipelagos or hollow rings, 
lattices, meshwork, and patchwork, fuelled by an increased need to move 
away from spatial containers (such as the nation-state) and to explore process 
geographies (see van Schendel 2002). Since John Agnew’s (1994) influential 
article about the ‘territorial trap’ the traditional vision of the topography 
22 As a matter of fact, the often naturalized tie between identity and territory has become a 
particularly salient problem in the case of Tibetan identity and nationalism. Chris Vasantkumar 
(2017, 119; 2013, 228) recently commented about how some Tibetans locate their ‘homeland’: ‘true 
Tibet lies not in a territorially def ined homeland, but in a body of religious and cultural practice 
that has travelled with the Dalai Lama and other members of the Tibetan religio-cultural elite 
into India and the West and, perhaps, beyond territory itself ’.
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of power has been shattered and has led to questions about the existence 
of clear ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ of spatial authority.
The vision of a social landscape where the centre’s reach is limited in the 
remote periphery, and according to which horizontal relations and vertical 
hierarchies determine the equation of various topographies of power, is a 
vision anchored in Euclidean geometry. As anthropologist Hjorleifur Jonsson 
(2010, 200) has already pointedly proposed in criticizing the underpinnings of 
the Zomia concept, ‘it is imperative to rethink the assumptions that sustain 
this particular production of knowledge’. In order to deconstruct the centre/
periphery binary it is useful to think along the lines of what Edwin Ardener 
(2012, 523) suggests in the case of ‘remote areas’ that ‘the actual geography 
is not the overriding feature – it is obviously necessary that “remoteness” 
has a position in topographical space, but it is def ined within a topological 
space whose features are expressed in a cultural vocabulary’.
Because frontier zones, like ‘remote areas’, are both geographical spaces 
and social constructs, one satisfying characteristic about the notion of 
‘middle ground’ as a spatial metaphor is that it conflates the process of 
accommodation characteristic of the frontier and the actual space where the 
process unfolds; but it does not qualify that space. The matrix, as discussed 
above, as a ‘boundary-blurring cultural formation’ (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 
151), can perhaps better capture a process through which cultures inter-
penetrate each other’s core spaces; as a result, in the ‘borderland matrix’ 
the internal exclusions and the external inclusions constitute a topological 
conundrum. We are faced with the shaping of a topology of belonging 
whereby the merging between the internal and the external creates pos-
sibilities for emerging social forms and events. We then inescapably face the 
challenge, as scholars, of renewing our vocabulary for an accurate rendering 
of these processes and of what emerges.
Therefore, to consider that Kham is in both Tibet and China results in 
rethinking the analysis of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands as a space and the 
very meaning of the hyphen (see Gros 2016, 220). The Möbius strip is a good 
metaphor to think with and can perhaps help provide a topology-inspired 
new conceptual grammar (see Figure 1.3).
The Möbius strip and its a priori paradoxical two-sidedness displays 
characteristics that are congruent with processes that take place in the 
frontier zone: 1) the inside and outside are part of a single continuous space, 
yet can nonetheless be identified as distinct sides at any one point or location; 
2) there is a continuous exchange between what happens internally and what 
takes place outside; 3) sources of change, as stressed above, are both internal 
and external and produce transformations that allow relationships to be 
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reproduced differently. For social topology, these continuities undergoing 
transformations are what is of interest here (see Allen 2016, Martin and Secor 
2014). In the case of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, topology can capture the 
non-linear characteristic of this zone, and perhaps how the colonial process 
with its constant ‘re-mapping’ can be effectively addressed as spatial history. 
Furthermore, the trope of the Möbius strip also conveys the malleability of 
Kham as an analytic and heuristic concept.
According to a recent discussion about topology in social and cultural 
theory, a topological surface such as the Möbius strip can be described as ‘a 
relational f ield of emergence’ (Lury, Parisi, and Terranova, 2012, 8). This is a 
particularly f itting formulation for Kham if we are to challenge its givenness 
and f ixity as a spatial entity that would exist ‘out there’ prior to the relations 
and the world they create. Places and territories are continuously produced 
in a relational manner. The description provided in the previous sections of 
the spatio-temporal variation of Kham as an in-between place substantiate 
the claim that the multiplicity of its constitutive relations ‘does not simply 
happen in the in-between’ of power centres ‘but rather operates a topological 
continuum of the in-between’ (Lury, Parisi, and Terranova, 2012, 13, emphasis 
added). The Möbius strip, as a continuous surface with only one side, also 
aptly evokes the historical process by which frontier dynamics tends to 
cycle through, producing new forms of territorialization and re-ordering. 
If one starts on one side and follows the loop of the Möbius strip, one ends 
up on the other side without having crossed a border.
This brings us back to our original question: what about Kham then 
as a ‘regional entity’ in this complex lattice of relational networks and 
non-Euclidean geometry? As I have tried to emphasize in this Introduction 
and as the following chapters further illustrate, it is important to recognize 
that Kham is a composite entity. According to Ansi Paasi and Jonathan 
Metzger’s recent discussion about regional formations, multiple actors are 
involved in these processes: local actors but also more or less distant ‘others’ 
who ‘lie topologically and topographically both “inside” and “outside” the 
everlastingly reconstructing, material and discursive socio-spatial process 
that becomes labelled as “the region”, and where variegated actors contribute 
Figure 1.3  The Möbius strip: from frontier zone to topological space
source: allen (2016, 42)
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to producing (often contested) accounts and narratives of such regions 
as to some degree constituting coherent and def inable entities’ (2016, 8). 
To promote the notion of frontier is to go beyond regarding Kham as a 
straightforward and unproblematic regional category. To push for a vision 
of Kham as a topological space is another step towards formulating aspects 
of co-presence that acknowledge the continuity of relationship of power in 
a process of transformation that shapes forms of inclusion and exclusion.
Glossary of Tibetan terms
chölkha sum chol kha gsum




Dza chu Rdza chu
depa sde pa
Dokham né chen nyer nga Mdo khams gnas chen nyer lnga
Dri chu ’Bri chu
Ganden Phodrang Dga’ ldan pho brang
Gedun Chopel Dge ’dun chos ’phel
gang jong gang ljongs
gyalam rgya lam
gyalpo rgyal po
Ngül chu Rngul chu
Nyak chu Nyag chu
phayül pha yul
pon dpon
rong chenshi rong chen bzhi
sakyé dokyé sa skye rdo rkyes
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dao bianjiang qu 到邊疆去









shijie ditu jihua 世界地圖計劃




Zhongguo da Xianggelila jingji quan 中国大香格里拉經濟圈
References
Adelman, Jeremy, and Stephen Aron. 1999. ‘From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, 
Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History’. American 
Historical Review 104 (3): 814-41.
Agnew, John. 1994. ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of Inter-
national Relations Theory’. Review of International Political Economy 1: 53-80.
Agnew, John. 2005. ‘Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in 
Contemporary World Politics’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
95 (2): 437-461.
Allen, John. 2016. Topologies of Power: Beyond Territory and Network. London: 
Routledge.
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism, revised ed. London: Verso.
Ardener, Edwin. 2012. ‘Remote Areas: Some Theoretical Considerations’. HAU: 
Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (1): 519-533.
Atwill, David. 2005. The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebel-
lion in Southwest China, 1856-1873. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Barth, Fredrik. 1969. ‘Introduction’. In Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social 
Organization of Culture Difference, 9-38. Boston: Little, Brown.
Baud, Michel, and Willem van Schendel. 1997. ‘Towards a Comparative History of 
Borderlands’. Journal of World History 8 (2): 211-242.
74 sTéphane gros 
Benite, Zvi Ben-Dor, Stephanos Geroulanos, and Nicole Jerr, eds. 2017. The Scaffolding 
of Sovereignty: Global and Aesthetic Considerations in the History of a Concept. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber, eds. 1996. State Sovereignty as Social 
Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Billé, Franck. 2018. ‘Skinworlds: Borders, Haptics, Topologies’. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 36 (1): 60-77.
Bishop, Peter. 1999. ‘Reading the Potala’. In Sacred Spaces and Powerful Places in 
Tibetan Culture, edited by Toni Huber, 367-385. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan 
Works and Archives.
Bishop, Peter. 2001. ‘Not Only a Shangri-la: Images of Tibet in Western Literature’. 
In Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, edited by Thierry 
Dodin and Heinz Räther, 200-222. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Brown, Clayton. 2008. Making the Majority: Defining Han Identity in the Chinese Eth-
nology and Archeology. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
Bulag, Uradyn. 2002. The Mongols at China’s Edge: History and the Politics of National 
Unity. Lanham: Rowman and Littlef ield.
Bulag, Uradyn. 2007. ‘From Empire to Nation: The Demise of Buddhism in Mongolia’. 
In The Mongolia-Tibet Inferface: Opening New Research Terrains in Inner Asia, 
edited by Uradyn Bulag and Hildegard Diemberger, 19-58. Leiden: Brill.
Cai Yuanpei. 1962 (1926). ‘Shuo minzu xue’ (On Ethnology). In Cai Yuanpei minzuxue 
lunzhu (Ethnological Writings of Cai Yuanpei), edited by Zhongguo minzu 
xuehui, 1-11. Taipei: Zhonghua Book Co.
Calanca, Paola and François Wildt. 2006. ‘Les frontières: quelques termes-clés’. 
Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident 28: 17-56.
Cartier, Carolyn. 2002. ‘Origins and Evolution of a Geographical Idea: The Mac-
roregion in China’. Modern China 28 (1): 79-142.
Cartier, Carolyn. 2018. ‘Zone Analog: The State-Market Problematic and Territorial 
Economies in China’. Critical Sociology 44 (3): 455-470.
Cavafy, C. P. 1992 (1975). ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’. In C.P. Cavafy: Collected 
Poems. Translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Chayet, Anne. 2003. ‘A propos des toponymes de l’épopée de Gesar’. Revue d’études 
tibétaines 3: 4-29.
Chen, Zhihong. 2008. Stretching the Skin of the Nation: Chinese Intellectuals, the 
State, and the Frontiers in the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937). Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Oregon.
Chen, Zhihong. 2017. ‘Romance with the Periphery: Chinese Travel Writing About 
the “Frontier” During the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937)’. Journal of Tourism History 
8 (3): 215-223.
FronTier (oF) experience 75
Crossley, Pamela Kyle, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, eds. 2006. Empire at 
the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Donnan, Hasting, and Thomas M. Wilson. 1999. Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation 
and State. London: Berg.
Duara, Prasenjit. 2003. Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian 
Modern. Lanham: Rowman and Littlef ield.
Epstein, Lawrence, ed. 2002. Khams pa Histories: Visions of People, Place and 
Authority. Leiden: Brill.
Faure, David, and Ts’ui-p’ing Ho, eds. 2013. Chieftains into Ancestors: Imperial 
Expansion and Indigenous Society in Southwest China. Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press.
Faure, David. 2013. ‘Introduction’. In Chieftains into Ancestors: Imperial Expansion 
and Indigenous Society in Southwest China, edited by David Faure and Ho Ts’ui-
p’ing, 1-21. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Febvre, Lucien. 1962 (1928). ‘Frontière: le mot et la notion’. In Pour une histoire à 
part entière. Paris: SEVPEN.
Feuchtwang, Stephan. 2004. ‘Introduction: Making Place’. In Making Place: State 
Projects, Globalisation and Local Responses in China, edited by S. Feuchtwang, 
3-31. London: UCL Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1986. ‘Of Other Spaces’ (J. Miskowiec trans.). Diacritics 16 (1): 
22-26.
Gardner, Alexander. 2003. ‘Review article – Khams pa histories: Visions of people, 
place and authority’. The Tibet Journal 28 (3): 61-96.
Gardner, Alexander. 2006. The Twenty-five Great Sites of Khams: Religious Geog-
raphy, Revelation, and Nonsectarianism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Tibet. 
Unpublished PhD dissertation, The University of Michigan.
Gardner, Alexander. 2009. ‘The Twenty-f ive Great Sites of Khams: A Narrative Map 
of an Imperiled Place’. In Studies in the History of Eastern Tibet, edited by Wim 
van Spengen and Lama Jabb, 97-132. Leiden: Brill.
Gellner, David N. 2013. ‘Introduction’. In Borderland Lives in Northern South Asia, 
edited by D. Gellner, 1-23. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Giersch, C. Patterson. 2001. ‘A Motley Throng: Social Change on Southwest China’s 
Early Modern Frontier, 1700-1880’. The Journal of Asian Studies 60 (1): 67-94.
Giersch, C. Patterson. 2006. Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s 
Yunnan Frontier. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Giersch, C. Patterson. 2010. ‘Across Zomia with Merchants, Monks, and Musk: 
Process Geographies, Trade Networks, and the Inner-East-Southeast Asian 
Borderlands’. Journal of Global History 5: 215-239.
76 sTéphane gros 
Giersch, C. Patterson. 2011. ‘Cotton, Copper, and Caravans: Trade and the Transfor-
mation of Southwest China’. In Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities and 
Networks in Southeast Asia, edited by Wen-Chin Chang and Eric Tagliacozzo, 
37-61. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Giersch, C. Patterson. 2014. ‘Commerce and Empire in the Borderlands: How Do 
Merchants and Trade Fit into Qing Frontier History?’ Frontier of History in 
China 9 (3): 361-383.
Giersch, C. Patterson. 2016. ‘Afterword: Why Kham? Why Borderlands? Coordinating 
New Research Programs for Asia’. Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture 
Review 19 (E-journal); print journal 5 (2): 440-452.
Goldstein, Melvyn C. 1998. ‘Introduction’. In Buddhism and Contemporary Tibet: 
Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, edited by Melvyn Goldstein and Matthew 
Kapstein, 1-14. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gros, Stéphane. 2014a. ‘Introduction’. Special issue ‘Worlds in the Making: In-
terethnicity and the Processes of Generating Difference in Southwest China’. 
Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 24: 1-30.
Gros, Stéphane. 2014b. ‘Devenirs identitaires dans les conf ins sino-tibétains: 
contextes et transformations’. Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 24: 63-102.
Gros, Stéphane, ed. 2016. ‘Frontier Tibet: Trade and the Boundaries of Authority 
in Kham’. Special issue, Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
19 (E-journal); print journal, 5 (2).
Gruschke, Andreas. 2004a. The Cultural Monuments of Tibet’s Outer Provinces. 
Kham – Volume 1. The TAR Part of Kham (Tibet Autonomous Region). Bangkok: 
White Lotus Press.
Gruschke, Andreas. 2004b. The Cultural Monuments of Tibet’s Outer Provinces. 
Kham – Volume 2. The Qinghai Part of Kham. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.
Hall, Thomas D. 2005. ‘Borders, Borderland, and Frontiers, Global’. In New Dictionary 
of the History of Ideas, Vol. 1, edited by Maryanne Cline Horowitz, 238-242. 
Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Hämäläinen, Pekka, and Samuel Truett. 2011. ‘On Borderlands’. The Journal of 
American History 98 (2): 338-361.
Hansen, Thomas Blom, and Finn Stepputat. 2006. ‘Sovereignty Revisited’. Annual 
Review of Anthropology 35: 295-315.
Harrell, Stevan, ed. 1995. Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press.
Harrell, Stevan. 1995. ‘Introduction: Civilizing Projects and Reaction to Them’. In 
Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, edited by Stevan Harrell, 3-36. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
FronTier (oF) experience 77
Hayes, Jack Patrick. 2014. A Change in Worlds on the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands: 
Politics, Economies, and Environments in Northern Sichuan. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington.
Herman, John E. 2007. Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 
1200-1700. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University 
Press.
Hillman, Ben. 2003. ‘The Poor in Paradise: Tourism Development and Rural Poverty 
in China’s Shangri-la’. In Landscapes of Diversity: Indigenous Knowledge, Sustain-
able Livelihoods and Resource Governance in Montane Mainland Southeast Asia. 
Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium on MMSEA 25-28 August 2002, Lijiang, P.R. 
China, edited by Xu Jianchu and Stephen Mikesell, 545-553. Kunming: Yunnan 
Science and Technology Press.
Holmes-Tagchungdarpa, Amy. 2011. ‘Defining Peripheral Power: Writing the History 
of the Kingdom of Lhathog, Eastern Tibet’. In New Views of Tibetan Culture, 
edited by David Templeman, 7-19. Caulf ield, Australia: Monash University Press.
Holmes-Tagchungdarpa, Amy. 2014. The Social Life of Tibetan Biography: Textuality, 
Community, and Authority in the Lineage of Tokden Shakya Shri. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington.
Holmes-Tagchungdarpa, Amy. 2015. ‘Depicting Life in the Twentieth-Century 
Sino-Tibetan Borderlands: Local Histories and Modernities in the Career and 
Photography of Zhuang Xueben (1909-1984)’. In China’s Encounters on the South 
and Southwest: Reforging the Fiery Frontier over Two Millenia, edited by James 
A. Anderson and John K. Whitmore, 339-369. Leiden: Brill.
Huber, Toni. 2004. ‘Territorial Control by “Sealing” (rgya sdom-pa): A Religio-Political 
Practice in Tibet’. Zentralasiatische Studien 33: 127-152.
Imamura, Masao. 2015. ‘Guest Editorial: Rethinking Frontier and Frontier Studies’. 
Political Geography 45: 96-97.
Jagou, Fabienne. 2010. ‘Étude des toponymes utilisés par les Mandchous pour définir 
le territoire tibétain’. In Études tibétaines en l’honneur d’Anne Chayet, edited by 
J.-L. Achard, 127-146. Genève: Droz.
Jeanpierre, Laurent. 2010. ‘Frontière’. In Dictionnaire des concepts nomades en 
sciences humaines, edited by Olivier Christin, 157-169. Paris: Métailié.
Jessop, Bob, Neil Brener, and Martin Jones. 2008. ‘Theorizing Sociospatial Relations’. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26: 389-401.
Jinba, Tenzin. 2014. In the Land of the Eastern Queendom: The Politics of Gender and 
Ethnicity on the Sino-Tibetan Border. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Jinba, Tenzin. 2017. ‘Seeing Like Borders: Convergence Zone as a Post-Zomian 
Model’. Current Anthropology 58 (5): 551-575.
Jonhson, Corey et al. 2011. ‘Interventions on Rethinking ‘the Border’ in Border 
Studies’. Political Geography 30: 61V69.
78 sTéphane gros 
Jonsson, Hjorleifur. 2010. ‘Above and Beyond: Zomia and the Ethnographic Challenge 
of/for Regional History’. History and Anthropology 21(2): 191-212.
Kang, Xiaofei and Donald Sutton. 2016. Contesting the Yellow Dragon: Ethnicity, 
Religion, and the State in the Sino-Tibetan Borderland. Leiden: Brill.
Klein, Kerwin Lee. 1996. ‘Reclaiming the “F” Word, or Being and Becoming Post-
western’. The Pacific Historical Review 65 (2): 179-215.
Kolås, Åshild. 2008. Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called 
Shangrila. London: Routledge.
Lattimore, Owen. 1962. Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers 1928-1958. 
London: Oxford University Press.
Lattimore, Owen. 1951 (1940). Inner Asian Frontiers of China. New York: Capitol 
Publishing and American Geographical Society.
Lawson, Joseph. 2017. A Frontier Made Lawless: Violence in Upland Southwest China, 
1800-1956. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Leach, Edmund. 1960. ‘The Frontiers of “Burma”’. Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 3 (1): 49-68.
Leibold, James. 2007. Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier 
and its Indigenes Became Chinese. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lewis, Martin W. and Kären E. Wigen. 1997. The Myth of Continents: A Critique of 
Metageography. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Li Shaoming. 2008. Zang-Yi zoulang minzu lishi wenhua (History and Culture of 
the Tibeto-Yi Corridor). Beijing: Minzu chubanshe.
Lin, Hsiao-ting. 2006. Tibet and Nationalist China’s Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopo-
litics, 1928-49. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Lury, Celia, Luciana Parisi, and Tiziana Terranova. 2012. ‘Introduction: The Becom-
ing Topological of Culture’. Theory Culture Society 29 (4/5): 3-35.
Macdonald, Alexander. 1987. ‘Remarks on the Manipulation of Power and Authority 
in the High Himalaya’. The Tibet Journal 12 (1): 3-16.
Maconi, Lara. 2014. ‘Dans les yeux des artistes: Visions chinoises de Muli et du Kham 
pendant la seconde guerre sino-japonaise (1937-1945)’. Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 
23: 163-199.
Makley, Charlene E. 2003. ‘Gendered Boundaries in Motion: Space and Identity on 
the Sino-Tibetan Frontier’. American Ethnologist 30 (4): 597-619.
Martin, Lauren and Anna J. Secor. 2014. ‘Towards a Post-Mathematical Topology’. 
Progress in Human Geography 38 (3): 420-438.
McGranahan, Carole. 2002. ‘Sa spang mda’ gnam spang mda’: Murder, History, and 
Social Politics in 1920s Lhasa’. In Khams pa Voices: Visions of People, Place, and 
Authority, edited by L. Epstein, 103-126. Leiden: Brill.
McGranahan, Carole. 2003a. ‘Empire and the Status of Tibet: British, Chinese, 
and Tibetan Negotiations, 1913-1934’. In The History of Tibet, Vol. 3: The Tibetan 
FronTier (oF) experience 79
Encounter with Modernity, edited by Alex McKay, 267-295. Richmond, UK: 
Curzon Press.
McGranahan, Carole. 2003b. ‘From Simla to Rongbatsa: The British and the “Modern” 
Boundaries of Tibet’. The Tibet Journal 28 (4): 39-60.
McGranahan, Carole. 2006. ‘Tibet’s Cold War: The CIA and the Chushi Gangdrug 
Resistance, 1956-1974’. Journal of Cold War Studies 8 (3): 102-130.
McGranahan, Carole. 2007. ‘Empire Out of Bonds: Tibet in the Era of Decoloniza-
tion’. In Imperial Formations, edited by Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, 
and Peter C. Perdue, 173-209. Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research 
Press.
McGranahan, Carole. 2010. Arrested Histories: Tibet, the cia, and Memories of a 
Forgotten War. Durham: Duke University Press.
Michaud, Jean, ed. 2000. Turbulent Times and Enduring People: Mountain Minorities 
in the Southeast Asian Massif. Richmond: Curzon Press.
Michaud, Jean. 2010. ‘Editorial: Zomia and beyond’. Special Issue ‘Zomia and beyond’, 
edited by Jean Michaud, Journal of Global History 5 (2): 187-214.
Michaud, Jean. 2017. ‘What’s (written) History For? On James C. Scott’s Zomia and 
Especially Chapter 61/2’. Anthropology Today 33 (1): 6-10.
Mills, Martin A. 2014. ‘Who Belongs to Tibet? Governmental Narratives of State 
in the Ganden Podrang’. In Facing Globalization in the Himalayas: Belonging 
and the Politics of the Self, edited by G. Toff in and J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, 397-419. 
New Dehli: Sage.
Millward, James A. 1998. Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing 
Central Asia, 1759-1864. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mo Yajun. 2013. ‘The New Frontier: Zhuang Xueben and Xikang Province’. In 
Chinese History in Geographical Perspective, edited by Jefff Kyong-McClain 
and Du Yongtao, 121-139.Lanham: Lexington Books.
Norbu, Jamyang. 1986. Warriors of Tibet: the Story of Aten and the Khambas Fight 
for the Freedom of Their Country. London: Wisdom Publications.
Oakes, Tim. 2000. ‘China’s Provincial Identities: Reviving Regionalism and Reinvent-
ing Chineseness’. The Journal of Asian Studies 59 (3): 667-692.
Oakes, Tim. 2007. ‘Welcome to Paradise! A Sino-U.S. Joint-Venture Project’. In 
China’s Transformations: The Stories beyond the Headlines, edited by L. Jessen 
and T. Weston, 240-264. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlef ield.
Oakes, Tim. 2012. ‘Looking Out to Look In: The Use of the Periphery in China’s 
Geopolitical Narratives’. Eurasian Geography and Economics 53 (3): 315-326.
Oppenheim, Robert. 2007. ‘Actor-Network Theory and Anthropology after Science, 
Technology, and Society’. Anthropological Theory 7(4): 471-493.
Paasi, Ansi and Jonathan Metzger. 2016. ‘Foregrounding the Region’. Regional 
Studies 51 (1): 19-30.
80 sTéphane gros 
Parker, Bradley J. 2006. ‘Toward an Understanding of Borderland Processes’. 
American Antiquity 71 (1): 77-100.
Peng, Wenbin. 2002. ‘Frontier Process, Provincial Politics and Movements for 
Khampa Autonomy During the Republican Period’. In Khams pa Histories: 
Visions of People, Place, and Authority, edited by L. Epstein, 57-84. Leiden: Brill.
Perdue, Peter C. 2001. ‘Empire and Nation in Comparative Perspective: Frontier 
Administration in Eighteenth-Century China’. JEMH 5 (4): 282-304.
Perdue, Peter C. 2005. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. 
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna, and Gérard Toff in. 2011. ‘Introduction: Belonging and 
Multiple Attachments in Contemporary Himalayan Societies’. In The Politics of 
Belonging in the Himalayas: Local Attachments and Boundary Dynamics, edited 
by J. Pfaff-Czarnecka and G. Toff in, xi-xxxviii. New Dehli: Sage.
Pratt, Mary Louise. 1991. ‘Arts of the Contact Zone’. Profession: 33-40.
Ptáčková, Jarmila and Adrian, Zenz, eds. 2017. ‘Mapping Amdo: Dynamics of 
Change’. Special Issue, Archiv Orientální: Journal of African and Asian Studies, 
supplementa x.
Rafael, Vicente L. 1999. ‘Regionalism, Area Studies, and the Accidents of Agency’. 
American Historical Review 104 (4): 1208-1220.
Ren, Naiqiang and Tshe-dbang Rdo-rje. 1991. ‘A Toponymic and Administrative 
Study of Mdo-Khams’. In Theses in Tibetology in China, compiled by Hu Tan, 
30-66. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House.
Richardson, Hugh E. 1945. Tibetan Precis. Calcutta: Government of India Press.
Roche, Gerald. 2014. ‘Flows and Frontiers: Landscape and Cultural Dynamics on the 
Northeast Tibetan Plateau’. The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 15 (1): 1-25.
Rodman, Margaret C. 1992. ‘Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality’. 
American Anthropologist (NS) 94 (3): 640-656.
Rodriguez, Andres. 2011. ‘Building the Nation, Serving the Frontier: Mobilizing and 
Reconstructing China’s Borderlands during the War of Resistance (1937-1945)’. 
Modern Asian Studies 45 (2): 350-351.
Rodseth, Lars and Bradley J. Parker. 2005. ‘Introduction: Theoretical Considerations 
in the Study of Frontiers’. In Untaming the Frontier in Anthropology, Archaeology, 
and History, edited by Bradley J. Parker and Lars Rodseth, 3-21. Tucson: University 
of Arizona Press.
Rodseth, Lars. 2005. ‘The Fragmentary Frontier: Expansion and Ethnogenesis in 
the Himalayas’. In Untaming the Frontier in Anthropology, Archaeology, and 
History, edited by Bradley J. Parker and Lars Rodseth, 83-109. Tucson: University 
of Arizona Press.
Rösler, Michael and Tobias, Wendl, eds. 1999. Frontiers and Borders: Anthropological 
Perspectives. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
FronTier (oF) experience 81
Rumford, Chris. 2012. ‘Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders’. Geopolitics 
17: 887-902.
Ryavec, Karl E. 2015. A Historical Atlas of Tibet. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Samuel, Geoffrey. 1993. Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies. Wash-
ington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Scott, James C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Shi Shuo, ed. 2005. Zang-Yi zoulang: Lishi yu wenhua (The Tibeto-Yi Corridor: 
History and Culture). Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe.
Shi Shuo. 2011. ‘Jin jinian dalu xuezhe dui Kangqu de Yanjiu ji jueshi’ (New Directions 
in the Study of Kham among Mainland Researchers in the Last Decade). Xinnan 
Minzu Daxue Xuebao 12: 1-6.
Shneiderman, Sara. 2010. ‘Are the Central Himalayas in Zomia? Some Scholarly 
and Political Considerations across Time and Space’. In ‘Zomia and beyond’, 
special issue, Journal of Global History 5(2): 289-312.
Siu, Helen F., Eric Tagliacozzo, Peter C. Perdue. 2015. ‘Introduction: Spatial As-
semblage’. In Asia Inside Out: Connected Places, edited by E. Tagliacozzo, H. F. 
Siu, and P. C. Perdue, 1-30. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Slatta, Richard W. 1997. Comparing Cowboys and Frontiers. Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press.
Smyer Yü, Dan. 2017. ‘Introduction: Trans-Himalayas as Multistate Margins’. In 
Trans-Himalayan Borderlands: Livelihoods, Territorialities, Modernities, edited 
by D. Smyer Yü and J. Michaud, 11-41. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Sperling, Elliot. 1976. ‘The Chinese Venture in K’am, 1904-1911, and the Role of Chao 
Erh-feng’. The Tibet Journal 1 (2): 10-36.
Sułek, Emilia Róża and Jarmila Ptáčková. 2017. ‘Mapping Amdo: People and Places 
in an On-going Transition’. In ‘Mapping Amdo: Dynamics of Change’. Special 
Issue, edited by J. Ptáčková and A. Zenz, Archiv Orientální: Journal of African 
and Asian Studies, supplementa x: 1-14.
Tsering, Tashi. 1985. ‘Ñag-roṅ Mgon-po Rnam-rgyal: A 19th Century Khams-pa War-
rior’. In Soundings in Tibetan Civilization, edited by B. N. Aziz and M. Kapstein, 
196-214. New Delhi: Manohar.
Tsomu, Yudru. 2009. ‘Political and Territorial Survival in the Sino-Tibetan Bor-
derland: A Case Study of the Lcags La Kingdom During the Qing Dynasty’. In 
Studies in the History of Eastern Tibet, edited by Wim van Spengen and Lama 
Jabb, 55-96. Verlag: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies.
Tsomu, Yudru. 2013. ‘Taming the Khampas: The Republican Construction of Eastern 
Tibet’. Modern China 39 (3): 319-344.
Tsomu, Yudru. 2015. The Rise of Gönpo Namgyel in Kham: The Blind Warrior of 
Nyarong. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
82 sTéphane gros 
Turner, Frederick J. 1994 (1893). ‘The Signif icance of the Frontier in American 
History’. In ‘The Frontier in American History’. In Rereading Frederick Jackson 
Turner: ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ and Other Essays, 
edited by John Mack Faragher, 31-60. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tuttle, Gray. 2007. Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China. New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Van Schendel, Willem. 2002. ‘Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: 
Jumping Scale in Southeast Asia’. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 20: 647-668.
Van Schendel, Willem. 2015. ‘Spatial Moments: Chittagong in Four Scenes’. In Asia 
Inside Out: Connected Places, edited by Eric Tagliacozzo, Helen S. Hsiu, and Peter 
Perdue, 98-127. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Van Spengen, Wim and Lama Jabb. 2009. ‘Introduction’. In Studies in the His-
tory of Eastern Tibet, edited by Wim van Spengen and Lama Jabb, 7-17. Verlag: 
International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies.
Vasantkumar, Chris. 2014. ‘Dreamworld, Shambala, Gannan: The Shangrilazation 
of China’s “Little Tibet”’. In Mapping Shangrila: Contested Landscapes in the 
Sino-Tibetan Borderlands, edited by Emily T. Yeh and Chris Coggins, 51-74. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Vasantkumar, Chris. 2017. ‘Tibetan Diaspora, Mobility and Place: “Exiles in Their 
Own Homeland”’. Theory, Culture & Society 34 (1): 115-136.
Wang Mingming, 1999-2000. ‘Minzu yu Guojia. Cong Wu Wenzao de zaoqi lunshu 
chufa’ (Nationality and State: From the First Works of Wu Wenzao), Yunnan 
minzu xueyuan xuebao 16 (1/6) (1999): 19-25; 17 (6/1) (2000): 20-26.
Weinstein, Jodi L. 2014. Empire and Identity in Guizhou: Local Resistance to Qing 
Expansion. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Weiner, Benno R. 2016. ‘Tibet in China? China in Tibet’. In Handbook on Ethnic 
Minorities in China, edited by Zang Xiaowei, 83-110. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar.
White, Richard. 2011 (1991). The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics 
in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, Thomas M., and Hastings Donnan. 2012. ‘Borders and Border Studies’. In 
A Companion to Border Studies, edited by T. M. Wilson and H. Donnan, 1-25. 
Malden MA: Blackwell.
Winichakul, Thongchai. 1994. Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Wu Wenzao. 1990 (1926). ‘Minzu yu guojia’. Liumei Xuesheng Jibao (A Quaterly 
Journal for Chinese Students America) 11 (3). Reprinted in Wu Wenzao, Renleixue 
shehuixue yanjiu wenji (Studies in Anthropology and Sociology). Beijing: Minzu 
chubanshe, 19-36.
FronTier (oF) experience 83
Yang, Evelyne. 2016. ‘Tracing the Chol kha gsum: Reexamining a Sa skya-Yuan Period 
Administrative Geography’. Revue d’Études Tibétaines 37: 551-568.
Yeh, Emily T. 2007. ‘Exile Meets Homeland: Politics, Performance, and Authenticity in 
the Tibetan Diaspora’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25: 648-667.
Yeh, Emily T., and Chris Coggins, eds. 2014. Mapping Shangrila: Contested Land-
scapes in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Yen, Hsiao-pei, 2012. Constructing the Chinese: Paleoanthropology and Anthropology in 
the Chinese Frontier, 1920-1950. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University.
Ying, Li-hua. 2014. ‘Vital Margins: Frontier Poetics and Landscapes of Ethnic Identity’. 
In Mapping Shangrila: Contested Landscapes in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands, edited 
by Emily T. Yeh and Chris Coggins, 27-50. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Zangpo, Ngawang. 2001. Sacred Ground: Jamgon Khongtrul on ‘Pilgrimage and 
Sacred Geography’. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications.
Zartman, William I. 2010. Understanding Life in the Borderlands: Boundaries in 
Depth and Motions. Athens: The University of Georgia Press.
Ze Po and Ge Lei, eds. 2004. Hengduanshan minzu wenhua zoulang. Kangba wen-
hua mingren luntan wenji (The Cultural and Ethnic Corridor of the Hengduan 
Mountains: Miscellany Forum of Personalities about Khampa Culture). Beijing: 
Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe.
Zinda, John Aloyysius. 2014. ‘Making National Parks in Yunnan: Shifts and Struggles 
within the Ecological State’, in Mapping Shangrila: Contested Landscapes in the 
Sino-Tibetan Borderlands, edited by Emily T. Yeh and Chris Coggins, 105-128. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
About the Author
Stéphane Gros is a researcher at the Centre for Himalayan Studies, Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique (C.N.R.S., France). A social anthropolo-
gist by training (PhD Paris-Nanterre University, 2005), he has published a 
monograph entitled La Part Manquante (Société d’ethnologie, 2012) about 
the Drung (Dulong), a long-deprived minority of swidden agriculturalists 
of Yunnan province (China). He is the author of numerous articles and 
book chapters on issues of interethnic relations and ethnic classif ication, 
representations of ethnic minorities, poverty and categorization, as well 
as rituals and cosmology. He has edited or co-edited four collections of 
relevance to ethnographic theory, Chinese studies, and area studies. He was 
Principal Investigator for the European-Research-Council-funded project 
(Starting Grant No. 283870, 2012-2016) entitled ‘Territories, Communities, 
and Exchanges in the Kham Sino-Tibetan Borderlands’ (http://kham.cnrs.fr).





This article discusses the expression ‘Tibetan Borderlands’, a designation 
commonly used in Tibetan scholarly works when dealing with Kham and 
Amdo areas. It also reconsiders the centre-periphery dynamics between 
Central Tibet and the eastern regions, especially in the contemporary 
context. Contrary to most studies that focus on the relations between 
the eastern Tibetan regions and China, this paper questions their relation 
to the traditional centre: Lhasa and Central Tibet. In view of the current 
decline of Lhasa and its prevalence as a centre, is it still relevant today 
to speak of the eastern Tibetan regions as borderlands, and all the more 
so when they appear to have taken over from Lhasa as the new Tibetan 
centre?
Keywords: Buddhism, cultural life, identities, Kham, politics, tourism
To Elliot Sperling1
With the collapse of Lhasa as the center of its cultural world, the Tibetan 
periphery has had to devise means of survival in order to preserve its identity.
– Tsering Shakya, ‘Whither the Tsampa Eaters?’ (1993, 8).
1 While writing this article, I learned of the death of a very dear and close friend, Elliot 
Sperling. As a tribute to his total dedication to the Tibetan cause, I would like to offer him this 
article. 
This article has benef ited greatly from comments made by participants at the symposium 
‘Territories, Communities, and Exchanges in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands’, especially from 
those of Stéphane Gros and Pat Giersch to whom I am very grateful. I thank Bernadette Sellers 
who edited my English. All remaining errors are mine.
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
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Introduction
The eastern edge of the Tibetan plateau has long been the meeting ground 
and the politico-cultural interface between Mongols, Manchus, and Chinese 
rulers on one side, and Central Tibet rulers on the other. Nevertheless, this 
chapter focuses exclusively on the regions of Kham and Amdo as borderlands 
or margins of Central Tibet and Lhasa (Ü) in contemporary times. Two 
reasons go to explain this choice: on the one hand, these regions (especially 
Kham) have been the focus of growing attention in recent scholarship which 
details their relations with China from various perspectives – political, 
commercial, religious, cultural, etc. – (among others, Sperling 1976, 10-36; 
Nietupski 1999, 2011; Van Spengen 2000, 2006, 209-230; Epstein, ed. 2002; 
Rigzin Thargyal 2007; Mackley 2007; Van Spengen and Lama Jabb, eds. 2009; 
Gros, ed. 2016). Much less attention has been given to how these two regions, 
often qualif ied as ‘eastern Tibet’, can be understood and characterized 
in relation to Central Tibet. Among the few contributions on this topic, 
Pommaret (1999) and Huber (2011) discuss the Central Tibetan attitude 
towards some highland communities in the south (Mönpa-Lhopa), and 
Shneiderman (2006) focuses chiefly on the issue of ethnicity.
The expression ‘Tibetan borderlands’ appears quite commonly in Tibetan 
scholarly works, but the implications of its use on the areas it applies to are 
seldom explained. Among the earliest is Aris’s (1992) edited volume and 
introduction to photographs by the famous botanist-explorer Joseph Rock. As 
is often the case with works that deal with Kham and Amdo (see for example 
Wellens 2010; Yeh and Coggins 2014), Aris focuses only on the Chinese side 
of the borderland, as if Amdo or Kham were not also a borderland with 
Central Tibet. This is true of another conventional expression: ‘Sino-Tibetan 
Border(lands)’ (see Jinba 2014) which furthermore renders invisible the other 
ethnicities of these borderlands (Roche 2014). By contrast, the eponymous 
volume edited by Klieger (2006) offers a much broader coverage of Tibetan 
Borderlands in which he encompasses Nepal, Ladakh, Sikkim, Baltistan, 
Gyelrong, and Amdo. These few references, among many others, suff ice 
to point out that while the Tibetan borderlands have been the focus of 
growing attention, further work has yet to be done not only to grasp a 
better understanding of these diverse areas but mainly to reconsider the 
centre-periphery dynamics between Central Tibet and the eastern regions, 
especially in the contemporary context.
To shed some light on these dynamics, in this chapter I propose to f irst 
explore the Tibetan terminology used for borderlands and borders, and then 
to outline the characteristics of the relations between the traditional centre 
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of the Tibetan world (Lhasa and Central Tibet) and its eastern periphery. 
Against this background and underlying the changes that have taken place 
over several decades in Kham and Amdo, I argue that at present we observe 
a process whose dynamics no longer radiate from the centre to the periphery 
but, on the contrary, from the periphery to the centre. This de-centering 
process, as I see it, is the result of a complex combination of factors that 
I detail by paying particular attention to the f ields of religion, politics, 
culture, and tourism.
Through this endeavour I rely on an understanding of ‘borderlands’ akin to 
Zartman’s definition (2010, 2): ‘Borderlands are inhabited territories located 
on the margins of a power center, or between power centers, with power 
understood in the civilizational as well as the politico-economic sense. But 
like the sea at the edge of land (and the reverse), they are continually in 
movement, both fast and slow and any static depiction of the moment con-
tains within it the elements of its change’. This type of definition, however, 
gives prominence to power relations and centrifugal forces that need to be 
counterbalanced with proper acknowledgement of the dynamics alluded 
to above and the forms of agency that also contribute to shaping change. 
The contemporary period seems to be characteristic of a ‘frontier moment’, 
following Gros’ coinage in his Introduction, as a particular political and 
cultural conjuncture; it unsettles the conventional prism of centre-periphery 
relations.
Here I emphasize the relation to one centre (Lhasa) as opposed to the 
other (Beijing), which should not be understood as underestimating the 
latter’s role and influence on the changes I depict, because this particular 
lens seems appropriate for questioning whether the term borderlands is still 
appropriate to describe the two eastern regions, Kham and Amdo. In a more 
provocative manner, this chapter raises the question: since the prevalence 
of the centre that led these eastern regions to be called borderlands is no 
longer what it used to be, is it still relevant to speak of borderlands when the 
centre is in decline and the periphery has somehow dethroned the centre?
Vernacular terminology2
It would seem worthwhile to start our examination by reviewing the vernac-
ular terminology in the context of Tibetan history for what we conventionally 
2 In this section based on Tibetan terminology, the Wylie system of transliteration is given 
in parenthesis after the simplif ied transcription.
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call borderlands, borders, frontiers, or margins. This brief outline will show 
signif icant overlaps with the modern concept of borderland.
In ancient documents and inscriptions, one f inds so, or sokha (so kha), for 
‘frontier’ and so lönpo (so blon po)3 for ‘frontier minister’ (Richardson 1985, 
112-113). The great scholar and artist Gendün Chömpel (1903-1951) reminds us 
that ‘the minister who maintained vigilance (so) against external enemies 
was known as phyi so and the minister who maintained vigilance within 
the state was known as nang so. The latter term is still used as a title.4 The 
term so blon is an offshoot of the above term and is often encountered in the 
inscriptions of rdo ring (stone monuments)’ (Gedun Choephel 1978, 27-28). 
According to this author, the notion of ‘border’ is implicit in the toponym 
Kham, which derives from the expression khamkyi gyeltren (khams kyi rgyal 
phran), ‘the small principality on the border […], denoting the “border” of 
the land’ (ibid., 24).
Still in use today, sokha has the meaning of ‘a place to be on the watch 
for enemies; a watchtower’ (Tshig mdzod chen mo)5 and is thus related to 
borders. A common expression in the literature is takhop (mtha’ ’khob), an 
expression that comes from the Sanskrit pratyanta meaning:6 ‘bordering 
on, adjacent or contiguous; a bordering country, i.e. a country occupied by 
barbarians’. The Tshig mdzod chen mo (1986, 1201) def ines takhop as ‘a land 
where civilisation [Dharma] has not spread’,7 ‘the country where the fourfold 
retinue8 of the Buddha have not come’; ‘a border region of a country or a 
kingdom’.9 It is not surprising that this expression, which can be glossed 
as referring to bad, rough, remote, and barbarous areas, is generally used 
in Buddhist historiography with the meaning ‘uncivilized country’. It is 
signif icantly applied, for example, to Tibet, the Land of Snow, before the 
latter was civilized or ‘tamed’ by Buddhism.10 Takhop is also sometimes 
3 See also the Dba’ bzhed (folio 5b; Pasang Wangdu-Diemberger 2000, 39) where we can read 
that Dba’ gsal snang was sent to Mang yul as so blon.
4 On nang so, see also Yangdon Dhondup (2011, 33-59).
5 Dgra la sol ta sa; so kha’i mgar (1986, 2952).
6 Monier-Williams (1993, 664). I would like to thank Daniel Berounsky for this information.
7 Rig gzhung ma dar pa’i yul.
8 Sangs rgyas kyi ’khor rnam bzhi mi rgyu ba’i yul; the four types of followers of the Buddha 
are male and female laypersons, fully ordained male and female persons [including monks, 
nuns, and male and female novices].
9 Rgyal khams sam yul gru bzhi gi mtha’ mtshams sa khul.
10 There are plenty of examples in the Mani bka’ ’bum, a ‘treasure-text’ (gter ma) which is a 
collection of teachings and practices centred on Avalokiteśvara as well as in the Rgyal rabs 
gsal ba’i me long (Mirror Illuminating the Royal Genealogies), a fourteenth-century Buddhist 
historiography. As for example in the Rgyal rabs gsal ba’i me long translated by Sørensen (1994), 
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understood as the periphery populated by ‘barbarians’.11 Ta (mtha’) with 
the meaning of ‘remote, borders’ is still in use in modern times. In the 1940s 
the Khampa Communist Bapa Püntsok Wangyel and his friends used it in 
the name of the organization they founded, the Khambö takhül ledönuyön 
lenkhang (Khams bod mtha’ khul las don u yon lhan khang), the ‘Communist 
Party Work Committee of the Kham-Tibetan Border Area’ (Goldstein et 
al. 2004, 129). This expression is used today in the media to describe a remote 
area.12 In addition, one can say tatsam (mtha’ mtshams) (lit. demarcation of 
the margins) or satsam (sa mtshams) (lit. demarcation of land) for borders, 
and satsam kyimi (sa mtshams kyi mi), for ‘people of the border’ or satsamsu 
dökhen (sa mtshams su sdod mkhan), ‘those who inhabit the border’.13
To sum up, we can say that the vernacular terminology def ines the 
borderlands as places to be defended or to be made civilized. But do people 
from Central Tibet regard Kham and Amdo as places to be defended or 
civilized? And what about the perception Tibetans from eastern areas have 
of Ü, the traditional centre?
Borderlands versus Centre
For centuries, Central Tibet and its capital Lhasa were considered to be 
the centre – as expressed in the very name of the region, Ü, ‘Centre’ – of 
the historical, religious, economic, and cultural life of the Tibetan world, 
mtha’ ‘khob, pp. 26 and 38 of the Tibetan text, is translated as ‘barbarous borderland’ (Sørensen 
1994, 97 and 112), and kha ba can ni mtha’ ’khob kla klo’i yul is translated as ‘The Snow-capped 
[country], a barbarous and savage borderland’ (Sørensen 1994, 205).
11 This is the case in a Tibetan encyclopedia compiled in the f ifteenth century by Döndam 
Mawe Senge (Don dam smra ba’i seng ge), the Bshad mdzod yid bzhin nor bu (A Treasure of 
Explanation, the Jewel that Fulf ills One’s Desires) (Smith 2001, 221). See also: mtha’ ‘khob kyi 
kla klo rnams, ‘People Inhabiting the Outlying Territories’ http://rywiki.tsadra.org/index.php/
mtha%27_%27khob_kyi_kla_klo (accessed 4 September 2017); and kla klo mtha’ ‘khob kyi zhal 
lce, ‘The Law of the Barbarian Borderlands’ http://www.tbrc.org/#!rid=O01ACI124|O01ACI1240
1ACI168$W12165 (accessed 4 September 2017). The Tibetan and Himalayan Library’s dictionary 
gives ‘outlying district, border, outskirts, barbarian, primitive [border]land without learning. 
Border regions. A wild and savage land; borderland; primitive borderland’, http://www.thlib.
org/reference/dictionaries/tibetan-dictionary/translate.php (accessed 8 September 2017).
12 http://tb.tibet.cn/2010news/xzxw/whjy/201404/t20140410_1987488.html (accessed 4 Sep-
tember 2017).
Samten Karmay told me that in the eulogy (bstod pa) to Shugden, it is written: gshen rab lugs 
ngan ‘dzin pa’i mtha’ ‘khob tu: here mtha’ ‘khob designates the Dromo valley, in southern Tibet, 
on the eastern border of Sikkim (personal communication 17 February 2015).
13 Information given orally by Chung Tsering (17 January 2016).
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the civilizing centre where all Tibetans aspired to go, at least once in their 
lifetime. A saying expresses this feeling very clearly: ‘They who have not 
seen Lhasa live only half [a life]’.14 ‘Until 1950, all Tibetan-speaking people 
regarded Lhasa as the centre of their universe’, writes Tsering Shakya (1993, 
10). The same applied to Tibetans from all over Tibet, as shown for example 
in Tibetan biographical literature translated into English. Aten, a ‘Khampa 
warrior’, claims that ‘for our people in eastern Tibet it was the culminative 
[sic] experience of a lifetime to see Lhasa, at least once before we died. The 
city was not only the capital of our country but also the centre of our culture 
and our religion’ (Jamyang Norbu 1979, 45). Rinchen Lhamo ([1926] 1985, 
165), also a Khampa and the f irst Tibetan woman to marry a European, 
Sherap from Kham (Combe 1975, 56), noble ladies such as Jamyang Sakya 
from Kham (Jamyang Sakya and Emery 1990, 43), or Dorje Yudon Yuthok 
from Lhasa (1990, 73), and Bapa Püntsok Wangyel (Goldstein et al. 2004, 
69), among others, all speak about Lhasa in the same terms. As for the great 
Amdowa yogi Shabkar, ‘he portrays the city of Lhasa as being the “center 
of Tibet”’ (Pang 2018, 44).
Amdowas emphasized even further the centrality of the city when going 
on a pilgrimage to Lhasa, saying that ‘they were going to Ü, to the [spiritual] 
centre’. They even called themselves Ü-pas, literally ‘those of the centre’, 
understood as ‘those going to the [spiritual] centre’ (Naktsang Nulo 2014, 
75), and the road the pilgrims took when going to Lhasa on a pilgrimage 
was called ülam, ‘The road to the [spiritual] centre’, that is to say Lhasa.
One may wonder why people from Ü do not call themselves Ü-pas in the 
same way that people from Kham are called Khampas or those from Amdo, 
Amdowas. Could it be because they do not have the same sense of unity, 
or because they travel less than people from the eastern regions who often 
have to explain their origin (it is a fact that Khampas and Amdowas often 
went to Central Tibet for religious or commercial purposes, while it was not 
usual for people from Central Tibet to travel to the east); or rather because, 
being from the centre, they represent the place in relation to which others 
def ine themselves.15
As for monks from the eastern regions, going to Lhasa to study at the 
famous Gelukpa monasteries, even if they were Bönpos, was extremely 
important since the monasteries at the periphery were ‘unable to compete 
14 Lha sa ma mjal mi lus phyed pa.
15 Generally speaking, this parallels a ‘majority’ (those at the centre) as the by-default category. 
This is true of Han in the context of China. See Mullaney et al. (2012), a collection of essays 
exploring what it means to be Han in China.
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with the great scholastic centres’ in Lhasa (Dreyfus 2003, 47). For these 
monks, Drepung was the most prestigious centre of philosophical studies 
since it had been the seat of the Ganden Phodrang, the Tibetan government 
in former times, thus lending importance to a government of which they 
otherwise considered themselves independent.
The feeling of not even belonging to the same country (namely Tibet) 
was manifest in the use of the term Bö, ‘Tibet’, to designate Lhasa and 
Central Tibet.16 The biography of Bapa Püntsok Wangyel (2004) clearly 
shows how the idea of a pan-Tibetan nationality was often badly looked 
upon because many Khampas regarded the ‘Böpas’, Tibetans from Central 
Tibet, as ‘different nationalities or ethnic groups’ (Goldstein et al. 2004, 
55) – a perception conf irmed by a Khampa from Lithang who describes 
his trips to Lhasa before 1959 as going to ‘Tibet’ (Bö),17 implying that he 
was going to another country. But Böpa does not have the same meaning 
throughout Tibet and the people from the high plateau of Changthang, 
the Northern Plain, only use it to designate the people of Lhasa (Tsering 
Shakya 1993, 8).18
Another striking example of this sense of not belonging to Tibet – nor to 
China – can be found in a Golok song recorded by Namkhai Norbu (1997, 3):
I rebel (nolok) against those up there/ I rebel against Tibet/ I rebel/ Against 
the orders of the Dharma King of Tibet I rebel/ I rebel and the sky is with 
me/ The blue sky is with the rebellion/ I rebel against those down there. 
I rebel/ Against China I rebel […]19
As this song clearly shows, relations between the Ganden Phodrang gov-
ernment and the peripheral areas were not of the peaceful neighbourly 
sort. There were numerous conflicts and exchanges of f ire could often be 
heard. In the 1930s the Khampas regarded the ‘Tibetan army’, the army of 
the Lhasa government, as an enemy army. In a book written by a certain 
Orgyan Nyima (2016) containing a collection of interviews by Khampas 
describing their lives between the 1930s and the Chinese occupation of 
16 A lot of work still has to be done on the terms pha yul, lung pa, rgyal khab, mes rgyal (This 
last term is a new one which appeared after 1950. Information Bugang from Chamdo, May 2016). 
The question of when Tibetans use these words depends on the region they belong to, on the 
context, and on who their interlocutor is.
17 McGranahan (2010, 120). See also Goldstein et al. (2004, 54).
18 Here I will not discuss the situation among the diaspora since it is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
19 Namkhai Norbu doesn’t provide the Tibetan version of the song.
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the 1950s, those interviewed recount the ‘invasion of the Tibet Army’ 
in the 1930s (ibid., 22, 29, 36, etc.). Khampas were even members of a 
militia which, alongside the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang (1903-1975), fought 
against the Tibetan Army (ibid., 27), and the militia in Drawu (place of 
the narrator’s native community)20 joined the Chinese soldiers to defeat 
the Dergé troops (ibid. 4). During those years, the Khampas considered 
that they were in ‘Tibet proper’ when they were on the other side of the 
Drichu or Yangtze (Goldstein et al. 2004, 57), which marked the frontier 
between ‘Inner Tibet’ (Kham) under Qing authority and ‘Outer Tibet’ 
(Bö) under the Ganden Phodrang, thus following and respecting the 
Simla Convention of 1914.21 It was only with the advent of the People’s 
Liberation Army that ‘the hatred between Drawu and Dege faded’ (ibid., 44) 
since they had to f ight side by side against the same enemy. Nevertheless, 
relations between them were still tense: in 1956, following the numerous 
battles between Khampas and the soldiers of the People’s Liberation 
Army, Khampa traders appealed to the Lhasa government for help and 
were ‘amazed’ not to receive an answer (Tsering Shakya 1999, 141). In 
fact, following the implementation in 1955-1956 of so-called ‘democratic 
reforms’ in Kham, widespread revolts erupted and were brutally repressed; 
the main monastery in Lithang was bombed on 28 March 1956. Many 
Khampas f led and took refuge in Lhasa22 where they had to face the 
inhabitants of the city who, at the outset, did not believe their stories 
about the exactions. On the contrary, ‘they tended to stereotype them 
as unruly and troublesome’ (Tsering Shakya 1999, 142), all the more so 
since the Khampas themselves conceived their own country as ‘a lawless 
and uncertain land’ in which ‘a rif le was an essential part of man’s life. It 
was not only the fear of bandits […] but also due to prevalence of bloody 
and interminable feuds’ (Jamyang Norbu 1979, 24).23 Relations between 
Lhasapas and Khampas were problematic: even though Lhasapas did not 
refer to Khampas and Amdowas by the same pejorative names they used 
for communities on the southern margins, they nevertheless considered 
themselves much more ‘civilised’ (Pommaret 1999, 53; Schneiderman 
2006, 15; Huber 2011, 260).
20 Drawu (Gra ’u) was a place under the jurisdiction of Drawu cenurion (Tib. brgya dpon; Ch, 
baihu) in Jyekundo (I thank Yudru Tsomu for this information).
21 On the Simla Convention regarding Kham, see Goldstein (1989, 67-74 and 832-841).
22 According to Kapstein (2004, 237) about 55,000 Amdowas and Khampas camped in and 
around Lhasa at the beginning of 1959.
23 There is an old saying: A blow on the nose of a hated enemy / Is surely more satisfying / 
Than to listen to the advice / Of benevolent parties (Jamyang Norbu 1979, 25).
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For their part, Khampas perceived themselves as ‘straightforward and 
honest’ while they regarded Lhasapas as affected and slick (McGranahan 
2010, 121). When in Lhasa on a pilgrimage or for trade, Khampas and Amdo-
was were faced with new customs, new laws, and new habits, which often 
accentuated this feeling of otherness they felt in relation to Lhasapas. In 
1954-1955, when Naktsang Nulo (2014, 108), a young Amdowa, went on a 
pilgrimage to Lhasa with his father and some companions, he was struck by 
the spectacle he witnessed of criminals with shackles around their ankles 
and a yoke around their necks. This reminded him of a saying he had often 
heard: ‘If you want to see the sufferings of hell, you must go to Lhasa’.24 
Moreover, one of his companions was arrested by Tibetan soldiers, and the 
Amdowa pilgrims refused to abide by the laws laid down by the Ganden 
Phodrang, laws which they did not consider themselves to be concerned 
by. They therefore disarmed the soldiers, released the prisoner, and handed 
him over to their own chief (ibid. 117), the only person who, according to 
them, represented the law.
Local and national identities
Relations between the centre and the eastern borderlands were not devoid 
of ambivalence. But after Chinese communists entered Central Tibet in the 
1950s, regional identities that were traditionally strongly bound to local terri-
tory, religious school, and master were then eclipsed by a pan-Tibetan identity, 
more secularized (through the influence of intellectuals) and politicized.25
The emergence of a feeling of Tibetan national identity is a recent 
phenomenon linked to political events in the recent past (occupation of 
Tibet, national policies, and ethnic categorization system introduced by 
the Communists) (Tsering Shakya 2012, 24) – even if regional identity is still 
sometimes stronger than national identity (Kolås 2008, 83). Indeed, there 
were grounds for a shared identity: Tibetan Buddhism, a specif ic culture, a 
common mythology, a common written language, a common history, shared 
memories, customs, and territory gave the population of the vast Tibetan 
plateau a sense of belonging to a specif ic group, sharing a large number of 
identity features distinct from other countries.
24 dmyal khams sdug bsngal ni blta dgos na ; lha sa’i grong du ‘gro dgos ni red (Naktsang Nulo 
[Nags tshang nus blo] 2008, 190).
25 For the transformation from a feeling of regional identity to a much more secular feeling 
of national identity, see Tsering Shakya (1993) and Jia Mang (2015).
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At the root of this sense of common belonging also lies the fact that 
Tibetans consider themselves insiders, that is to say Buddhists (nangpa) 
as opposed to outsiders, non-Buddhists (chipa). This strong feeling was 
expressed, for instance, through the name given to Chinese Communists 
who were described as ‘enemies of the doctrine’ (tendra), while the ‘Four 
Rivers, Six Ranges’ resistance army, the Chushi Gangdruk, was also called 
‘The Tibetan Volunteer Army to Defend Buddhism’ (Bökyi tensung dang 
langmak).
The f irst time the whole Tibetan population was united in a ‘common 
purpose and shared values’ (Tsering Shakya 1999, 165) was in 1957 when 
Khampa traders from Lhasa organized groups of people to collect, from 
all Tibetan regions, contributions towards offering a golden throne to the 
Dalai Lama in order to preserve Tibet and Tibetans from any obstacles and 
calamities that might arise.26 This was offered to the hierarch on 4 July 
during a ceremony called Tenshuk shabten, which, for Dreyfus (2005, 12), 
marked ‘the birth of Tibetan nationalism, the awareness that Tibetans have 
of belonging to a single country’.
The creation of the resistance army in 1958 was also an important step in 
nurturing the feeling of national identity. Although the Khampas organized 
it to combat the Chinese and made up the majority of the f ighters, some 
Amdowas and Lhasapas joined its ranks, thus creating a national movement 
(Nima Chodon 2012, 35-45).27
Between 1959, the year of the Lhasa uprising, until 1980 Tibet suffered 
a series of dreadful events: ‘democratic’ reforms, the destruction of the 
religious and cultural heritage, and the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution that swept through China. But following the visit to Central 
Tibet in 1980 by Hu Yaobang, the then Secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party, a movement of ‘liberalization’ emerged which led to a religious and 
cultural revival. Amdo and Kham then underwent a ‘revitalization of the 
local identity and the reconstitution of scarred sites, with this revival of 
religion and traditional practices heightening local identity’ (Tsering Shakya 
2012, 24). As we shall see, however, this revitalization of the local identity 
does not preclude the feeling of national identity from (re)appearing as soon 
as Tibetans confront the ‘Others’, the Chinese.
26 This ceremony expressed the people’s loyalty and confidence in the Dalai Lama’s leadership 
and conf irmed his earthly sovereign powers (Andrugtsang 1973, 51).
27 It is important to underline that many Amdowas had already been killed or jailed. ‘[In 1958] 
some nomadic areas of Amdo were reported to have been virtually emptied of men, all having 
f led or been killed or imprisoned. Most of the population of the Sokpo (Mongol) areas east of 
the Ma chu were reportedly massacred’ (Smith 1997, 442).
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Religious revival
Religious revitalization led to the (re)construction of religious buildings in 
the eastern borderlands just like in Central Tibet. Yet these areas stand out 
from others by the fact that replicas of monuments from Central Tibet, India 
and Nepal were (re)built. I have already shown elsewhere (Buffetrille 2015, 
133-152) that the choice of duplicate edif ices bears witness to the glory of 
a politically and religiously prestigious Tibetan past, referring to a time of 
Imperial Greatness, to the introduction of Buddhism in the Land of Snow, and 
to India, the holy country from where Buddhism came. They also constitute 
substitutes to famous pilgrimage sites where Tibetans are not allowed or are 
unable to go since these replicas are said to bring the same amount of merit.
Lung Ngön monastery in Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is a 
perfect example of a place where many replicas have been erected (Figure 
2.1): the main temple of Samyé (the f irst monastery built in Central Tibet in 
the eighth century), and Sekhar Gutog, Milarepa’s tower originally located 
in Lhodrag (southern Tibet) (see Akester 2016, 305-328; 464-469), as well as 
the Bodh Gaya Mahabodhi temple and the Jarung Kashor stūpa (Bodnath), 
which is even bigger than its original in Nepal. Dzogchen monastery, in 
Kandzé Autonomous Prefecture, also has its own replica of the Jarung Kashor 
stūpa whose consecration took place on Guru Rinpoche’s day, 13 August 
2016. Moreover, in several monasteries, such as Sershül or Dzogchen, Aśoka 
pillars and statues of elephants covered in gold leaves – a clear reference 
to India – have been built in the front courtyard. Furthermore, a private 
Tibetan company intends to build a new Yumbu Lagang in Amdo.28
One building in particular has been duplicated in many places: Milarepa’s 
tower, perhaps because Milarepa is considered the Tibetan yogi par excellence 
– contrary, for instance, to Padmasambhava who came from India (another 
sign of the emphasis on Tibetan identity). One was built in the seventeenth 
century in the city of Tsö in Amdo, then rebuilt after its destruction during the 
Cultural Revolution. Another one is to be found in Kham, in Sangkar (Gyelrong 
region),29 and yet another one in Kyodrag gönpa (Nangchen region).30
28 Françoise Robin, personal communication, 17 February 2015. She saw the plans of the building 
in 2014. Yumbu lhagang is said to have been the oldest building in Tibet. It was the palace of 
King Lhathotho Rinyentsen, the 28th mythical king. According to tradition, various Buddhist 
items – text about Avalokiteśvara as a stūpa – fell onto the roof one day. Not understanding the 
content of these objects yet aware of their value, he treasured them.
29 http://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-china-tibet-kham-sangkar-gyarong-gorges-novices-
in-front-of-milarepa-70376412.html (accessed 15 November 2017)
30 I thank Cécile Ducher for this information. The monastery belongs to the Barom Kagyü School.
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While Lhasa has long been the main destination for pilgrimages, eastern 
areas now appear to be more and more attractive on a religious level to the 
overall Tibetan population, and this is not only because of the replicas. 
Another phenomenon specif ic to Amdo and Kham is the presence of char-
ismatic religious f igures who have created new semi-monastic Buddhist 
encampments (chö gar) where several thousands of lay and religious devotees 
gather or have founded mountain hermitages (ri trö). Among them we f ind 
four prominent masters: Jigme Püntsok (1934-2004), founder of Larung 
Gar;31 Drubwang Lüntog Gyeltsen (1927-2011), known as Khempo Achung, 
who created Yachen Samten Ling (also simply called Yachen), which houses 
nuns as well as monks (see Cho, this volume); Kusum Lingpa (1934-2009), 
who set up Lung Ngön in Golok (see Buffetrille 2009, 523-554); and Dechen 
Ösel Dorjé (b. 1921), founder of f ive mountain hermitages in Nangchen 
(Terrone 2010). The setting-up of monastic camps is nothing new. Religious 
encampments already existed in the fourteenth century and were generally 
associated with the Karma Kagyü School (Terrone 2008, 763; 2009, 87). What 
is new though is the presence of lay and religious practitioners and the size 
of these encampments, which can house more than 10,000 practitioners, 
exceeding the number of monks in monasteries such as Drepung or Sera 
prior to the 1950s.32
These masters largely contributed to the revitalization of Buddhism in 
contemporary Tibet. Not only did they attract Tibetan disciples from all 
parts of Tibet and from all schools of Tibetan Buddhism, but also many 
Chinese practitioners. They were famous treasure-revealers (tertön) of the 
Nyingma school of Buddhism who upheld an ecumenical approach (rimé, lit. 
‘impartial’). Their endeavour has been perpetuated by their disciples. This 
is no mere anecdote because, as Dreyfus has shown, ‘memories as they are 
contained in the “treasures” act as a focus of identity for Tibetans’ (1994, 209).
A new religious phenomenon that was inspired by Jigme Püntsok and 
systematized during the years 2008-2010 by his main disciples continues 
today through other great masters and gives new visibility to these regions: a 
31 See Germano (1998, 53-94) and Terrone (2008, 747-779 and 2009, 73-110).
32 Since July 2016 the Chinese authorities have started the demolition of monastic dwellings in 
Larung gar and the eviction of nuns and monks with the aim of cutting the number back to 5000. 
See Shadow of Dust across the Sun: How Tourism is Used to Counter Tibetan Culture Resilience. ICT 
Report 13 March 2017. https://www.savetibet.org/shadow-of-dust-across-the-sun-how-tourism-
is-used-to-counter-tibetan-cultural-resilience/ (accessed 8 September 2017). Yachen underwent 
the same fate in the summer of 2017, see http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=39431
&article=After+Larung+Gar%2c+Yarchen+Gar+demolition+underway (accessed 8 September 
2017).
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movement based on a new set of ‘Ten Virtues’33 – with a focus on the ban on 
killing animals. Vegetarianism, which is not listed as one of the ten virtues, 
is also strongly advocated (see Tan, this volume). This new phenomenon, 
much discussed on blogs and supported by high-ranking lamas mostly from 
the eastern ‘borderlands’, is gaining strength throughout the country.34 In 
Amdo and Kham, for instance, most monasteries no longer serve meat but, 
while some of them allow their monks to eat meat outside (like Rongwo 
gönchen in Rebgong), others have totally banned its consumption inside and 
outside the monastery (such as Tashi Dargyeling in Kham). This movement, 
which has not received the support of all Tibetan people, has spread to the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (T.A.R.).
It may happen that the religious sphere is sometimes conflated with the po-
litical sphere. It is a well-known fact that the most important sacred mountains 
are located in border areas (as are beyül, valleys hidden by Padmasambhava 
33 The ten new virtues are: 1) not to butcher and sell meat, 2) not to steal or rob, 3) not to f ight 
with weapons, 4) not to prostitute one’s body, 5) not to sell guns and opium, 6) not to smoke 
opium or cigarettes, 7) not to drink alcohol, 8) not to gamble, 9) not to hunt, and 10) not to wear 
animal skin and fur.
34 See Galley (2011, 2013, 2016); Gaerrang (2011, 2012); Barstow (2013); Buffetrille (2015, 2016).
Figure 2.1  Lung Ngön monastery: Jarung Kashor stûpa (Bodnath)
photograph by katia buffetrille 2011
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where Tibetans could seek refuge when dangers threatened the country).35 
These mountains, which were traditionally perceived as territorial gods 
(yül lha), a non-Buddhist concept, mainly attracted populations from the 
surrounding areas who, through their worship, expected various mundane 
benefits (see Buffetrille 1998, 18-34). But this has changed. The year 2015 
was the year of the sheep according to the Tibetan duodenary calendar and 
the most important year for the pilgrimage to Mount Kawakarpo, located 
in northwest Yunnan province. Pilgrims from all over the Tibetan plateau 
came to circumambulate the mountain in growing numbers thanks to new 
modern means of transportation, to the rise in income, and to the increasing 
Buddhicization of these sacred mountains. In fact, these mountain territorial 
gods are more and more integrated in the Buddhist pantheon through a process 
of Buddhicization, which has led to their transformation into Buddhist sacred 
mountains. The growing number of pilgrims who come from all Tibetan regions 
to circumambulate Mount Kawakarpo (Figure 2.2) is also a consequence of the 
Chinese authorities’ religious policies that have prevented Tibetans from going 
to Kailash, the most sacred mountain in the T.A.R., for the great pilgrimage 
in the year of the horse (2014). Consequently, quite a few Lhasapas and people 
from Central Tibet have replaced it with the Kawakarpo pilgrimage, taking 
advantage of the greater political openness in eastern regions. This exemplifies 
the fact that the political situation can vary greatly across the Tibetan Plateau.
Political situation
As previously mentioned, following the Chinese occupation in the 1950s, the 
Land of Snow underwent a series of dramatic events that contributed to the 
decline of the Holy City. Moreover, in 1965 the territory that had been governed 
by the Ganden Phodrang since the seventeenth century was transformed into 
the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region which, for the Chinese authorities, 
corresponds to what they consider to be ‘Tibet’. For decades and up until today 
they regard it as an ‘autonomous’ area that had to be kept under strict control. 
This tighter control contrasts with the situation in Kham and Amdo – with the 
exception of parts of western Kham that are included in the T.A.R. – which 
have been fragmented into various autonomous administrative entities within 
Chinese provinces. There, the control exercised by the authorities has always 
been looser than it was in the T.A.R., providing more opportunities and rela-
tively greater freedom to partake in various cultural and religious practices.
35 See among others Bernbaum (1980), Sardar-Afkhami (2001), Buffetrille (2007, 1-22).
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At a political level, the demonstrations in 2008, which started in Lhasa 
and were led by monks, spread throughout the entire plateau. The feel-
ing of national identity was clearly expressed by Khampas and Amdowas 
who brandished the Tibetan flag during their demonstrations. From then 
on Tibetans in the eastern areas once again became agents of resistance, 
destroying the common perception of Tibetans in Tibet as powerless victims 
of the Chinese state (see also Shneiderman 2006, 61-63). Even though Lhasa 
had been a place of considerable contestation in the 1980s and in subsequent 
years, the Tibetan diaspora was usually considered to be the main centre 
of resistance and the promoter of nationalism. After 2008, however, the 
eastern margins became the centre of numerous peaceful protests: refusal to 
celebrate the New Year or to harvest; sit-ins by students or monks; desertion 
of monasteries by nuns and monks to escape the new restrictive rules; 
celebration of ‘White Wednesdays’ (Lhakar) that has spread through the 
diaspora, etc.36 One retaliatory measure imposed on Khampas and Amdowas 
was the ban on travelling freely to the T.A.R., demanding that they possess 
36 On this day which is said to be the day the Dalai Lama was born, Tibetans ‘eat Tibetan food, 
wear Tibetan clothing, speak [the] Tibetan language and celebrate the Tibetan identity’. See 
https://lhakardiaries.com/about/ (accessed 10 February 2019).
Figure 2.2  Kawakarpo range
photograph by katia buffetrille 2014
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a special permit, that they stay in designated hotels – new regulations that 
have contributed to altering a little more the role that Lhasa has played in 
Tibetan life for more than a millennium.
Following on from the 2008 demonstrations, a movement of self-
immolations that was launched in Amdo Ngawa in 2009 has signif icantly 
strengthened the sense of identity of all Tibetans in the Land of snow and 
beyond.37 To this day (15 March 2019), 153 Tibetans have self-immolated in 
Tibet and, with only six exceptions – in the years 2011 and 2012 – all the 
immolators hailed from Kham or Amdo (including two young men who 
self-immolated outside Jokhang temple in Lhasa on 27 May 2012 and a woman 
in Beijing on 12 September 2012). Following the system of ‘punishment by 
association’ established by the Chinese authorities, which entitles them to 
imprison all the relatives of the self-immolator, the movement has dwindled 
dramatically.38 Nevertheless, despite a step-up in spot-checks, Tibetans 
from the borderlands are still mobilized, and as of 2015 a succession of lone 
protests started to take place in Kham and Amdo.39
Cultural revival
One might think that this political tension in the borderlands would hinder 
the development of cultural life, which on the contrary is thriving. The 
literary scene has moved from Central Tibet to Amdo, particularly from 
the mid-1990s onwards, as shown by numerous scholars (Venturino 2007, 
Hartley and Schiaff ini 2008, Lama Jabb 2015, among others). Almost all 
writers who publish work in Tibetan (Döndrup Gyal, Tsering Döndrup, 
Shogdung, Jangbu, Sangdor, to name just a few) are from Amdo, as are 
several others who write in Chinese (Yidam Tsering, or Jamphel Gyatso i.e. 
Jiangbian Jiacuo), without forgetting Alai, from Gyelrong. Starting in 1993, 
quite a few of them set up literary groups, a phenomenon which apparently 
37 On self-immolations, see the Hot Spot in Cultural Anthropology (online), 11 April 2012; 
Buffetrille and Robin, eds. 2012; Buffetrille 2016, 343-360. The f irst immolation by a Tibetan took 
place in Delhi (India) on 27 April 1998. The self-immolator was Thupten Ngodrup, a sixty-year-old 
ex-Buddhist monk from Tashilhunpo monastery (Central Tibet) and a former soldier (in exile). 
See Buffetrille (2012, 1-18). See also the Afterword by Carole McGranahan, this volume.
38 There have been a total of 153 immolations in Tibetan areas: 1 in 2009, 12 in 2011, 84 in 2012, 
26 in 2013, 11 in 2014, 7 in 2015, 3 in 2016, 6 in 2017, and 3 in 2018.
39 http://tchrd.org/lone-tibetan-protester-holding-dalai-lamas-portrait-detained-incommu-
nicado/ (accessed 10 February 2019).
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/critical-03212017154647.html (accessed 10 February 2019).
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does not exist in Lhasa.40 The publishing sector is also booming in eastern 
areas along with websites and independent online forums, though none 
come from the T.A.R. (Tsering Shakya 2012, 27).
Moreover, the support that Chinese authorities have manifested over the 
decades for the recording and study of the Gesar Epic has prompted a revival 
in Kham and in Amdo of the Gesar religious cult and of the dances and 
cham dedicated to him. Statues of Gesar are being erected everywhere and 
museums dedicated to him are being opened (Figure 2.3). This revitalization 
of the Gesar tradition, which is used by the Chinese authorities as a means 
of propaganda, has nevertheless created an arena where Tibetans can assert 
their identity.41
In Amdo the preservation of a pure Tibetan language is taken very seri-
ously, and changes have been observed over the years with the gradual 
disappearance of Chinese loan words from the language. The importance 
accorded to language, a very strong medium for asserting the Tibetan 
identity, is often expressed on small pieces of paper that are put in shops 
requesting that Tibetans speak a pure Tibetan. Since 2010 Tibetans from 
Amdo have manifested through peaceful demonstrations their attachment 
to their language and its teaching in schools, a movement that has recently 
spread to Chengdu where a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress 
regional committee member and professor at Sichuan Teachers University 
has appealed for a real bilingual education.42 Since 2012 Tibetans have 
even succeeded in organizing in Nangchen a week-long competition to test 
Tibetan language skills.43
Amdo is also the cradle of new forms of expression with f ilmmakers such 
as Padma Tseten, Sonthar Gyal, Jangbu, or Kashem Gyal. They generally 
focus on their native land, shooting in rural or nomadic environments 
and in the Tibetan language. Their f ilms give insight into contemporary 
eastern Tibet, far from old stereotypes, exoticism, and Western fantasies. The 
spectator is confronted with today’s situation: the diff iculties, frustrations, 
and marginalization the Tibetan population encounters when faced with 
modernization and globalization whose impact on their traditional world 
is often brutal and destructive. Thanks to their success, their f ilms are now 
40 Sangye Gyatso (Gangzhün) 2008, 263-279, in particular pp. 268, 272-278.
41 Buffetrille (2010, 523-554), Henrion-Dourcy (2017, 191-214).
42 http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/education-01192017151624.html (accessed 10 February 
2019).
43 http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/awards-02012016143320.html (accessed 10 February 
2019).
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competing at national and international levels and have brought to mainland 
China, and even beyond, images of the Tibetan world of the margins.
Though writers and f ilmmakers are mainly Amdowas, most celebrated 
popular singers such as Yadong, Tsewang Lhamo, Dekyi Tsering, or Kunga 
Tsering are Khampas. They are recognized all over Tibet regardless of the 
language in which they sing: the Lhasa dialect, the Khampa dialect, or 
even Chinese. Their songs, which often deal with the beauty of the Tibetan 
landscape, religion, and the importance of expressing one’s Tibetanness 
through language, for instance, contribute to strengthening the sense of 
a Tibetan identity. The Chinese authorities are not altogether mistaken 
about the hidden messages of these artists, some of whom end up in jail.44
Local N.G.O.s also play a role in the cultural sphere and often hold an 
emphatic discourse on Tibetanness. A number of foreign N.G.O.s were 
expelled after the 2008 protests and many local ones forced to suspend their 
activities. Nevertheless, some are still active in the eastern borderlands and 
44 See among others: https://www.freetibet.org/about/human-rights/case-studies/musicians 
(accessed 10 September 2017). http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/singers-11292014130459.
html (accessed 10 September 2017). http://www.guchusum.in/popular-tibetan-singer-jailed-
for-political-songs-released/ (accessed 10 September 2017).
Figure 2.3  Gesar statue, Machen (Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture)
photograph by katia buffetrille 2011
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continue to provide services after changing their status to ‘social enterprise’ 
to escape the tighter controls in place today. In Kham, for instance, the 
Kawakarpo Institute in Dechen is highly involved in promoting local culture. 
Not only does it organize classes of spoken and written Tibetan, but it also 
publishes local writers (poetry and essays) and old songs heard in villages 
in a magazine entitled Return (Logs phebs).45 Though f irst published only in 
Chinese, it was decided in 2013 to publish it also in Tibetan. For some, this 
may appear to be a symbolic move since Tibetans in this area read more 
Chinese than Tibetan. It perhaps announces the beginning of a revival 
in Tibetan scripture in Dechen region, a revival that can be seen as the 
‘protection of one’s own ethnic identity and culture from cultural assimila-
tion, and resistance to the Chinese cultural and political domination in 
Tibet’ (Jia Mang 2015, 20). In fact, whereas in the years 2003-2005 there were 
practically no Tibetan-language books in Gyelthang, since 2014 bookshops 
have boasted a growing Tibetan section.
Boom in tourism
At the beginning of the 1980s, especially from 1984 with the opening of the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region to individual travellers, foreigners fascinated 
by Tibet poured into the T.A.R. But the Lhasa demonstrations in 1987, 1988, 
and 1989, the imposition of martial law from April 1989 to May 1990, and 
the restriction imposed on Westerners in the 1990s to travel only in groups 
organized through big-budget travel agencies all led to a relatively small 
number of Western visitors to the T.A.R. (compared to Nepal for example). 
The decision to promote tourism in the T.A.R. was taken in 2001 at the 
Fourth Tibet Work Forum in Beijing, but it was oriented mainly towards 
Chinese tourists.
For their part, off icials and locals in the eastern borderlands realized the 
economic potential of tourism and launched several projects to promote 
their region’s landscapes and culture. A Khampa Art Festival was organized 
as early as 1994. It is now held every four years on a rota basis in Jyekundo 
(Qinghai), Gyelthang (Yunnan), Chamdo (T.A.R.) and Dartsedo (Sichuan), 
therefore calling upon a Khampa city from each of the four Chinese provinces 
into which Kham has been divided, thus recreating a sort of Khampa terri-
tory. This festival is aimed at showing through various performances how 
45 The title itself is interesting and may give rise to various interpretations: return to the past? 
to the old world? to the old culture? to the Dalai Lama? etc.
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Tibetan culture is protected and developed in the framework of the People’s 
Republic of China (P.R.C.). It attracts innumerable tourists, both Chinese 
and Tibetan, from every part of the country. It receives strong support from 
the Chinese authorities, which have thereby become one of the instigators 
of the emergence of a new Khampa identity – this in no way undermines 
the large voluntary participation on the part of Tibetans.
Gyelthang is another example of a successful touristic destination. The 
boom started in 2001 after the city was renamed Shangrila.46 The place attracts 
mostly Chinese tourists, but more and more Tibetans from Lhasa and Central 
Tibet come to the city thanks to the airport which offers flights to and from 
Lhasa. This explosion of tourism (six million visitors in 2013 from April to 
September alone, according to a Tourist Office off icial) has drawn most of 
the local population into the tourist industry. Many Khampas from the area 
who were living in India have come back. The boom in tourism has attracted 
many Tibetans from other areas who are looking for a job and in addition 
like being in a place where police control is not as strict as elsewhere in the 
Tibetan areas. They settle here and often intermarry with local people. Quite 
a few are from Amdo or from Central Tibet. Most of them have been educated 
in India and often know each other from their period of exile. Their presence 
is far from being merely anecdotal: on the one hand, these are people who 
read and write Tibetan, contrary to the majority of Gyelthangpas; and on the 
other hand, and in spite of a strong sense of local identity and a tendency to 
keep company with people who are originally from the same region, their 
shared experience of living together reinforces a sense of national identity.
Conclusion
Although the civilizational centre of the Tibetan world was traditionally 
Lhasa and Central Tibet, the so-called Tibetan eastern borderlands, that is 
to say Kham and Amdo, are seen to be benefiting from increasing visibility 
and to be becoming today a seat both of resistance and of civilizational 
development. The dynamics of this shift are driven by the political situation: 
a centre crushed by a wall of silence and a periphery subjected to weaker 
control for several decades. As they watch Sinicization steamroller everything 
in its path, Khampas and Amdowas reveal their tenacity in claiming their 
Tibetanness in every way possible, as long as the latter is of a pacif ic nature, 
thus in keeping with the request of the Dalaï-Lama. In a way, the demise of 
46 Among others, see Hillman (2003, 177-190; 2010, 269-277), Kolås (2008).
The increasing visibiliT y oF The TibeTan ‘borderlands’ 105
Lhasa as the centre of the Tibetan cultural world has prompted people of 
the border areas to f ind new ways to assert their own culture and identity. 
Though Khampas or Amdowas still f ight to preserve their identity, their sense 
of belonging to the Tibetan nation is also present and expressed as soon 
as they are confronted with a denial of their right to express their identity.
As this chapter has demonstrated, and casting back to Zartman’s defini-
tion (2010, 2), ‘[borderlands] are continually in movement, both fast and slow 
and any static depiction of the moment contains within it the elements of its 
change’. Going beyond a simplistic portrayal of these borderlands as passive 
victims of distant power centres, this chapter has brought to the fore some of 
their internal dynamics. Today, the eastern margins of the Tibetan plateau 
no longer appear as a boundary between what in the past was considered 
the centre of the Tibetan world (Lhasa and Central Tibet) and the present 
dominant centre, the P.R.C. In spite of the centrally imposed diktat, people 
from these areas are active players in religious, political, cultural, and tourist 
realms. They take part in many ways in the dynamics that shape the Tibetan 
identity today, even when State institutions are involved, as in the Khampa 
art festival. This process of (re)construction of cultural forms and sense of 
belonging further blurs the centre-periphery divide and is exemplary of the 
kind of entanglements discussed by Gros in his Introduction. As he points 
out, the ‘in-betweenness’ of the borderlands gives rise to new proximities 
and distances alike; it attests to the multiplicity of the constitutive relations 
of the borderlands, which generate both continuity and transformations.
It is not the f irst time in Tibetan history that a territory on the margins 
has managed to maintain its own identity despite pressure exerted by the 
two centres of power that surround it. As is clearly shown by Yudru Tsomu 
(2009, 67), under the Qing, the kingdom of Chakla in Kham, ‘managed to […] 
survive by relying on a nascent Qing China to resist the encroachment of the 
newly founded Dalai Lama’s government of Lhasa’. The new centres that are 
Kham and Amdo, however, do more than just survive as Tibetan cultural, 
religious, political, and touristic centres: in the contemporary context, they 
constitute new poles of attraction for Tibetans and Chinese alike.
Glossary of Tibetan Terms
Amdo A mdo
Barom Kagyü school ’ba’ rom bka’ brgyud school.
beyül sbas yul
Bö Bod
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chö gar chos sgar
Chushi Gangdruk Chu bzhi gangs drug
Dartsedo Dar rste mdo
Dechen Bde chen
Dechen Ösel Dorjé Bde chen ‘Od gsal rdo rje
Dekyi Tsering Bde skyid Tshe ring
Dergé Sde dge
Döndrup Gyal Don grub rgyal
Drepung ’Bras spungs
Drichu ’Bri chu
Drubwang Lüntok Gyeltsen Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan
Dzogchen monastery Rdzogs chen dgon pa
Gaden Phodrang Dga’ ldan pho brang
Gendün Chömpel Dge ’dun chos ’phel




Jampel Gyatso ’Jam dpal rgya mtsho
Jangbu Ljang bu
Jarung Kashor Bya rung kha shor
Jyekundo Skye dgu mdo
Jigme Püntsok ’Jigs med phun tshogs
Karma Kagyü Kar ma bka’ brgyud
Kashem Gyal Mkha‘ byams rgyal
Kawakarpo Kha ba dkar po
Kham Khams
Khempo Achung Mkhan po A khyug
Künga Tsering Kun dga’ tshe ring
Kyodrag gönpa Skyo brag dgon pa
Kusum Lingpa Sku gsum gling pa
Larung gar Bla rung gar
Lhathotho Rinyentsen Lha tho tho ri gnyan btsan
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Lhodrag Lho brag





Padma Tseten Pema Tshe brtan
Rebgong Reb gong
ri trö ri khrod
rimé ris med
Rongwo gönchen Rong bo dgon chen
Samyé tsuglakhang Bsam yas gtsug lag khang
Sengdor Seng rdor
Sangkar Zangs dkar (?)
Sekhar Gutok Sras mkhar dgu thog
Shabkar Zhabs dkar
Sonthar Gyal Zon thar rgyal
Sershül Ser shul dgon pa
Shogdung Zhogs gdung
Tashi Dargyeling Bkra shis dar rgyas gling
Tendra Bstan dgra
Tenshuk shabten brtan bzhugs zhabs brten
tertön gter ston
Tsering Döndrup Tshe ring don grub




Yachen Samten Ling Ya chen bsam gtan gling
Yadong Ya dong
Yidam Tsering Yi dam Tshe ring
Yumbu Lagang Yum bu bla sgang
Yül lha yul lha
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This project seeks to discern and problematize the physical and concep-
tual boundaries of the Tibetan region of Gyelthang, in southern Kham. At 
issue are questions about the relationships between older conceptualiza-
tions of place and newer understandings of identity vis place. How do the 
various peoples who live within its boundaries understand Gyelthang? 
I argue that the complex and dynamic webs of religious institutions 
and ethnic identities in the region neither conform to f ixed physical or 
conceptual boundaries, nor situate Gyelthang as being in a ‘borderland’ 
between Tibet and China for local inhabitants. My work is based on an 
evaluation of historical sources coupled with ethnographic and folkloric 
data gathered during f ieldwork conducted over the past twenty-f ive 
years in Gyelthang.
Keywords: folklore, Geza, Gyelthang, Shangri-La, Xianggelila, Yunnan
Introduction
This chapter seeks to discern and problematize the physical and conceptual 
boundaries of the Tibetan region of Gyelthang, in southern Kham. At issue 
are questions about the relationships between older conceptualizations 
of place and newer understandings of identity vis place in 21st-century 
Sino-Tibetan borderlands, and about what might constitute a borderland. I 
argue that the complex and dynamic webs of religious institutions and ethnic 
identities in the region neither conform to f ixed physical or conceptual 
boundaries, nor situate Gyelthang as being in a ‘borderland’ between Tibet 
and China for local inhabitants.
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
doi: 10.5117/9789463728713_ch03
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Today, Gyelthang is part of Northwest Yunnan Province of the People’s 
Republic of China, roughly corresponding to the current administrative 
division of Shangri-La County (Ch. Xianggelila xian), although not, more 
expansively, the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Ch. Diqing Zangzu 
zizhizhou). Gyelthangpa – the people of Gyelthang – speak several local 
Tibetic languages,1 and there are pockets within this territory where Tibetan 
inhabitants identify neither as Gyelthangpa nor Khampa. Gyelthang cannot 
be cleanly defined by the constellations of monastic power. With no specific 
historical political or religious demarcation of the boundaries of Gyelthang, 
and with no unified linguistic or ethnic identity, what then makes (or made) 
Gyelthang Gyelthang? How do the various peoples who live within its 
boundaries understand Gyelthang? Do Tibetans of Gyelthang understand 
themselves to be Khampa, or even Gyelthangpa?
As historians and anthropologists interested in Kham, many of us seek 
to understand the interface of the Tibetan and Chinese cultural, political, 
and religious ‘borderlands’, and recent works have ostensibly addressed the 
region, sometimes without adequately scrutinizing the way we employ the 
term – as Gros and Buffetrille also point out in this volume.2 The concept 
of a Sino-Tibetan ‘borderland’ also assumes a prioritization of the points of 
view of the large but historically distant power centres of ‘Tibet’ (whatever 
‘Tibet’ might mean or might have meant historically to Gyelthangpa), and 
‘China’, writ large (same issue). The borderlands are further problematized by 
the ethnic diversity of the interface. Not only are there many ethnic groups 
such as the Naxi, Yi, Primi, Drung, Nung, Lisu, Bai, and Malimasa who live 
within and between regions traditionally understood as Tibetan and (Han) 
Chinese in southern Kham, but the cultural identity of these peoples is 
differently understood depending on the perceiver (e.g. many Tibetans from 
areas further north in Kham think of the Naxi as being slightly wayward 
Tibetans, despite the Naxi understanding of themselves as distinct from 
Tibetans), and depending, bien sûr, on the imposed ethnic classif icatory 
scheme devised by the Chinese state. Historically, and to a lesser degree still 
today, Gyelthang is positioned between other Tibetans to the north, and 
non-Han groups to the south, east, and west. So, in effect, Gyelthang might 
be better considered the Naxi-Tibetan borderlands or the Yi-Tibetan, rather 
1 See Bartee (2007), and for a nuanced account of the ‘Tibetic languages’ of the region, see 
Suzuki (2015).
2 In her review of Emily T. Yeh and Chris Coggins’s (2014) edited volume, Mapping Shangrila, 
Katia Buffetrille (2016) celebrates the scholarship inside the volume, while ‘regretting the absence 
of a discussion about the def inition of the term “Sino-Tibetan Borderlands”’.
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than the Sino-Tibetan borderlands. My point here is that there is a worry 
that the term ‘borderlands’ runs the risk of assuming a simple dichotomy 
between two important groups, but such is not necessarily the predominant 
way Gyelthangpa understand themselves; many Gyelthangpa neither think 
of their neighbours as two large clearly-defined identity centres, nor do they 
see themselves as living ‘in between’.
In what follows, I will delve into two related tributaries that together 
contribute to the difficulties in f ixing a clear definition of Gyelthang. First, in 
admittedly rough and broad brushstrokes, I will attempt to contextualize the 
roles of power and history in the demarcation of Gyelthang with an emphasis 
on the importance (or lack thereof) of Ganden Sumtseling monastery.3 While 
since the seventeenth century Ganden Sumtseling monastery constituted 
an important centre of identity-gravity in the region, the geographical 
extension of its control was not congruent with the region of Gyelthang.4 
The monastery includes eight kangtsen, or monastic colleges. Importantly, 
some of the geographical areas controlled by the eight kangtsen fall outside 
of Gyelthang.5 Herein, I will bring us up to the present moment (2018) and 
3 Although certainly not the only monastery in the region, Ganden Sumtseling was, since 
the late seventeenth century, the primary monastery of Gyelthang, representing the reach of 
inf luence of the Ganden Phodrang in Lhasa. However, the much smaller Geluk monastery of 
Ringa (Ch. Da Bao Si) is sometimes better known to Tibetans from other regions and remains 
a place of great spiritual import to locals.
4 By ‘identity-gravity’, here, I am highlighting the idea that for many Gyelthangpa, the mon-
astery itself was an important part of their identity, and the monastery and its geographical 
location served as a crucial place indicator for one’s homeland. When speaking with people 
about where one is from, monasteries not only serve as part of an answer, but people from 
farther af ield often associate people with the religious and/or political aff iliations of the most 
prominent local monastery or even monastic kangtsen. Of course, a monastery is much more 
than simply an identity marker.
5 Kangtsen are physical structures within the monastery, associated with geographical areas 
near to the monastery. In total, the areas associated with the kangtsen correspond to the full 
range of control of the monastery, and the Tibetan (and Naxi) inhabitants traditionally paid 
taxes to and sent their sons to be monks at their corresponding kangtsen. This is not to say 
that the entirety of the population represented by a kangtsen of Sumtseling Monastery were 
Gelukpa Buddhists. For example, while Dongwang kangtsen, one of the most important and 
economically powerful at Sumtseling, is the place Gelukpa families from Dongwang send their 
sons to be monks, the valley system of Dongwang includes many Nyingmapa families that do not 
support and are in no way aff iliated with Sumtseling. When Gelukpa pilgrims from Dongwang 
visit Sumtseling, a stop at the Dongwang kangtsen is a central component of their visit, is the 
central place of their f inancial donations, and is the residence of the monks who would be asked 
to travel to Dongwang when there is a need for the performance of domestic ceremonies. More 
to the point of this chapter, though, Dongwang lies to the north of and is not considered to be 
part of the region of Gyelthang. The constellation of power of the most central and important 
monastery in Gyelthang – both in terms of constellation of monastic institutional power and 
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illuminate how diff iculties associated with the monastery contribute to a 
lack of clarity about Gyelthangpa identity. Second, attention will be turned 
to the theoretical work of scholar of comparative religious theory Jonathan Z. 
Smith. I employ Smith’s claims and warnings about the relationship between 
‘map’ and ‘territory’ in relation to dynamics of identity among Tibetans 
of Gyelthang. I do not think that the idea of Kham, the notion of being a 
borderland, and even the moniker of Gyelthang are particularly important 
to local inhabitants or central to their identity. Instead, far more value is 
placed on the very local, the very ground beneath very real feet. My work is 
based on an evaluation of historical sources coupled with ethnographic and 
folkloric data gathered during f ieldwork conducted over the past twenty-five 
years in Gyelthang.
Gyelthang as Territory: Power, the State, and the Monastery
All told, Gyelthang is relatively small, and today one can drive across from 
east to west in three hours, and from south to north in about f ive.6 There are 
two common misconceptions about Gyelthang: f irst, that it is the Tibetan 
region of Yunnan Province. Rather, it is one of several Tibetan regions of 
Yunnan; the regions of Dechen and Tacheng are not part of Gyelthang, nor 
are other Tibetan areas of Yunnan such as Yagra, and Dongwang.7 Second, 
the related power of the Geluk religious order – does not correspond to the physical landscape 
of the region of Gyelthang. See Schwieger (2010) and Kolås (2008), and for a detailed account 
of the power dynamics behind the founding of the monastery, see Schwieger (2011). For details 
about Ganden Sumtseling prior to its destruction, see Bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan (1985). For an 
understanding of Sumtseling monastery’s destruction during the early phases of the Cultural 
Revolution, see the chapter by Dáša Mortensen in this volume. For a glimpse into the role of 
the monastery vis the local community f ifteen years ago, see Hillman (2005). For a sense of 
Gyelthangpas’ understanding of and sentiments about Sumtseling, see Mortensen (2016).
6 Gyelthang is approximately 120 miles (193 km) north to south, and at its widest, 60 miles 
(97 km) east to west. However, due to the high mountains and steep river valleys running 
longitudinally more or less north to south, there are no direct east-west roads. Gyelthang is 
approximately 10,000 km2.
7 The edges of Gyelthang are, alas, diff icult to define, and the definitions can depend on whom 
you ask. Inhabitants of Balagezong, for example, do not universally consider themselves to be 
Gyelthangpa, and their neighbours, the inhabitants of Nagara, do not think of Balagezong as part 
of Gyelthang. However, some people from Shangrila Town with whom I have spoken describe 
Balagezong as being part of Gyelthang. Part of this discrepancy can perhaps be attributed to 
the fact that while Balagezong does lie within Yunnan and to the (north)east of Benzilan, which 
is considered to be just outside the western edges of Gyelthang, the inhabitants of Balagezong 
are rumoured to be descendants of refugees from Bathang, in today’s Sichuan Province, to the 
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that it corresponds to Shangri-La County-Level City (Xianggelila County); 
it does not (see Map 3.1).
The idea of Gyelthang is bordered to the southwest by the (primarily Lisu, 
Tibetan, Naxi, and Han) Weixi Lisu Autonomous County (within Diqing 
Prefecture), including the Tibetan area of Tacheng, which is not part of 
Gyelthang. To the west, Gyelthang does not include areas west of the Nixi 
valley. Thus, Benzilan and Dechen fall outside of Gyelthang. Deqin County 
(Ch. Deqin xian) to the northwest, is not part of Gyelthang. The country of 
Myanmar and the Tibetan Autonomous Region (T.A.R.) lie not far to the 
west and northwest.
The Tibetan Autonomous Ganzi Prefecture of Sichuan and the proximate 
valley of Chaktreng (Xiangcheng), lie just beyond the northern boundary of 
Gyelthang, just north of the mountain Daxueshan (locally Jiarongya) and 
the valley system of Dongwang Township (Tib. Termarong).8
north. This suggests that for some, inclusion in the category of Gyelthangpa can sometimes 
include conceptions of historical homelands and dynamics of migration.
8 The Tibetans who live in or hail from the valleys of Dongwang do not consider themselves 
to be Gyelthangpa. Thus, the northern boundary or Gyelthang lies along the granite outthrusts 
of the earth’s crust that form the Daxueshan (literally ‘Big Snow Mountain’), and, to the west, 
form the watershed between the village system of Nagara and Dongwang. It is entirely possible 
that Dongwang is today considered by some to be part of Gyelthang in that it is part of Shangri-
La County. However, most commonly, Dongwang and Gyelthang are discussed by locals as 
separate places. Today, people in Dongwang refer to people from Chaktreng (Ch. Xiangcheng) as 
Sichuan people (Sichuan ren). The etymology of the Tibetan name for Dongwang is a bit unclear. 
Most commonly, the Chinese name Dongwang is understood to be a rendering of the Tibetan 
Termarong, marking a relationship between the precipitous valley and the treasure (terma) 
revelation tradition (rong, in Tibetan, means ‘gorge’ or ‘narrow ravine’, which very accurately 
describes Dongwang). Another possible Tibetan root for Dongwang is the name Tongrong, 
with tong echoic of one of the six tribes of Yarlung. A third possibility for the Tibetan name for 
Dongwang is simply gtorma rong, as one prominent mountain peak in the region resembles a 
cone-shaped torma (ritual eff igy). The possible etymologies of Tongrong and Torma rong were 
provided to me by Bai Linde, assistant director of the Foxueyuan (Buddhist Research Institute) 
in Shangri-La (personal interview 12 July 2017). See also Zhongdian xian renmin zhengfu, 
Zhongdian xian diming lingdao xiaozu (1984). Interestingly, Bai Linde also claimed that many 
of the current inhabitants of Dongwang trace their ancestry to the south, and that they were 
once Naxi. This would not be surprising, as Naxi communities can be found in Sichuan and 
the T.A.R., and the complex and syncretic relationship between Naxi and Tibetan religions is 
in evidence throughout the region, such as in the use of Naxi pictograph-painted wooden slats 
in Dorje phurba rituals in the Karma Kagyu monastery of Phangpu northeast of Chaktreng, 
and the huge overlap of local ritual practices and folklore; see, for example, Mortensen (2006). 
Today, the Nyingmapa maintain a strong presence in Dongwang, and there are notably no 
Nyingma monasteries in Gyelthang. About half the populace of Dongwang is Geluk, and Ganden 
Sumtseling monastery has a Dongwang kangtsen. Semantically and structurally, it is unclear 
whether Sumtseling has a kangtsen for Dongwang, or if, from a more grass-roots perspective, 
120 eric d. morTensen 
Dongwang maintains a kangtsen at Sumtseling. Nevertheless, in terms of Geluk identity, the 
inhabitants of Dongwang, despite their kangtsen at Sumtseling to the south, have a stronger 
aff inity with religious institutions to the north in Chaktreng, across the border in what is today 
Sichuan Province; see Thondup (1992). This aff inity is in part related in recent decades to the 
religious aff iliation with the tantric yidam Dorje Shugden; Shugden practice is strong among 
the Gelukpa of Dongwang, and Chaktreng remains one of the centres of Shugden practice 
in southern Kham. Geluk monasteries in Chaktreng, Bathang, and Gyelthang, for example, 
had strong bonds, although bandit raids from Chaktreng to Gyelthang were notorious; see D. 
Mortensen (2016) and Rock (1947). Chaktreng raids prior to the 1950s on the valleys of Yagra 
(just to the northwest of Gyelthang) were particularly devastating, as large percentages of the 
young men in Yagra villages were killed. While conducting folklore f ieldwork in Yagra in 2013, 
I was told on several occasions that P.R.C. control in the region was welcomed largely because 
it brought an end to such raids and low-intensity internecine warfare.
Map 3.1  Gyelthang (Xianggelila) and its surroundings
sources: based on srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders extracted from gadm 
database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
authors: rémi chaix and stéphane gros
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The (historically mostly Tibetan, Primi, and Nuosu Yi) Muli Tibetan 
Autonomous County of Sichuan, just east of the village of Nizu (Tib. Mik-
sur), is the eastern border of Gyelthang, and the (primarily Naxi) Lijiang 
prefecture-level City lies to the south.9 The southern boundary of Gyelthang, 
in essence, is the Yangtze River (locally called the Jinshajiang, ‘Golden 
Sands River’). Thus, predominantly Naxi areas such as Sanba and Baishuitai 
spring, the Hui reaches of upper Haba village, several Yi villages such as 
Jiulong, and the entirety of Haba Mountain (the north side of Tiger Leaping 
Gorge, Ch. Hutiaoxia), all lie within Gyelthang. The land across the river 
from Shigu town, as is evidenced by the territorial demarcation inscribed 
on the town’s famous stone drum from which the town gets its moniker, 
marks the southernmost reaches of Gyelthang.
Historically, prior to P.R.C. control of the region, Gyelthang was only 
periodically under the political control of Tibetan powers (Gyaltsen 1971). 
Indeed, we should be careful to distinguish between ‘political’ and ‘religious’ 
Tibetan power, for although monasteries were and are often seats of political, 
economic, and military dominance (or perhaps ‘centres of gravity’, depending 
on one’s perspective), even when the Gelukpa government of the Ganden 
Phodrang, based in Lhasa, exerted only limited control over Gyelthang, 
Ganden Sumtseling Monastery remained the most important institution 
in the minds of many Tibetans (and many Naxi) in the region.10 Gyelthang 
was not part of the large region controlled by (Nyagrong) Gönpo Nyamgyel 
during the height of his power between 1835-1865. Indeed, the areas of Jol 
(Dechen),11 the region of Lijiang and the Mu kingdom, Gyelthang, and Muli (in 
today’s Sichuan), all lay to the south of his control (Tsering 1985, Tsomu 2015).
9 For early def initions of Gyelthang, see Schwieger (2017). See also Diqing zhou gaikuang 
bianxie zu (2007).
10 Historically (and in some small senses into the present), the Naxi were practitioners of 
Kagyu Buddhism. With the destruction of many Kagyu monasteries in the 1870s during the 
Muslim Panthay Rebellion, many disenfranchised Naxi monks returned to their home villages 
to become ritual experts, syncretically blending Bön and Buddhist ritual cycles with local 
religious dynamics including elements of Yi religion. For more details, including the argument 
that this shift in the 1870s led to the f lourishing of Naxi dtô-mbà pictographic script, see Jackson 
and Pan (1998); also Jackson (1979). For alternative perspective, see Mathieu (2003). Indeed, it is 
diff icult to say who the Naxi were prior to their identif ication as such at the hands of the state 
in the 1950s, and their religious practices were not def initively separable, taxonomically, from 
the religious practices of their neighbours: the Moso, Gyelthangpa Geluk Tibetans, Nizupa, 
Primi, Yi, etc. See Mortensen (2009) for a discussion. In fact, boundaries of ethnicity were far 
more f luid and malleable prior to the 1950s than they are today, when ethnic identity is more 
‘f ixed’ by institutional and state power structures.
11 Identifying Dechen as Jol is questionable here, as Jol is sometimes understood as the region 
stretching south into Yunnan, including Jang (Jang Satam), although whether Jol encompassed 
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Gyelthang’s centre is Jiantang Town, the county seat, generally known 
as Xianggelila, called Zhongdian throughout at least the second half of 
the twentieth century until 2002, and still sometimes called Zhongdian 
by locals who f ind the tourist-driven transformation of the name of their 
home to be somewhat surreal. The town and region have long been a Tibetan 
interface with neighbouring peoples, primarily the Naxi, and the ‘Old Town’ 
of Dukezong was around 30 percent Naxi until the tsunami of tourism 
shattered the traditional demography. Xianggelila has recently exploded 
into a bourgeoning small city, stretching across the entirety of the valley 
between the central village of Dukezong and the historically important 
Geluk monastery Ganden Sumtseling. Following the logging ban of 1998, 
the economy has largely transformed into a tourist service industry, with 
mining, song rong mushroom, and caterpillar fungus collection and sales 
providing a massive influx of capital in the past two decades.
In order to understand the geographic and perhaps cultural identities of 
the people who live in the region where southeastern Tibet interfaces with the 
rest of Yunnan Province, we must scrutinize and complicate any simplistic 
notions of what constitutes the ‘state’. Studies of the role of the Chinese state 
have drawn valuable attention to the problem of historical blame and to 
complicity in the enactment of state policies in local non-Han contexts.12 If 
one’s nominal identity is in formal ways created or established by a ‘state’, 
per se, then understanding who constitutes the ‘state’ becomes of increased 
importance. It is clear that local government actors enact policies that affect 
minority nationality (Ch. shaoshu minzu) communities in differing ways in 
different regions. It is simultaneously valuable to understand the construction 
and negotiation of ethno-political identity as being as much informed by inter-
ethnic and intra-ethnic relationships and perceptions as it is by the hitherto 
prioritized (and overly simplistic) binary model of assessing the identity of 
a given minority group in relationship to the Chinese state. In other words, 
the tensions, concerns, conflicts, and everyday grievances at the forefront of 
the entirety of Jang is questionable. I am unsure about this point, and do not know how the Naxi 
under the Mu kings (and earlier) understood the boundaries or overlaps between Jol and Jang 
Satam, let alone how they understood Gyelthang.
12 See, for example, Mueggler (2011), Harrell (2007), and D. Mortensen (forthcoming). Mueggler’s 
brilliant ethnography complicates the notion of simplistic blame for devastation suffered by 
a community that found the Chinese state both imaginatively distant and manifest as eager 
members of their own community. Harrell’s point is similar, focusing on the examples of several 
individuals who, despite their local ethnic identity, represented the state. Both Mueggler’s 
and Harrell’s works address Yi peoples, geographically close to but culturally distinct from 
Gyelthangpa Tibetans. For an assessment of the dynamics between Gyelthangpa and ‘the state’, 
see also Mortensen (2016).
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the minds of locals in (for example) Gyelthang are as much shaped by their 
relationships with other local minority ethnic groups (such as the Naxi, Yi, 
and Hui) and non-local Tibetans as they are by relationships with the Han 
Chinese or the local or national governments.13 Local relationships with the 
state are only further complicated in Gyelthang when the local authorities and 
policy implementers (and sometimes makers) are themselves Naxi or Tibetan.
Part of the reason the identif ication of institutional agents of power (the 
‘state’, monasteries, etc.) is so vital is that just as victors write history, those 
with power are the ideological if not the literal cartographers of identity in 
terms of the nomenclature of place. Any older model wherein Gyelthang 
marked the interface between Tibetan populations and various other peoples 
such as the Naxi, Yi, Lisu, Bai, etc. (but notably not Han Chinese population 
centres), is also rendered complex now that the government of the P.R.C. 
controls Gyelthang.
Most Tibetans of Gyelthang are Gelukpa Buddhists,14 although the 
decimation of institutional religion over the past sixty years has left the 
region with a precarious sense of its own Buddhist identity. Sumtseling 
monastery has been rebuilt from the utter devastation it underwent at the 
hands of locals in 1966, during the early tumult of the Cultural Revolution 
(D. Mortensen, forthcoming). Sumtseling, though, remains a complex and 
tense institution – a tension largely exacerbated by issues surrounding 
the divisive personage of the protection deity (yidam) Dorje Shugden. In 
essence, over the past two decades, the Chinese government has seized 
upon the Fourteenth Dalai Lama’s dismissal of Dorje Shugden from the 
Geluk pantheon, and augmented the post Cultural Revolution ostensible 
rehabilitation of Buddhist practice with legitimation and amplif ied valu-
ation of Dorje Shugden temples and monasteries, particularly in southern 
Kham. Thereby, a tense bifurcation has been exacerbated in Gyelthang (and 
elsewhere, such as in Dongwang) wherein monastery, kangtsen, temple, 
household, and individual loyalties to either the Dalai Lama or Dorje Shugden 
(and thus ‘the state’) have become polarized (Hillman 2005, E. Mortensen 
13 McKhann (1998) observed and warned of this needed perspective a full twenty years ago.
14 Karma Kagyu power in the region predated Gelukpa hegemony. There is still one small 
Taklung Kagyu monastery just outside of Jiantang Town, Nyagpel Monastery (sngags ‘phel 
sdom gsum gling), and there are several other Kagyu monasteries in the broader region. For 
information about religions in Zhongdian county, see Zhondian xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 
(1997, 227-230, 233-235), also for descriptions of the various monasteries in Zhongdian county. In 
addition, there are vital elements of Bön in the religiosity of the people of Nizu valley, although 
from the best I can discern, Nizu religion is a syncretic mix of Bön, local (non-Bön, mi chö) 
practices and beliefs, and some Geluk influences.
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2016). Entire village systems within Gyelthang, such as Xiao Zhongdian 
and Sanba, where Dorje Shugden practice is strong, are in the throes of 
something akin to what citizens of the U.S.A. call ‘culture wars’, vis-à-vis 
the anti-Shugden areas of Geza and Dukezong, which are loyal to the Dalai 
Lama. Stories in Jiantang town abound about family members who won’t 
eat with one another, about village families whose member’s funerals are 
shunned by other families from the same small village, and businesses 
refusing to hire employees who maintain religious loyalties on the other 
side of this sensitive divide. The tensions are very high, and the ‘Shugden 
issue’ is perhaps the most serious divisive force in Gyelthangpa society today.
Again, although the territory of the regions aff iliated with Sumtseling’s 
kangtsen does not match up with the map of Gyelthang, the tensions are 
perhaps most acute at Sumtseling itself, despite the outward gleam presented 
for the throngs of Han tourists. The ‘pro-Shugden’ kangtsen have the support 
of the abbot (Tib. khenpo), and the government, which, as the anti-Shugden 
people will tell you, provides a lot of funding for Shugden temples and 
monasteries precisely to aggravate and sew discord within the community. 
The ‘Shugden issue’ is prevalent beyond Gyelthang, of course, and throughout 
Kham there are push-pull tensions within Tibetan communities between 
those who are striving for cooperation and unity and those who are heated 
in their partisanship over the issue. In Gyelthang and Chaktreng, however, 
‘pro-Shugden’ support is a vibrant, if minority voice. Döndrupling monastery 
(also Gelukpa) outside the town of Benzilan (and therefore also just outside 
of Gyelthang) does not suffer this same tension, as it eschews Shugden 
practice, and as a result many residents of Gyelthang have more respect for 
Döndrupling than they do for the more local and larger Ganden Sumtseling 
monastery. Clearly, one set of outlying and obvious questions that remains 
unanswered in this analysis includes why the boundaries of Gyelthang do not 
match with the territory associated with the eight kangtsen of Sumtseling. 
The strongest conclusion I can offer to this issue is that the idea of Gyelthang 
long predates the establishment of Ganden Sumtseling (1679).15
A Sense of Place: Ambiance, Identity, and the ‘Idea’ of Gyelthang
So, as we examine what Kham is, in other words where it is and who lives 
there, we must ask the same thing of its sub-regions, its southern plateau 
15 The ruins of a Karma Kagyu monastery that predated Geluk hegemony in the valley can 
still be found in the forest east of Napa Hai on the road to Nixi.
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grasslands (Tib. thang), of its ‘borderlands’. How close can we ‘zoom in’ 
to best understand place? Of course, in wondering such things, we note 
that political and religious control is not the only cartographer at work in 
def ining Gyelthang or the identity of its inhabitants. Granted, in saying 
this I am making several assumptions. First, I am assuming that there is a 
marked difference, at times, between authoritative def initions of a region 
and the understandings of regional identity by local inhabitants. Second, 
I am assuming that a sense of place is not constituted entirely by places. 
When I imagine my own hometown, the ambiance of my memories of that 
place is constructed by more than just its physical setting, the land, and 
weather. The ambiance of place is often informed by one’s friends, kin, 
experiences, by the languages used in the transmission and creation and 
negotiation of culture, and by such things as wildlife, cuisine, past events, 
jokes, and lullabies. Place is in vital ways a blending of the physical place 
and the people who live there, yet augmented by appositional def initions 
of who does not live there and what other ‘places’ are like.
Gyelthang, then, is a place wherein Tibetans live alongside and inter-
spersed with Naxi, Nuosu Yi, Hui, Lisu, Bai, and other minority nationality 
(shaoshu minzu) peoples, as well as with increasing numbers of Han Chinese, 
many of whom have migrated from Sichuan. It is a place that has on the one 
hand seen its ethnic identity effaced in Mao-era campaigns, and on the other 
hand experienced reif ied state-narrated Tibetan identity-revivif ication in 
light of ethnic tourism in recent years. It is a place with a relatively weak 
sense of Tibetan nationalism and, correlatively, with a diluted and arguably 
insecure sense of pan-Tibetan identity, although the suppressed political 
uprising of 2008 in Kham has led to a slight augmentation of this pan-Tibetan 
identity. Gyelthangpa are often belittled or demeaned by Tibetans from 
Ü-Tsang and from farther north in Kham (e.g. Dergé and Kandzé) and Amdo, 
with sentiments ranging from ‘Ah… that’s China’, to ‘Shugden people’. The 
local Tibetic languages spoken in Gyelthang are unintelligible even to 
Tibetans from nearby places like Lithang or Dechen, let alone Lhasa, and 
indeed, Tibetan is spoken by less and less Gyelthangpa, and Chinese loan-
words are increasingly common in local parlance. Tibetic languages within 
Gyelthang are also at times mutually unintelligible, and it is important to 
note that language is not a unifying characteristic of what makes Gyelthang 
Gyelthang. Tibetan language education is not robust in Gyelthang, and 
Tibetan literacy is rapidly declining, although it is questionable whether it 
was ever particularly strong.
Gyelthang is a place where many rural Tibetan women regularly sport 
communist Mao caps, in part because they do not adhere to the sentiment 
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that communist policies constituted a bad change. Gyelthang is a place 
where many villagers in remote regions are thankful for the establishment 
of the P.R.C. rule. Gyelthang is a place where Chinese nomenclature for 
geographical features is employed on a regular basis and the Tibetan and 
Naxi names are often all but forgotten. It is a place where the local names 
for many gods are forgotten.
Gyelthangpa are sometimes seen as ‘less Tibetan’ by other Tibetans, and the 
Gyelthangpa know this. Coupled with a particularly ineffectual and politically 
compromised monastery,16 few Gyelthangpa know much about Buddhist 
philosophy, ethics, or practices. Indeed, many Gyelthangpa see themselves 
as peripheral to the rest of Tibet (although there are also peripheries within 
this peripheral place) and understand themselves as well-integrated with 
the rest of China. This is not, of course, to say that Gyelthangpa are in fact 
‘less’ Tibetan than other Tibetans, as such a claim presupposes an ideal 
Tibetanness or a normative cultural authority. The sense of difference from 
other Tibetans, even their direct neighbours, contributes to a local sense of 
distinction. Although if asked ‘are you Khampa’, most Gyelthangpa would 
say ‘yes’, very few offer Kham as part of their identity unless asked. Instead, 
locals will say they are Gyelthangpa (typically with the Chinese pronunciation 
of Jiantang), or that they are from Shangri-La (Ch. Xianggelila).
For Gyelthangpa, despite the embarrassment or insecurity about having 
less religious or linguistic vitality or ‘authenticity’ as other Tibetans, there 
is never ever a sense for Tibetan Gyelthangpa that they are not Tibetan. The 
‘border’ is to the east, south, and southwest. Gyelthangpa do not think of 
themselves as a border-‘land’, per se, but instead as the southeastern reaches 
of Tibet, with the territory of other minority nationalities on the other side 
of an often-inexact boundary. That Gyelthang’s location in Yunnan Province 
separates it politically and administratively from Sichuan and the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region (T.A.R.), and thus from the rest of Kham, is important, 
but Gyelthangpa don’t think of themselves as thereby less Tibetan, regardless 
of what other Tibetans might think. They also don’t see themselves as more 
a part of China than any other part of Tibet. One crucial and enormous 
caveat to this line of thinking is that it is foolish to generalize and thereby 
essentialize all Gyelthangpa as thinking or believing the same thing; just as 
it is wildly problematic to claim that ‘Chinese people believe’ any singular 
thing, Gyelthangpa are diverse in their perspectives, and certainly do not 
share identical senses of their own identities.
16 For details on the sentiments toward Ganden Sumtseling monastery, see E. Mortensen 
(2016).
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For most Gyelthangpa, the ambiance of daily life does not involve a 
heavy f lavouring of the sense of being a ‘borderland’. Sure, farmers in Geza 
(Tib. Ketsak) are inf luenced by their proximity to Han China in ways as 
varying as the effects of outside mining companies on clean water to the 
lament for the religious vacuum resulting from the spiritual impotence of 
the monastery, from the television they enjoy to their inability to procure a 
passport with ease, and from mandatory hospital childbirth to mandatory 
centralized boarding schools. And their view to the north and northwest, 
to Kham and the rest of the Tibetan world, is inf initely more profound 
and pervasive. In order to conceive of living in a ‘borderland’, in a place of 
liminality or ‘between-ness’ or even of interface, culturally or ethnically 
or even religiously, there needs to be a sense of belonging to both or to 
neither.
The ‘idea’ of Gyelthang remains relatively clear in the minds of most 
locals, regardless of changes in language, demography, institutional power, 
politics, or maps. Whereas much else has changed for locals in the way place 
is defined by power or authority, the idea of Gyelthang, perhaps because it is 
so local and old, has remained a more vital part of local identity than the idea 
of Kham, although that it remains does not mean that it has not changed.
Most Gyelthangpa consider themselves to be Khampa only secondar-
ily, unlike, for example, in Lithang, where Khampa identity is central and 
primary. Gyelthang is an old idea and is potentially thereby more stable.17 
There are also differences between Gyelthang and the rest of Kham worthy 
of note, such as the fact that there are relatively few Gyelthangpa nomads. 
In this, Gyelthang shares something with the Tibetans of Muli, Dechen, and 
other places that are technically (whatever that means) part of Kham. Key, 
here, is why any of this matters, and for whom? Obviously, identity matters 
deeply to more or less everyone, from the song rong hunters to the state, 
and a sense of homeland is central to Tibetan life. The Tibetan term phayül, 
‘homeland’, is often one of the first things Tibetans from different regions ask 
of one another when they meet. Gyelthangpa visiting Lhasa do not answer 
this question with the word ‘Kham’, but with ‘Gyelthang’. If asked for more 
specif icity, most would follow-up with ‘Xianggelila’ (only in the last few 
years has the old name Zhongdian faded from use) or ‘Yunnan’. Obviously, 
Gyelthangpa visiting Lithang (as it is also part of Kham) would never answer 
‘Kham’. And although where you say you are from is not the be all and end all 
of identity, the degree to which Gyelthangpa think of themselves as Khampa 
matters in important senses when it comes to issues of larger Tibetan regional 
17 I do not know when the term Gyelthang was f irst employed.
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identity and affiliation, which can have political and religious ramifications. 
However, locally, on a day-to-day level, the boundaries of what is and what 
is not Gyelthang, whether or not one is foremost Khampa or Gyelthangpa, 
and whether or not Shangri-La Town is a ‘borderland’, per se, matter little.
Yes, there are small pockets of Amdowa inside northern Kham and vice 
versa, and yes, people in Tibet generally identify, with great specif icity, as 
being from a particular region (e.g. people are not simultaneously Khampa 
and Amdowa). This aspect of identity – that of the place you identify as 
being from, your phayül – is not edgeless; this aspect of Tibetan identity 
does not bleed like watercolours. But other aspects of identity, of culture, 
religion, and ethnicity, absolutely do. In Gyelthang, maps don’t help much. 
Maps are not identity.
Map, Territory, and the Cartographer’s Guild
Who are the cartographers, and why are they (we) making the maps they 
(we) make? What is at stake, and for whom? In his work ‘Map Is Not Territory’, 
Jonathan Z. Smith (1994, 291, and f.n. 115) worries about ‘the insistence on the 
cognitive power of distortion, along with the concomitant choice of the map 
over the territory’. In the case of understanding Gyelthang, of attempting to 
see landforms through the mist, why is it we sometimes privilege the map? 
Who might want us to privilege the territory? Whose territory? Owned or 
controlled by whom? Territory how defined, how constituted? ‘Borderlands’ 
according to whom?
Jonathan Z. Smith continues: ‘There are situational or relational catego-
ries, mobile boundaries which shift according to the map being employed’ 
(ibid.). In his introductory chapter, Stéphane Gros describes the constant 
‘re-mapping’ that results from discursive socio-spatial processes and various 
knowledge economies. Similarly, here, there are Buddhist institutional 
maps (e.g. kangtsen territories), Chinese geopolitical taxonomic maps, 
ethnic maps, road maps, satellite maps, linguistic maps, and tourist maps 
all def ining Gyelthang differently, and all with different sorts of agency 
and power. Yet they do not agree or conform when it comes to Gyelthang. 
A map, writes Smith (2004, 17), ‘guarantees meaning and value through 
structures of congruity and conformity’.
Smith’s concern is religion, and the problematic nature of discerning pat-
terns in religiosity. Perhaps Smith’s greatest contribution to the discipline of 
comparative religion has been to critique problematic methods of comparison, 
identifying quagmires and pitfalls for the comparativist. He writes (ibid.):
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Students of religion have been most successful in describing and interpret-
ing this locative, imperial map of the world – especially within archaic, 
urban cultures. […] Yet, the very success of these topographies should 
be a signal for caution. For they are largely based on documents from 
urban, agricultural, hierarchical cultures. The most persuasive witnesses 
to a locative, imperial world-view are the production of well organized, 
self-conscious scribal elites who had a deep vested interest in restricting 
mobility and valuing place. […] In most cases one cannot escape the 
suspicion that, in the locative map of the world, we are encountering a 
self-serving ideology which ought not to be generalized into the universal 
pattern of religious experience and expression.
Smith’s identif ication of a ‘universal pattern’ is ‘intended to refer to Mircea 
Eliade’s “archaic ontology”’, but the ‘ideological element’ was expanded 
to include ‘a variety of approaches to religion which lay prime emphasis 
upon congruency and conformity, whether it be expressed through phe-
nomenological descriptions of repetition [or] functionalist descriptions 
of feedback mechanisms’ (1994, 229). Smith is concerned with what he 
sees as a pervasive tendency of scholars of the historical and comparative 
study of religion to seek out and identify patterns of similarity between 
religious phenomena. He famously identif ies this tendency as methodo-
logically problematic, noting that similarities in the eye of the beholder 
were importantly not constitutive of causal mechanisms. In other words, 
patterns of religious phenomena described by scholars led to associative 
conclusions about the relationships between religious phenomena based 
on such ‘magical’ causal criteria as mimesis, contiguity, or raw similar-
ity. Smith expands his concerns with ‘universal patterns’ he saw in the 
work of Eliade to critique the broader f ield of comparative religion, and 
emphasizes the importance of scrutinizing difference instead of similarity 
when engaging in the methodology of comparison. In our creation of and 
wondering about maps and borderlands, how might we best avoid the error 
of generalizing our emphases on the production of locative classif ications 
of the people who live in the mountains and grasslands and forests of the 
area called Gyelthang? Can we possibly, as Gros calls for in his Introduction, 
conceive of spaces as social constructs through more unfamiliar forms of 
spatialization?
When we identify ‘the very success of these topographies’ as being the 
historical forces and institutional agents of place naming for a place such as 
Gyelthang, we wonder about what ‘self-serving’ ideologies are being general-
ized. Who, in the case of Gyelthang, are the ‘well organized, self-conscious 
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scribal elites who [have] a deep vested interest in restricting mobility and 
valuing place’? Could the answer be the ‘state’, or perhaps the Tibetologists 
who perpetuate a focus on ‘borderland’, ‘frontier’, or ‘territory’ based on 
a hermeneutic that privileges the large, powerful, power centres of Tibet 
and China?18
One point here is that Smith’s emphasis is on religion, and when we ‘map’ 
his point onto the lived ground of Gyelthang, we must wonder about the 
applicability of his larger question. What are the parallel ‘ideologies’ and 
patterns for our wonderings about the ‘idea’ of Gyelthang for the people 
who live therein? Identity for Gyelthangpa certainly includes religion, but 
religious identity for Gyelthangpa is not markedly different from other 
peoples in southern Kham, excepting perhaps that institutional Buddhist 
revival has been relatively stagnant in Gyelthang. To what degree can 
Smith’s cautionary about the cartographers of a locative map help us to 
remove the boundaries of provinces and counties, the demarcated regions 
of Sumtseling’s kangtsen, or even, if we expand the notion, the edges of 
‘minority nationality’ groups, or the importance of sacred mountains (as 
decided by whom)?
What are the contexts being negotiated when the question of Gyelthang 
comes up in conversation? In scrutinizing Gyelthang, it is not so much that 
boundaries move as that different models are selectively employed based 
on the context of identity-negotiation. For example, even with the issue of 
phayül, whether or not a local will use the word or even think of the notion 
of Gyelthang depends on with whom they are speaking or interacting 
and why. Gyelthang is only used as an identif ier of home-identity when 
someone from, say, Geza, is speaking with a Tibetan (only when speaking 
Tibetan) from the outside, or when the Geza person is themself outside 
of the region speaking with another Tibetan. Thus, while it is understood 
that Gyelthang is a placename known to Tibetans in general, the word is 
only used to locate one’s homeland in the ears of an outside listener. While 
this is not too surprising – I do not harp on about being a North Carolinian 
when I am in North Carolina talking with other North Carolinians – the 
situation is distinct in that when inside Gyelthang ‘territory’ there is almost 
never any sense of a suff icient cohesion, or nationalism (or the equivalent), 
not much sense of local Gyelthangpa pride – because there is not really 
a strong sense of bounded place or importance of place or central notion 
of what Gyelthang even means. This is not to say that farmers in Geza in 
18 Note that in China (and to some degree in other countries) it is diff icult to disentangle 
Tibetology from the ‘state’.
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Gyelthang, for example, are not proud of their valley, or even of the larger 
region, and this sense of awesomeness can include a sense that this southern 
reach of Kham is in fact different in qualitative important ways to locals. 
They feel a strong sense of ‘Ah, home again in this beautiful land’ when 
they come back.
I would argue that identity in Gyelthang is particularly local, tied to 
the land itself but not to any map of the land, similar to the ways in which 
religion is often very local in ‘peripheral’ areas (thus defining the periphery). 
Particularly in more rural parts of Gyelthang, the revivif ication of local 
non-Buddhist, pre-Buddhist (yet not Bön), ‘folk religion’ (Tib. mi chö) has 
been the result of the systematic deconstruction of institutional religion. 
The absence of numbers of charismatic or respected teachers at Sumtseling 
has left communities without religious teachers for decades. In conjunction 
with decreased literacy and a general state-imposed dismantling of the 
importance of religion, people in, for example, Geza or Nagara villages have 
replaced aspects of what were formerly more orthodox Buddhist valences 
with religious identity strands of story that are markedly and often beauti-
fully folkloric. In this context, the cartographers are very local, and do not 
add to their recipes, at least not intentionally, emphases on notions such 
as ‘periphery’ or ‘borderland’. The village community is a centre, and the 
mountains above the tree lines are full of monsters.
In Geza, for example, the animated landscape is instrumental in the 
construction of local identity, and people are concerned about mining and 
water, and about mushroom harvests. They re-perform stories about now-
uninhabitable (and previously invisible) villages that were made visible and 
abandoned due to dangerous nak nyi gö (wild people), transgressions having 
to do with the bounds of what it means to be human, or forced relocations 
of villages at the hands of representatives of the state due to the perceived 
remoteness of the high villages, or both. The border is something akin to 
everything out of sight over all the surrounding mountains.
Smith’s topography employs three categories: 1) the ‘here’ of domestic 
religion, located primarily in the home and in burial sites; 2) the ‘there’ of 
public civic and state religions, largely based in temple constructions; and 
3) the ‘anywhere’ of a rich diversity of religious formations that occupy 
an interstitial space between these other two loci, including a variety of 
religious entrepreneurs and ranging from groups we term ‘associations’ 
to activities we label ‘magic’ (Smith 2004, 325). Of the three, the people of 
Geza and Nagara, for example, are far more focused on the f irst, the local, 
the ‘here’ of domestic religion, though not merely relegated to the house. 
The extended family’s local domestic religion is the category we see most 
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manifest in Geza village life.19 With local domestic religiosity, displacement 
and forgetfulness become paramount concerns, alongside the worry about 
agency and who controls or creates memory (Smith 2004, 326-327; Mueggler 
2001; E. Mortensen 2016). In the sphere of civic and national religion, the 
religion of ‘there’ is ‘over there’ in relation to one’s home place and involves 
expressions of power. For the people of Geza, this is Buddhism, and the 
‘there’ is, quite fundamentally, Ganden Sumtseling monastery. What does 
‘political legitimacy’ mean for locals? To what degree are jurisdictions based 
on what local people care about?
For Gyelthangpa, seeing themselves as peripheral to Central Tibet or to 
the rest of Kham is a different thing, categorically, than seeing themselves 
as the borderlands, as the in-between people on competing guild maps. 
Larger questions of whether Tibet historically understood itself as a centre 
or peripheral world (vis Kalachakra or other cosmography, or in relation to 
powerful neighbours) are also worthy of deeper exploration.20
I’d like to argue here that Gyelthang is, in a sense, an idea of place, the 
def inition and meaning of which is quite old, if vague, and the reasons 
for its territory no longer very important. Locals absolutely identify as 
Gyelthangpa, understand themselves to be Khampa even if this is only 
secondary, and many do deeply love where they live. Locally, the ‘idea’ of 
Gyelthang is stronger than the ‘idea’ of Kham, and while Gyelthangpa may 
understand Gyelthang to be peripheral to the rest of the Tibetan world, they 
don’t really locate themselves when they think about their identity as being 
the borderland between two or more places. Proximity matters. Just because 
Gyelthang is peripheral to Tibetan cultural power centres does not make 
it the interface between Tibet and China. It is not adjacent, historically, to 
China, but to other minority regions. It is not the boundary, although it 
might be considered frontier for the Chinese, particularly in years long past.
‘A theory, a model, a conceptual category cannot be simply the data writ 
large’, pens Smith (2004, 31). Gyelthang, if it is an idea, cannot be constituted 
merely by a constellation of data points – unless we connect them differently, 
more topologically, as Gros suggests in his chapter. What would be the data 
points of Gyelthang? Tourist maps readily available in the Old Town do a f ine 
job of offering a version of such a way of understanding places within a larger 
place, and their importance. Religious sites are writ large, with sketches of 
monasteries sized according to their ‘importance’ for the tourist (and for 
19 For an example from China, see Granet (1929, 205; 1951, 21-25).
20 Regarding ways in which China and India have historically understood the other-ness of 
their neighbours, see White (1991).
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their entrance ticket sticker price). Roads between these sites are the only 
paths depicted, and the maps are printed on brown paper reminiscent of 
enticingly old and perhaps mysterious maps. Truly, the effect of tourism on 
Gyelthang in the past twenty years has been profound. Huge government 
money has revitalized the same buildings that the same government’s 
policies razed half a century ago, and there are now nice roads, hundreds 
of hotels, an airport, and soon, a rail line. Opportunities to capitalize on the 
boom are myriad, and, like in much of China, the populace is far better off 
economically than they were a few decades ago. The tourism is, of course, 
managed by the state in conjunction with local entrepreneurs, etc., but 
the degree of agency locals have to determine how their own identities 
are marketed is questionable at best. The exotif ication and racism that 
has accompanied the creation and control of the narrative of ‘authentic’ 
Tibetanness has had an odious effect on Gyelthangpa identity, including 
religious identity.
In the performance of cultural identity, formative stories are dripping 
with the charisma of the suspension of (dis)belief. Just as the ‘truth’ and 
‘reality’ of monsters in wild-forest-man tale performances is importantly 
unimportant, and just as accuracy (and sometimes even eff icacy) in local 
non-Buddhist divination rituals is not (always) why they are performed, so 
too the ‘authenticity’ of Tibetan religio-cultural identity is not really why 
the tourists come to Shangri-La. The description of ‘authenticity’, after all, 
depends on whom you ask. Gyelthangpa agency is, at best, not of primary 
concern to the Cartographer’s Guild of Shangri-La County.
Epilogue
In his wonderful essay ‘Bible and Religion’, Jonathan Z. Smith exhumes 
Jorge Luis Borges’ parable about the perfectly congruent map that is, among 
other things, absolutely useless for ‘f inding one’s way around’ (2004, 209). 
Borges’ passage is worth quoting in full:
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the 
map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of 
the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, these Unconscionable 
Maps no longer satisf ied, and the Cartographer’s Guild struck a Map 
of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided 
point by point with it. The following generations, who were not so fond 
of the Study of Cartography, as their Forebears had been, saw that that 
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vast Map was useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they 
delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts 
of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited 
by Animals and Beggers; in all of the Land there is no other Relic of the 
Discipline of Geography.21
I ask you to envision Borges’ empire (imperial power, cartographers?) as 
‘us’, the practitioners and cartographers of Tibetology. Ever cognizant of 
China’s imperial hegemony and goal of assimilation as a ‘spectral state’22 
that looms over our need as historians to complicate, to problematize, and 
to emphasize the proportionality of even minute detail, we also care for 
emic assertions of identity, care about the local, and seek out stories that 
f ill out and paint our map of Kham with bleeding watercolour. But as we 
seek to def ine, taxonomize, and render intelligible the nuances of Kham, 
we may be wise to push through to see the ramif ications of Smith’s claim 
that ‘map is not territory’.
If territory, for Smith, equals data that needs to be processed and analysed 
in order to create a map (a model), then if maps are not territory it is because 
they are inevitably merely representative abstractions – phantom and inexact 
semiotic parole penned by power. How then might Tibetologists create use-
ful maps to best represent, for example, Gyelthang? Only if the notion of 
‘borderlands’ (or of Kham) is particularly helpful for a given purpose should 
it be employed.23 Importantly, not all ‘maps’ are contributions to cartographic 
knowledge. Some might be dreamscapes, others records of experience, some 
pathways of memory, and others intentionally misleading. When we consider 
Gyelthang, perhaps Smith is suggesting that if we wish to consider a map, 
we need to critically admit its quality of abstraction, but also that maps are 
nevertheless not things that we should not make at all, or that should exist only 
as tatters in western regions populated by animals and beggars. Focusing on 
the identity of Gyelthang as place, a multi-layered place with lived experiences 
and ambiances, is such a problematic abstraction, and one we should consider, 
perhaps, only for certain purposes. But mapping Gyelthang as a borderland, 
and even as part of a larger borderland, belies the local sense of place.
21 Borges, ‘Exactitude in Science’, as quoted in Smith (2004, 209).
22 Here taking out of context a phrase coined by Mueggler (2001).
23 I am indebted here to Stéphane Gros for his valuable comments on this section of this 
chapter, and for his suggestions about rethinking Smith’s notions of maps, particularly in light 
of their possible ‘utility’. Regarding the problem of what kind of knowledge can produce what 
kind of conceptualization of space and thus of ‘map’, see Mueggler (2011).
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We add as many details as we possibly can to our understanding of the 
histories (and who constructed them), of the religions (and how they make 
meaning in people’s lives), and of the importance of place in each. With col-
lective scholarship, isn’t our map becoming increasingly detailed? Wouldn’t 
it be more ‘helpful’ were we to highlight certain places of interest (to the 
reader, unless ‘they’ is really ‘we’, in which case the guild’s map is intended 
for internal circulation only), perhaps by sketching them in relative size of 
value or importance across Kham? Are we the Cartographer’s Guild, ‘strik-
ing’ a map, like minting currency, coinage we can exchange for contested 
histories? Is the utility of smaller maps more beneficial to us as we seek to 
define ‘borderlands’? Why should we, or why should the Gyelthangpa, care 
whether or not the Central Tibetans, who don’t give much of a f lip about 
Gyelthangpa in the f irst place, see Gyelthang as a ‘borderland’? How do 
other residents of northwest Yunnan and Gyelthang, many of whom are 
not Tibetan, see themselves?
Perhaps the Cartographer’s Guild is comprised of pan-Tibetan advocates. 
Imagine zooming in on Google Earth24 but instead of the image getting 
closer to a particular locus, the borders of the map – the physical edges of 
the computer screen – grow wider with each click on the zoom function 
icon. And almost as an afterthought, if we as scholars are the Cartographer’s 
Guild, then who are ‘the following generations, who were not so fond of the 
Study of Cartography’? Smith writes: ‘For Borges, when map is the territory, 
it lacks both utility and any cognitive advantage with the result that the 
discipline which produced it, deprived of its warrants, disappears’ (Smith 
2004, 209).
Glossary of Chinese and Tibetan Terms
Chaktreng Phyag phreng
Deqin xian 德钦县
Diqing Zangzu zizhizhou 迪庆藏族自治州
Döndrupling Don grub gling (Tib.), Dongzhulin si 
东竹林寺 (Ch.)
Dorje Shugden Rdo rje Shug ldan
Geza Skad tshag
Gyelthang Rgyal thang
24 https://google.com/earth/ Ironically, this is not something easy to do inside China, where 
Google is currently blocked.





mi chö mi chos
Nagara Nags rked rag
nak nyi gö nags myi rgod
Nizu Rmig zur
shaoshu minzu 少數民族
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Most of the recent research on the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, in history, 
anthropology, and related f ields has focused on the dynamics of state in-
corporation and on the marginalization of the local population. Following 
the Manchu intervention in Tibet in the 1720s, there was a sustained effort 
to incorporate Kham into Sichuan province both administratively and 
economically. These moves were countered by attempts from the government 
of Central Tibet, the Ganden Phodrang, to expand its own religious and 
politico-economic presence.
Colonial frontiers are not necessarily of the ‘tidal-wave’ type where a 
centre moves into an uncontrolled area, where the civilized gradually 
subsumes the wild. Many authors have used the metaphor of the sea to 
describe borderland interactions, whereby the relentless waves rolling in 
from the civilizational centre would progressively, but ineluctably, wear 
away the land. Borderland interactions do not leave the centre untouched; 
it too is altered in the process. The logic underlying the ‘frontier of control’ 
has generally been to ensure the continued presence of indigenous com-
munities and their political system. In the words of Ann Stoler and Carole 
McGranahan (2007, 8), ‘imperial formations thrive on deferred autonomy, 
meted out to particular populations incrementally, promised to those in 
whose lives they intervene’. A key element of imperial formation is the 
balance between direct and indirect rule exemplif ied in Qing Empire’s 
periphery by the native off ice (tusi) system:
Qing expansion into Kham depended on the cooperation of local elites, 
and in this case the device to lure them toward Beijing was the tusi office. 
Imperial governance was by necessity a series of compromises, and this 
was especially true at the empire’s edge where the Qing state offered 
tusi titles and off ices, as well as vital military and f inancial support in 
return for a declared submission to the Qing throne. (Herman 2014, 79)
This system of indirect rule allowed for the maintenance of indigenous 
leaders and their political system with a great degree of independence, and 
sympathetic local leaders were bestowed tusi titles, which became a step 
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towards their integration. Full incorporation, however, did not take place 
until a transition to direct administration had been forcefully achieved, 
replacing indigenous leaders with state-appointed off icials – a process 
alluded to in several of the chapters in this volume.
The experience of imperialism significantly differed across Tibetan areas 
and between Central Tibet and Kham or Amdo. The kind of state presence 
in Kham itself also varied in time and from place to place. For a long time 
the colonial agenda in Kham focused on controlling trade routes: vital 
pathways that connected the lowlands of the Sichuan basin to the highlands 
of the Tibetan plateau. Military colonists were deployed in strategic locales, 
especially along the southern ‘off icial’s road’, and merchants from Sichuan 
and Yunnan took advantage of the military presence to resume trade. There 
was also, at times, interest in the exploitation of certain natural resources on 
the territories concerned, which were turned into ‘frontiers of extraction’. 
This came with an increase in the number of settlers, as Relyea and Frank 
both demonstrate here. For the most part, though these people were not 
permanent residents, settler colonialism nevertheless became part of evolv-
ing policies and ideologies about the frontier, especially in republican times.
Late Qing and later republican era efforts in Kham and the Sichuan 
frontier resulted in important steps towards the integration of the highlands 
within the realm of centralized administrations and the nascent nation-
state. The chapters in this section delve further into the complexities of the 
historical context and of the conditions of the time already alluded to in the 
introductory chapter. The region was repeatedly destabilized by internal 
strife and by events elsewhere: the development of Western imperialism, the 
Sino-Japanese war, the rise of provincial warlords, territorial dismember-
ment, and the growth of nationalism as a new political ideology. As Jack 
Patrick Hayes (2014) demonstrated in his groundbreaking environmental 
history study about the northern Sichuan region, the struggle to control 
people, resources, and land led local residents and elites, other than business-
men, warlords, and government agents, to create environmental and social 
changes through a series of ‘changing market regimes’. In this context, 
the frontier became both a space for opportunities and a place in need of 
intervention. The rise of this developmentalist approach and its legacy has 
survived to this day, and the chapters in this section contribute to show 
how interventionist policies in Kham, since late imperial and republican 
times, have contributed to a process of territorialization that transformed 
the land and the people (see Yeh 2013).
We continue to engage with these issues here, well aware of the need to 
pursue the exploration of forms of colonialism or expansion in Asian contexts 
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(Wade 2014) and the ‘civilising missions’ that inform them (see Harrell 1995). 
This section is organized around contrasting approaches to large-scale and 
externally driven transformations and modes of expansion that led to the 
progressive integration of Kham. The chapters focus on the historical period 
that saw rising nationalism, forced integration and reactions to it, and later 
integration into the newly founded People’s Republic of China. Part III, in a 
complementary fashion, assembles chapters that focus on local instances 
and individual trajectories that detail the limitations and opportunities 
provided by these transformations.
One of the underlying questions that tie the chapters together is: how is 
state control achieved and, more importantly, maintained? External powers 
might be able to establish control over a brief period, but they could not 
generally afford to maintain it until the 1950s. This section offers a detailed 
exploration of the means mobilized to maintain state control as well as 
of the ideology that inspired it. What is also discussed here is the kind of 
cultural and ecological determinism that informed much of the colonial 
thinking in China, just like anywhere else.
Addressing the many faces of the ‘civilising mission’ in Kham, this section 
starts with John Bray’s depiction of French missionaries’ entanglement 
in economic and political affairs as they settled in the highly contested 
region of Kham in the second half of the nineteenth century. The story of 
the attempts by the Société des Missions Etrangères de Paris to settle on 
Tibetan land and reach Lhasa, the ‘Rome of Tibet’, is highly revealing of 
on-the-ground conflicts over territorial control. This chapter discusses 
the missionaries’ involvement in trade as a means of shedding light on 
wider historical developments in the region and as a lens through which to 
make plain the status of these borderlands. In trying to advocate for their 
presence, and in their dealings with various agents of the late Qing Empire 
and the young Republic, missionaries contributed to increasing political 
tension. One can hardly think of a more ‘external’ presence than French 
missionaries’ in Kham but, for the historian, their continuous presence over 
several decades made them key witnesses of their time (as much as they 
were key informants for Foreign Affairs services) and their archives can 
help shed a different light on events as they unfolded locally.
As Mark Frank points out in his chapter (to which I return below), the 
Tibetologist Ren Naiqiang felt that French missionaries had succeeded where 
Imperial or Republican interventions had failed: ‘Such a vast stretch of fertile 
earth Han people have not been able to cultivate in over two hundred years 
of management, he remarked, but the French Catholic church has cultivated 
it in our place – how disgraceful ought this to be?’ (see Frank, this volume). 
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During the republican period, concerns about controlling and developing 
the hinterland and the diff iculty in achieving transformation towards 
‘progress’ were often evaluated with regard to the success of some of the 
Christian settlements in the borderlands. Historian Wang Xiuyu (2011, 3) 
describes Qing expansion into the Tibetan Kham areas of Sichuan in the 
late nineteenth century as ‘episodic escalations of state violence propelled 
by regional interests, which were distinct from central-level priorities but 
connected to them in dynamic ways’. The missionaries’ presence epitomizes 
the political fault line that ran through Kham, and which elicited state 
interventions that can be briefly captured through three main historical 
f igures.
The f irst is Lu Chuanlin (1836-1910), the Sichuan governor-general who 
prescribed a forward policy and a more interventionist stance as the imperial 
government struggled to limit the loss of its control over the frontier, espe-
cially after the Tibetan military intervention in Nyarong (see the Chronology 
and Gros, this volume). He proposed the implementation of direct rule 
through the process of gaitu guiliu (bureaucratization), an imperial policy 
by which indigenous rulers who had been granted tusi titles were removed, 
sometimes forcibly, and replaced with civil off icials appointed by Beijing. 
The implementation of a comprehensive set of policies in Kham influenced 
by the Westphalian sovereignty model became the strategic mission of 
the second key f igure, Zhao Erfeng (1845-1911) who, in 1906, was appointed 
the f irst Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner. As many scholars have 
noted, Zhao Erfeng, who literally launched wars against Tibetan leaders and 
monastic institutions to establish a new administration in Kham through 
the forceful implementation of gaitu guiliu, referred to Western and Japanese 
colonialism as models. As one of the architects of Xikang province, he 
exemplif ies the complex ways in which global factors were connected to 
internal circumstances – which still need to be evaluated properly. These 
local conditions are primarily what led to the rise to power of the third and 
most important f igure, the warlord Liu Wenhui (1895-1976), who was made 
Chairman of the government of Sichuan province in 1929. The territories 
controlled by Liu Wenhui were combined into Xikang Province in 1939, 
an idea f irst formulated in the late Qing, and Liu ruled this part of the 
highlands as his ‘f iefdom’ until 1949. Under his rule, Xikang was the target 
of ambitious modernizing measures for which more settlers were required. 
Settler colonization became (and somewhat remains) an important activity 
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on the frontier, with organizational and environmental consequences, but 
also with a direct relation to the changing meaning of sovereignty.1
As Scott Relyea points out, intense competition for authority within east-
ern Tibet between the Sichuan provincial government and Lhasa was linked 
to perceived regional pressure from Western imperialism. In his chapter, he 
explores the role that settler colonialism played in the consolidation of rule 
in Kham, in relation to shifting conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This approach is com-
plemented by M. Frank’s study of the role played by agricultural development 
projects in Kham when the region was converted into the new Xikang Prov-
ince in 1939. This national agrarian development experimentation inspired 
confidence in the ability of the Chinese state to implement larger social and 
environmental interventions on the plateau. These pursuits are of course 
reminiscent of the socialist state’s efforts to transform Tibetan management 
of land and resources in order to transition to a more ‘agrarian’ regime, as 
discussed by Tan in her contribution. Hayes (2014) rightly highlights how 
the socialist state’s interpretation of the local inhabitants’ way of ‘abusing’ 
their natural resources is crucial for understanding the process of ethnic 
assimilation of this region. Here, both Relyea and Frank examine some of 
the antecedents to a vision of what ‘proper’ use of land and resources was 
for the Chinese state as of the republican period. There seems to be a clear 
parallel between the concern for ‘proper’ crops, discussed in both chapters, 
and ‘good’ varieties of practices and associated knowledge. In Frank’s case, 
this concern extended to the search for ‘good varieties’ of worker, and the 
influence of the physiocratic movement on some of the Chinese thinkers 
(Frank, personal communication) calls for a parallel with Michel Foucault’s 
well-known notion of biopolitics as a form of regulatory power characterized 
by the extension of state control over the biological. One cannot but note 
the obvious resonance with the contemporary discourse on suzhi (‘quality’), 
which is used to justify various social and political hierarchies, as well as 
interventions motivated by the will to improve.
These types of intervention were part and parcel of Chinese approaches to 
modern economic and political development that became sources of ethnic 
inequality, as the chapter by C. Patterson Giersch aff irms. In his chapter, 
Giersch links the state and the market, and shows that the advent of a 
1 The adoption of standards derived from international law introduced a signif icant change 
in China’s attitude towards its borders, as most notably exemplif ied by the role of British 
imperialism in f ixing Tibet’s geopolitical identity, and the switch from the notion of suzerainty 
to that of sovereignty.
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market economy is linked to the patterns of dependence among indigenous 
peoples, and that dependence was exacerbated by the state. This trend 
became particularly salient during the rise of the powerful developmentalist 
state during the 1895-1911 modernization efforts. Giersch argues that the 
engendering of economic inequality along ethnic lines dates back further and 
is not a product of the communist period alone. As he further demonstrates, 
there was no immediate singular moment or process of change, but a series 
of conjunctural changes in politics and trade. The republican period saw 
greater competition for (economic) power between monasteries, former 
secular ruling families, and merchants. This competition allowed for new 
commercial entities to gain power, a process that, when combined with 
political changes, laid the foundations for modern China’s long-term practices 
of development that disempower local communities. This seems to be of 
greater relevance across upland Southwest China where land was one source 
of conflict and, as Joseph Lawson (2017, 3) recently argued, ‘state off icials[’s 
…] grand plans for the cultivation of land, the opening of mines, and other 
resource extraction industries, […] fuelled further cycles of dispossession and 
conflict’. The ‘transformative power of trade’, in particular the lucrative tea 
trade, also provided opportunities to a fringe of local entrepreneurs whose 
‘bargaining power’ increased thanks to their pivotal position as intermediar-
ies (Tsomu 2016) and enabled key individuals to seize opportunities, a point 
that Lucia Galli discusses in her chapter in Part III.
There is a long history in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands of trans-local 
networks of trade and interregional connections that are re-emerging today 
in new forms and involve various actors (see Yeh and Coggins 2014, 100-103). 
Concurrently, the borderlands are the ongoing target of sweeping infrastruc-
tural and economic transformations, as well as biopolitical interventions and 
disempowerment that characterize some of The P.R.C.’s minority politics.
In the early 2000s, the Great Western Development Strategy (Go West) 
launched a series of policies and large-scale investments in infrastructural 
and regional economic growth, designed to reduce inequalities between 
China’s poorer western regions and the industrialized coastal provinces. 
Some of these policies are reviewed here by Gillian G. Tan in the context 
of pastoralism in Kham. The push to develop agriculture, she argues, was 
often based on an understanding of pastoralism as a marginal activity 
that was undertaken out of environmental necessity. In her chapter Tan 
discusses the problems with such a biased view, based on her long-term 
ethnography of a contemporary community of pastoralists in eastern 
Kham. She further demonstrates how pastoralism can be interpreted as a 
degree of specialization and shows how its shifting practices are articulated 
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around the forces of state policies and forms of governmentality. In their 
complementary discussion of state ‘agrarianism’, the chapters by Frank 
and Tan clearly state that the borderlands are fundamentally configured 
according to agro-urban standards, imposed on ecological conditions that 
they attempt to shape. To this day, Kham retains an ‘inner frontier’ quality 
and, as such, remains the target of many developmentalist strategies that 
constitute a continuation of borderland integration.
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The Missions Étrangères de Paris (M.E.P.) operated in the Sino-Tibetan 
border region of Kham between 1847 and 1952. The missionaries’ prime 
objective was of course religious, but the division between spiritual 
and this-worldly aspirations was rarely straightforward. In practice 
they had to engage with secular rulers, if only to secure the political 
protection they needed to preach freely. Similarly, they could scarcely 
avoid entanglement in economic affairs, including trade. This essay 
discusses the M.E.P.’s involvement with trade as a means of shedding 
light on wider historical developments in the region in the second half 
of the nineteenth century.
Keywords: Kham, missionaries, Missions Étrangères de Paris, Tibet, trade
Introduction
In March 1848, a suspicious-looking trader turned up in the eastern Tibetan 
town of Chamdo. Uncertain of his identity, the Chinese civil mandarin 
summoned him for interrogation. In the face of detailed questioning, the 
stranger decided that he had no option but to admit that – contrary to his 
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disguise as a Chinese merchant – he was a French national and that his 
‘trade consisted of selling, without money, the doctrine that leads to heaven’.1
The ‘trader’ was Fr. Charles Renou (1812-1863), a Roman Catholic priest 
in the service of the Missions Étrangères de Paris (M.E.P.). On this occa-
sion the Chinese authorities forced him to leave Chamdo and turn back to 
Guangzhou and then Hong Kong. However, he later succeeded in establishing 
a mission in the Tsarong region of southern Kham, under Lhasa’s authority. 
His successors were expelled from Tsarong in 1865 but were later able to 
set up a chain of missions in the Sino-Tibetan border areas of Sichuan and 
Yunnan and maintained a presence there until 1952. Together with their 
Protestant counterparts, they spent longer periods in the region than any 
other category of Westerner. This extended engagement qualif ies them 
both as ‘participants’, intensely involved in local affairs, and as ‘observers’ 
whose testimony constitutes a vivid and informative historical source for 
borderland history.2
Founded in 1658, the M.E.P. was by the mid-nineteenth century enjoying a 
period of revival and growth.3 Its prime objective was of course religious: to 
share the ‘doctrine that leads to heaven’. Indeed, the Monita ad Missionarios 
(Instructions to Missionaries), which were issued in 1665 and serve as one 
of the M.E.P.’s foundational texts, explicitly call on missionaries to avoid 
the slightest taint of commerce (Bousquet 2010, 180). However, the division 
between spiritual and this-worldly aspirations was rarely straightforward. 
In practice, M.E.P. missionaries had no choice but to engage with secular 
rulers, if only to gain access to land and to secure the political protection 
that they needed to preach freely. By the same token, they could scarcely 
avoid entanglement in economic affairs, including trade.
In this essay I adopt the theme of nineteenth-century French missionary 
involvement with trade as a ‘prism’ or ‘lens’ through which to shed light on 
wider historical developments in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands. The essay 
draws on original sources in the M.E.P. and French diplomatic archives, and 
is further informed by contemporary missionary publications as well as a 
range of more recent scholarship.4 To set the scene, I begin with a broad 
1 Renou to M.E.P. Directors, 28 December 1848. Cited in Launay (1905, vol. 1, 81).
2 For a study of French missionaries’ role as ‘incidental ethnographers’ in a neighbouring 
region, see Michaud (2007).
3 For a selection of recent reviews of the M.E.P.’s history, see Guennou (1986), Moussay (2008), 
and Marin (2010).
4 The most important of the missionary publications is Launay’s two-volume, Histoire de 
la Mission du Thibet (1905). Launay was himself an M.E.P. priest. His work is scrupulously 
documented with references that can still be used as a guide to the M.E.P. archives. I have also 
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review of power structures and trade networks in eastern Tibet before 
examining the M.E.P.’s experiences and observations in greater detail.
The Setting: Interlocking Power Structures and Regional Trade 
Networks
The M.E.P.’s engagement with Tibet came as a result of an appeal by Mgr. 
J.-L. Borghi, an Italian Capuchin bishop based in India who led the so-called 
Hindustan-Tibet Mission (Launay 1905, vol. 1, 65). In 1707 the Capuchins had 
established a mission in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, but they were expelled 
in 1745.5 Ever since, they had retained formal ecclesiastical jurisdiction over 
Tibet but were short of resources in India, let alone north of the Himalaya. 
Knowing that the M.E.P. had established missions in Sichuan and Yunnan, 
Borghi suggested that it should take over responsibility for Tibet.
In 1846 the Vatican ratif ied this proposal with the establishment of the 
Apostolic Vicariate of Lhasa – also known as the Vicariate of Tibet – which 
was to be managed by the M.E.P. The vicariate was intended to cover the 
territories administered by Lhasa and, as will be seen, later came to include 
ethnic Tibetan regions in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands. In their writings the 
missionaries distinguished between ‘the kingdom of Tibet’ or ‘Tibet proper’ 
(Thibet proprement dit), meaning the territories controlled by the Ganden 
Phodrang administration in Lhasa; and ‘Chinese Tibet’, referring to the 
Tibetan chiefdoms or polities located in Sichuan and Yunnan. They rarely 
referred to ‘Kham’ except in discussions of the history and administrative 
structure of the region.6
At the outset, the M.E.P. was familiar with conditions in the main centres 
of Sichuan and Yunnan, but not with the border regions and still less with 
central Tibet. Their f irst challenge was therefore to understand the political 
landscape. As the M.E.P. quickly discovered, the Ganden Phodrang, the 
Tibetan administration in Lhasa, exercised a high degree of autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the Qing administration employed a parallel and overarching 
network of off icials not only in Lhasa but also in regional centres such as 
benef itted from more recent scholarship, especially Coleman (2014), Deshayes (2008), and Gros 
(1996, 2001, 2016). See also my own earlier articles on the M.E.P. in Kham (Bray 1997) and on 
Christian missionaries and Tibetan trade (Bray 2014).
5 On the Capuchins’ eighteenth-century mission in Lhasa, see Petech (1952-1957) and Engel-
hardt (2005).
6 For example, Desgodins discussed the eighteenth-century division of Kham province in a 
chapter on the geography of Tibet (Desgodins 1872, 165).
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Markham and Chamdo. In its attempts to establish a foothold in Tibet, 
the M.E.P. would need to deal with both sets of off icials. A similar pattern 
applied in the border regions of Sichuan and Yunnan where local chiefs 
enjoyed varying degrees of local autonomy while acknowledging the ultimate 
authority of the Emperor (see the Chronology of Major Events, this volume).
In their dealings with Tibetan and Qing off icialdom, the M.E.P. would 
try to leverage their support of the French government. As will be seen, this 
approach was double-edged. Even the anti-clerical elements in the Paris 
establishment believed that Catholic missions could be a valuable instrument 
of French diplomacy.7 However, French government support would often 
fall short of the missionaries’ expectations. A still greater problem was the 
Ganden Phodrang’s fear of British expansionism from India. The M.E.P. 
missionaries emphasized that they were French, not British. The significance 
of this distinction was lost to many of their Tibetan interlocutors.
At the local level, overlapping political power structures were under-
pinned by an equally complex set of economic networks. As will be seen, the 
missionaries were to have no great diff iculty in acquiring land to provide 
livelihoods for their followers, at least temporarily, because landholders 
were keen to encourage cultivators to settle in their regions. The greater 
problem was to establish a secure title to their land once they had acquired it.
For local landowners, the scarcest economic resource was not so much 
land as the labour needed to cultivate it. Taxes were paid in kind, in silver and 
through a variety of corvée labour obligations, especially transport labour. 
The diff iculty of meeting these demands meant that it was all too easy for 
ordinary peasants to fall into debt to local landowners or to monasteries. 
Debt obligations could well lead to one of several different forms of servitude, 
including local forms of slavery (Gros 2016). Alternatively, peasants might 
flee the land altogether. In 1857 Renou wrote:
Taxes and corvée labour beyond the capacity of the people have obliged 
entire villages to leave their homelands, especially in Chinese Tibet, and 
the land has remained fallow. This class of men who have left their land 
have lost their civil rights. They form great bands of mendicants who travel 
in caravans, forcing villages to give them alms, and they are not without 
danger for the traveller who encounters them in the middle of the desert.8
7 On this point see Young (2013).
8 Renou to Count de Courcy, French chargé d’affaires in China at Macao, Tsarong, 26 July 
1857. Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (hereafter A.D.N.), Pékin 37. I am responsible for this 
and subsequent translations from the French.
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The missionaries believed that one of their key tasks was to protect their 
followers from this kind of fate.
Outside the monasteries, the majority of the region’s inhabitants de-
pended on a combination of agriculture and pastoralism, supplemented 
by trade. As in other regions on the edge of the Tibetan plateau, local and 
regional trade typically consisted of the exchange of salt, butter, and other 
produce from the higher regions in return for agricultural produce from the 
valleys. Trade was rarely ‘free’ in the sense that it was typically underpinned 
by a complex framework of labour obligations. To cite one example, also 
reported by Gros (2016, 152), Desgodins described how Tibetans from Tsarong 
exchanged salt for grain with the Nung, a non-Tibetan ethnic group in the 
neighbouring Salween valley (C.H. Desgodins 1872, 323). The Nung had 
to carry 500 to 600 loads of salt from Tsarong every year free of charge, 
and then exchange it at a pre-determined non-market rate of f ive loads of 
cereals for one of salt.
The most important long-distance trade was in tea along the route from 
Dartsedo via Lithang and Bathang to Lhasa. Tea was of considerable eco-
nomic and strategic importance to the Qing authorities and to the trading 
houses (guozhang) of Dartsedo (Yudru Tsomu 2016). Many of the leading 
Buddhist monasteries served in effect as trading houses in their own right, 
although there was often an element of compulsion in their sales practices. 
As Bishop Félix Biet (1838-1901) noted in 1893:
With little respect for the law of supply and demand, the monastery is in 
effect able to impose the sale of its products on its clients, even against 
their will. When it has a stock of tea to place, it divides it among rich 
families in accordance with their wealth and obliges them to take delivery, 
either in cash or on credit. It is an obligatory purchase – but not free of 
charge (cited in Groff ier 1893, 141).
However, as Renou reported in 1857, tea was by no means the only medium 
and long-distance trade item:
English cotton goods are spreading more and more in Tibet. Crockery 
and many other European objects, introduced by the Nepalis above all, 
are beginning to present a considerable competition for China. For a long 
time India has supplied Tibet with pearls, coral and sea-shells. Russia 
also sends cloth there.9
9 Renou to Comte de Courcy, Bonga, 26 July 1857. A.D.N., Pékin 37.
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Figure 4.1  Chinese coolies carrying tea to Dartsedo
source: cooper (1871, 201)
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In the same letter, he noted that the British were also having an impact on 
the musk trade:
What was regarded as the best quality [of musk] was provided by savage 
tribes, situated to the east of Assam, among them the No-kong, who 
come each year to Dza-yul to exchange the produce of their country for 
cloth, chaudières10 and agricultural tools. However, since the English 
have become masters of Assam, these savages prefer European cloth 
and rupees, and they have begun to sell them their musk directly, and 
no longer bring so much to Tibet as in the past.
In the 1850s and 1860s most local and regional trade took place through barter. 
However, tea was also widely used as a form of currency, supplemented by 
silver. Since the early eighteenth century, the Chinese had imported silver – 
often in the form of ingots – to pay its military garrisons in Lhasa and other 
towns along the main trade routes. Silver ingots were also in circulation in 
Tsarong in the 1850s, and used to pay taxes although they were often in short 
supply. In later decades, as Relyea (2016) has pointed out, the circulation of 
British rupees increased enormously in Tibet and as far as western Sichuan.
Throughout the period under review, European economic influence was 
expanding, and this was an important part of the backdrop for the M.E.P.’s 
activities. At the same time, as pointed out by Yudru Tsomu (2016) and C. 
Patterson Giersch (this volume), indigenous Tibetan trading houses from 
Dartsedo and Chinese merchants from Shaanxi and Yunnan were expanding 
their own networks. The M.E.P. missionaries set themselves the task f irst 
of understanding these developments and then – where possible – turning 
them to the mission’s advantage.
Trade, Exploration and Information-Gathering
When Renou began his explorations of eastern edge of the Tibetan plateau 
in 1847, his immediate preoccupation was to work out where to establish 
the f irst missionary outpost. From the outset, he made a close study of 
Sino-Tibetan trade networks as a vital source of intelligence. In his travels, 
he chose the disguise of a trader because Christian missionary activity was 
still severely restricted in the interior of China in the 1840s. It would be going 
10 The dictionary def inition is ‘boiler’ or ‘heater’. Here the word perhaps refers to pots and 
pans.
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too far to say that his disguise placed him beyond suspicion. The fact that he 
was able to attempt it at all testif ies both to his Chinese language skills and 
to the rarity of Westerners in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands in that period.
At the outset, Renou argued that the M.E.P. should place a missionary 
in Dartsedo, which lay within the borders of Sichuan, because it would be 
the most favourable post for communicating with eastern Tibet.11 However, 
when he arrived there in September 1847, he noted the presence of a large 
number of Qing off icials. He therefore travelled on to Bathang, and then via 
Markham to Chamdo, both of which lay within the territories administered 
by the Ganden Phodrang.
Renou’s 1848 expulsion from Chamdo at the hands of a Qing off icial 
raised questions about the extent and nature of China’s authority in Tibet 
(here referring to the territories administered by Lhasa). At this time Renou 
argued that if the Chinese could expel a Frenchman from Tibet, it would be 
necessary to ‘accord them the same rights for the kingdoms of Ava, Siam, 
Cochin-China and others who are subject to them on the same footing as 
Tibet and Bhutan’.12 However, even with the support of the French legation, 
the M.E.P. was unable to persuade the Qing authorities to accept the argu-
ment that Tibet was in effect an independent country. The outcome was a 
diplomatic stalemate: the Qing administration gave no clear explanation 
of the nature of their political authority in Tibet. At the same time, they 
insisted that there was no possibility of Renou being allowed to return there.13
In late 1851 Renou once again disguised himself as a merchant to resume 
his explorations, this time from Yunnan. By April 1852, he reached the Dali 
region where he learnt of the regular Tibetan pilgrimages to Mount Jizu, 
known from its shape as the ‘chicken foot mountain’. He also learnt of a local 
fair which was visited by Tibetan merchants in the third and ninth months 
of the Chinese lunar calendar. Renou sent two Chinese servants – likewise 
disguised as traders – on a reconnaissance of the Yunnan/Tibet borders.14 They 
brought back a favourable report, and he decided to follow the same route.
At this point, he sent a request to Rome asking for special dispensation to 
engage in trade in the light of the M.E.P.’s ban on commercial activity.15 His 
plea was based on the argument that he needed trade goods to support his 
11 Renou to M.E.P. Directors, 29 April 1849. Cited in Launay (1905, vol. 1, 74-75).
12 Renou to the French minister, Hong Kong, 14 December 1848. A.D.N. Pékin 37.
13 See Launay (1905, vol. 1, 88-97) for an account of the arguments on both sides. In Launay’s 
view the outcome was not so much a stalemate as a defeat for French diplomacy.
14 Renou to Directors, Dali, 3 July 1852. Archive des Missions Étrangères de Paris (hereafter 
A.M.E.P.) 556, p. 304.
15 Ibid.
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disguise as a merchant. Moreover, the regions in which he hoped to travel 
were scarcely monetized and most exchanges therefore took the form of 
barter. Communications with Europe were slow: it would have taken several 
weeks for Renou’s letter even to reach the Chinese coast. Rome eventually 
granted Renou’s request, although he did not receive the confirmation until 
well after his return to Dali.16
On September 1852, Renou set out again, accompanied by a small group 
of Chinese Christians. A few weeks later, he arrived at the monastery of 
Döndrupling, where he displayed the goods that he had to sell, mainly cloth. 
One of the more unusual items in Renou’s baggage – a telescope – piqued 
the curiosity of the monastery’s incarnate lama. Renou at f irst explained 
that the telescope was not for sale, but then agreed to offer it in exchange 
for Tibetan lessons.17 He subsequently spent ten months studying at the 
monastery. He did not f it the characteristic mould of a Chinese trader 
because – while it was understandable that he might wish to learn spoken 
Tibetan – it was more unusual that he wished to study Tibetan written 
texts, and even the niceties of Buddhist philosophical terms. However, it 
seems that he was not identif ied as a European, at least not conclusively.
After returning to the Dali region, Renou outlined his proposal to establish 
a foothold in territory under Lhasa’s administrative control in a letter to 
Paris in February 1854. Among other details, he proposed to engage in a 
different kind of trade: the purchase of child slaves in order to bring them 
up in the Christian faith.18 He noted that the ‘misery that reigns in the lower 
classes’ meant that parents were frequently obliged to sell their children 
to pay their debts. In the future such children could serve the mission by 
sharing their faith with their compatriots.
In March 1854, Renou set out again. This time his route took him to the 
monastery of Changputong on the bank of the upper Salween River, where 
he again made friends with the incarnate lama. He stayed for another three 
months, continuing his study of Tibetan, but still in his guise as a merchant:
As for my trade, the pretext for my stay in Tibet, this was easy to conduct 
because the lama, while saying nice words to us, prevented his subjects 
from buying or selling anything, whatever it might be, reserving the 
monopoly for himself in the belief that it must be very profitable for him. 
16 See Launay (1905, vol. 2, 394) for the Latin text of the decision by the Propaganda Fide, dated 
4 May 1853.
17 Renou to the M.E.P. directors, 3 December 1852. Cited by Launay (1905, vol. 1, 206-207).
18 Renou to the M.E.P. directors Houang-kia-pin, 15 February 1854, A.M.E.P. 556a, 493-498.
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Poor lama! Prophet though he claimed himself to be, he scarcely perceived 
what kind of trade I had come to conduct in his country!19
Here he heard of possible land to rent on the far side of the river, just inside 
the Tsarong district of Tibet proper. Making the acquaintance of Tsewang, 
one of the richest people in the region, he agreed to lease land in Bonga. 
Bonga was not a mere patch of land but an entire valley. In the past it had 
been cultivated by Nung farmers, and had produced good harvests of wheat. 
However, they had been forced to cede the land because of heavy debts to 
Tsewang, and had ultimately withdrawn, leaving the land uncultivated.
A Foothold in Southern Kham
Renou’s acquisition of land in Tsarong meant that he had at last established 
a base in ‘the kingdom of Tibet’: Tsarong was in the district of Menkong 
which was itself part of a wider region administered from Markham within 
the part of Kham under the authority of Central Tibet. In Markham there 
was a small Qing military garrison. Ironically, in view of subsequent events, 
Renou at f irst believed that he was safer in Tsarong than in China where 
Christianity was still off icially forbidden.20 The Chinese legal code did 
not extend as far as Tibet and, according to Renou, no one had thought of 
banning Christianity there.
Renou had also crossed the boundary from being a pretended merchant 
to becoming a farmer. At the same time, he changed from being a mere 
observer of Tibetan life to becoming a full participant, including in local 
trade. He of course brought with him the attitudes and aspirations of a 
European outsider, and a Catholic missionary at that. However, in putting his 
plans into practice, he had to adapt to the social as well as the geographical 
constraints of the environment in which he worked. It would be too much 
to claim that he became in any way ‘Tibetan’. However, his overall approach 
may have been more indigenous than he himself realized.
Having acquired the land, Renou now had to consider the greater chal-
lenge of securing an adequate labour supply. He addressed the problem 
in three ways. First, he imported labourers from Yunnan: these included 
Chinese Christians who were to form the core of the new community, as well 
as craftsmen who would help construct the mission buildings. Secondly, as 
19 Renou to the M.E.P. directors, Bonga, 1 July 1855. A.M.E.P. 556.
20 Renou to Count de Courcy, 26 July 1857. A.D.N., Pékin 37.
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he had planned, he purchased orphans with a view to building up a Christian 
community for the future. Thirdly, he hired labourers from the local villages 
to clear trees to make room for cultivable land. Meanwhile, he was joined 
by a fellow-missionary, Jean-Charles Fage (1824-1880).
The missionaries also needed to buy necessities such as grain, salt, and 
butter, and this was another important point of contact with neighbouring 
villages. In the f irst instance they paid for these goods by bartering cloth 
and other trade goods from Yunnan. However, as Renou explained, there 
was a local shortage of silver, which was needed to pay taxes. The result was 
that their neighbours were reluctant to supply the missionaries and their 
followers unless they gave silver in return.21
In 1857, encouraged by Renou’s reports of the new missionary outpost in 
Bonga, the M.E.P. appointed Jacques Thomine-Desmazures (1804-1869) to 
serve as the f irst Bishop of Tibet. It also sent a group of younger missionar-
ies to serve as reinforcements. However, the mission did not develop as 
they had hoped. In September 1858 Tsewang announced that he wished to 
regain possession of Bonga, and turned up with a band of thugs to expel 
the missionaries. This episode set in motion a chain of events that brought 
the mission to much greater off icial attention in both Lhasa and Beijing.22
According to Fage, economic considerations were among the factors 
leading to attacks on the mission:
I am convinced that we would not have been attacked if our f inancial 
resources had permitted us to continue our trading, especially at a time 
when silver is very rare in Tsarong. The people who earlier found silver only 
in Bonga would not have wished to oppose us, in the hope that they would 
still have the means through us to pay their taxes and debts. Only, we had 
almost no silver left – approximately 200 taëls at the beginning of 1858.23
At this point, Thomine-Desmazures decided that it was time for the mission 
to adopt a much more public stance and to seek overt French diplomatic 
support. An important factor in this decision was Article 8 of the 1858 Treaty 
of Tianjin, which declared that Christian missionaries were entitled to the 
protection of the Chinese authorities. Contrary to their earlier argument 
that Tibet enjoyed a similar status to Siam, the M.E.P. now argued that it 
21 Renou to Libois, 20 August 1856. Cited by Launay, (1905, vol. 1, 51).
22 See Launay (1905, vol. 1, 316-383) and Deshayes (2008, 57-64) for more detailed accounts. 
See also Gros (1996) and Bray (1997).
23 Fage to Libois, 8 August 1859. Cited in Launay (1905, vol. 1, 317).
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was directly subject to Chinese rule. Missionaries therefore enjoyed the 
same right to Chinese protection in Tibet as they did in China proper. In 
pursuit of this claim, and flying the French flag as a mark of off icial status, 
Thomine-Desmazures marched via Dartsedo and Markham to Chamdo.
During this period, Thomine-Desmazures sent two Chinese Christian 
merchants to Lhasa to prepare the way for the missionaries (Launay 1905, vol. 
1, 371). However, the Ambans expelled them on the grounds that, since they 
were Christians, they must be in contact with the French and the British. 
They were forced to leave the capital before they had had an opportunity 
to sell their merchandise, and they suffered a loss of 2,000 taëls.
In Chamdo the missionaries negotiated with representatives from the 
Lhasa and the Qing administrations while drawing on long-distance support 
from the French legation in Beijing. The eventual outcome in 1862 was that 
the Qing and Tibetan authorities formally acknowledged the M.E.P.’s title to 
Bonga, and even promised to punish Tsewang for his aggression. However, the 
missionaries were obliged to accept that they could not now travel to Lhasa, 
ostensibly because it was not safe to do so. It was clear that the assent of 
both the Qing and – still more – the Lhasa authorities was at best lukewarm.
In the short term the perception that the missionaries had access to 
political as well as spiritual power contributed to a series of conversions f irst 
of the entire village of Songta close to Bonga, and then of a series of other 
villages and hamlets. However, such interventions threatened to disrupt 
local religious and political power structures. The missionaries forbade 
their converts to make grain contributions to local monasteries, to whom 
they were often in debt, in return for their prayers. In 1863 the monastery of 
Menkong responded by demanding immediate repayment of an enormous 
debt from the recently Christianized village of Aben (Launay 1905, vol. 1, 401).
Renou’s death in late 1863 deprived the mission of its most forceful leader 
at a time when it had become acutely vulnerable. In 1864 a decree issued 
with the Dalai Lama’s seal stated that Lhasa had learnt that the religion 
of the heretics (mou-ti-pa in the French transcription, probably mutekpa) 
had been introduced in the region: local off icials and monasteries were 
charged with stamping it out.24 The ultimate outcome was that in 1865, the 
missionaries were forced to leave Tibetan territory altogether, along with 
the followers who remained loyal to them. One of the missionaries, Gabriel 
Durand (1835-1865) was killed, as were several converts.
In their analysis of these events, the M.E.P. complained that the French 
legation in Beijing failed to give them the wholehearted support that they 
24 Durand to the director of the M.E.P., Bonga, 9 July 1864. A.M.E.P. 556c (2).
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had hoped for.25 This complaint was partially justif ied inasmuch as the 
legation judged that the Qing authorities in practice exercised limited 
authority in Tibet, particularly on religious matters. It was therefore both 
impolitic and impractical to press them too far. The M.E.P.’s argument was 
now that the Qing had both the authority and the power to protect the 
missionaries inside Tibet proper, but chose not to do so.
Regrouping in Sichuan and Yunnan
After their expulsion from Tsarong, the M.E.P. missionaries regrouped 
in the border regions of Sichuan and Yunnan. In December 1865, Bishop 
Joseph Chauveau (1816-1877), who had now taken over the leadership of the 
mission, reaff irmed that the Apostolic Vicariate of Lhasa extended as far as 
the borders of Kashmir (Launay 1905, vol. 2, 21). However, for the time being, 
he forbade his missionaries to enter ‘Tibet proper’. Instead, while waiting 
for happier days, they should establish themselves as f irmly as possible 
‘in the country where Chinese authority exercises a more or less decisive 
influence’ (ibid.). He therefore applied to the Vatican for the formal transfer 
to the Tibet vicariate of fourteen ‘principalities’ from Sichuan, including 
Bathang, Lithang, and Chakla (including Dartsedo); as well as four ‘towns’ 
from Yunnan, including Adunzi (Deqin). In 1868 the Vatican duly gave its 
assent (Launay 1905, vol. 2, 29, 396) (see Map 4.1).
The M.E.P.’s strategy of appealing for the Qing government’s protection 
was based on the Treaty of Tianjin. However, in the borderlands as in ‘Tibet 
proper’, the missionaries needed to deal with parallel and often overlapping 
authorities. In practice, the power of local Qing officials was constrained by 
poor communication lines to the main centres of authority in Chengdu and 
Kunming (then known as Yunnanfu), let alone Beijing. Meanwhile, indigenous 
rulers continued to exercise a high degree of local autonomy, although their 
positions and status were now formally confirmed by the Qing. The two depas 
of Bathang are an example. In 1648 the Fifth Dalai Lama appointed the original 
holders of these posts to collect taxes for a f ixed three-year term (Coleman 
2014, 49). However, their positions soon became hereditary and, by the time 
the M.E.P. entered the region, they stood at the apex of a local hierarchy of 
Kham Tibetan aristocrats whose status was likewise hereditary. The depas had 
their own trading interests which were supported by rights to corvée labour.
25 I discuss the issues in greater detail, drawing on French diplomatic archives, in Bray (1997). 
See also Launay (1905, vol. 2, 31-66) and Deshayes (2008, 64-73).
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The role of the Buddhist monasteries was a further complicating factor. 
Again, Bathang is an example. Ba Chöde was the leading local monastery. 
Since the mid-seventeenth century it had belonged to the Geluk and was 
therefore closely aligned with Lhasa spiritually and politically. It was also 
a major regional landowner, possibly administering as much as 40-50 per 
cent of land in the Bathang district (Coleman 2014, 33, 36-37). Like the depas, 
the monasteries had their own trading interests.
For the M.E.P. good lines of communication were as important as ever, and 
Chauveau established his headquarters in Dartsedo because of its status as a 
Map 4.1  The principal M.E.P. mission stations in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, c. 
1900
sources: based on desgodins (1872); launay (1905); srTm (nasa) and modern administrative 
borders extracted from gadm database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
authors: rémi chaix and john bray
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regional trading centre. For similar reasons, the M.E.P. established outposts 
at Bathang and at Adunzi in the same period. However, the majority of their 
stations were more agricultural in nature. Beyond their primary religious 
objectives, the missionaries’ main preoccupation was to provide security 
and livelihoods for their followers. In this phase of their activities, they 
no longer needed to disguise themselves as traders or to undertake major 
trading activities in their own right. However, they continued to depend on 
regional trading networks for their own logistical support. At the parochial 
level, their role was to create a secure environment where their followers 
could engage in local trade as a supplement to their farming. In this they 
were partially successful, but life remained precarious for their Christians 
converts, as it did for their Buddhist neighbours.
Yerkalo serves as an example of the challenges. Then lying just inside 
Sichuan on the slopes above the banks of the river Mekong, Yerkalo is known 
in Chinese as Yanjing (literally ‘salt well’) and famous for its salt production, a 
prime trade item.26 The Catholic parish there was originally founded by Biet 
and Auguste Desgodins (1826-1913) following their expulsion from Tsarong. In 
1870 they were able to acquire some abandoned fields in Yerkalo on a 50-year 
rent.27 They and their successors gradually built up the settlement so that 
by the 1880s it amounted to a substantial Christian village consisting of 21 
families (104 people), together with 21 houses as well as stables and barns.28
In principle, the salt trade should have been a source of wealth in good 
years, and an economic safety net in years when harvest yields were poor. 
However, in practice many of Yerkalo’s inhabitants endured no more than a 
precarious existence. In part this is because of the conditions under which 
salt was traded. Every year each of the two Bathang depas sent four off icial 
salt collectors to the region (Soulié 1904, 103). They had the right to free 
accommodation and sustenance during their stay of two to three months, and 
the local people had to carry the salt free of charge to Bathang. In addition, 
the off icials compelled people to buy tea at three to four times the market 
price. The economic benefits of the salt trade therefore accrued not so much 
to the local inhabitants as to regional officials. The nineteenth-century village 
traders of Yerkalo were far from having the economic power of the mid-
twentieth-century Khampa traders described by Lucia Galli (this volume).
26 Due to twentieth-century boundary changes, Yerkalo now falls within the Tibet Autonomous 
Region and is no longer part of Sichuan. For an account of the techniques of salt production, see 
Desgodins (1872, 293-297).
27 Francis Goré (1880-1954). A.M.E.P. Typescript papers. Une mission thibétaine (Yerkalo). 
Éphémérides de Notre Dame de Sacré-Coeur 1865-1922.
28 Ibid.
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Advocating British Indian Trade with Tibet
Already in 1865, feeling ‘abandoned’ by the French mission in Beijing, 
Desgodins had suggested that the M.E.P. should seek aid from the British.29 
Later on, he and other missionaries suggested that the British might be 
instrumental in opening up Tibet, either through political or military means, 
or through trade. They therefore took all possible opportunities to lobby the 
British on the benefits of commercial engagement with Tibet.
One such opportunity came in 1868, when a young Englishman called 
Thomas Thornhill Cooper (1839-1878) travelled to Dartsedo and Bathang. 
Cooper claimed to be acting on behalf of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 
which was interested in potential new trade routes in southwest China, and he 
hoped to travel via Lhasa to India or, alternatively, to travel south via Adunzi 
to Burma. Cooper benefited from the M.E.P.’s logistical network at every stage 
of his journey. For example, while still travelling up the Yangtze, he mentions 
meeting a ‘Catholic Mission Agent’, whom he describes as a wealthy merchant 
engaged in an extensive trade with Sichuan (Cooper 1871, 39). He needed to 
deal with this merchant to arrange funds for his onward journey to Chongqing.
Similarly, in Bathang Cooper mentions that he met a Chinese merchant 
who was ‘the writer, or chief man of business of the missionaries’ (Cooper 
1871, 261). Together with his brother, this man had owned a ‘drug shop’ in 
Lhasa, but they had been expelled because they were Christians. Cooper 
does not mention this man’s name, but he may have been one of the two 
merchants whom Thomine-Desmazures had sent to Lhasa in 1862. Ap-
parently, he hoped that Cooper would indeed travel to Lhasa, where he 
would be arrested and maltreated by the Tibetan authorities. This in turn 
would provoke British intervention which would benefit the mission and 
at the same time enable him to recover his business. In the event, Cooper 
disappointed the merchant by travelling to the south instead of via Lhasa. 
However, he was forced to turn back before he could reach Dali, let alone 
the Burmese border. Despite this defeat, he was full of praise for the M.E.P. 
missionaries who had assisted him throughout his journey.
While still en route, Cooper (1868) wrote a letter to the Royal Geographical 
Society in London, including a set of ‘Notes on Thibet, by a French mission-
ary’, probably Desgodins. This includes a discourse on the prospects for sales 
of Indian tea in Tibet. Cooper returned to this topic in his subsequent book, 
noting the likelihood of political opposition from the Chinese authorities 
and the Tibetan monasteries:
29 Desgodins to Lebois, 18 June 1865. A.M.E.P. 556.
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The Chinese on their part dread the loss of their valuable wholesale 
monopoly, to maintain which they give the Lamas the monopoly of the 
retail supply; who by this means, hold in absolute subjection the people, 
to whom tea is a prime necessity of life. The Lamas, on their part, fear that 
with the introduction of British trade, the teachers of the new religion 
would come, and free trade and free thought combined would overthrow 
their spiritual sway (Cooper 1871, 263).
The book concludes with a memorandum by ‘an old resident in China’, 
almost certainly a French missionary. This pays tribute to England as ‘the 
only power on earth suff iciently rich and strong enough to rely together 
China, Thibet and India’, and calls for the establishment of English factories 
(i.e. trading posts) in Lhasa, Bathang, Dali, and Chongqing.
The M.E.P. likewise offered practical assistance to Captain William Gill 
(1843-1882), a second British traveller, who travelled to Dartsedo in 1877 
Figure 4.2  Tibetan Inn in Dartsedo
source: cooper (1871, 204)
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and – unlike his predecessor – succeeded in making the overland journey 
to Burma. For example, Gill notes that the missionaries helped him gather 
a supply of British Indian rupees, which were the most convenient currency 
in southwest China and Tibet:30
At the time of our visit, we found it diff icult to obtain a large number of 
rupees; for the embassy that had just arrived from Peking, and was on its way 
to Lassa, had bought them all up; but Monseigneur Chauveau contrived to 
find ten thousand for us among his friends and acquaintances. (Gill 1883, 171)
In 1878, a third British traveller made his way to Dartsedo. This was Edward 
Colborne Baber (1843-1980), an off icial in the China Consular Service. Ac-
cording to Launay (1905, vol. 2, 143-145), Baber hoped to become the off icial 
British Resident in Lhasa. In pursuit of this ambition, he was assiduous in 
collecting economic information, and repeatedly plied Biet with questions 
on the price of tea and cloth in local markets. Although Baber’s report makes 
no reference to M.E.P. sources, it repeats many of the same arguments that 
they had put forward:
To the Tibetan, tea is more than a luxury, it is an absolute necessary. 
Deprived of the costly, but indispensable, astringent, he suffers from 
headache, grows nervous, restless, out of condition, and altogether 
unhappy. (Baber 1882, 198)
In 1880 Biet sent Desgodins to India where he eventually established an 
outpost of the mission at Padong, near Kalimpong and close to the southern 
borders of Tibet. In 1883, in response to a request from the M.E.P., the Vatican 
formally attached the eastern part of Darjeeling district to the Tibet vicariate 
(Launay 1905, vol. 2, 184, 404). It also included the Chumbi valley (an outpost 
of Tibetan territory between Sikkim and Bhutan) and Tawang (now in the 
Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh but claimed by China). From Desgodins’ 
perspective the references to Chumbi and Tawang were welcome but not 
strictly necessary because these were in any case part of Tibet and therefore 
within the mission’s original mandate.
Desgodins made extensive contacts in British off icial circles and pub-
lished a pamphlet on A Tea Trade with Thibet at the expense of the Bengal 
Government Secretariat. Writing as though from a British perspective, 
Desgodins argued that there was an ‘export tea market at our doors’. The 
30 On this point, see Relyea (2016).
Trade, TerriTory, and missionary connec Tions 169
pamphlet goes into some detail on the different types of tea and how they 
are made. It also discusses the political economy of the trade, including 
the role of off icials acting in a private capacity, and taking advantage of 
corvée labour:
When Chinese mandarins in charge of the troops and of the Lamas’ pay 
[italics in the original] receive their allowance, they generally expend at 
Ta-tsien-loo [Dartsedo] part of the money entrusted to them in buying 
tea. This tea is conveyed at the expense of the people, as extra duty, and 
given as pay to the soldiers, and even to the Lamas, at the price current in 
the interior, according to the place. The conveyance having cost nothing, 
and the price being threefold or fourfold higher than at Ta-tsien-loo, the 
mandarins realise by this means considerable prof its for themselves, in 
which the Government does not participate. (Desgodins c.1881, 13)
The pamphlet concludes by expressing the view that the tea trade might 
be the means by which ‘the people of Thibet would learn to appreciate and 
wish for the more enlightened rule with which India is blessed’ (Desgodins 
c.1881, 14). However, on a strictly practical note, he argued that success could 
only be achieved ‘by offering to our customers what they want: tea prepared 
to suit their tastes’ (Desgodins c.1881, 16).
Desgodins’ recommendation that Indian tea planters should provide 
Tibetan customers with what they wanted seems obvious but it was never 
achieved. The Chinese authorities continued to oppose the Indian tea trade, 
but their objections were not the only obstacle. The Tibetans did not like 
the taste or quality of Indian tea and, as Booz (2011) points out, British tea 
planters had little enthusiasm for the Tibet market. Sales to England were 
expanding in any case, and there was therefore little incentive to embark 
on an alternative project that seemed new and strange. Desgodins and his 
colleagues hoped that Catholicism would follow Indian tea into Tibet. This 
never happened.
Local Repercussions of International Rivalries
In 1887 the M.E.P. faced a fresh outbreak of persecution. The epicentre was 
at Bathang.31 The f irst major sign of trouble came in May when a crowd 
31 This episode is discussed at some length, with copious quotations from original correspond-
ence, in Launay (1905, vol. 2, 220-255). See also Deshayes (2008, 102-104).
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threw stones at the missionaries’ residence, causing considerable damage.32 
Tensions continued to build up over the following weeks, and in July a crowd 
of about a hundred peasants launched a full-scale attack on the residence. 
The two M.E.P. missionaries, Pierre Giraudeau (1850-1941) and Jean Soulié 
(1858-1905), found refuge f irst in the house of the second depa and then with 
the f irst depa. On 1 August they fled from Bathang and eventually reached 
safety in Dartsedo.
In the M.E.P.’s analysis a combination of local and international factors 
had prompted the attacks. In their view, the root cause was the ‘hatred of 
the lamas’, specif ically the lamas of Lhasa.33 For example, they cited a set 
of letters issued by the ‘king of Lhasa’ and the three great monasteries of 
Lhasa that condemned Christianity and was explicitly addressed to the 
chiefs, monasteries, and people of Bathang (Deshayes 2008, 321-326). The 
secondary cause was the Government of India’s decision to withdraw plans 
for an expedition to Lhasa to be led by the British off icial Colman Macaulay 
(1849-1890) with a view to promoting trade with Tibet.34 The Lhasa monks 
were strongly opposed to the proposed mission and took the decision to 
cancel it as a sign of weakness. Having seen off a potential British threat 
to the south, they believed that they could now turn their attention to the 
French in Kham.
At the local level, the missionaries believed that a combination of factors 
were in play. Their main enemy was the Ba Chöde monastery, acting on 
instructions from Lhasa. The people who actually attacked them were 
detsodunpo (‘people of the seven districts’), villagers who were clients of the 
monastery and obeyed its orders. The assault on the mission was therefore 
far from spontaneous. The missionaries believed that the Qing mandarin 
in Bathang had the authority to stop the attacks but, motivated by a ‘deaf 
jealousy’ of the mission, had deliberately failed to do so.35 Meanwhile the 
two depas were caught between opposing forces, ostensibly sympathetic to 
the missionaries’ plight, but ultimately unable to protect them.
The M.E.P. posts in Yaregong and Yerkalo – both in the Bathang domain – 
also came under attack, and the missionaries in these stations were forced to 
32 Giraudeau and Soulié to Biet, Dartsedo 1 September 1887, cited in Launay (1905, vol. 2, 
228-233).
33 Procès de la Mission Catholique Française au Thibet chinois, 2 November 1893 A.D.N. Pékin 
37.
34 On Macaulay see Singh (1988, 205-210).
35 Drawing on Qing sources, Coleman (2014) presents a rather different view of local Qing 
off icials’ position, emphasizing that their authority was far from absolute, and that they in 
practice needed to negotiate with local Tibetan interests in order to achieve their objectives.
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flee with their followers. In Yunnan, monks in Adunzi monastery, apparently 
acting in collusion with their counterparts in Bathang, likewise destroyed 
the local mission station. At the same time, Etienne Dubernard (1840-1905) 
and some 300-400 Christians were forced to f lee from the nearby station 
of Cigu (Tsekou).
Appeals to French Trading Interests
Over the next ten years the energies of Bishops Biet and Giraudeau, who was 
appointed coadjutor in 1892, were almost fully taken up with the demand 
for reparations for the destruction of the missions. The French legation in 
Beijing was broadly supportive of the M.E.P. but did not always act with the 
alacrity that the missionaries wished.
In November 1893, hoping to boost French diplomatic support, Biet wrote 
a brief on the ‘Industrial and commercial advantages for France prepared 
by the French Catholic mission’.36 The brief starts by reviewing British 
and Russian commercial initiatives in the region, and then points out that 
36 Biet, Procès de la Mission Catholique Française au Thibet chinois, 2 November 1893, A.D.N.
Figure 4.3  Bathang, early twentieth century
source: m.e.p. archives, paris
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the only gateway to Tibet from Yunnan and the French colony in Tonkin 
would be Adunzi, a town occupied by French missionaries for 30 years. The 
inhabitants of the mountains and valleys regarded the French as ‘friends and 
liberators’ because of the missionaries’ work in vaccinating them against 
smallpox.37 Dartsedo would be an alternative gateway from Sichuan and, 
there too, the French were held in high regard:
At very short notice, industrial and commercial France will be able to reap 
the benef its of the installation of her missionaries in Tibetan territory 
for 30 years; and the French missionaries of Tibet will always make it a 
pleasure and a duty to assist with the development of French influence 
and interests in any way possible.38
He then presented a long list of Tibetan exports including wool, yak leather, 
animal skins, and musk. In return the Tibetans would be pleased to purchase 
red, purple, and green cloth, cotton goods, camphor, aloes, quinine, knives, 
scissors, mirrors, musical boxes, stereoscopes, dolls, drugs, telescopes, 
binoculars, watches, kitchen clocks, and bridles for horses.
The M.E.P. received strong support from Frédéric Haas (1843-1915), a French 
diplomat who in the early 1890s served as consul in Hankou (Bensacq-Tixier 
2003, 290-294). Haas was an enthusiastic proponent of French commercial 
expansion, including the development of a commercial route as far as the 
borders of Tibet. In June 1894, Haas wrote to Biet pledging his personal 
devotion to the mission in his capacity as a man of faith as well as a French 
patriot.39 He recommended that, in the interests of the mission, Biet should 
appeal to French commercial as well as political interests. In a subsequent 
letter, he went so far as to offer to lead an off icial French mission to Bonga, 
and suggested that the missionaries should accompany the mission as 
interpreters.40 The Chinese could scarcely object to an off icial French 
mission of this nature and, having reached Bonga, the M.E.P. would then 
be able to take repossession of their former post.
The French expedition to Bonga never took place. However, in late 
1895 Haas was appointed to serve as the f irst French consul of Chongqing. 
From there he continued to promote the idea that Yunnan qualif ied as the 
37 As early as 1854, Renou had written to his colleagues to apply for a supply of smallpox 
vaccine. Renou to Libois, 31 January 1854, A.M.E.P. 556a, 477-483.
38 Biet, Procès de la Mission Catholique Française au Thibet chinois, 2 November 1893, A.D.N.
39 Haas to Biet, 5 June 1894. A.M.E.P., 556G, 841-848.
40 Haas to Biet, 19 June 1894. A.M.E.P., 556G, 849-856.
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commercial ‘hinterland’ of the French colonial possessions in Tonkin. This 
idea attracted a degree of support from the French colonial authorities in 
Tonkin, but the French never developed signif icant commercial interests 
in Tibet.
Nevertheless, Auguste Gérard (1852-1922), the French minister in Beijing, 
continued to give the M.E.P. political support. In 1897 he ordered Haas to 
travel in person to Chengdu to take up the missionaries’ cause there (Launay 
1905 vol. 2, 317). If necessary, he was to accompany the missionaries in person 
to Bathang. As noted above, Haas never went that far, but it seems that this 
threat of intervention at last galvanized the Sichuan authorities into taking 
action. They appointed Ji Zhiwen, a former Bathang civil mandarin, to take 
up the M.E.P.’s case. Ji quickly reached an agreement with the two depas 
and the Ba Chöde monastery facilitating the missionaries’ return in May 
1897, while offering them f inancial compensation.
A f inal settlement to the Bathang affair was signed by the two Bathang 
depas and the head of the Ba Chöde monastery in February 1900 (Launay 
1905, vol. 2, 328-330). The settlement confirmed that Bathang natives would 
have all freedom to become Christians. Those who were already required 
to pay tribute as part of their land title would continue to do so, but no 
one could demand extra tribute from them because they were Christians. 
At the same time they would be exempt from f inancial or corvée labour 
contributions for the monasteries.
The settlement addressed the main social issues that had troubled the 
Tibet mission since its foundation. In that respect, it marked an end to a 
distinct period in the mission’s history. However, it provided no more than 
an interim respite. In 1905 the M.E.P. was beset by an even worse calamity 
in the form of an uprising, starting in Bathang, that led to the murder of 
f ive missionaries, and formed part of the background to Zhao Erfeng’s 
subsequent military campaign in Kham.41 For the purposes of this paper, 
these events belong to a different era.
Conclusion: Global Forces and Local Responses
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the M.E.P. retained 
the hope that they would one day be able to build a church in Lhasa. In that 
respect the broad contours of their vision of ‘Tibet’ remained unchanged: it 
always encompassed the whole of the territories of the Ganden Phodrang 
41 On these events see Deshayes (2008, 138-186) and Coleman (2014, 190-261).
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and, from the 1860s onwards, came to include the Tibetan polities in Sichuan 
and Yunnan as well. Nevertheless, for the M.E.P., the political boundary 
between ‘Tibet proper’ and ‘Chinese Tibet’ proved to be a hard border, 
not a soft one. The establishment of the Padong mission in India was a 
reaff irmation of their dreams of reaching Lhasa, but never became more 
than a geographical anomaly. Although they would never have accepted the 
term, the ‘Vicariate of Tibet’ in practice became the ‘Vicariate of Kham’. To 
take the irony a step further, it could even be argued that, by establishing his 
headquarters in Dartsedo, Bishop Chauveau anticipated the 1928 creation 
of Xikang Province, which centred on the same town (see Stéphane Gros’ 
Introduction, this volume).
The history of the M.E.P. in the second half of the nineteenth century 
reflects the tensions between the missionaries’ aspiration to bring Chris-
tianity to Central Tibet and their own confinement to the borderlands. In 
pursuit of the broader vision they promoted all possible agents of change, 
including advocating the Western powers’ economic expansion into Tibet 
proper.
As has been seen, when the missionaries were the only Europeans in 
Tsarong in the 1850s, Renou was already able to report on the effects of 
growing Western economic influence. The M.E.P. hoped to accelerate this 
process of change by advocating more direct British and French political 
and economic engagement, thus creating more favourable conditions for 
the ‘doctrine that leads to heaven’. In this project they clearly had limited 
success. The main reasons included the Lhasa authorities’ fear of European 
expansion, their continuing influence on the Tibetan monasteries outside 
their formal authority in western Sichuan and Yunnan, and the limita-
tions of Qing power in the borderlands. French pressure on the Beijing 
administration therefore translated into no more than a qualif ied degree 
of local protection for the missionaries.
Alongside their wider geopolitical ambitions, the M.E.P. were also 
intensely local. Indeed, to the extent that they changed people’s lives, this 
was primarily at the parochial level among the villagers of Yerkalo and other 
settlements. In endeavouring to provide secure livelihoods for their followers 
through agriculture and trade, they struggled with the same geographical 
and ecological constraints as their neighbours. Unable to survive in isolation, 
they sought the support, or at least the acquiescence, of whichever political 
authorities would listen. In this approach they followed a pattern not so 
different from that of the Buddhist monasteries for centuries before them.
The M.E.P. fathers certainly started as aliens and, from the perspect-
ive of Lhasa as well as the Qing mandarins, they always remained so. 
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However, in agricultural settlements such as Yerkalo and Cigu, as well 
as the markets of Adunzi and Dartsedo, they gradually became part of 
the fabric of local society. By the end of the century, to evoke the title 
of Lipman’s (1997) work on the Muslims of northwest China, they had 
become ‘familiar strangers’, even if they would never have qualif ied as 
‘familiar Khampas’.
Glossary of Chinese and Tibetan Terms
Bathang ’Ba’ thang
Ba Chöde ’Ba’ chos sde dga’ ldan phan bde gling (full name)
Bonga Ba nga
Bongmé ’Bum nye
Cigu 茨姑 var. Tsekou
Chamdo Chab mdo
Dartsedo Dar rtse mdo (Tib.), Dajianlu 打箭炉(Ch.), var. 
Tatsienlou, Tachienlu. Now Kangding 康定.
depa sde ba
detsodunpo Sde tsho bdun po
Döndrupling Don grub gling (Tib.), Dongzhulin si 东竹林寺 (Ch.)
Ganden Phodrang Dga’ ldan pho brang




mutekpa mu stegs pa
Tsarong Tsha rong
Tsewang Tshe dbang
Yaregong Yar ri sgang
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5 Settling Authority




From 1907 to 1911, some 4000 commoners from Sichuan ventured west. 
Enticed by promises of large tracts of uncultivated land, they ascended 
the Tibetan Plateau seeking new lives – and new benef its for a changing 
Sichuan Province and Qing polity. Their presence was both the result of 
and a response to intensifying competition for authority within eastern 
Tibet between the provincial government and Lhasa, and perceived 
regional pressures from British India and Imperial Russia. Using Kham 
as a case study, this chapter explores the role such state-supported settle-
ment played in the consolidation of rule within a state’s borderlands and 
the relationship between shifting conceptions of territoriality within a 
globalizing structure of international law as substantiation for asserting 
sovereignty.
Keywords: borderlands, colonization, Kham, Qing China, Republican 
China, sovereignty
民安、國富，必自無曠土無游民始，以是謂中國不可一日缓者。
Bringing peace to the people and enriching the state must begin 
 from having no empty lands and no idle people. This is a goal 
which attainment China cannot delay for a single day.
– Zhao Erxun (1909)1
1 Zhao Erxun 543 Roll 70, Record 361 (1909: XT1): QA.
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
doi: 10.5117/9789463728713_ch05
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Introduction
For more than two centuries, strict central policy off icially prevented or 
restricted emigration from the Qing polity’s core provinces into borderland 
regions spanning the empire’s southwest to its northeast and Taiwan.2 
Yet by the f inal decades of Qing rule, these regulations began to ease. This 
prompted neighbouring provinces to encourage its beleaguered commoners 
to escape overcrowding and settle these regions, at times even providing 
material support to ensure both their successful cultivation of new lands and 
the concomitant expansion of imperial tax rolls – as well as their continued 
loyalty to Qing rule. By the last third of the nineteenth century, in Mongolia 
and Manchuria, in Taiwan (before 1895) and in Xinjiang, imperial subsidies 
supported the journey from neidi of many a commoner and his family, 
providing seeds, tools, even initial tax abatement for reclaiming distant 
‘wastelands’. Pursuing promises of new opportunities and a fresh start, 
these settlers by venturing into the empire’s borderlands contributed to 
Qing responses to newly emerging pressures on imperial rule in regions at 
the edge of its authority which manifest in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.
Much of the literature on Qing era settlement beyond China proper 
(Perdue 2005, Teng 2004, Millward 1998, Lee 1970, Reardon-Anderson 2005) 
explores the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when a majority of of-
f icial ‘settlers’ were soldiers tasked with defending expanded imperial 
borders and maintaining stable Qing rule in newly acquired territory, such 
as Xinjiang. During that era, border defense was focused predominately 
inward, concerned less with repelling external incursion than co-opting 
local indigenous rulers and forestalling challenges to Qing rule, all while 
attempting to achieve self-suff iciency through farming. As the nineteenth 
century unfolded, intensifying demographic pressures in China proper 
converged with the view that commoner farmers better supported the goals 
of self-suff iciency to shift off icial policy toward borderland settlement, just 
as the increasing intensity of Russian and Japanese imperialism across Qing 
territory from Xinjiang to Manchuria added a new dimension to its role in 
the outward focus of border defense (Lan 1999, Lee 1970). Contributing to 
2 The Qing polity’s core comprises the eighteen provinces commonly called ‘China proper’ 
in historical literature and designated neidi (‘inner lands’) by Qing off icials, merchants, and 
soldiers in contrast to contiguous territory ‘beyond the passes’, administered by the Lifanyuan 
(Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces). In relation to Kham, those traveling west of Dartsedo 
were said to chuguan (‘cross the pass’), i.e. leave neidi.
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scholarship on the processes and goals of settlement in China’s borderlands, 
this chapter explores the connection between state-sponsored settlement 
and this new dimension manifest in late Qing and early Republican deploy-
ment of international law rhetoric and the concept of sovereignty to counter 
the territorial ambitions of neighbouring imperialist powers.
By the f irst years of the twentieth century, settlers ascended the Kham 
region of eastern Tibet, much of which stood within the western boundary 
of Sichuan Province. But unlike those of the previous 150 years who ventured 
only as far as the eastern edges of Kham (Lawson 2017, Dai 2009), these 
commoners traversed high mountain passes to settle deep in the valleys 
of Kham. The presence of these later settlers was both the result of and a 
response to intensifying competition for authority within eastern Kham 
between the provincial government and Lhasa, and perceived regional 
pressures from British India and Imperial Russia. At the time, Kham was 
on the cusp of political and economic change. Since the placement of a 
stele in a pass through the Ningjing Mountains (Tib. Bumla) in 1727, the 
region’s western half fell under the direct administration of the Ganden 
Phodrang in Lhasa, its eastern half nominally under the jurisdiction of 
Sichuan Province (see map 5.1). Rather than integrated into Sichuan’s ter-
ritorial bureaucracy, however, the myriad polities east of the stele were 
administered indirectly via indigenous, lay rulers invested with tusi titles 
who received corresponding seals from the Qing Emperor. While Sichuan 
off icials focused on exerting temporal authority over the territory and 
inhabitants of Kham largely through these invested tusi, Lhasa projected 
its spiritual authority on Khampa society via monasteries, both Gelukpa 
and less so those of other Tibetan Buddhist schools, all of which often held 
sway over local lay rulers. The resulting bifurcated structure of competing 
authority persisted in Kham until the turn of the twentieth century.
Before this time, off icials in Lhasa and Beijing – as well as in Chengdu 
– perceived the part of Kham situated east of the stele as little more than 
a periphery, an intermediate space lying between China proper and ‘Tibet 
proper’. For the latter, the region provided but a conduit, the southern (or 
off icials’) road, which tethered Lhasa to the Qing Court via Chengdu; for the 
former, the region epitomized its toponym as a space ‘to be defended or to 
be made civilized’ (Buffetrille, this volume), evinced by Ganden Phodrang 
actions in eastern Kham both at the end of the seventeenth and in the 
mid-nineteenth centuries. Yet by the turn of the twentieth century, new 
regional challenges – both internal and external – converged with the 
transformative influence of newly globalizing statecraft norms to render 
continuation of a bifurcated structure of shared, sometimes ambiguous 
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authority untenable (Relyea 2015b). Once peripheral, Kham thus became 
central to the Qing-Tibetan, and later Sino-Tibetan relationship. Exploring 
the nature of internal and regional confrontations, both real and imagined, 
and the ramifications of late Qing policies in a borderland such as Kham is 
equally central to understanding the structural and conceptual origins of 
the Chinese state and its relationship with Tibetan regions.
In the decade spanning the Qing Dynasty’s last years and the first years of 
the Republic of China (R.O.C.), from roughly 1904 to 1914, a reorientation in 
both the constitution of and expectations for the settlement of Kham manifest 
as a consequence of these regional and global stimuli, serving as the impetus 
for China’s assertion of sovereignty on the Tibetan plateau under international 
law. Using Kham as a case study, this chapter explores the role state-supported 
settlement plays in the expansion into and consolidation of rule within a 
state’s borderlands and the relationship between shifting conceptions of the 
territoriality norm within a globalizing structure of international law and 
such settlement as substantiation for asserting sovereignty. The following 
discussion focuses on the constitution, results, and rhetoric surrounding 
Map 5.1  Map showing 1727 stele and the main trade road through Kham. Inset: 
Location of Kham within the Qing Empire
source: based on srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders extracted from gadm 
database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
authors: rémi chaix and scott relyea
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a multi-faceted endeavour implemented in Kham in the midst of China’s 
tumultuous transition from imperial to state form. This culminates with the 
subsequent role the endeavour played in negotiations at the Simla Convention 
(1913-1914), convened by representatives of the British, Tibetan, and Republican 
Chinese governments to determine the territorial extent of R.O.C. sovereignty 
on the Tibetan Plateau (McGranahan 2003a; Goldstein 1993, 68-75).
Colonizing Kham, supporting the migration of ‘idle’ commoners from the 
overcrowded Sichuan Basin to reclaim vast, presumably ‘empty’ wastelands, 
was one component of the endeavour initiated by the f irst Sichuan-Yunnan 
Frontier Commissioner Zhao Erfeng to incorporate the region into Sichuan 
province. The ramifications of this endeavour demonstrate the transforma-
tive influence on conceptions of authority in borderlands between empires 
and between states wrought by the influence of European-forged statecraft 
norms expanding across the globe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The indigenization of two such norms – territoriality and sover-
eignty – by Sichuanese and Tibetan gentry and officials reoriented centuries-
old imperial Chinese frontier policy and the conduits through which Lhasa 
exerted influence in regions of the plateau beyond its administrative reach.
The implicit emphasis of these norms on exerting authority over territory 
not simply through its rulers, rather more effectively through its inhabitants 
shifted the goals of settlement within Kham and fostered a new external 
goal. Rather than despatching soldier-farmers as colonists, Sichuan off icials 
turned to recruiting and supporting non-military commoners whose pres-
ence would serve to strengthen exertion of exclusive authority internally.3 
This settlement in Kham was then deployed to legitimize f irst Qing and 
later Republican government assertion of sovereignty externally – to Lhasa, 
to regional competitors, and to the global community. This represented the 
external manifestation of a plan proposed by Sichuan Governor-general 
Lu Chuanlin in the last years of the nineteenth century to exert ‘suff icient 
control’ in Kham – and through it Tibet. Both goals were implicated in Zhao’s 
explicit comparison of his multi-faceted endeavour, of which settlement 
was its cornerstone, with four diverse models of colonialism – England 
in Australia, France in Madagascar, the United States in the Philippines, 
and Japan in Hokkaido.4 Zhao’s f irst appeal for settlers circulated three 
3 In the next chapter, Mark Frank explores a similar focus on recruiting commoners, now 
citizens, under a Republican Chinese government which used Xikang Province as a laboratory 
for a Han Chinese form of agrarian nationalism.
4 ‘Chuandian bianwu shiyi jun guanjin yao…’ (The Importance of Sichuan Yunnan Frontier 
Matters…) (1907: GX33.6.11). In Wu Fengpei (1984, 48).
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years before his older brother and Sichuan Governor-general Zhao Erxun 
submitted a memorial, from which this chapter’s epigraph is drawn, asserting 
that such settlement would strengthen the Qing state. Commoner settlers 
from the Sichuan basin, and thus largely Han, served a dual role in Zhao 
Erfeng’s endeavour in Kham, f irst as loyal subjects, later citizens, reclaiming 
‘wastelands’ and expanding taxable land; and second, as models of ‘civiliza-
tion’ supporting the efforts of Zhao and his successors to undermine Lhasa’s 
competing authority by acculturating the region’s indigenous inhabitants, 
the Khampas.
In exploring the manifestation of these new external goals for borderland 
settlement and the reorientation of its inner constitution, this chapter focuses 
primarily on the f irst role. Section one briefly introduces the imperial policy 
of establishing military agricultural colonies in Kham and other borderlands 
across the Qing Empire, then surveys a shift beginning in the late nineteenth 
century toward opening such borderlands to settlement by commoners from 
neidi. At the turn of the century, a new conception of Kham emerging among 
Sichuan off icials and gentry, influenced by the newly globalizing statecraft 
norms, fostered a parallel shift in the constitution of settlement in Kham 
toward actively recruiting and supporting commoners. The next section 
details great expectations and misperceptions underlying these settlement 
efforts and the concomitant establishment of experimental farms in eastern 
Kham initiated by Zhao and his predecessors. The f inal section turns west 
of the stele to analyse the relationship between the settlement endeavour, 
territorial authority, and Chinese assertions of sovereignty over Kham from 
the last year of Qing rule through the f irst years of the Republic of China.
This turn away from an earlier focus on rulers as conduits of authority over 
territory to the role of commoners as settlers in early twentieth-century Kham 
is epitomized by Zhao Erxun’s exhortation to f ill China’s ‘empty’ lands with 
once-‘idle’ people. Built on Lu’s proposal to exert ‘suff icient control’ in the 
borderland, this shift manifests in the settlement component of Zhao Erfeng’s 
multi-faceted endeavour and its deployment at the Simla Convention as partial 
substantiation for Republican China’s appeal to the international law principle 
of ‘effective occupation’ in asserting sovereignty over the entirety of Kham.
Shifting Borderland Settlement
In 1896, conflict erupted between the rulers of two Kham polities, the 
chikhyap (Commissioner) of Nyarong, who had been appointed directly by 
the Ganden Phodrang, and the King of Chakla, who held the Qing-invested 
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title xuanwei shisi (Pacif ication Commissioner). The Governor-general 
of Sichuan at the time, Lu Chuanlin, seized the opportunity to initiate a 
transformation in the nature of governance in eastern Kham. Lu’s f irst 
acts were to implement gaitu guiliu (bureaucratization), a long-standing 
imperial frontier policy, in two small polities north of Nyarong, Hor Trehor 
and Hor Drango, in which governance the chikhyap had meddled. Under 
this policy, indigenous rulers were deposed and replaced by civil off icials 
appointed by the Qing Court, and their polities were incorporated into 
the junxian system of direct imperial administration, the Qing territorial 
bureaucracy. Lu also established a military agricultural colony (tuntian) in 
the two polities (Luhuo’er zhi 2000, 7-8; Coales 1917, 203).5 The following year, 
a succession dispute between two brothers vying to succeed their father, the 
King of Dergé, in which the chikhyap had also meddled, provided a further 
opportunity for Lu to enforce his vision of Qing authority and stability not 
only in Kham, but also across the entirety of the Tibetan Plateau.6
Following the Nyarong chikhyap’s hasty f light to Lhasa in the face of 
Lu’s soldiers in 1896, and the imprisonment of the feuding Dergé brothers 
in Chengdu in 1897, Lu memorialized the Qing Court for permission to 
implement gaitu guiliu and also establish new military agricultural colonies 
in both Nyarong and Dergé. At the time, Sichuan gentry perceived that 
Kham and Tibet together formed a fence protecting the province from 
external encroachment. Responding to their fears for perceived threat to the 
stability of the fence from British India and Imperial Russia, Lu’s goals for 
bureaucratization were three-fold. By removing the chikhyap and ceasing his 
persistent meddling in the affairs of neighbouring Kham polities, Lu sought 
to stabilize Qing temporal authority in eastern Kham as a demonstration of 
imperial power to an ‘obstinate’ Dalai Lama, who would then be compelled 
to accept once again the oversight of the Amban (Qing Imperial Resident) 
in Lhasa. That acceptance, Lu asserted, would further encourage the Dalai 
Lama to abandon his apparently deepening relationship with the Russians, 
perceived as groomed by the Buryat monk Agvan Dorjiev (Kuleshov 1996). 
Concerned that such provocative actions would instead anger the Dalai 
Lama, driving him closer to Imperial Russia, the Qing Court rejected Lu’s 
proposals, ordering the chikhyap and all deposed tusi reinstated.
Though thwarted, and rotated to a new post the following year, Lu con-
tinued to advocate bureaucratization and colonization in Kham, compiling 
5 The colony, which lasted into the early twentieth century, was known as Luhuo Tun.
6 For background on Lu’s efforts in Nyarong and Dergé, see Wang (2009). On the origins of 
the chikhyap in Nyarong, see Tsomu (2014, Chapter 7).
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his Nyarong memorials and related writings into a book published in 
1900. Its preface reflects the influence of both international law and the 
two globalizing norms of statecraft. Referring to the regional goals of his 
proposed actions in Kham, he wrote, ‘If we can suff iciently control Tibet, 
then England will be willing to acknowledge that Tibet is under our control. 
Under international law, states do not invade each other, thus we can use 
this to repel Russia’7 (Lu 1900, 5). Lu asserted that regional powers would be 
dissuaded from interfering in Tibet only by demonstration of direct Qing 
authority in Tibetan territory, and thus over the Dalai Lama, effected by 
implementation of his proposals. For Lu, establishing ‘sufficient control’ over 
the territory of Kham encompassed both the exertion of direct authority 
through imperial off icials rather than tusi, and, by establishing colonies, 
the exertion of authority over the territory also through settlement. Lu’s 
memorials, and later his book, contributed to a gradual shift in concep-
tions of the Kham borderland among Sichuan off icials and gentry from an 
inert, two-dimensional protective fence, administered only indirectly, to a 
potentially fertile and productive three-dimensional territory, a storehouse 
of natural resources of value to Sichuan and the Qing (Relyea 2015a). This 
paralleled a shift earlier in the nineteenth century in conceptions of the 
globalizing norm territoriality from a focus solely on boundaries to what 
happened within those boundaries (Maier 2006, 41-46). This shift was at 
the core of the def inition of ‘effective occupation’, introduced in Article 35 
of the General Act of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), by which European 
empires legitimized their colonial claims in West Africa, and manifest in 
R.O.C. justif ication for its claim to sovereignty over Kham at the Simla 
Convention.
The likely models for Lu’s settlement proposals were f ive military ag-
ricultural colonies established in 1776 in Gyelrong, at the eastern edge of 
Kham, following Qing victory in the second Jinchuan War. Such military 
agricultural colonies, ideally self-suff icient garrisons of soldier-farmers, can 
be traced to the Han dynasty during the second century B.C.E. (Yu 1986) The 
most common imperially-sponsored and supported form of settlement in 
borderland regions until the last decades of Qing rule, these colonies were 
often established in the aftermath of imperial intervention in the affairs of 
indigenous rulers to either suppress local rebellion or forcefully mediate a 
succession dispute. They were established both in polities which indigenous 
rulers had been recently replaced through bureaucratization and in polities 
7 On the relationship between suff icient control and Lu’s understanding of international 
law, see Relyea (2017).
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where such rulers remained in power, presumably restrained by imperially-
invested titles (Gong 1997). Their self-suff iciency depended on opening or 
reclaiming wastelands, a process generally styled kaiken, which encompassed 
the transformation of ‘empty’, uninhabited space into cultivable land which 
harvests would provide food for the entire garrison. Yet soldier-farmers alone 
were often unable to achieve self-suff iciency. Instead, they relied either on 
indigenous farms or on f ields cultivated by commoner settlers for additional 
foodstuffs. For example, by the early nineteenth century, in addition to a 
complement of roughly 2500 soldiers, more than 5000 households of farmers 
from neidi settled near the f ive Gyelrong colonies. All had received imperial 
support including initial travel expenses, a house, 30 mu of land (roughly 
4.5 acres), seed, and farm implements. Their presence proved essential not 
only to feeding the garrison, but also to maintaining stability across the 
region and providing a ‘civilizing’ influence for the indigenous population 
(Zeng 2016; Xu 1995).
Such settlement by non-military subjects from imperial China’s core 
regions has an equally long history, mostly spontaneous and sometimes initi-
ated with imperial support, both of which continued into the Republican-era 
as Mark Frank discusses in the next chapter. Of the former, commoners 
emigrated to escape warfare, natural disasters, or overcrowding in their 
home districts and to f ind arable land to cultivate and begin their lives anew, 
to escape taxation or imperial authority, even to flee from a criminal past. 
Yet the growing presence of settlers in borderland regions often prompted 
the institutions of imperial governance to follow, sometimes to protect 
indigenous inhabitants from the rapaciousness of settlers, but more often 
to return these immigrants and their newly acquired lands to the imperial 
tax rolls. Both settlers and imperial Chinese governments alike were also 
drawn by the discovery of bountiful natural resources in some corners 
of the borderlands, the latter ultimately extending its authority through 
bureaucratization. This occurred most successfully during the Ming dynasty 
in the region which would become Guizhou Province in 1413, and in the 
southward expansion of Yunnan Province to absorb Sipsongpanna in the 
early eighteenth century under the Qing dynasty (Herman 2007, Shin 2006, 
Giersch 2006, Yang 2008).
Sending non-military settlers to the borderlands with imperial support, 
often to supplement the food production of soldier-farmers in frontier 
garrisons, as in Gyelrong, also dates to the early Han dynasty. In 169 B.C.E., 
Chao Cuo proposed a policy loosely known as yimin shibian, ‘settle people 
to support the border’. Under this policy, settlers, initially convicts, exiles, 
and slaves, were despatched to the fringes of imperial territory, provided 
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with housing and farm implements, and assigned land to reclaim in order 
to provide sustenance for locally garrisoned soldiers. Chao asserted that 
the happiness and success of these f irst settlers would entice the poor 
commoners of neidi to follow them, thereby providing more food for the 
garrison and further strengthening both stability and imperial authority 
along its frontiers (Chang 2007, 18-21; Gong 1997, 66). Despatching commoners 
to open wastelands in support of military agricultural colonies established in 
the northern and northwestern borderlands of the early Han dynasty was a 
response to the persistent threat of Xiongnu incursion into imperial territory. 
Similarly, Lu’s proposals for Kham some two millennia later were prompted 
by concern among Sichuan off icials and gentry that Imperial Russia sought 
to expand its ‘Great Game’ of territorial conquest with British India onto 
the Tibetan Plateau. Yet the implications of this later threat were different.
The details of Chao’s proposals to strengthen the borderlands through 
colonization resonate especially in the components of Zhao Erfeng’s settle-
ment endeavour, as well as in the content of his appeals to the commoners 
of Sichuan. Yet by the early twentieth century, regional circumstances had 
changed. The emergence of powerful, more capable competitors to Qing 
authority in Central Asia and especially on the Tibetan Plateau converged 
with the transformative influence of newly globalizing norms of statecraft 
to structure his actions and contribute to Lu’s conception of suff icient 
control. Together, these stimuli reoriented the constitution and goals of 
settlement in imperial borderlands such as Kham. Attaining regional 
acknowledgment of exclusive and unchallenged Qing authority over the 
borderland necessitated demonstrating the exertion of exclusive authority 
over its inhabitants in all facets of life within a clearly delimited territory, 
thus fulf illing the parameters of sovereignty as def ined by international 
law texts introduced to China in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
(Svarverud 2007). Around the same time, an evolving conception of Kham 
as a region with plentiful open land and bountiful natural resources seemed 
to mirror conditions which had stimulated independent emigration of Han 
commoners into Guizhou and Sipsongpanna, and the subsequent extension 
of Qing authority through bureaucratization. The geological difference 
between these regions and Kham notwithstanding – especially the latter’s 
altitude – this apparent parallel may have contributed to Zhao Erfeng’s 
great expectations for a f lood of Sichuanese answering his call for settlers.
More than military garrisons, the presence of numerous commoners from 
neidi in the Kham borderland promised to further demonstrate suff icient 
control and strengthen the exertion of exclusive authority in two ways. First, 
by colonizing the borderland with loyal imperial subjects, who would serve 
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as models of that loyalty for the indigenous inhabitants, both the geographic 
reach and legitimacy of Qing authority would be expanded. Second, these 
settlers would also serve as models of civilization, reinforcing policies 
focused on acculturating the Khampas as a means to undermine Lhasa’s 
exertion of competing authority on Kham society via local monasteries. 
Zhao Erfeng’s comprehensive endeavour, and especially his emphasis on 
recruiting commoners rather than establishing the military agricultural 
colonies initially proposed by Lu, evinces a shift away from exerting author-
ity over the territory and people of the borderland only through rulers or 
garrisons to a geographically wider conception of authority exerted through 
the loyalty of all its inhabitants.
Similar efforts to demonstrate expanded territorial authority and forestall 
potential external encroachment by encouraging borderland settlement 
manifest in regions across the empire in the last few decades of the nine-
teenth century, most notably in Taiwan and Manchuria. Officially, migration 
from the former Ming territory into the Manchu homeland beyond the 
Willow Palisade had been banned from the earliest years of the Qing dynasty, 
but periodic imperial ambivalence, settler ingenuity, and Manchu landlords 
seeking income resulted in a small population of agricultural settlers, both 
legal and illegal, cultivating lands particularly along the Liao and Yitong 
Rivers (Reardon-Anderson 2000, 515). Yet as land use across Manchuria 
remained sparse and the population small, especially in regions abutting the 
border with Imperial Russia established by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), 
the latter’s eastward expansion in the nineteenth century, itself influenced 
by globalizing norms, endangered Qing authority over these open spaces. 
Consequently, in 1860, the ban on Chinese migration was rescinded, allowing 
an influx of agricultural settlers to bolster the scattered banner garrisons 
and older settlements in hopes of deterring Russia’s looming territorial 
ambitions (Reardon-Anderson 2000, 516; Hunt 1973, 8-9).
In the empire’s southeast, a more immediate territorial threat unfolded 
in 1874 as Japanese soldiers briefly occupied a corner of southeast Taiwan 
in retribution for the slaughter of marooned Ryukyuan sailors by a group of 
aborigines three years earlier. Despite this aggressive act, the real challenge 
to Qing authority on the island arose in negotiations. Asserting that the 
‘savage’ region of Taiwan’s east coast lay beyond Qing jurisdiction, the 
Qing initially refused to pay reparations to Japan for the sailors’ slaughter, 
both in its immediate aftermath and following the Japanese incursion. 
Further negotiations compelled the Qing to pay the indemnity and also 
acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over its once-tributary, the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, in exchange for recognition of Chinese sovereignty, this time over 
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the entire island of Taiwan (Stern 1979, Chapter 4; Gordon 2007, Chapters 
4-5). The Court and local off icials on Taiwan then focused on transforming 
this assertion of sovereignty into a demonstration of their substantive 
exertion of authority throughout the island. As in Manchuria before and 
Kham after, commoners as settlers were central to the effort.
After the Qing seized control of Taiwan in 1683, only males were allowed 
to emigrate to the island, but immigration surged in 1786 when the island 
was opened also to family members of these prior immigrants. Finally, in 
1860 all restrictions were lifted except the prohibition against settlement east 
of the ‘savage boundary’, running roughly along Taiwan’s central mountain 
range8 (Chen 1999, 135-136; Roy 2003, 22-24). In a direct response to Japan’s 
earlier challenge to Qing authority east of the boundary, Shen Baozhen 
initiated a policy of ‘Opening the Mountains and Pacifying the Savages’ 
(kaishan fufan). This policy paralleled both the shift in conceptions of the 
Kham borderland prompted by discovery of its presumed natural resource 
wealth and the dual role of Han settlers in Zhao Erfeng’s comprehensive 
endeavour. Government-supported establishment of farming villages in 
eastern Taiwan was intended both to demonstrate exclusive authority 
through occupation of the once-disputed region and to provide models of 
‘civilization’ to bolster acculturation of the indigenous community (Teng 
2004, 211-215; Chang 2008, 18-21). Emigration and acculturation would thus 
foster a loyal population as further demonstration of authority.
In both Manchuria and Taiwan, the government enticed the commoners 
of neidi to cross barriers to settle presumably empty, but potentially fertile 
wastelands ripe for reclamation and conversion to productive agriculture, 
but these were regions with a history of illicit Han settlement. By contrast, 
the terrain beyond the Dartsedo barrier had rarely attracted settlers from 
Sichuan or elsewhere to its east. The plateau was high, the climate inhospi-
table, and the journey arduous. Demonstrating authority in the context of 
the globalizing norms was thus more challenging – but as the nineteenth 
century closed, also more pressing.
‘No empty lands’
In Kham, as well as Manchuria and Taiwan, settlement was only one 
component of the local effort to exert exclusive, unchallenged internal 
8 On the origins of the ‘savage boundary’ and debates regarding its continuation, see Chang 
(2008).
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authority as substantiation for Qing assertion of sovereignty to regional 
competitors and the global community. In addition to bureaucratization, 
Zhao Erfeng’s comprehensive endeavour also encompassed the opening of 
schools, the expansion of mining to exploit natural resources, the establish-
ment of manufacturing and other industries, the expansion of local and 
export-oriented commerce, and the integration of the land and its products, 
animal, vegetable, and mineral, into the territory and economy of Sichuan. 
Roughly a year after detailing these components for the Qing Court, however, 
Zhao acknowledged that settlement was the cornerstone of his efforts. ‘In 
my humble opinion’, he wrote in 1908, ‘to manage the whole of Tibet, it is 
most appropriate to give priority to colonization (zhimin)’ (No. 0167 (1908: 
GX34.5.24) QCBDS, 186-187).
Settling Kham with Han commoners provided crucial support for Zhao 
Erfeng’s comprehensive endeavour. While each component contributed to 
the effort to sever Lhasa’s competing, spiritual authority on Kham society, 
acculturative policies centred on compulsory schooling in Confucianism, 
nationalism, and a range of ‘civilizing’ subjects for Khampa children and 
young adults most directly challenged that authority. In addition to their 
anticipated numbers, the presence of these commoners in Kham as models 
of loyalty and ‘civilization’ was expected to reinforce this acculturation and 
bolster the effort to transform the Khampas into Qing subjects and later 
Chinese citizens. To demonstrate exclusive authority in the borderland and 
thus fulf il the parameters of sovereignty externally, it was essential that 
both the territory and the people inhabiting that territory were perceived as 
integral to Sichuan and the Qing as a whole. These new goals for settlement 
were epitomized by Zhao Erxun’s assertion that China’s prosperity and 
stability depended on having ‘no empty lands and no idle people’.
By the early twentieth century, vast stretches of level terrain across Kham 
remained uncultivated. Yet with the region’s southern reaches stretched 
across six mountain ranges and four river valleys, none of the latter below 
2000 metres in altitude, and its northern, more level reaches encompassing 
grasslands towering some 4,000 metres above sea level, how much of this 
land was suitable for reclamation by potential settlers from the Sichuan 
Basin? In an initial report from early 1904, Wu Xizhen, the Commissary 
Off icial in Bathang, site of the f irst, limited effort to reclaim wastelands in 
eastern Kham, identif ied some 4610 mu (roughly 700 acres) of potentially 
fertile, but uncultivated land at four sites near Bathang town. Several months 
later, Wu reported another 28,500 mu (roughly 4,300 acres) of potential 
wasteland further af ield, at several sites in neighbouring polities. Wu 
proposed recruiting some 100 settlers from neidi to reclaim and cultivate 
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these lands, but under mild imperial pressure for speedy results instead 
reassigned more than a quarter of the Bathang garrison’s 83 soldiers to 
full-time agricultural work. By mid-year, 300 mu had been reclaimed at 
three sites near Bathang, and of that only 70 mu were under crop, mostly 
buckwheat9 (Mei 1934, 220-223; No. 0010 (1904: GX34.5) QCBDS, 11-14). With 
much of the best and most fertile land already under Khampa cultivation, 
the only spaces left for possible reclamation lay further up the slopes of the 
mountains surrounding the valley, where the soil was rockier and irrigation 
more diff icult.
These f irst, tentative steps laying the groundwork for the introduction of 
predominately Han settlers from neidi to cultivate crops alongside Khampas 
in the fertile Bathang Valley were taken only after careful negotiations 
with both the junior and senior depa (governor) of Bathang and the khenpo 
(abbot) of Ba Chöde Monastery. Despite persistent reservations from Khampa 
monk and layman alike, reclamation proceeded without incident until the 
arrival in late 1904 of Fengquan, the newly-appointed Assistant Amban to 
Tibet.10 After four ambitious – and contentious – months in the valley, an 
uprising forced him to f lee. Roughly a week earlier, Alexander Hosie, the 
British Consul at Chengdu, had described Fengquan as ‘headstrong’, writing, 
‘[I]t is evident that his plans must create serious disturbances, unless the 
Chinese garrisons in east Tibet are strengthened’ (FO 228/2571, D1, 13, NA). 
Those plans included the expansion and acceleration of land reclamation. 
Soon after his arrival, Fengquan identif ied another f ive to six thousand mu 
of Bathang land suitable for immediate reclamation, planning to despatch 
as many as 300 soldiers to locations across the polity to bring roughly 1,000 
mu of land under cultivation annually (No. 0025, QCBDS, 38-39). As these 
wastelands newly designated for reclamation encroached on land controlled 
by the monastery, threatening its income and the harvests of Khampa 
farmers, when the effort began in earnest during the f irst months of 1905, 
they responded with violence.11 During a negotiated retreat from Bathang, 
Fengquan was ambushed and slaughtered in a narrow pass called the Parrot’s 
Beak (Yingge zui) on the road to Chengdu just south of town.
9 See also ‘Huiyi Batang liangyuan bing zun ban kenwu bing ni zhangcheng ying zhun zhaoban 
xiang wen’ (Discussion of the Batang Commissary’s Report on Reclamation, his Proposed 
Regulations, and Allowing Him to Pursue Them), Sichuan guanbao 20 (1904: GX30.8.10): 8a-9b.
10 As Assistant Amban, Fengquan was posted to Chamdo, northwest of the stele, but soon after 
arriving in Bathang, he memorialized the throne for permission to remain there for at least part 
of the year. Though ordered to proceed to Chamdo forthwith, he remained in Bathang.
11 It should be noted that other grievances against Fengquan contributed to the rebellion, but 
his land reclamation effort was perhaps the most visible catalyst.
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In the aftermath of Qing reprisals for this ‘uprising’, Zhao Erfeng assumed 
the newly created post of Frontier Commissioner, establishing his base in 
Bathang. Though initially tasked only with reconstituting Qing garrisons 
across Kham, in early 1907 he advanced an even more ambitious plan than 
his predecessors for the reclamation of wastelands throughout the Bathang 
Valley, as well as in other polities across Kham. Like Wu, Zhao sought to 
entice the commoners of Sichuan to ascend the plateau, but unlike his 
predecessor, Zhao would neither settle for reassigning his soldiers to the task 
nor expected this would be necessary. Believing that fertile, unused land 
was plentiful in Bathang and across eastern Kham, as were ‘idle’ farmers 
in the overpopulated Sichuan Basin, he ordered 50,000 blank title deeds 
printed in Chengdu and shipped to Bathang in anticipation of an avalanche 
of settlers (He 2001, 43; ‘Lubian jin xin’ 1906, 1a). In the immediate aftermath 
of his soldiers’ brutal pacif ication of Qicungou, the Gully of Seven Villages 
situated some 50 kilometres up the valley from Bathang town, in late 1905, 
many farmhouses and fields indeed lay abandoned, their Khampa occupants 
either driven out or slaughtered. But those who survived returned and the 
f ields were again cultivated by Khampas as the region calmed in the wake 
of Zhao Erfeng’s subsequent departure for Chaktreng and later Chengdu 
with the bulk of his soldiers. This again left only the rocky, unproductive 
plots initially reclaimed under Wu available for settlement in Qicungou.12 
Nevertheless, Zhao’s f irst appeal for settlers emphasized the plight of the 
average Sichuan farmer, vast tracts of uncultivated land, and the potential 
to forge a better life in the higher, greener f ields of Kham.
Written in vernacular Chinese (baihua), the 1300-character proclamation 
was posted outside local Yamen and other government buildings in every 
hamlet, village, and district across Sichuan in the last days of 1906, and 
published in Sichuan guanbao the following month. Zhao Erfeng opened 
with a sympathetic tone, conveying his awareness of the plight of the 
average Sichuan farmer. ‘Knowing that you Sichuanese are many yet land 
is limited, and that your lives are diff icult, I have taken it upon myself to 
f ind some better places for you to cultivate’. He contrasted the hardships 
in an over-populated Sichuan with the benefits awaiting both married and 
unmarried settlers in Kham, assuring them that life was more economical 
than in neidi. For those settlers without families, he proclaimed that ‘the 
women of this land [are] numerous and the men few, the women industrious 
and the men lazy. If you take a local maiden as your wife, she might very 
12 No. 0362 (1909: XT1.7.28) QCBDS, 404-405; No. 0356 (1909: XT1.7.18) QCBDS, 398-400; Edgar 
1908, 44-45; L/P+S/20/87-2, IOR; MssEur F157/304C, 6, IOR.
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well be able to assist in the work, carrying water, cooking food, hoeing the 
ground, and cutting f irewood’ (‘Qinchai duban chuandian bianwu dachen 
Zhao zhao ken baihua gaoshi’ 1907, 2a-b).
Beyond potential free labour – and companionship – commoners were 
promised generous material incentives, both assistance for the arduous 
journey and support once they reached their designated settlements (‘Bianwu 
dachen zisong guanwai kenwu zhanxing zhangcheng’ 1910, 7a-8b). They 
received travelling expenses in the amount of one silver qian, the equivalent 
of one tenth of a tael, per day for each adult and half that for each child 
younger than twelve years of age, and food was provided throughout the 
journey. On arrival, each settler was provided with cattle and farm imple-
ments for ploughing, seeds for planting, and additional daily food rations 
during at least the f irst year and until such time that their land produced 
sufficient harvest both to feed him and any accompanying family members. 
After three or four years, settlers were expected to begin reimbursing the 
government for its investment. And once the entirety of the loan had been 
repaid, each settler would receive one of the 50,000 deeds of ownership 
guaranteeing the right to farm the land in perpetuity – and the duty to pay 
land taxes equal to those assessed in neidi.13
In principle, each settler sent to Kham satisf ied stringent requirements, 
detailed in Zhao Erfeng’s f irst appeal, though in practice it is uncertain how 
many in fact did. And due to the considerable investment – Zhao had set 
aside the initial sum of 60,000 taels to support the settlements – each settler 
was required to provide his local magistrate satisfactory assurance that he 
would not turn back before reaching his f inal destination. Keenly aware that 
the success of the endeavour would depend greatly on the quality and ability 
of the settlers, Zhao sought only those commoners who were strong and 
healthy, no more than 30 years of age, and smoked no opium. They should 
also have committed no crimes and belonged to a noble and honest family. 
Thus, in addition to being capable workers and farmers, expanding tax 
income for the provincial treasury, these settlers were expected to fulfil dual 
roles in Kham. As loyal subjects, grateful for the Emperor’s – and the Com-
missioner’s – benevolence, each settler and his farm, perhaps unwittingly, 
provided regional demonstration of the Qing’s exclusive territorial authority 
in the borderland. They also served as excellent models of ‘civilization’, their 
13 Though deeded in perpetuity, the settler’s rights ended with farming as the state still owned 
the land, which he was expressly forbidden from buying or selling. If the settler were either 
unable to adhere to the terms of the agreement or fell ill without an heir, the land would revert 
to government ownership.
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presence in borderland communities reinforcing the acculturation of the 
Khampas by both modelling morality and the ‘proper’ way of life, including 
the demonstration of ‘proper’ agriculture.
Zhao Erfeng was surprised to discover that the Khampa farmers knew 
nothing of fertilizer and continued to use wooden ploughs, which were 
less eff icient than the iron ploughs of neidi, implying that the addition of 
such implements and the knowledge and experience of Sichuan’s farmers 
would render their surprisingly good harvests magnificent (‘Qinchai duban 
chuandian bianwu dachen Zhao zhao ken baihua gaoshi’ 1907, 2a-b). Wu 
Xizhen, based on his prior experience in Bathang, held a much dimmer view 
of Khampa farmers, advising, ‘We should make distinctions when recruiting. 
Since the Khampas are foolish and ignorant of agriculture, it is absolutely 
necessary to recruit men from neidi’ (‘Weiguan Batang liangwu tongzhi 
Wu Xizhen kaiban kenwu liu tiau qing zhe’ 1906, 4b). Though disproved by 
green Khampa f ields carpeting the Bathang Valley, and the fertile lands 
in other districts, this f lawed perception was part of the conceit of Han 
gentry and central Qing off icials toward societies at the fringes of imperial 
territory – and ‘civilization’. Official memorials and opinion pieces published 
in newspapers from Sichuan and elsewhere in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries persistently characterized both Tibetans and 
Khampas as either ‘simple-minded and muddle-headed’ (hunhun’e’e) or 
‘ignorant and uncivilized’ (mengmei). More than the Khampas’ presumed 
poor agricultural skills – or knowledge of fertilizer – it was the inextricable 
link between rice cultivation and ‘civilization’ which fostered perceptions 
of them as incapable farmers, because they did not cultivate ‘proper’ crops, 
as further discussed by Mark Frank in his chapter.
In addition to his benevolent desire to elevate the agricultural skills of the 
Khampas, Zhao Erfeng also understood that future settlers from the Sichuan 
Basin would not easily adapt to a diet of tsampa and yak meat, requiring 
instead pork, rice, and familiar vegetables. He thus brought agricultural 
specialists to Kham, two from Japan and several more from Sichuan, to 
oversee the reclamation of wastelands, assist settlers in irrigation and 
planting, improve the productivity of Khampa f ields and teach them to 
diversify their crops (He 2001, 43). In 1910, two experimental farms were 
established, the Batang Farming Test Field (Batang nongye shiyan chang) 
and the Dengke Farmers Test Field (Dengke nongmin shiyan chang), the 
latter situated in Dergé to Bathang’s north. Precursors of the experimental 
f ields set up by the Xikang Provincial Bureau of Agricultural Improvement 
(Frank, this volume), these farms tested the viability of growing vegetables 
and grains introduced from neidi and around the world, including several 
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varieties of wheat, maize, potatoes, soybeans, rapeseed, beans, and squashes, 
as well as walnuts, tangerines, and pears.
Both farms also required local headman to send one Khampa from each 
community to study the cultivation of new crops. They were then expected 
to disseminate both these new methods and new seeds to their neighbours. 
Similarly, Zhao reportedly required Khampa farmers to attend lectures on 
new agricultural methods presented sporadically in primary schools then 
opening across Kham. Despite Wu’s earlier caution regarding indigenous 
agricultural skill, the Dengke farm also worked in tandem with the Farming 
Improvement Institute (Nongshi gailiang suo) to extend to destitute Khampas 
the same terms offered to settlers from neidi: the loan of farm implements 
and seeds repayable in full after an initial three- to four-year period of 
supported cultivation. Pastoral nomads inhabiting the northern plains of 
Kham were not forgotten in the effort to ‘civilize’ agriculture as an Animal 
Husbandry School (Xumu xuexiao) was also established in Dengke with 
eight heads of dairy cows from Holland and 24 dairy goats from Australia 
joining donkeys and horses from Shaanxi.14
The observations of two missionaries, however, suggest that these 
experimental farms were largely a failure.15 On separate visits to Lithang 
in 1910, both the American missionary J.H. Edgar and the French diplomat 
Pierre-Rémi Bons d’Anty observed spinach, lettuce, carrots, turnips, pota-
toes, and two kinds of cabbage growing within a sheltered experimental 
nursery similar to the experimental farms further west. All were well 
fertilized with manure, but ‘hopelessly stunted’. In fact, the Chinese of-
f icial tending the nursery seemed ‘astonished’ by the suggestion that such 
crops might not f lourish at Lithang’s 4000 metres altitude. According to 
local Chinese, the turnips and lettuce from the nursery, though selling 
for ten times the normal price, were f it only for pigs. Perhaps also due to 
its altitude, though lower at roughly 2700 metres, several rice f ields in the 
Bathang Valley observed by Bons d’Anty at f irst seemed to f lourish, but 
never matured. Rice may have been the most diff icult cereal to cultivate in 
Kham, yet also the most essential to ensure the success of the settlement 
endeavour. Thus, when Zhao’s armies encountered a new region west of 
the stele standing a mere 2300 metres above sea level with a history of rice 
cultivation, it became the focus of his third and f inal appeal for settlers, 
discussed in the next section.
14 No. 0583 (1910: XT2.4.23) QCBDS, 640-642; No. 0771 (1911: XT3.2.10) QCBDS, 860-861; No. 0786 
(1911: XT3.2) QCBDS, 888; He 2001, 43.
15 L/P+S/20/87-2, IOR; FO 228/2573 D13, NA.
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Despite acknowledging the suffering of Sichuan’s farmers and offering 
such enticements as virtually free labour and a seemingly easy-going life 
for the ‘idle’ men of Sichuan, and a new start for its families, few settlers 
responded to Zhao Erfeng’s f irst appeal. Between hopeful memorials 
and possibly over-ambitious reports, reliable f igures for early settlers are 
somewhat diff icult to discern. Encompassing the f ifteen month period 
from roughly April 1907 to November 1908, when Zhao posted his second, 
more impassioned appeal, one document suggests that a mere 141 set-
tlers accompanied by only two dependents registered for their onward 
journey in Dartsedo. All but four were destined for Bathang; the rest 
headed for Chaktreng (Jin 1932a, 13-15). In a telegram dated only the 34th 
year of the Guangxu Emperor’s reign, Zhao reported the division of 800 
settlers, of which 370 were dependents, into groups of 200, which were 
then despatched to four settlement sites: Dabpa, Bathang, Hekou, and 
East Eluo (No. 0258 (1908: GX34) QCBDS, 278). Though larger, this second 
f igure still fell far short of Zhao’s expectations. And those who did reach 
their destinations may not have stayed for long. Bons d’Anty characterized 
the f irst settlements as complete failures, writing that ‘Chinese colonists, 
discouraged, sold everything that they could to draw together money 
and took the road to Sichuan; many fell into deep poverty, begging at the 
doors of lamaseries and along the main road’ (Bons d’Anty. 1908, 279-281). 
Zhao’s second appeal took a different tack from his f irst, more clearly 
ref lecting the inf luence of the globalizing norms of statecraft on the 
settlement endeavor.
Published in Chengdu Daily (Chengdu ribao) in December 1908, the appeal’s 
rhetoric went beyond extolling the vast potential for settlers in Kham. After 
once again expressing his empathy for the impoverished commoner toiling 
in hardship on scarce land in the Sichuan Basin, Zhao Erfeng proclaimed, 
‘The Heavens have bestowed this colony on the poor of Sichuan and tasked 
them with its revival’ (‘Zhu Zang Chuandian Bianwu Dachen xiaoyu baixing 
guanwai kaiken liyi baihua gaoshi’ 1908, 1b). He then tickled their nascent 
nationalism, challenging Sichuanese to seize their destiny on the plateau 
as foreigners had done across the globe:
You see, foreigners pay close attention to colonization. Their commoners 
also follow the same maxim, so, no matter where, they are ready to go. 
They need only hear of it. Whether they must traverse tens of thousands 
of li, whether they must climb mountains or cross seas, they neither see 
the distance as too far, nor are they afraid of danger as they strive to 
open wastelands. […] You decide if this is worthy of respect or not, that 
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the foreigner in fearing no hardship can ensure the prosperity of his 
family and business.
Zhao then assured potential settlers that the ascent to Kham had been 
rendered considerably less arduous. ‘Now the lands beyond the barrier are 
still Sichuan’s lands. You need go little more than 10 stages beyond Dartsedo 
to f ind cultivable wastelands. This is far superior to taking your family on a 
journey of tens of thousands of li.’ As new settlers would traverse widened 
and smoothed mountain roads, no longer sleeping in the open, instead 
resting in a series of newly constructed inns all serving the dishes of neidi, 
the journey was perhaps characterized as almost luxurious in comparison 
with the hardships endured by colonizing foreigners. As further incentive, 
Zhao also increased the daily stipend for travel.
In April 1909, the magistrate of Pengzhou, Zai Gengtang, posted a proc-
lamation in honour of 97 residents who responded to this second appeal 
to ascend the plateau, urging others to follow in their footsteps (Jin 1932b, 
15-17). Zai’s proclamation echoed the appeal’s tenor of nationalistic duty, 
a sentiment just beginning to capture the imagination of an awakening 
Chinese nation in the early twentieth century, though perhaps more pro-
nounced among the gentry than the commoners targeted by Zhao Erfeng. Zai 
compared the settlement of Kham with internal state expansions in Europe 
and America, casting his residents as pioneers as great as the settlers of the 
American West or the Russian Far East, venturing into dangerous spaces in 
service to the nation. Closer to home, he also compared the endeavour with 
the state-sponsored settlement of the empire’s northwest two decades earlier.
Whereas eighteenth-century settlement in Xinjiang had centred on 
recruiting commoners to join soldiers in together reclaiming wastelands in 
support of Qing garrisons, renewed settlement in the late nineteenth century 
comprised part of the Qing effort to forestall Russian territorial encroach-
ment after the region’s re-conquest in the 1870s. The arrival of new settlers 
contributed to demonstrating the exertion of territorial authority over the 
region and served as prelude to the establishment of Xinjiang Province in 1884. 
Similarly, rescinding the prohibition on settlement along Taiwan’s eastern 
coast demonstrated the exertion of territorial authority both by occupying 
previously ignored territory beyond the ‘savage boundary’ and by forging 
a loyal population through emigration and acculturation, buttressing the 
formation of Taiwan Province in 1887. Fostered by this reorientation in the 
internal constitution of settlement first emerging at the end of the nineteenth 
century in Taiwan, Xinjiang, as in Manchuria, the establishment of a province 
further demonstrated the exertion of exclusive authority in the borderland 
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and substantiated the assertion of sovereignty to regional competitors and 
the global community.16 Indeed, further explaining his goals of stabiliz-
ing the people and enriching the state in the memorial which opened this 
chapter, Zhao Erxun continued, ‘On discussing the policy of colonization, 
if we speak of these goals, it is essential to convert Tibet and Mongolia into 
provinces’.17 The dual role which once-idle Sichuanese settlers were to fulfil in 
Kham, reclaiming wasteland and reinforcing the comprehensive endeavour’s 
acculturative challenge to Lhasa’s competing, spiritual authority, laid the 
foundation for both the late Qing proposal to establish Xikang Province and 
subsequent R.O.C. territorial claims at the Simla Convention.
Coupled with the reference to a competitive nationalism in Zhao Erfeng’s 
second appeal, demonstrating territorial authority through the settle-
ment and cultivation of lands by presumably loyal Qing subjects from neidi 
proved especially important after Zhao’s frontier army entered Dzayül in 
early 1910, a corner of Kham southwest of the 1727 stele. After crossing the 
‘boundary’ ostensibly delimited by the stele in the last days of 1909, his army 
implemented gaitu guiliu in polities throughout western Kham, severing 
the direct administration of the Ganden Phodrang. Tenuously extending 
Qing authority to (Kongpo) Gyamda, within 250 kilometres of Lhasa and 
outside the traditional territory of Kham, this westward expansion was a 
concern not only to Tibetan off icials, but also to the British. Among the 
newly created districts, Dzayül in particular offered great promise for 
Zhao’s settlement endeavour, featuring prominently in his third appeal, 
but its proximity to British India also portended potential peril for the 
then-ambiguous northern boundary of Assam.
Extending Borderland Authority
In August 1910, just f ive months after his soldiers had glimpsed the vast, 
fertile f ields of Dzayül, Zhao Erfeng circulated his third and f inal appeal for 
settlers.18 Expressing empathy this time not only for the plight of farmers in 
16 Conversion into a province, the highest level in the administrative structure of both the 
Qing Empire and the R.O.C., signif ied the borderland region’s unequivocal incorporation into 
the Qing territorial bureaucracy.
17 Zhao Erxun 543 Roll 70, Record 361 (1909: XT1), QA. Zhao’s reference to Mongolia in addition 
to Tibet is likely influenced by proposals to carve both regions into several provinces circulating 
in Beijing at the time.
18 ‘Bianwu dachen zhao ren kaiken baihua gaoshi’ 1910, 1a-2a; FO 228/2571 D19, NA; Liu 1995, 
207-208.
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the Sichuan Basin, but even more for those who had answered his previous 
two calls, he proclaimed the discovery of this new, more promising – and 
potentially more satisfying – destination. ‘Last year I despatched soldiers 
especially to seek lands where rice always has been sown. Now a place called 
Dzayül has been found not more than 10 days’ journey from Bathang. It is 
a wide plain where rice once had been grown and its climate resembles 
that of Chengdu’.
With barely a hundred Khampa families reportedly cultivating no more 
than one one-hundredth of its fertile and well-irrigated lands, stretching for 
several hundreds of li, Dzayül perhaps seemed to fulf il the image of ‘Eden’ 
painted in his f irst two appeals – open f ields ripe for reclamation. Yet Zhao 
Erfeng ignored the reality that more than 1000 settlers had discovered on 
reaching Bathang, Chaktreng, and other initial settlements during the 
previous three years – that open, cultivable land was scarce. Instead, he 
placed the blame for their hardships – and flight back to Sichuan – squarely 
on the absence of rice in their plateau diet. Though this was undoubtedly 
Map 5.2  Full extent of Zhao Erfeng’s bureaucratization and location of main 
farming settlements, with indication of Tibetan and Chinese claims at 
Simla Convention (1913-1914)
sources: based on srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders extracted from gadm 
database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
authors: rémi chaix and scott relyea
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a hindrance to the success of the settlement endeavour, more detrimental 
were conditions such as those observed by Edgar in Chaktreng in 1910. With 
all fertile corners of the district densely populated by Khampas, the few 
Sichuan settlers inhabited the crumbling remains of Sampheling Monastery, 
left to cultivate only the dusty, deserted streets of the surrounding town (L/
P+S/20/87-2, IOR). Despite periodic reports of newly identif ied wasteland 
for reclamation even in Chaktreng,19 before Zhao’s soldiers crossed the 
stele, fertile land not under indigenous cultivation, and thus available to 
settlers, remained scarce.
Standing at an altitude of only 2300 metres, lower and more temperate 
than the Bathang Valley, Dzayül promised to solve both problems simultane-
ously. The region encompassed a reported ten million mu (more than 1.5 
million acres) of open land awaiting settlers, and had a history of small-scale 
rice cultivation. Diverging from both his own and Wu Xizhen’s stronger con-
demnation of Khampa agricultural skill, perhaps implicitly acknowledging 
what previous settlers had observed east of the stele, Zhao Erfeng explained 
that the inhabitants of Dzayül were neither lazy nor incompetent. Rather, 
preferring tsampa to rice, they cultivated only small crops of the latter, 
which they sold to Yunnanese merchants and Han residents of Chamdo 
and elsewhere in Tibet. With only a small, scattered population, Dzayül 
provided vast potential for Zhao’s settlement endeavour, but also required a 
signif icant mass of settlers to demonstrate the exertion of authority across 
its territory, a situation not lost on British observers.
Travel expenses and the three-year term of repayment all remained the 
same as in previous appeals, as did Zhao’s assertion that a settler needed 
only a little bit of hard work to change his lot in life. In addition, for the f irst 
time, those with independent capital were explicitly encouraged to hire 
men to collect the travel stipend and head to Dzayül essentially as tenants, 
carving a farm of hundreds or thousands of mu from the wastelands on 
their future landlord’s behalf. Undoubtedly also aware of the questionable 
qualif ications of previous settlers, Zhao emphasized one new requirement at 
the very end of his appeal, that those applying for the opportunity in Kham 
must be both hardworking and legitimate, experienced farmers. ‘If you 
are evil-doers or idlers who live not by honest labour’, he warned, ‘I cannot 
extend this opportunity’ (‘Bianwu dachen zhao ren kaiken baihua gaoshi’ 
1910). Encouraged by this third appeal, and accompanying enthusiastic 
19 See, for instance, No .0627. 1910 (XT2.6.6). QCBDS, 680-681. In mid-July 1910, the weiyuan 
(expectant off icial) in Chaktreng reported another 1320 mu (nearly 7200 acres) of potentially 
cultivable wastelands.
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reports, most of the perhaps 2000 Sichuanese settlers to ascend the plateau in 
1911 took the longer road toward Dzayül and several other, newly discovered 
destinations immediately west of the stele (He 2001, 43).
It is diff icult to determine from available records how many of these 
settlers headed to Dzayül, how many stayed, or if those who answered 
this third call indeed possessed the agricultural skills Zhao Erfeng sought. 
However, a report detailing the plight of a group of settlers who crossed the 
stele in late 1910 and a report from Dzayül by British Captain F.M. Bailey 
nearly a year later offer some clues. The settlers had chased their dreams 
of a better life in a site near Drakyap, north of Dzayül close to the Ningjing 
Range, only to f ind a nightmare. ‘Believing a preposterous rumour that 
rice, millet, wheat, and beans all sprout from the ground on their own and 
a mountain of glutinous rice cakes provides food for the taking’, the report 
explained, ‘the foolish people were tricked into hastening toward a place 
called Baimaguan’ (Qing 7-956, SA). Many who embarked on the journey fell 
ill en route with half never reaching their destination. As with many who 
answered Zhao’s calls, these settlers had abandoned everything on leaving 
the comfortable surroundings of neidi. But this group was lucky. Feeling 
pity for their foolishness, rather than punishing them on their return to 
his district, the local magistrate granted each family a small parcel of land 
to cultivate. On a visit to Dzayül in early 1911, Bailey caught sight of nary a 
settler, instead encountering a band of some 200 frontier soldiers encamped 
near a small village, living in huts surrounded by small plots in which they 
tended several varieties of vegetable and maize (MssEur F157/304C, 6, IOR; 
Bailey 1945, 116).
From early 1910, the British consul-general in Chengdu, W.H. Wilkinson, 
had monitored the movement of Zhao’s frontier army in the regions west 
of the stele, largely through missionary reports, relaying his increasingly 
concerned f indings to the British Minister in Beijing. More than the proxim-
ity of the frontier soldiers to British Indian territory, it was Zhao’s proposed 
settlement of the region – purportedly welcomed by the local inhabitants 
– which further heightened Wilkinson’s apprehension. In his cover letter 
accompanying a translation of Zhao Erfeng’s third appeal, he wrote of the 
new target for settlement, ‘if [Zhao] does succeed, there will eventually 
be found, north of Rima, a Chinese agricultural colony that will gradually 
spread until it impinges on northern Burma and the north-east frontier of 
Assam’ (FO 228/2571 D19, NA). This contributed to a growing concern that the 
Qing and later R.O.C. governments sought to consolidate Chinese authority 
throughout the eastern Himalayas, perhaps even intent on infringing on 
British Indian territory, a situation which seemed to catch British off icials 
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by surprise (Guyot-Réchard 2016, 31-32). Even more problematic was the 
Indian Office’s prior hesitation either to extend direct British authority into 
the mountainous regions north of Assam or to clearly delimit a boundary 
with Tibetan regions. Periodic proposals to carve new provinces from the 
Tibetan plateau advanced during the Qing’s last years, and especially an 
R.O.C. Presidential Order from April 1912 equating the administration of 
Tibet with the provinces of neidi, further attested to the role these initial 
soldiers and settlers could play in substantiating Chinese assertions of 
sovereignty.20
When Capt. Noel Williamson, an Assistant Political Off icer in Assam, 
reported seeing Chinese flags in the Mishmi Hills in February 1911, beyond 
what the British considered Tibetan territory, the government of Assam 
expressed concern that the Chinese might attempt to stretch their authority 
even further south, seizing the ‘tea gardens north of the Brahmaputra’ (Reid 
1942, 217). Coupled with Bailey’s report of Zhao Erfeng’s frontier soldiers in 
Dzayül, noted above, and his observing ‘evident signs of friendliness’ toward 
them among most locals, the government of Assam recommended expanding 
demonstration of clear British authority into the Mishmi Hills. With neither 
Delhi nor London taking definitive action, Williamson again headed north 
in March, without off icial permission but at the invitation of the leaders of a 
non-Tibetan group, the Abors, with whom he had been friendly in the past. 
Venturing closer to Dzayül, further up the Siang Valley than ever before, in 
order to assess Qing influence, Williamson and his party were murdered by 
his hosts.21 In reprisal, a detachment of British soldiers headed to the region 
in October to force the Abors to acknowledge British authority and pay an 
indemnity. A team of surveyors followed, whose f irst detailed maps of the 
region would contribute to the later delineation of Assam’s border some 
60 miles further north than the greatest prior demonstration of effective 
British authority (Grunfeld 1987, 63; The Annual Register 1911 1912, 412-413; 
Reid 1942, 223-225; and Guyot-Réchard 2016, 40-44; Gunter 1915). With these 
actions, the British hoped to preclude any potential Chinese encroachment 
into Assam, whether military or settler, by ending decades of ambiguity in 
the Mishmi Hills.
20 Issued on 22 April 1912, the Order read in part: ‘The Republican government […] considered 
Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan as equal in status to the provinces of neidi and in the future 
the governments of each would be under the auspices of the Interior Ministry’. See ‘Beijing lai 
dian’ (1912, 2). See also ‘Yuan Shikai Zongtong guanyu gonghe zhengfu bu she lifan zhuanbu 
ling’ 2005 and FO 228/2575 D66, NA.
21 For further details of concern for Qing actions in Dzayül among Assam off icials and Wil-
liamson’s fateful trip, see Guyot-Réchard (2016, 36-40).
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These British incursions into and near Dzayül worried off icials of the 
Great Han Sichuan Military Government (Da Han Sichuan jun zhengfu), 
established in March 1912 in the aftermath of the Qing dynasty’s collapse. 
It inherited and vigorously defended territorial claims across the entirety 
of Kham, including Dzayül, bolstered by the presumed success of Zhao 
Erfeng’s comprehensive endeavour during the previous years. In response 
to the prospect of continued British incursions, Huang Xuchang, director 
of the newly-established Off ice for Managing the Frontier (choubianchu, 
shortened C.B.C.), proposed despatching soldiers from Bathang to line the 
southern border of Dzayül with a row of R.O.C. f lags (FO 228/2575 D57, 
NA). Fluttering in the plateau wind, these flags would have served as both 
a practical and performative demarcation of the territorial extent of China’s 
claim to sovereignty in the region, a manifestation of both bureaucratization 
and settlement carried out west of the stele. Huang reportedly observed, 
‘All we have to do is to station a few soldiers, and fly the flag, where foreign 
troops, however bold, would not venture to press forward’ (FO 228/2575 
D51, NA).
Although a ‘fence’ of flags might never have been raised, several Chinese 
border markers, remnants of the Qing era, still stood in the Mishmi Hills 
as late as 1914. The f irst, discovered by the British survey team in a village 
then known as Menilkrai in early 1912, bore the inscription: ‘The southern 
frontier of Zayul on the borders of the Szechuan Province of the Chinese 
Empire’ (Guyot-Réchard 2016, 45-47). These markers, and the diligence with 
which the British ensured their removal, were a testament to persistent 
territorial ambiguities across the contentious Himalayan region and the 
increasing potential for confrontation, which contributed to the opening 
of the tri-partite Simla Convention in October 1913. It was during these 
negotiations that the legacy of Zhao Erfeng’s comprehensive endeavour in 
the Kham borderland – and especially the success of settlements – were 
assessed.
In principle, the reoriented internal goals of settlement, colonizing the 
borderland with loyal subjects and models of civilization to support the 
acculturation of the Khampas, had transformed the structure of governance 
in Kham. These cornerstones of the entire endeavour effectively dem-
onstrated Chinese exertion of exclusive authority within, thus fulf illing 
the parameters of sovereignty, substantiating its assertion to a regional 
audience – the Russians, and especially British India. In the latter half of 
1911, the perceived success of the comprehensive endeavour prompted Zhao 
Erfeng and his successor as Frontier Commissioner, Fu Songmu, to propose 
the establishment of Xikang Province across the entire region ostensibly 
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bureaucratized by Sichuan’s frontier army. Roughly two years later, this 
perceived success also bolstered appeal to the international law principle 
of effective occupation in support of the R.O.C. plenipotentiary’s assertion 
of sovereignty over the entirety of Kham at the Simla Convention. However, 
in the Simla Accord, initialled by all three plenipotentiaries in April 1914, 
this assertion was rejected. Instead, the British proposed what would be 
known as the ‘McMahon Line’, which divided the Kham borderland into 
an ‘inner’ Tibet, situated east of the stele wherein Chinese sovereignty 
was recognized, and an ‘outer’ Tibet, wherein the R.O.C. possessed only 
suzerainty (McGranahan 2003b, 44-46).
Despite voluminous historical documents submitted in support of the 
Tibetan claim to authority over all of Kham as far east as Dartsedo, and 
the R.O.C.’s submission of but a single document in support of its explicit 
assertion of effective occupation of the same territory, British off icials 
seemed most persuaded in determining the boundary between ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ by the legacy of the 1727 stele – and by Fu Songmu. While imprisoned 
outside Chengdu in the aftermath of Sichuan Province’s declaration of 
independence from the Qing Empire, Fu (1912) compiled and published A 
Record of Province-building in Xikang (Xikang jian sheng ji). For the British, 
a close reading of Fu’s book, as much a work of ethnography and geography 
as of history and policy, suggested that the territorial reach of Zhao Erfeng’s 
comprehensive endeavour was more tenuous than either the Sichuan 
or R.O.C. governments had asserted. Although indigenous off icials had 
nominally been replaced throughout Kham, and schools and mines had 
been opened and settlements established in polities immediately west of 
the stele, including Dzayül, most demonstrable activity occurred to its east 
(see Map 5.2). The initial draft of the Accord f irst presented in March was 
perhaps also a product of British desire to ensure that substantive Chinese 
action remained east of the stele, thereby preserving Tibet proper as a buffer 
between British India and the R.O.C., coupled perhaps with concern for a 
potential increase in Chinese activity in Dzayül. Following more than eight 
months of negotiation, tri-partite accord became bilateral agreement on 
3 July 1914. The McMahon Line reinstituting the limits of Chinese sovereignty 
on the plateau roughly along the border originally set by the 1727 stele 
compelled the R.O.C. plenipotentiary ultimately to withhold his signature. 
(L/P+S/18/B212, IOR; Anonymous. 1940, 101-114, 124-129)
Just days earlier, in a perhaps direct rebuke to the McMahon Line and 
despite agreeing to a stipulation against converting Tibet into a province, 
the R.O.C. government off icially established the Sichuan Frontier Special 
Administrative Region (Chuanbian tebie xingzhengqu, S.A.R.) (Min 195 
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juan 9 (16 June 1914), SA).22 Stretching from Luding Bridge east of Dartsedo 
to Gyamda, designated Taizhao Prefecture ( fu) in early 1913, the S.A.R.’s 
territory encompassed the initial proposal for Xikang Province and the 
greatest extent of bureaucratization carried out by Zhao Erfeng’s frontier 
army. Yet substantiation for both the assertion of effective occupation at the 
Simla Convention and this subsequent establishment of the Sichuan Frontier 
S.A.R. was based largely on an exaggerated perception of what Zhao Erfeng’s 
comprehensive endeavour had accomplished – widespread settlement and 
acculturation of the Khampas – ignoring its contraction in the tumultuous 
early years of the Republic of China. Contrary to the conclusions drawn by 
British off icials from a close reading of his text, the serialization of Fu’s 1912 
book in the popular Shanghai periodical Dongfang zazhi on the eve of the 
Simla Convention likely generated this perception of the endeavour’s lasting 
success, particularly for readers outside Sichuan (Fu 1912; ‘Xikang jiansheng 
tan’ 1913). At the same time, the R.O.C. established three additional Special 
Administrative Regions in the Mongolian grasslands, a borderland similarly 
threatened by external imperial encroachment and which had seen an 
increase in agricultural Chinese settlement since the last decades of Qing 
rule. Occupying a contiguous stretch of territory corresponding with much 
of today’s Inner Mongolia, the three S.A.R.s, Rehe, Chaha’er, and Suiyuan, 
were converted into provinces in 1929.23 Xikang Province, however, would 
not appear on maps for another decade.
Settlement remained an important method for both managing and 
claiming the territory of the Kham borderland. In August 1912, Acting 
Sichuan Military Governor Hu Jingyi proposed treating Kham differently 
from Tibet, absorbing the former into Sichuan. Among his four reasons for 
this action was the benefit of colonization, and its contribution to making 
the region self-suff icient. ‘The country is really fertile, a paradise not yet 
exploited’, he wrote with hyperbole echoing the ambitions of late Qing 
era gentry. ‘If we establish county organisation, and settle the land with 
colonists, in a few years time the land and other taxes will suff ice to pay all 
expenses of administration and of military occupation’ (FO 228/2577 D60A, 
NA). The C.B.C.’s structure also suggests the importance of colonization for 
Sichuan in Kham. One of its four primary divisions was the Department 
22 In 1924, the S.A.R. was renamed the Xikang Special Administrative Region (Xikang tebie 
xingzhengqu), See also Jagou, this volume.
23 ‘Dong Meng gaisheng zhi chouyi’ (1914, 9-10); ‘Neimenggu gaisheng zhi jinxing’ (1913, 28-29). 
For a detailed and excellent examination of the origins of Suiyuan and its evolution from special 
administrative region in 1914 to the province’s abolition in 1954, see Justin Tighe (2005).
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for Colonization (zhimin si), which oversaw both agriculture and education 
(FO 228/2575 D51, NA). Though available records from the C.B.C.’s brief 
existence remain scarce, indicative perhaps of other proposals circulating 
at the time, in the summer of 1913 the Sichuan Branch of the Agricultural 
Society (kenzhi xiehui Sichuan zhibu) advocated sending 10,000 settlers to 
reclaim new wastelands across Kham on both sides of the stele (‘Yimin shi 
bian’ 1913, 1). They never went.
In the months following establishment of the C.B.C. and as several 
expeditions continued to expand British knowledge of the Mishmi Hills 
and beyond, re-asserting Sichuan authority politically and militarily, re-
establishing peace and stability on Chinese terms across the borderland 
region re-envisioned as Xikang took precedence over despatching new 
settler commoners. Explicitly citing increased British presence south of 
and potentially encroaching on Dzayül, observed during an investigation 
of Kham in August 1912, C.B.C. Director Huang proposed an action more 
substantive than a fence of f lagpoles. Rather than establishing a separate 
Xikang Province, he advocated the extension of Sichuan’s western border 
beyond the stele and the incorporation of Dzayül, Chamdo, and polities in 
between directly into Sichuan’s territorial bureaucracy as most effective 
to both exert and assert demonstrable authority.
A measure of Sichuan authority was reinstated across much of Kham 
by a Western Expedition (xi zheng) led by the f irst Republican era Frontier 
Commissioner, Yin Changheng, from autumn 1912 to the end of 1913. Though 
his soldiers initially reached Gyamda, Tibetan forces pushed them further 
east to the banks of the Salween (Ngül) River where a stalemate held until 
1917. During the course of the Simla Convention, the extent of Yin’s control en-
compassed a smaller region than that claimed by the R.O.C. plenipotentiary 
and later encircled by the borders of the Sichuan Frontier S.A.R., both based 
on the greatest territorial extent of bureaucratization implemented by Zhao 
Erfeng’s frontier army. The accomplishments of Yin’s new frontier army – and 
subsequent Frontier Commissioners – reinstating Chinese authority within 
Kham were never suff icient to substantiate assertions of sovereignty across 
the entire region. Thus the R.O.C. plenipotentiary explicitly referenced not 
the contemporaneous actions of Yin’s army, rather the accomplishments of 
Zhao Erfeng’s comprehensive endeavour, with settlement as its cornerstone, 
as substantiation for his appeal to the principle of effective occupation during 
negotiations at Simla. The new internal constitution of settlement, Zhao’s 
recruitment of commoners, as a crucial component of his comprehensive 
endeavour, corresponded with the expectations of effective occupation – and 
thus fulf illed the parameters of sovereignty.
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Conclusion
Settling farmers in the borderland was an old imperial policy, most often 
manifest in the establishment of colonies of solider-farmers, but the influence of 
newly globalizing norms of statecraft coupled with new regional challenges to 
Qing authority in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries transformed 
the policy’s internal constitution and introduced new external goals. As inter-
national law evolved in this same era, claiming territory, asserting sovereignty 
over a borderland region came to require a state’s demonstrable exertion of 
exclusive authority. In addition to state actions within the borderland, whether 
military or commercial, this authority necessitated a demographic shift, both 
in the indigenous community and through the introduction of a stable, loyal 
population transplanted from the state’s core region. Conceptions of the ter-
ritoriality norm marked a shift away from focusing on local rulers as conduits 
of state authority over vast stretches of their territory to the direct extension of 
that authority throughout the borderland region through individual settlers, 
each claiming a parcel of stable, taxable land. Recruiting commoners to reclaim 
‘wastelands’ in these distant borderlands rather than assigning soldiers to 
the task represented a related reorientation in the internal constitution of 
settlement which manifest across the Qing Empire in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, and especially in Kham in the early twentieth.
This reorientation in turn supported the pursuit of new external goals for 
settlement fostered by changing regional and global conceptions of statecraft 
in the early twentieth century. As models of ‘civilization’ and loyalty to a 
supportive state, these settlers would simultaneously reinforce internal state 
efforts to acculturate the indigenous Khampas, thereby further expanding 
state authority over territory through its inhabitants, both indigenous and 
emigrant. Their presence was expected to cultivate a borderland population 
which acceptance of exclusive Qing authority would fulfil the parameters of 
sovereignty, perhaps even support the eventual establishment of a province, 
and thereby forestall either British Indian or Russian encroachment on the 
Tibetan Plateau. Once perceived as a periphery by Qing off icials in both 
Beijing and Chengdu, from the dynasty’s last years, the Kham borderland 
had become central to the establishment of a Chinese state and a crucible for 
early R.O.C. assertion of territorial sovereignty to the global community. The 
R.O.C. plenipotentiary’s appeal to effective occupation at the Simla Conven-
tion represented the intersection of Zhao Erfeng’s and his successors’ great 
expectations for the success of settlement, grounded in the shift to recruiting 
once-‘idle’, but worthy and able commoners and the resulting exertion of 
exclusive authority throughout the Kham borderland’s once ‘empty’ lands.
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China’s direct control over the Tibetan Plateau was long limited to 
relatively low-altitude sites where intensive agriculture was viable. The 
integration of Kham into Xikang Province in 1939 was accompanied by a 
programme of experimental agriculture under the Bureau of Agricultural 
Improvement (B.A.I.) that sought to extend the elevational limits of inten-
sive agriculture and ‘improve’ agricultural production. Based on archival 
and print materials, this essay contextualizes the work of the B.A.I. within 
national agrarian developments and offers a portrait of everyday life at 
two of its experimental farm stations in Kham. I contend that these sites, 
though diminutive, inspired confidence in the ability of the Chinese state 
to implement larger social and environmental interventions on the plateau.
Keywords: agricultural history, environmental history, ecology, history 
of science and technology
In politics everything hangs together and all politics starts with a grain of wheat.
– Victor de Riqueti, Marquis of Mirabeau (1775)1
Introduction
Historians are by now accustomed to thinking about ‘the frontier as a dis-
cursive process’ as Lawrence Epstein once urged (2002, 2), but recently China 
historians have paid closer attention to the frontier as an environmental 
1 Quoted from Fox-Genovese (1976, 47-48).
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
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218 mark e. Frank 
process.2 In line with the broader f ield of environmental history, some recent 
scholarship emphasizes that while ideas about environmental difference 
have historically been central to distinguishing between China proper (neidi) 
and the lands ‘beyond the pass’ (guanwai), these environmental differences 
are not reducible to pure discourse (Bello 2016, 2, 7). In the twentieth century, 
scientif ic approaches to diagnosing and circumnavigating environmental 
obstacles were integral to the process of ‘frontier reconstruction’ that 
Stéphane Gros points to in his Introduction. This chapter examines how 
the Chinese nation-state addressed ecological challenges in its attempt to 
settle Kham during the early twentieth century.
Specif ically, Chinese of the early twentieth century associated Kham’s 
‘frontier’ status with its relatively low production of recognizable food grains. 
That concern came to a head when Kham was incorporated into China’s new 
Xikang Province in 1939. The subsequent decade saw a spirited discussion 
of the ‘food grain problem’ (liangshi wenti) in Kham, the so-called ‘problem’ 
being that local soils could not produce large volumes of the crops that 
Han settlers desired (see Duan 1944). A 1943 agricultural survey concluded 
that ‘since there are many mountain slopes, the altitude is high, and the 
temperatures are low […] food grain production amounts are insuff icient to 
provide for a dense population’ (Zhang Yuxin and Zhang Shuangzhi 2009, 
412). The following year, Xikang agriculture chief Duan Tianjue concurred 
that ‘food grain production in the Kham dependency is suff icient only for 
the consumption of a small portion of residents within the territory’ (1944, 
16). Even so, there was a growing confidence that climate would not forestall 
the march of Chinese progress – confidence that was inspired by a series 
of small-scale interventions in the landscape.
Consider the experience of Zhang Jinquan, an agronomist from faraway 
Zhejiang Province. The Japanese invasion of east China in 1937 drove him 
west, and in June 1942 he became the chief of an experimental farm station 
in Kham called Taining Pastures (Taining mu chang) where he endeavoured 
to grow wheat (S.A., Min 249-1-156). He sowed his f irst crop at Bamei in the 
spring of that year, much as he would have in lowland Zhejiang, but early 
frosts kept his stalks from producing ears in the fall. It must have been cold 
comfort when the Department of Agriculture and Forestry telegrammed 
from Chongqing to recommend that Zhang f ind more frost-resistant strains 
of wheat to plant next year. Faced with hunger, he consigned himself to 
growing highland barley like Khampa farmers and learned to forage for 
2 Recent environmental histories of the Chinese frontier/borderlands include Bello 2016, 
Schlesinger 2017, Kinzley 2018.
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wild ginseng roots in the high grasslands like Khampa nomads (Zhang 
Jinquan 1947, 27).
But Zhang was undeterred. ‘Highland barley is no good for Han people’, 
he complained. Wheat was the most common grain on earth; if Siberia 
could grow wheat, Zhang reasoned, so could Kham. As war with Japan 
raged in the interior provinces, Zhang waged his own war against hunger 
in the highlands. By 1944 he had assembled 25 varieties of wheat seed from 
different Chinese institutions for a variety comparison experiment, which 
he ran at two different sites near the town of Kangding. By 1946 he had 
identif ied and re-tested three high-yielding, cold-resistant varieties that 
the government could plant throughout the Kham region at elevations of 
up to 3500 metres (Zhang Jinquan 1947).
Zhang’s experience is extraordinary, but not unique. He belonged to a 
new professional class of agriculturalists that were university-educated, 
mobile, and well connected. In the late 1920s Zhang matriculated at the 
agricultural college of National Central University, where he likely brushed 
shoulders with prominent American agronomists, including the missionary 
John Lossing Buck.3 He graduated from the Department of Agricultural 
Land Reclamation (Nongyi kenzhi ke) in 1931, and served as an agricultural 
technician in the eastern provinces of Anhui, Fujian, and Zhejiang before 
his thousand-mile exodus to Kham, where he joined the government of 
the newly-established Xikang Province. During Zhang’s time at the Anhui 
Province Cotton Improvement Station he had served alongside brothers 
Duan Tianjue and Duan Tianzhen, both of whom would join him in the 
Xikang Provincial Bureau of Agricultural Improvement (Xikang sheng nongye 
gaijin suo, henceforth B.A.I.).4 There they shared quarters with migrants 
from several other provinces at experimental farm stations modelled on 
those of the interior provinces, where they managed small local labour 
forces. The work these agriculturalists did, and the topic of this essay, was 
‘improvement’ (gaijin, or gailiang).
Improvement was in many ways a precursor to the notion of ‘develop-
ment’ that found prominence in the latter half of the twentieth century 
(see Giersch and Tan, this volume). The origins of improvement are in early 
modern Europe where it clearly signif ied agricultural innovation, although 
by the twentieth century ‘improvement’ referred more broadly to a range of 
3 The American agronomist and missionary John Lossing Buck moved from Anhui to Nanking 
University in 1920 (Stross 1986, 161). He remained until 1944, traveling intermittently to the 
United States and elsewhere.
4 These biographical details are gleaned from personnel f iles in S.A., Min 249-156.
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technocratic interventions in society and the environment. Anthropologist 
Tania Murray Li cogently identif ies two core features of global improvement 
schemes: the first is problematization, or ‘identifying deficiencies that need to 
be rectif ied’, and the second is rendering technical, or assigning resolution of 
the problem to experts in a neatly-defined field (2007, 7). This understanding 
of improvement f its the B.A.I., which conceived its mission in opposition to 
the supposed ‘food grain problem’. It also f its the general approach to the 
‘frontier service’ and forms of social work that, as Gros reminds us in the 
Introduction, formed a new ideology for borderlands integration.
In the long view, the B.A.I. was part of a process that began in the late 
Qing Dynasty. In 1904 Fengquan, an Assistant Amban commissioned by 
the Qing court, launched an unprecedented agricultural colonization effort 
that provoked to local unrest and his subsequent murder by Khampa hands 
(Gao Lao 1913, 7; Relyea, this volume). Rather than dissuade the imperial 
state, Fengquan’s death catalyzed Qing intervention in Kham, beginning 
with Frontier Commissioner Zhao Erfeng’s campaign to consolidate power 
in the region (Wang 2011, 212). As part of this effort, Zhao conceived an 
elephantine scheme to settle Kham with farmers from Sichuan, commission-
ing 50,000 title deeds for migrant settlers. Most of these settlers either failed 
to materialize or deserted after realizing that Kham’s growing potential 
did not meet expectations (Relyea, this volume). But in the late 1930s, the 
incorporation of the Kham region into a ‘Xikang Province’ of the Republic of 
China reinvigorated land reclamation efforts there under the governorship 
of warlord Liu Wenhui. As the Christian Science Monitor reported in 1939:
Government heads at Chungking have decided that with the New Year, 
Sikang – formerly known as ‘Inner Tibet’ – will be a new province and 
given full recognition for its role as site of vast land-reclamation projects 
which are to be pushed by both Government and semioff icial circles. […] 
Sikang will become to China what the Japanese used to say Manchuria 
was to them – a ‘life line’. (‘China Builds Inner Empire’ 1939)
Superf icially, the Republic of China appeared to inherit its Kham doctrine 
from the Qing empire. Scott Relyea (this volume) notes several features 
of Zhao Erfeng’s colonization push that resonate with subsequent efforts 
under Liu Wenhui: namely, reliance on civilian migrants, the establish-
ment of experimental farms, the introduction of nonnative crops, and 
the conceptualization of land reclamation as a civilizing project. Yet 
Republican state-builders perceived that Zhao had failed. ‘Zhao Erfeng 
once implemented migrant cultivation’, wrote Kham scholar Ren Naiqiang, 
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‘but unfortunately, he did not see results’ (2009 [1931], 3). In reprising an 
ill-fated imperial project, were off icials trying to do the same thing and 
get different results?
This chapter demonstrates that fundamental changes in Chinese 
agrarianism differentiated Republican-era agricultural colonization in 
Kham from that of the late Qing. A new agrarianism emerged that was 
distinctly nationalist in character, and that offered a holistic vision of China’s 
place in the international community: China, some said, was ‘a country 
founded on agriculture’. Politicians employed this vision to enhance the 
popular appeal of migrant land reclamation, construing it as an avenue 
for broad participation in what Benedict Anderson (2006, 7) calls the ‘deep, 
horizontal comradeship’ of the nation. This ‘agrarian nationalism’ was also 
characterized by a turn to the international paradigm of scientific, industrial 
agriculture. Experimental farms were not entirely new to China, but China’s 
experimental farms of the 1930s and beyond were linked in unprecedented 
ways to networks of bio-matter, information, and agricultural professionals.
The Tibetan plateau proved to be a unique challenge for agrarian 
nationalism, which presumed isometry of national territory with fertile 
earth. The elevation and topography of Eastern Tibet militated against the 
cultivation of the food crops that Chinese settlers desired. Wheat cultivation 
was exceedingly diff icult, rice impossible. I have previously contended 
that the elevational limits of grain agriculture were effectively the mate-
rial limits of the Chinese state apparatus (Frank 2016, 115-123). This essay 
chronicles how the Xikang provincial government sought to extend its limits 
by technical means through the agronomists of the Bureau of Agricultural 
Improvement. Through their research on ‘high-cold’ (gao han) crops and 
livestock, technicians like Zhang Jinquan contributed to ameliorating 
national territory and local soils. Drawing deeply from the unpublished 
archives of the Xikang Province Bureau of Agricultural Improvement, I 
analyse everyday practice at two experimental sites, Simaqiao and Taining, 
that occupied different ecological niches within the Kham region. Both 
sites entailed creative adaptations of agrarian nationalism to challenging 
local conditions, with mixed results.
Reclaiming Kham
Chinese land reclamation policy of the twentieth century turned its attention 
from the imperial practice of establishing discrete military colonies (tuntian) 
to land reclamation as a continuous civilian and military enterprise, now 
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referred to as tunken or kaiken (Relyea 2010, 50).5 Kate Merkel-Hess describes 
tunken-style development as ‘a distinct alternative to rural reconstruction’s 
remaking of the countryside’ that nevertheless co-opted rural reconstruc-
tion’s village utopianism (2016, 82). Kham was among the earliest regions 
to institutionalize this approach with the 1926 establishment of the Xikang 
Tunken Commissioner (Xikang tunken shi). In 1928 the Nanjing government 
identif ied fourteen zones for institutionalized land reclamation, most of 
which were in the borderlands, including Xikang (Huang Fensheng 1946, 182).6
It was in this milieu that a certain Zhang Yunping published a manifesto 
in 1931 entitled ‘Tunken Recommendations Regarding the Moving of Soldiers 
to Xikang’ (Duiyu yi bing Xikang zhi tunken jianyi). The thrust of Zhang’s 
proposal was that Xikang administrators could settle all of its 34 counties 
with farmer-soldiers who would ‘turn stony f ields into fertile land’, and who 
could revert to civilian status and receive titles to their land after three years 
of continuous cultivation (Zhang Yunping 1931, 47). The author hailed from 
Sichuan’s Maogong, which had been a land reclamation station (tunwu ting) 
since the eighteenth century. At the heart of his manifesto was an agrarian 
philosophy of the Chinese nation, which he articulated as follows:
Our country is a country founded on agriculture; the refinement of poetry 
and the discipline of calligraphy take their restraint from agriculture 
and their diligence from agriculture. The governance of agriculture is 
done by expert off icials, who in directing the hardships of sowing and 
reaping must lead by example and inspire their countrymen. (Zhang 
Yunping 1931, 43)
The phrase ‘our country is a country founded on agriculture’ (wo guo yi nong 
li guo) was a watchword of a conservative vein of nationalism that origi-
nated with the influential writer and statesman Zhang Shizhao.7 Zhang 
introduced the slogan that ‘China is a country founded on agriculture’ in the 
1920s after his experiences as a student in Tokyo and then Edinburgh, which 
5 These words were often used interchangeably in Republican-era discourse, but tunken 
implies land reclamation overseen by the army while kaiken has no military implication.
6 The other thirteen locations slated for tunken development were Xing’an, Songhua Jiang, 
Rehe, Chahar, Gansu, Xining, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Yunnan, Sichuan, and 
Guizhou.
7 The phrase Zhongguo yi nong li guo is diff icult to translate. A more literal translation might 
be ‘China erects the country with agriculture’, but I have opted for the translation ‘China is 
a country founded on agriculture’, which I believe sounds more natural while maintaining 
functional equivalency with the Chinese phrase.
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were instrumental in his embrace of what he perceived to be traditional 
Chinese values (Boorman 1967, 105-106). He outlined a fundamental, binary 
opposition between ‘agrarian states’ (nong guo) and ‘industrial states’ (gong 
guo), associating the agrarian state with the virtues of thrift, modesty and 
the ancient principle of wu wei (non-action) but the industrial state with 
greed that begat capitalism and imperialism (Zhang Shizhao 1926). His 
agrarianism inspired a number of disciples, corresponding to what historian 
Zhuang Junju describes as a loosely-aligned ‘country founded on agriculture’ 
clique (yi nong li guo pai) (Zhuang Junju 2007, 94).
Zhang Yunping’s rhetoric in ‘Tunken Recommendations’ echoed Zhang 
Shizhao’s, including the latter’s depiction of imperialist powers as posing an 
existential threat to a fundamentally agrarian China. But equally troubling 
to Zhang Yunping were the nomadic ways of the Khampas. He conjured the 
image of a Kham stuck in the ‘nomadic age’ (youmu shidai) and populated 
with ‘restless people, wriggling around, accustomed to drink, given to 
drunken stupors, stark raving mad (ru kuang ru chi), with cattle shit all over 
their tents’ (Zhang Yunping 1931, 44). His agrarianism thus f igured as a sort 
of middle ground between two extremes: the nomadic and the industrial.
Agrarian thought in Republican China paralleled similar ideas in Japan, 
where discontent with rapid urbanization and industrialization fuelled 
an ‘agrarian nationalism’ among certain statesmen and intellectuals who 
‘shared a conviction that agriculture was crucial for creating a stable, 
harmonious Japan’ (Havens 2015, 7). Japanese agrarian nationalists like 
Katō Kanji advocated mass agricultural emigration to Manchuria under 
the belief that it would simultaneously create utopian farming villages on 
the Manchurian frontier and revitalize struggling villages on the home 
islands (Young 1999, 309-310). In a similar vein, Chiang Kai-shek implored 
Chinese youths to ease population pressure in the industrialized treaty 
ports by migrating to the borderlands for tunken work, calling it ‘a great 
task of the highest order in the building of our nation’ (Jiang Jieshi 1943, 28). 
The ethnologist Huang Fensheng seized on Chiang’s terse tunken remarks 
to write his own manifesto, which he published in 1946 as the Borderlands 
Tunken-worker’s Handbook (Bianjiang tunken yuan shouce). Huang wrangled 
a multitude of facts and f igures into a narrative on the historical trajectory 
of tunken practice covering two millennia of Chinese history, in which 
tunken f igured as an enabling condition of the development of borderlands 
into Chinese provinces.8 His rhetoric reflects both Zhang Yunping’s holistic 
8 Scott Relyea notes that the conversion of borderlands into provinces, including Xikang 
Province, was a project that linked the late Qing dynasty with the Republican era (2010, 50-51).
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interpretation of tunken and Chiang Kai-shek’s concern with population 
redistribution:
The land (tudi) of a nation should be harmonized with the people of the 
nation. Only then can this land be possessed by the people, be exploited 
by the people, be enjoyed by the people. Otherwise, the relationship 
between humans and earth will be in discord. There are some areas 
where the human population is densely concentrated, and there are 
other areas where humans have not left their footprints and the land is 
gone to waste. This gives rise to lopsided development; not only does it 
influence citizens’ livelihood, but it threatens the very existence of the 
nation (minzu). (Huang Fensheng 1946, 183-184)
Huang’s Handbook inundated its readers with startling population statistics: 
for instance, it compared the population density of Henan at 211.16 people per 
square kilometre with that of Xikang, at 5.76. Of China’s 11,562,888 square 
kilometres, only 9,300,000 (about twelve per cent) was under cultivation – far 
less than that in most industrialized states – and most of this uncultivated 
land was in the borderlands. Huang offered an ambitious solution: ‘more than 
one hundred million people should be distributed from the population of the 
interior to various locations in the borderlands’ (Huang Fensheng 1946, 194).
Tunken’s ascendancy in national policy provided the provincial and 
central governments with a common idiom regarding land use policy. In 
1940 Liu Wenhui petitioned the central Administrative Yuan to supplement 
his funding for military tunken in Xikang, with the reason that ‘the popula-
tion of this province is scant and the soldiers deployed are limited’ (AS 
20-00-63-017-13). In May of the same year, Xikang’s provincial government 
promulgated a set of twelve stipulations for the reclamation of public land, 
which the central Administrative Yuan approved. Province-wide f igures on 
the total number of migrants and the total area reclaimed are exceedingly 
hard to come by, because reclamation was a piecemeal activity rather than 
a centrally-coordinated strategy; various provincial organs ran their own 
reclamation programs on the land under their control.9
Hundreds of migrants from other provinces, including many war refugees, 
came to Xikang each year as participants in land reclamation, but few of 
9 For example, in 1940 the Provincial Council off ice in Hanyuan welcomed 53 war refugees to 
settle as cultivators in Yichang and nearby counties, while the nationally-administered Xikang 
Student Headquarters settled 81 war refugees (including 60 students) in the Xikang counties of 
Ya’an, Hanyuan, and Xichang (J.S.G. 18-21-16-020-01).
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these wound up in the Kham region. Hesitant to f inancially subsidize 
Liu Wenhui’s province-building project, the nationalist government in 
Chongqing instead authorized the redrafting of Xikang’s eastern border 
to incorporate fourteen fertile lowland counties and three proto-counties 
(shezhi ju) from west Sichuan as of September 1939 (JDKQ 59; see also Jagou, 
this volume).10 These counties, corresponding to the province’s new Ya and 
Ning dependencies, would absorb most of Xikang’s incoming tunken settlers, 
thanks in large part to the 1939 establishment of a Xikang Province Ning 
Dependency Tunken Council (Xikang sheng Ning shu tunken weiyuan hui). 
All of this production subsidized rapid institutional growth. Historian Joseph 
Lawson writes that the Ning dependency metropolis of Xichang ‘flourished 
during the war’ and that, according to one contemporary observer, it was 
‘a city of civil servants’ (Lawson 2018, 163-164). The situation was differ-
ent in the Kham region, where the state farms were barely solvent, there 
was little investment from the central government, and Han migrants 
remained distinctly in the minority. To colonize Kham, the state would 
need to confront that region’s environmental peculiarity.
Kham as an Empirical Problem
Tunken discourse tended to elide regional differences. Historian Wang Xiuyu 
notes that ‘the very compound term tunken evokes the agrarian ideals of the 
central plain: that of expanding productive farm land by opening up wastelands 
and the venerable tradition of farm colonization’ (2013, 212). If advocates of 
migrant land reclamation offered a vision for harmonizing borderland soils 
to the needs of the nation, they did so based on dubious claims about soils. 
Zhang Yunping’s ‘Tunken Recommendations’ was unequivocally optimistic 
about Kham’s cultivation potential. He described the fields of Kham as ‘level 
and fertile, conducive to herding and conducive to planting’ (1931, 40), and 
elsewhere referred to Kham’s ‘boundless fertile soil’ (43). Huang Fengshen’s 
Handbook spoke of ‘limitless virgin land’ and beckoned youths to ‘create an ideal 
environment upon the white paper of this swathe of nature’ (1946, 192). Ignoring 
local ecologies and indigenous peoples, these agrarian nationalists imagined 
the Inner Asian borderlands as an empty scroll upon which migrant farmers 
might inscribe the nation. Their optimism lacked any clear evidentiary basis.
10 ‘Proto-counties’ here refers to shezhi ju. In the administrative system of the Republic of 
China, provinces instituting new counties f irst established a shezhi ju (literally ‘establishment 
off ice’) that eventually achieved full status as a county.
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Field surveys produced more cautious forecasts, though some early 
reports were in fact quite optimistic. Feng Yunxian of the national Tibetan-
Mongolian Affairs Council performed county surveys that seemed to support 
bold claims about the region’s potential, prompting her to return optimistic 
reports to the Council and issue public calls for citizens to settle Kham as 
tunken workers. In a 1931 essay on ‘Essentials of Reforming Contemporary 
Xikang’ in the journal New Asia she claims the ‘Lamaist religion’ (Tibetan 
Buddhism) inducts so many young Khampa men into monasteries that there 
is plenty of abandoned land for the taking. Feng writes that in Kangding 
(Dartsedo), Jiulong (Gyezil), Luhuo (Drango), Danba (Rongdrak), Daofu 
(Tawu), and Ba’an (Bathang), only three tenths of the arable land was under 
cultivation, while in the more remote counties of Yajiang (Nyakchu), Lihua 
(Lithang), Ganzi (Kandzé), Zhanhua (Nyarong), Daocheng (Dabpa), Yanjing 
(Yerkalo), and Derong (Dérong), only half of the arable land was under 
cultivation. She proposed a dual programme of encouraging citizens to 
migrate to the Kham region and resettling soldiers there as tunken workers 
once the civil war has ended. ‘We should absolutely implement cultivation 
(kaiken)’, she urges, ‘so as to open up the spring of benefits’ (Feng Yunxian 
1931, 62). The same year in a private memorandum to the Tibetan-Mongolian 
Affairs Council, Feng would write that ‘this land is situated in the southwest 
epicentre of national defence’, and that ‘the fertility of the land and the 
bounty of its production are not less than those of the interior (neidi)’ (Z.D.E. 
374).
Scientif ic analyses of Kham’s growing conditions began in earnest during 
the late 1930s. These were sobering. The National Agricultural Research 
Institute (Zhongyang nongye shiyan suo) carried out an extensive survey of 
soils in west China after the Japanese invasion of 1937 forced that institute 
to relocate from Nanjing to Chengdu.11 Among the research team was the 
London-trained soil scientist H.L. Richardson, who summarized his f indings 
in a report on ‘Soil and Man in West China’. West China, he explained, 
suffered from a phenomenon called ‘fertility migration’ in which fast-flowing 
rivers (especially the Yangtze and its tributaries) washed nutrients to the 
south and east, such that ‘the high productivity of east China has been 
obtained at the expense of the west’. Further, soils in upland and far northern 
settings were subject to ‘podzolization’, a process in which key nutrients are 
leached from higher to lower levels of soil because cool temperatures inhibit 
decomposition near the surface. And western Kham was exceptionally arid 
11 The provinces surveyed included Gansu, Shanxi, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Yunnan, Guizhou, 
and Guanxi as well as Tonkin in Indo-China.
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because the ‘Szechuan alps’ (Zheduo mountains) intercepted precipitation 
(Richardson 1940). The implication, he contended, was that the political 
hype over agrarian migration was unmerited:
The existence of these immense areas of uncultivated land has suggested 
to many that there must be a f ine f ield in the west for resettlement and 
the disposal of some of the surplus population of the east. Actually this is 
not so, at least with present methods of land utilization and the traditional 
Chinese pattern of cultivation. China has already reached the stage where 
almost all the land which should be cultivated is being cultivated, and 
much is already being cultivated which should not. (Richardson 1940, 124)
Chinese land use surveys roughly concurred. In 1943, Xikang off icials 
participated in the f irst county-by-county ‘National Survey of Land Use 
Status’.12 Existing farmland in most Kham counties was estimated to 
comprise about f ive to ten per cent of total area, and arable waste (the site 
of agrarian potential) was generally estimated at well under ten per cent of 
total area. Ning counties, by contrast, were believed to feature more arable 
waste in spite of this region’s far greater Han population – as much as 20 
per cent of Xichang’s area was unused and arable. There was great variation 
within Kham as well, consistent with Feng’s observations; counties along 
the southern route such as Ganzi and Danba were associated with greater 
growing potential than those along the northern route, such as Dengke, 
where it was felt that there was no potential for farm expansion. The greatest 
obstacle was Kham’s high-altitude climate. Land labelled ‘severely cold and 
not conducive to forestry or pastoralism’ (industries more cold-resistant than 
cereal farming) reached 20 per cent in Dengke and Lihua and an incredible 
40 per cent of total area in mountainous Derong (S.A., Min 234-1-253).
In 1941 a ‘University Summer Term Borderlands Service Group’, comprised 
of students from various Chinese universities, embarked on a survey tour of 
Xikang, the outcome of which was their ‘Western Sichuan Survey Report’. 
The team departed westward from Chengdu on 15 August and spent over 
a month conducting surveys of indigenous peoples, geography, economy, 
agriculture, and animals along the courses of the Zagunao and Min rivers. 
As educated youths, these students would appear to have been the target 
demographic for Chiang Kai-shek’s call to tunken service, but even their 
brief visit was beset by environment-related diff iculties. The two teams that 
conducted the agricultural surveys suffered attrition from the elements; 
12 The results of this survey would not reach Chongqing until 1946 due to the war with Japan.
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the report notes that several people (not numbered) had to retreat because 
of ‘bodily weakness’ and that ‘limitations on the survey could thus not be 
avoided’. Even in summer the climate was severe; though afternoons felt 
pleasantly similar to ‘mid-autumn in the lands along the Yangtze’, mornings 
and evenings were bitterly cold. What arable f ields the surveyors found 
among the mountains and valleys were plagued by a lack of rainfall and 
an excess of salt that ran down from the mountaintops when it did rain 
(Zhang Yuxin and Zhang Shuangzhi, 439-440).
In spite of all this, the agricultural survey report ends on a high note 
with recommendations on how to ‘improve’ (gailiang) agriculture in Kham. 
These focused heavily on variety selection. Different varieties of corn and 
wheat were optimal for various elevations, but the surveyors noted that 
local farmers did little to prevent these varieties from cross-pollinating. 
By sowing selectively, modern farmers could keep varieties with longer 
growing periods at low altitude and varieties with shorter periods at high 
altitude, maximizing production. By isolating crops with one annual harvest 
from those with two, farms could conserve manpower. The surveyors also 
recommend replacing much of Kham’s corn with potatoes, which yield 
more food at high altitudes (Zhang Yuxin and Zhang Shuangzhi, 447-449). 
These student opinions of course contended with a multitude of professional 
opinions, but they did so using the shared vocabulary of ‘improvement’ 
agriculture, based on the notion that the agricultural productivity of a 
particular region was not a given, but could be altered through scientif ic 
methods.
The Mission to Improve Kham
The new paradigm of agricultural ‘improvement’ helps to explain renewed 
interest in cultivating Kham during the mid-twentieth century in spite 
of decades of seemingly fruitless labour. It was largely a matter of faith. 
The outcome of any given improvement effort was unpredictable, and 
‘improvement’ in this context might best be understood not as a result, 
but as a protocol by which crops, livestock, implements, and methods were 
altered through experimentation to optimize performance in a given region. 
Institutionally, these efforts were spearheaded by a local improvement 
bureau that exchanged personnel, material, and information with national 
and international improvement networks, and it is this network aspect that 
differentiated Liu Wenhui’s experimental programme from that of Zhao 
Erfeng during the late Qing. Insofar as the local agriculture organ had yet to 
wheaT dreams 229
implement a modern improvement protocol, Kham stood to be improved. 
This is what the manuscript for the Xikang Tongzhi implied, for example, 
by a remark that ‘everywhere there are fertile grasslands that remained 
uncultivated with grain, and enormous herds of livestock whose quality 
remains unimproved’ (emphasis added, X.T.G. 346).
‘Improvement’ had its origins in England of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, where it fuelled a dramatic increase in agricultural production that 
we now call the ‘British agricultural revolution’. The emergence of market 
capitalism in northern Europe, and England in particular, prompted the 
marketization of crops, which in turn drove the consolidation or ‘enclosure’ 
of land under wealthy landowners. The ensuing privatization of commons 
provided new incentive for increasing yields, and agriculture became an 
intellectual pursuit of the bourgeoisie, who took advantage of the new 
technologies of printing to share knowledge about it. Noel Kingsbury writes 
that ‘by 1640 it was possible for an English landowner to have quite a service-
able library on farming matters’ (2009, 57). The United States inherited and 
improvised on these developments; Randall Stross notes that there were 
over 400 farm periodicals in the United States before 1860 (1986, 4). The 
English and American improvement movements benefited from relatively 
low population density and the emergence of print capitalism.
The population explosion that China experienced during the Qing ensured 
that it did not share the conditions that facilitated the agricultural revolution 
in the western hemisphere even after the fall of the dynasty. The average 
size of a farm in north China of the 1930s was 5.1 acres, and the average size 
in the south was 2.8 acres. In the United States of the 1930s, ‘the average 
farm family of 4.2 people lived on 157 acres; in China, the average farm 
family of 6.2 people drew its sustenance from about 4.2 acres’ (Eastman 
1988, 54). Developments in (mainland) Chinese agriculture fell far behind 
those in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan during the twentieth century because of 
population pressure; its agricultural history in the twentieth century more 
closely resembles that of India than those of its East Asian neighbours (P. 
Huang 2016, 340). With such diminutive farms, there was little room for most 
Chinese farmers to produce more food than they needed for sustenance and 
thus little incentive to invest in crop improvement. Mass marketization of 
food crops would not occur in China until the 1980s.
Accordingly, agricultural innovation was propelled mainly by the state. 
Late imperial off icials provided seeds to peasants, allocated funds for ex-
perimental f ields, and sometimes even invested in agricultural experiments 
(Perdue 1987, 22). Some late Qing statesmen were impressed by agricultural 
development in the west, including Kang Youwei, who in 1895 unsuccessfully 
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proposed to the Guangxu Emperor a programme of state-guided agricultural 
improvement modelled on the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which, we 
should note, had been established only three decades prior (Stross 1986, 
11). Nevertheless, Japan’s stunning victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 
1894-1895 jolted the provinces into implementing their own experiment 
stations modelled on Japanese and American precedents. Some of these 
stations survived the Chinese revolution of 1911, but Peter Lavelle observes 
several marked shifts in agricultural programs during the 1920s. Japanese 
influence waned and the United States emerged as the dominant influence 
on Chinese agronomy. Universities, rather than provincial governments, 
were now the epicentre of agricultural improvement, and they narrowed 
their focus to a select few industrial and food crops, like wheat and cotton 
(Lavelle 2015, 340-341).
By the 1930s, however, circumstances had changed. China had developed 
its own network of agricultural improvement organs thanks in part to 
direct exchanges with the United States, as institutions (most famously the 
Rockefeller Foundation) and missionaries (most famously John Lossing Buck) 
made inroads at Chinese institutions (especially in Nanjing). Meanwhile, 
improvement agriculture in the U.S. was experiencing its own changes. 
Deborah Fitzgerald chronicles the rise of an ‘industrial ideal in American 
agriculture’, in which farming came to resemble factory manufacturing 
during the 1920s (2003, 22-23). Certain aspects of this transformation were 
impractical for China, such as mechanization, which was too costly to 
implement and uneconomical on small farms. However, the Guomindang’s 
agrarian organs did implement other aspects of farm industrialization. 
These include the establishment of agricultural colleges, which led to the 
emergence of an agricultural professional class, and concomitantly what 
Fitzgerald describes (in the American context) as a ‘reliance on managerial 
(rather than artisanal) expertise, and a continual evocation of “eff iciency” 
as a production mandate’ (2003, 23), at least at the state-run agricultural 
stations.
By the 1930s there was renewed interest in implementing a programme 
of experimental agriculture in Kham in line with those of more developed 
provinces. Multiple authors presaged the eventual founding of the Xikang 
Province Bureau of Agricultural Improvement; for example, Chen Chongwei’s 
The Xikang Problem (Xikang wenti) envisioned agricultural experimentation 
stations and an Agricultural Research Council under a Ministry for the 
Management of Agricultural and Forestry Affairs (1930, 192), while Zhang 
Yunping’s ‘Tunken Recommendations’ similarly proposed that the Xikang 
administration establish agricultural experiment bureaus in each county 
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(1931, 43). In the following decade Huang Fensheng invoked the goal of 
developing scientif ic and industrial agriculture on the frontier, pontificating 
that ‘primitive modes of agriculture no longer meet our national defence 
needs in the borderlands’ (1946, 185). Huang’s statement in particular reflects 
the synthesis of industrialist and agrarian ideals in the larger discourse on 
the Chinese nation. When Xikang Province off icially launched its Bureau 
of Agricultural Improvement in 1939, these aspirations provided it with a 
clear mandate: to grow where no Han had grown before.
The Xikang Provincial Bureau of Agricultural Improvement
The Xikang Provincial B.A.I. was chartered in April of 1938 but was off icially 
launched on January f irst, 1939, the inaugural day of the province. Under 
the direct authority of the Xikang Province Establishment Office, the B.A.I. 
oversaw public forestry, husbandry, and agriculture in the province’s three 
administrative zones of Kham, Ning, and Ya. Its programmes in the relatively 
low-altitude Ning and Ya zones were ecologically diverse and included paddy 
(rice) farming and silk production, but its Kham farms were designated as 
sites for research on ‘high-cold’ (gao han) crops and livestock. The bureau’s 
two chief sites were located in Simaqiao, near Kangding, and Taining, to 
the northeast of Kangding bordering Daofu County.
An immediate benefit of Xikang’s establishment as a province is that the 
provincial B.A.I., being under the tutelage of the national Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry (Nonglin bu), could tap into a national network of 
educated professionals, including agrarian specialists educated at China’s 
premier schools of agriculture. The typical professional (zhiyuan) migrant 
to Xikang was a male between the ages of 20 and 40 with some higher 
education, but staff came from diverse geographical and professional 
backgrounds. Duan Tianjue typif ies these professionals; a native of Anhui 
Province, he graduated from National Southeast University in 1925 and 
made a career of education and scientif ic cotton farming in his home 
province, then travelled to the United States on the provincial dime for 
an agricultural survey tour. Shortly thereafter he moved to Xikang to 
become a member of the Provincial Establishment Council ( Jian sheng 
hui). Duan became vice-chairman of the B.A.I. and then chairman in 1945, 
frequently intermediating between its various sites and Governor Liu. Many 
other professionals moved to Xikang from sites along the war-torn and 
heavily-populated east coast, including Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
and Shanghai (S.A., Min 249-156).
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The B.A.I. was also linked to a national network of plant matter. Ex-
perimental sites like that at Simaqiao sent letters soliciting seed packets 
to research sites and schools of agriculture around the country, as well as 
other B.A.I. sites within Xikang, and catalogued their holdings on hundreds 
of index cards. The largest donor by far was the National Central University, 
conveniently based in Chongqing during the war. The Xikang B.A.I. received 
seed stock for nationally-designated ‘good varieties’ (youliang pinzhong) of 
major crops and tested them at experimental stations in Kham to see whether 
they could thrive in a ‘high-cold’ environment. In turn, Liu Wenhui authorized 
the extension of certain premium varieties in the Kham administrative zone 
as designated by the B.A.I., some of which came from other regions but some 
of which were apparently indigenous. If late Qing off icials were dismissive 
of Khampa farmers because ‘they did not cultivate “proper” crops’, as Scott 
Relyea highlights (this volume), these culinary prejudices were institutional-
ized in Republican China through the designation of good varieties.
However diminutive they were in relation to Kham’s vast land area, the 
sites run by the B.A.I. were models of agrarian nationalism that melded 
economic and social functions in keeping with the modern tunken vision. 
They were farms and laboratories, but they were also model communities 
that engaged neighbouring communities. I would argue that through the 
B.A.I., the modern Chinese state employed what James Scott calls ‘minia-
turization’ as a response to adverse conditions in Kham, which he def ines 
as ‘the creation of a more easily controlled micro-order’ in such things as 
model villages and model farms (1998, 4). Much as American agronomists 
in Republican China ‘generally dwelt in protective bubbles’ (Stross 1986, 13), 
the Han personnel at Xikang’s Kham dependency stations were relatively 
isolated within their agricultural micro-orders. It was the manageability of 
these sites, rather than their size, that allowed Han agronomists to envision 
large-scale transformations in Kham.
Whereas Zhao Erfeng had focused his agrarian efforts on the Bathang 
valley, the administration of Liu Wenhui turned its attention south. In 
principle, each Xikang county was to have its own agricultural station, or 
nongchang, subordinated to the county government. But only two farm 
sites within the Kham administrative region were directly administered 
by the province: Simaqiao and Taining (see Map 6.1). These were the B.A.I.’s 
primary interface with the growing conditions of Kham, and experimental 
results at these sites were distilled into directives to extend (tuiguang) 
premium varieties and growing methods throughout the counties of Kham. 
Below I employ a rich body of bureau archives to reconstruct a virtual tour 
through each of these sites.
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Simaqiao
Situated in a mountain valley at 2650 metres above sea level and f ifteen li 
(7.5 km) south of the provincial capital of Kangding, the experimental site 
Map 6.1  Map of Xikang territory showing the locations of the Simaqiao and 
Taining experimental stations
sources: based on chen & chen (2003, 22); srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders 
extracted from gadm database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
authors: rémi chaix and mark Frank
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at Simaqiao was founded in 1940 by the provincial B.A.I. and charged with 
overseeing research on ‘high-cold’ crop varieties. Kangding (Dartsedo) in 
southern Kham was set at the confluence of two rivers and host to a large 
Han population, so it seemed like a natural site for the province’s f irst crop 
experimentation station. The site initially planted some 84 mu of farmland, 
expanding this on a yearly basis.
Interestingly, the B.A.I. leased most of this land from local landlords, in-
cluding the French Catholic mission in Kangding and at least two prominent 
Tibetan guozhuang trading houses: the Wesekyap (Ch. Wasidiao) trading 
house and the Zhabpetsang (Wangjia) trading house.13 The largest tract of 
land belonged to the See, which provided 40 mu (6.6 acres) of waste (S.A., 
Min 249-1-140). The mission had in turn purchased this land from the Chakla 
King (Mingzheng tusi), at a price of 3000 taels of silver, and hired labourers 
to open it for cultivation at a wage of eight yuan per mu, then rented it to 
tenants (Ren Naiqiang 2009 [1931], 3-4). The mission had also cultivated plots 
in Luding and Ba’an, and Kham scholar Ren Naiqiang felt that the French 
had succeeded where Zhao had failed. ‘Such a vast stretch of fertile earth 
Han people have not been able to cultivate in over two hundred years of 
management, he remarked, but the French Catholic church has cultivated it 
in our place – how disgraceful ought this to be?’ (Ren Naiqiang 2009 [1931], 4).
The B.A.I. began planting land in Kangding under informal lease agree-
ments, but the concerned county magistrate implored the bureau to sign 
formal contracts ‘to avoid conflict’. At 10 a.m. on 29 July 1940 the acting head 
of the B.A.I. met with representatives of its three Simaqiao landlords at the 
off ice of the magistrate to negotiate lease terms and sign contracts. These 
each stipulated a 20-year lease term at a price the equivalent of sixteen 
jin of highland barley per mu per year after the harvest at current prices, 
but they made an exception according to a local custom: newly opened 
wasteland (uncultivated earth) was rent-free for the f irst three years in 
compensation for the labour of clearing and tilling it (S.A., Min 249-1-81). The 
B.A.I. additionally negotiated a contract for use of the county’s state farm, 
with the condition that land from the Catholic church and other landlords 
be used f irst. Absorption of the state farm would disrupt its current work, 
and farm labourers were to be compensated for labour and materials over 
the past season; the B.A.I. was also to offer current farmers position as farm 
labourers (nong gong), or assist in their relocation (S.A., Min 249-1-81, p. 98). 
Ten farmers received compensation for human labour, cattle labour, fertilizer 
13 Many thanks to Yudru Tsomu for personally helping me to identify these trading houses 
by their Chinese names. More can be found on both trading houses in Tsomu (2016).
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and seeds, totalling 2453.60 yuan, and they appear to have been retained as 
labourers (S.A., Min 249-1-81, p. 96). Under the administration of the B.A.I., 
the repurposed Simaqiao state farm had the ambitious goal of transforming 
agriculture in Kham by working on modest parcels of (mostly) rented land.
As with other sites run by the B.A.I., there was a division of labour between 
administrative staff (zhiyuan) and labourers (gongyi). Labourers were more 
likely to be local in origin, slept in cramped dorms, and were responsible 
for the back-breaking work of clearing waste, tilling f ields, planting and 
harvesting, and so on. From approximately February through September 
of each year workers tended to their crops, while October through February 
were devoted to various other activities: threshing the harvest, clearing the 
f ields, experimenting with winter planting, composting fertilizer, but also 
the critical (if tedious) task of kaiken, or opening up waste to cultivation. 
Quotas were set for how much waste a single labourer was to reclaim per 
day: if they shouldered their own yoke, 500 square shichi (167 square metres); 
with a single-ox plough, 2.5 mu (1536 square metres); with a double-ox plough, 
at least 3 mu (1843 square metres) (S.A., Min 249-1-11).
Improvement work at Simaqiao focused on staple crops. Highland barley 
(qingke) was the predominant crop in the environs of Kangding and a staple 
of Tibetan diets, but it was not particularly palatable to Han migrants and 
the Simaqiao station sought viable alternatives. It also sought options for 
increasing the number of growing seasons in the region from one to two by 
experimenting with different crops and methods. In some ways its mission 
was anticipated by the Catholic church, which had been introducing new 
bio-matter for years. Among the bureau’s earliest experiments in Simaqiao 
was a planting period experiment on a variety of rye that was introduced 
to local communities by the French priest, to determine its viability as 
a winter crop. Other crops grown at Simaqiao initially included wheat, 
potatoes, barley, highland barley, oats, broad beans, French beans, peas, 
corn, and buckwheat. In 1940, potatoes provided the largest yield by far at 
4072 jin, followed by highland barley at 1078 jin.
Shortly after its establishment, the Simaqiao Agricultural Experimental 
Site performed a survey of farming practices in the surrounding area and 
found that wheat, though morphologically similar to highland barley, was 
entirely absent from nearby farms. The surveyors learned that local farmers 
had little interest in wheat since it competed with barley for time and farm 
space, but did not perform as well. Because wheat was far more palatable 
than highland barley to Han migrants, introducing wheat to the region 
was an early priority. The challenge was f inding a suitably cold-resistant 
variety: the maiden crop of wheat planted in the spring of 1940 put forth 
236 mark e. Frank 
ears but yielded a disappointingly low amount of grain, which researchers 
attributed to the region’s short growing season (planting occurred later 
than in lowland regions) (S.A., Min 249-1-33).
Potatoes were already moderately popular in the region by 1939, and the 
site worked to further encourage their cultivation. This aligned with national 
policy, since experts promoted potatoes throughout China as a solution to 
the Chinese famine of 1942-1943. In a memo to B.A.I. chief Duan Tianjue, 
the Simaqiao site chief Liang Daxin noted that ‘potatoes are a disaster relief 
crop and a wonderful vegetable, and the environment ( fengtu) of Kangding 
is very amenable to the production of this crop. Our site has observed this 
and thus decided to implement large-scale planting, and to encourage 
planting among farmers in the vicinity’ (S.A., Min 249-1-78, S.A., p. 10). 
Though promotion work was a large part of the Bureau’s mission, usually 
through lectures and demonstrations, Simaqiao was exceptionally aggressive 
in promoting potatoes. Not only did it distribute 6050 jin of seed to fourteen 
nearby households, but it leased out 26 mu of land to four households with 
the stipulation that they pay yearly rent in potatoes. When loaning potato 
seed, the site forecasted 600 per cent returns and levied 50 per cent interest, 
such that a farmer receiving 1000 jin of seed should expect a yield of 6000 
jin and return 1500 jin to the bureau. At the same time, the site planted 70 
mu of its own land with potatoes and anticipated a harvest of 84,000 jin in 
the fall of 1943 (S.A., Min 249-1-78, S.A.).
Meanwhile, the B.A.I. persisted with its wheat experiments. After his 
disastrous attempt to grow wheat in Bamei at 3500 metres above sea level, 
Zhang Jinquan moved south to Kangding and repeated his attempt at lower 
altitude. There was no guarantee that this would succeed, and indeed, 
technicians at Simaqiao had thus far failed to grow edible wheat in their 
plots outside the southern gate. Over a span of three growing seasons from 
1944-1946 Zhang experimented with altering two major variables in wheat 
production: the planting period and the varieties planted. In the f irst year 
Zhang solicited 25 wheat varieties from the Central Bureau for Agricultural 
Research (Zhongyang nongye shiyan suo), and by the second year he had nar-
rowed the list to nine viable varieties, which he then tested the indigenous 
staple of highland barley. In the third year Zhang re-tested these, adding 
Simaqiao’s original wheat variety (Zhang Jinquan 1947).
By 1946 he arrived at a breakthrough: Not only did wheat variety Zhongda 
III 23-2419 (known today simply as ‘Nanjing Wheat’) put forth full ears, it also 
out-produced the control variety of highland barley. Two other wheats, #100 
and #690 matched this top yield within the margin of error. Moreover, Zhang 
simultaneously tested the same ten varieties in Bamei (3500 metres) and East 
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Eluo (3100 metres) in 1946 and found that the same varieties out-performed 
local highland barley there as well. Another variety, #487, displayed the 
shortest growing period, making it a candidate for higher elevations. Planting 
period trials further demonstrated that the best results were achieved by 
planting as soon as the earth thawed in the spring, given the early onset 
of frost at harvest time. In his report, Zhang concluded that ‘these four 
varieties can be extended throughout Kham, and that generally wherever 
highland barley can grow, these wheats can grow’ (Zhang Jinquan 1947, 32). 
Finally, the ambition of the B.A.I. to replace indigenous barley with wheat 
seemed empirically feasible.
Though Simaqiao would continue to operate until the Communist takeo-
ver and beyond, its prominence as a research site seems to have peaked with 
the culmination of this experiment. In 1946 it reported an ‘enormous funding 
shortage’, and its scope encompassed little more than wheat and grazing 
grass improvement (S.A., Min 249-147, S.A.). In its role as an experiment 
station, Simaqiao was eclipsed by the more ambitious target of Bamei, 
situated in the Taining Experimental Zone.
Taining
About a half-day’s ride to the northwest between Kangding and Daofu 
counties was a stretch of hills and grasslands known as Taining, site of 
Xikang Province’s oldest experimental farms (see Figure 6.1).14 Taining 
was already a Qing military post by the early eighteenth century, but the 
rapid expansion of Chinese mining operations and seizure of Khampa 
farms in 1904 led to discontent among indigenous locals and, ultimately, 
an anti-settler uprising the following year (Relyea 2015, 190-192). This only 
resulted in consolidation of Qing power over the area, and it became an 
early target for state intervention in livestock and agriculture. In 1913 an 
agricultural society proposed Taining as the initial site for a large-scale 
colonization project in Kham (Relyea 2015, 199). Zhang Yunping’s 1931 Tunken 
Recommendations accurately predicted both Taining and the environs of 
Kangding as initial sites for a renewed attempt at migrant land reclamation. 
Presciently, Zhang (1931, 42) understood that the Chinese state must venture 
into yak husbandry if it wished to control Kham, and that Taining was well 
suited for such a venture.
14 Taining was the oldest extant experimental zone in Xikang Province after 1939; Qing 
experimental farms predate it but were closed by the time that Xikang Province was founded.
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The experimental station at Taining preceded the establishment of the 
provincial B.A.I., and indeed, the establishment of Xikang Province itself. It 
was founded in 1937 by the Provincial Preparatory Committee as the Taining 
Cultivation and Pastoralism Experimental Site (Taining kenmu shiyan chang), 
then placed under the B.A.I. in 1942 and renamed the Xikang Provincial 
Taining Pastures (Xikang sheng Taining muchang). By 1946 it managed a 
large swathe of land, including 23,000 shimu of pasture and 4200 shimu 
of farmland (S.A., Min 249-147). Though Taining was deceptively close to 
Simaqiao, its climate was considerably harsher. In 1939 a provincial weather 
observer stumbled into the meteorological bureau in Kangding after a 
disastrous attempt to reach Taining on horseback; his partner’s horse had 
collapsed, and the pair had fallen ill after being ‘caught in the wind and 
rain’. Days later, another meteorologist travelled from Kangding to Taining 
for survey work and developed a hacking cough that would plague him until 
his evacuation from Kham the following year (S.A., Min 249-1-170).
In contrast to Simaqiao, Taining seems like a counterintuitive site 
for heavy state investment. The Xikang Tongzhi raves about the region’s 
Figure 6.1  B.A.I. staff member (name unknown) standing in front of an entrance 
to the headquarters of the Xikang Provincial Taining Pastures in 1939
source: sun and Zhang (2003, 150)
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potential, calling it ‘conducive to pastoralism and conducive to agriculture’ 
(X.T.G., S.A., 111). But other, more detailed sources paint a less sunny picture: 
as of 1943, 70 per cent of Taining’s area was deemed to be ‘incapable of 
production’ and 40 per cent suffered from a ‘severely cold climate unsuitable 
for forestry or pastoralism’ (S.A., Min 234-01-0253). The county experienced 
as little as 45 days of frost-free growing time annually. In 1943 frosts are 
recorded as continuing until June f ifth; on July twentieth temperatures 
reached 23 degrees Celsius during the day but once again dropped to zero 
degrees overnight. Workers awoke to f ind that frost had obliterated the 
entire potato crop, half of the peas, a large portion of the wheat and some 
of the highland barley. In a petition to the central Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, administrators predicted that ‘if frost continues to descend, 
there will be nothing to harvest in the entire Taining belt this year’. Yet 
provincial funding for the Taining site nearly kept pace with Simaqiao, 
ballooning from about 64,000 yuan in 1939 to about 660,000 in 1946 (S.A., 
Min 249-147). Why?
The establishment of the Taining site was predicated on an understanding 
that the economy of Kham was dominated by mobile pastoralism, and that 
the state would need to engage this livelihood if it hoped to remain viable 
(Frank 2018, 32-33). The focus here was on high-altitude livestock of the sort 
conventionally held by indigenous Khampas – chiefly yaks (and hybrid dzo), 
sheep, and to a lesser extent, horses. Initially the Taining ranch supplied 
livestock for a state-run Animal Transport Company (Mu yun gongsi) that 
was founded in 1938, although that was a short-lived enterprise (Lawson 
2013, 306). The B.A.I.’s long-term priorities were to improve wool quality and 
quantity of sheep wool, and to increase the stature and dairy production 
of yaks (X.T.G. 319-320). In a 1945 work report, the Taining site’s activities 
were enumerated as follows: 1) choosing livestock varieties; 2) improving 
livestock technology; 3) improving and transporting livestock products; 4) 
grazing grass and fodder crops experiments; 5) promoting optimal livestock 
breeds; 6) managing livestock hygiene and preventing veterinary disease; 7) 
survey and statistics on livestock; 8) other matters pertaining to livestock 
improvement (S.A., Min 249-1-13).
Taining was a more ethnically mixed community than Simaqiao, although 
roles were allotted unevenly. Formally educated Han migrants occupied all 
administrative positions while Khampas as well as local Han were most 
likely to be herders or labourers. By 1946, the site employed sixteen staff, 
eight manual labourers, and an additional four farm and livestock hands 
(S.A., Min 249-1-147). Considerably larger than Simaqiao, the Taining Pastures 
were actually three branch sites in a triangular arrangement linked by the 
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seasonal migration of livestock. Facilities at each site allowed for the migra-
tion of workers, somewhat resembling a bureaucratic version of indigenous 
drokpa (pastoralist) clans that also migrated their animals between three 
to four seasonal pastures. The primary branch was at Bamei, where, as of 
1945, the headquarters enclosed three off ices, a laboratory, an animal clinic, 
ten livestock pens, multiple store rooms and granaries, and facilities for the 
on-site workers (S.A., Min 249-1-13).
Even as livestock specialists mimicked indigenous pastoral practices, 
they sought to improve on them through agriculture. Globally, modern 
industrial livestock farming had turned to fodder as the primary avenue 
for ‘improving’ animals, which generally meant increasing their fat, wool, 
and dairy content (depending on the animal). Indigenous Khampas grazed 
their animals freely on the grasslands, a practice that the Chinese livestock 
scientists referred to as ‘natural grazing’ (tianran fangmu). An early and 
impactful experiment at Taining under Zhang Zhiyuan set out to determine 
the effects of fodder feeding versus natural grazing on yak-cattle hybrids (Tib. 
dzo; Ch. pianniu), effectively pitting indigenous practices against Chinese 
modernity. The results seemed to prove unequivocally that grain-fed dzo 
developed signif icantly higher fat and dairy content than naturally-grazed 
animals, but with the caveat that it was uneconomical to import grain from 
Xichang, which had provided the fodder used in the experiment (Zhang 
Zhiyuan 1939).15
From that point on, Taining f ixed its sights on growing food for yaks 
and sheep, including fodder crops but also superior grazing grasses that 
scientists hoped would replace indigenous ones. Fodder crops included (in 
order of prevalence) highland barley, wheat, oats, hay, and peas, supplying 
livestock with a diet heavy in carbohydrates and protein (S.A., Min 249-
1-13). As at Simaqiao, crop scientists at Taining conducted experiments to 
determine the most productive varieties and the optimal planting periods 
and methods. International grazing grasses also vied against one another 
in experiments. The American west served as a model for bovine and ovine 
production, and in 1946 Taining received an infusion of 56 American grasses 
to be tested against indigenous varieties, and found eleven of these to be 
viable; as of 1947 the site cultivated twelve grazing grasses from China and 
sixteen imported from other countries, primarily the United States (S.A., 
Min 249-1-136).
After establishing the value of fodder, two more major victories over 
indigenous methods – this time farming methods – seemed evident when 
15 For more on this experiment and yak improvement at Taining, see Frank (2018).
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scientists attempted to employ deep ploughing and to subvert the local 
practice of leaving f ields to fallow every other year. The only reason a fallow 
year was necessary, they suspected, was that local farmers did not fertilize 
properly. Manure production was a major enterprise for the B.A.I., and in fact 
much of it was made of plants that were grown and composted specif ically 
to produce what is known as ‘green fertilizer’. ‘After applying fertilizer and 
planting equally each year’, wrote site chief Liang Daxin, ‘the result is that 
crop viability is the same as planting every other year, effectively smashing 
the superstition among Khampas that crop viability will be poor if they plant 
every year’ (S.A., Min 249-1-13, p. 46). Scientists also experimented with using 
deeper ploughs than were used by locals, and found that a single shidou of 
wheat seed now yielded six shidou of grain instead of the usual three – an 
astounding 100 per cent increase. Imagining the combined results of deep 
ploughing and fertilizing rather than fallowing, Liang wrote that ‘if we are 
able to extend (tuiguang) these experimental results throughout the Kham 
region, Kham’s grain could increase four-fold’ (S.A., Min 249-1-13, p. 46).
By the late 1940s Taining expanded into human food. The site held 
vastly more land than it needed for experiments, and much of this – tens 
of thousands of mu – was put to use through the 1944 establishment of 
a Taining Tunken Zone, through which the state solicited cultivators to 
convert waste into farmland. In 1947 the experimental zone at Taining 
Pastures off icially branched into growing and experimenting with its own 
food crops, chiefly wheat and highland barley. But it also began working 
with greenhouse vegetables, among them carrots, cabbages, peas, garlic, 
onions, and American cucumbers. Liang Daxin explained that ‘the lands 
beyond the pass (guanwai) are lacking in vegetables and [Taining] has 
no vegetables to speak of; nutritional vitamins and nutrients cannot be 
obtained’ (S.A., Min 239-1-136, p. 12).
Taining Pastures was broadly touted as a success in its time. One headline 
read ‘Migration for Planting the Borderlands Sets Great Example, Xikang 
Experimental Planting Succeeds, Taining Experimental Zone Plants 
over 300 Mu’, and intoned that ‘one cannot but beam with happiness’ (‘Yi 
min zhi bian’, 15). In 1947 the region surrounding Taining Pastures was 
established as its own county, Qianning County, and the following year 
the site was renamed the Qianning Provincial Agricultural and Pastoral 
Site (Shengli Qianning nong mu chang). In 1950 the Communists would 
rename it the Bamei Agricultural Experimentation Site (Bamei nongye 
shiyan chang), and this would eventually develop into the Agricultural and 
Pastoral Scientif ic Research Institute (Nongmuye kexue yanjiusuo) in 1963 
(Wang Chuan 2005, 69). Bamei is to this day a thriving (and largely Han) 
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township. While Simaqiao was a fairly conventional growing site, Taining 
showcased the adaptability of scientif ic agrarianism to unconventional 
and environmentally challenging settings.
Beyond the Experiment Stations
Administrators envisioned the B.A.I.’s experiment stations as incubators 
for a comprehensive programme of tunken-style development in Kham. In 
1942 the provincial government, in consultation with the central Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, set a land reclamation target of 45,000 shimu in 
Kham spanning ten counties.16 Development was to begin on the outskirts of 
the Simaqiao and Taining stations, which were declared ‘model cultivation 
districts’ (kenzhi shifan qu), and radiate gradually outward. The experiment 
stations would perform the dual role of modelling scientific land reclamation 
for neighbouring areas and providing seed for ‘good varieties’ to incoming 
migrants in their respective regions. The Simaqiao site was to oversee 
extension work, including seed distribution, in southeast Kham, while the 
Taining site would oversee extension west of the Zheduo mountains (A.S. 
20-00-63-017-09).17
Reclamation efforts were further consolidated in 1944 when the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry established a ‘Taining Tunken Experimental 
Zone’ (Taining tunken shiyan qu) that subsumed all wasteland in the f ive 
counties of Kangding, Taining, Daofu, Luding, and Ganzi (A.S. 20-26-039-15). 
The Ministry appointed a management staff of several dozen personnel, 
including administrators, technicians, a physician, and a full complement 
of policemen. Some of the administration held concurrent positions in the 
provincial B.A.I., including Duan Tianjue, who was appointed head of the 
experimental zone, and Zhang Jinquan, who was appointed to the role of 
technician (A.S. 20-87-270-04). In 1944 the Experimental Zone recruited 
eleven migrant households that opened some 1269 shimu to new cultivation. 
Meanwhile, recruiters journeyed to northern Sichuan as well as Xikang’s own 
Hanyuan county in an effort to recruit a further 500 cultivators (kenmin) 
who might eventually colonize 200,000 mu of wasteland in the cultivation 
zone (A.S. 20-26-039-15).
16 The ten counties slated for land reclamation included Danba, Jiulong, Yajiang, Luhuo, Ganzi, 
Ba’an, Lihua, Taining, Luding, and Kangding (20-00-63-017-09, A.S.).
17 Specif ically, the Simaqiao agricultural station was assigned to oversee extension in Kangding, 
Luding, Danba, and Jiulong counties.
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These local schemes meshed neatly with the national tunken ideal of 
ethnic assimilation through agricultural migration. In the scenario that 
Duan Tianjue and Xikang superintendent of grain production Liu Yiyan 
jointly proposed to the central government in 1942, tens of thousands of 
Han migrants would transform the landscape over several years by planting 
empirically tested ‘good varieties’ of wheat, potatoes, highland barley, 
rye, and peas. The 1943 work plan for Taining alone would require 30,000 
migrants to clear and till wasteland, and another 7000 to cultivate it. Duan 
and Liu specif ied Han labourers, claiming that Khampas were indisposed 
to arduous reclamation work by nature. Provincial estimates set the cost 
of land reclamation in the Kham dependency at twice that of simultaneous 
reclamation in the Ning and Ya dependencies per shimu, due mainly to the 
cost of labour (A.S. 20-00-63-017-09).18
In retrospect the goals of these extension schemes were unrealistic 
because they were prohibitively expensive. Theoretically, the province 
was to pay for tools, fertilizer, and migrant resettlement with loans from 
the Farmer’s Bank of China (Zhongguo nongmin yinhang) and repay these 
loans with sales proceeds after the harvest. But runaway inflation during 
the war made long-term f inancial planning all but impossible. In fact, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was unable to adequately fund even 
the management off ice of the Taining Tunken Experimental Zone, which 
complained in 1944 that its stipends covered less than half of personnel 
expenses after inflation, such that staff were ‘all beset by hardship’ (A.S. 
20-26-039-15). By the time of the Communist takeover in 1949, labourers 
had reclaimed at least several thousand shimu within Kham’s two model 
districts, but it is unclear how far the project progressed beyond these areas.19
Conclusion: The B.A.I. in Critical Perspective
Unlike Zhao Erfeng’s agrarian exploits during the late Qing, those of the 
Xikang Provincial Bureau of Agricultural Improvement have been regarded 
kindly by Chinese historians. The historiography of the P.R.C., while devoting 
18 Budgeted land reclamation expenses included seed stock, fertilizer, and farm implements, 
but worker wages comprised a majority of the budget for the 1943 work plan (20-0-63-017-09, 
A.S.).
19 There is undoubtedly more information on the outcome of Kham land reclamation efforts 
in the P.R.C.-era archives of Xikang and Sichuan provinces at the Sichuan Provincial Archives, 
but I was not granted access to P.R.C.-era documents during my research. See Tan (this volume) 
for contemporary parallels.
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little attention to Xikang Province, appraises the B.A.I. as having made 
impressive contributions to both Kham’s regional economy and the national 
war effort in spite of adverse conditions. Wang Chuan writes that the work 
of the B.A.I. ‘may be considered the beginning of agricultural and husbandry 
modernization for the areas inhabited by Sichuan’s Tibetan, Yi and other 
ethnic groups’ (2009, 234), while Liu Jun notes that Xikang became a major 
domestic supplier of wool products to the war-torn interior, such that ‘the 
people of the borderlands made their own appropriate contribution to 
the War of Resistance’ (1988, 326). It is not diff icult to imagine that the 
provincial government might have come closer to realizing its ambitious land 
reclamation goals had it not been impeded by the bleak wartime economy.
But in evaluating the success of Xikang’s ‘improvement’ efforts, we ought 
to ask: for whom was agriculture improved? The history of U.S. agricultural 
interventions in the developing world during the mid-twentieth century, 
commonly known as the Green Revolution, offers an instructive analogy. The 
Green Revolution has been widely praised for roughly doubling agricultural 
production in much of the developing world, but it has also come under 
criticism. Some scholars argue that the United States initiated environmen-
tally unsustainable patterns of growth by disregarding local ecologies and 
indigenous practice. Others observe that national security, not altruism, was 
the driving factor behind these interventions, and that they fostered economic 
dependence upon the United States.20 The logic of ‘improvement’ foreshadows 
the developmentalist approach that informed subsequent policies in Kham 
and greatly impacted local economies, as Giersch aptly shows in his chapter.
Similar criticisms are applicable to the study of Chinese agricultural 
interventions in Kham. We should not ignore that where the B.A.I. achieved 
results that it considered successful, it did so according to criteria that it 
imputed on indigenous agriculture. This is most evident in two scientif ic 
endeavours of the B.A.I. that I chronicled in this essay: the effort to identify 
wheat varieties that could replace highland barley, and the effort to develop a 
sedentary mode of yak production that out-performed nomadic yak produc-
tion. In both cases, technicians ultimately seemed to arrive at ‘improved’ 
methods that produced higher yields than indigenous methods. In pursuing 
those results, however, they were driven by ethnocentric concerns that were 
extraneous to production targets: namely, a cultural preference for wheat 
over barley, and a cultural preference for sedentism over nomadism. The 
latter preference is particularly problematic, since Chinese and international 
20 For a critique of the environmental impact of the Green Revolution, see Shiva (1989); for a 
critique of Green Revolution politics, see Perkins (1997).
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scientists now increasingly recognize that nomadic pastoralism has salubri-
ous effects on the grasslands ecology of the Kham region, which faces 
serious degradation from other human causes.21 Nor is mobile pastoralism 
a more primitive mode of production than sedentary agriculture. Drokpa 
pastoralism relies on an elaborate system of indigenous knowledge that has 
been cultivated over many generations, even if this knowledge goes largely 
unappreciated by the Chinese state (Tan, this volume; Frank 2018, 23-28).
The politics of ‘improvement’ are especially legible in the context of 
national discourses on borderlands agriculture. This essay situated local 
improvement projects within the broader milieu of agrarian nationalism, 
which looked to agriculture as a source of national strength. The mission 
of the B.A.I. aligned especially well with national discourses on tunken, a 
practice that aimed to consolidate (Han) Chinese control in the borderlands 
through population redistribution. However, the careful reader may have 
observed a quirk in the timeline: state actors articulated clear visions of 
tunken development in Kham well before Chiang Kai-shek endorsed that 
strategy at the highest level. Further inquiry may illuminate the extent 
to which state-building in Kham informed national policy during the 
Republican era, and the extent to which tunken-style projects in various 
borderlands regions informed one another.
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21 For example, see Feng Hao (2017), Lei Dongjun (2013).
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Glossary of Tibetan Terms
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7 The Origins of Disempowered 




Recent research demonstrates that, for over f ifty years, the People’s Repub-
lic of China has tended to pursue development policies that disempower 
non-Han inhabitants of borderlands regions. Using Kham as a case study, 
this chapter demonstrates that the production of economic inequality, 
especially across ethnic lines, did not originate in the Communist period 
nor in actions of the state alone; instead, the sources of ethnic inequality 
were deeply entangled with trends in private corporate commercializa-
tion as well as with nascent statist approaches to modern economic 
and political development. To reevaluate the key elements of Chinese 
development, we must employ longer-range historical frameworks, and 
we must consider borderlands regions such as Kham, where diverse, and 
sometimes unexpected, actors have produced long-term impacts.
Keywords: borderlands, economic inequality, ethnicity, Kham, modern 
commerce
Introduction
In 1957, when Communist Party work teams entered Qiongshan Village in 
the old Khampa region of Drakteng (Danba), they were looking for links 
1 I wish to thank Stéphane Gros and Yudru Tsomu for their many f ine suggestions for this 
chapter. Their contributions were invaluable, but any remaining mistakes are mine.
The term ‘disempowered development’ is borrowed from the book title of Fischer (2014).
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
doi: 10.5117/9789463728713_ch07
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between exploitation and poverty, and they found them. One farmer, a 
Khampa named Peldengyel (Bandeerjia), farmed 7.5 mu (0.5 hectares) of 
land granted to him by the local Drakteng king (gyelpo), also known as 
the Badi tusi. In return, Peldengyel owed grain tax and corvée labour. But 
these burdens had proven too great at some point in the past, and, to make 
ends meet, Peldengyel had mortgaged three mu of his land, taking on the 
dreaded high-interest loans that helped reinforce regional hierarchies of 
power and subordination. To pay the interest, Peldengyel continued to farm 
all his assigned land, but the grain from his three mortgaged mu went to pay 
interest on his debt, leaving his family of six to subsist on a measly 400 litres 
(four dan) of grain for the year. This amount of grain provided, perhaps, just 
enough calories for one adult male,2 and the family did what 80 per cent of 
their neighbours did: To make ends meet, they sought sidelines, which, in 
this case, was collecting plant and animal products that could be sold into 
China’s vast herbal medicine markets (‘Danbaxian Badi xiang Qiongshan 
cun shehui diaocha’ 1958, 28-29).
In March of 1957, Peldengyel’s family collected twenty kilos (forty jin) 
of qinjiao (Gentiana macrophylla), which they sold for two silver dollars 
(dayang), and in April, they dug 100 caterpillar fungi (chongcao), which they 
sold for one silver dollar. In June, they dug a half kilo of beimu (Fritillaria 
thunbergii), which earned them another four silver dollars, and then in 
August, they had their best month, digging about f ifteen kilos of qianghuo 
(Notopterygium incisum) and 25 kilos of Chinese rhubarb (dahuang), for a 
take home of eight silver dollars. Since each silver dollar could be exchanged 
for ten litres of grain, the f ifteen silver dollars was the equivalent of produc-
ing another 150 litres of grain. At some point during the year, the family 
also harvested four musk deer, and they exchanged the musk pods for about 
400 litres of grain. They also hunted other wild animals, bringing in the 
equivalent of 200 litres of grain. Like so many Khampas in his region, then, 
Peldenyel relied heavily on market-oriented sidelines to survive; his land 
grant produced only a net of 400 litres of grain, but his sales of medicinal 
materials brought in the equivalent of another 750 litres of grain. This grain 
2 The grain was most likely barley and/or corn. Corn has more calories than barley, so if we 
assume that the entire crop was corn, then we can make the following calculations: according 
to the U.S.D.A., there are 2561 calories per litre of white corn. Four hundred litres of corn thus 
contains 1.0244 million calories, providing the family with an average of a little over 2877 calories 
per day – or just enough for one adult male. Active adult males need at least 2800 calories per day. 
Active adult females need 2200 to 2400 calories per day. Sources: United States Department of 
Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, ‘National Nutrient Database’; United States Department 
of Agriculture, Centre for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, ‘Estimated Calorie Needs per Day’.
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provided up to an additional 5395 calories per day, which was still probably 
not enough, but got the family much closer to their caloric needs than 
farming alone. Thus, Peldenyel’s non-farming income constituted almost 
two thirds of the total, a relatively large percentage in a village where the 
average for sideline work was about one third of total income (‘Danbaxian 
Badi xiang Qiongshan cun shehui diaocha’ 1958, 28-29).
The Party work teams used this type of information to demonstrate how 
people such as Peldengyel were trapped in cycles of poverty. They owed rents, 
taxes, labour, and interest to the powerful kings, headmen, or monasteries 
who granted them land, and these obligations might be associated with a 
loosely-defined sort of feudalism. But lying in plain sight alongside this ‘feudal’ 
exploitation were two other powerful mechanisms of economic disempower-
ment that the Communist Party would, ironically perhaps, f ind very useful 
to wield themselves: the market and the state. Long before collectivization, 
much less the post-1979 market reforms, the Sichuan provincial and national 
Chinese states, along with powerful merchant interests, were already limiting 
the financial opportunities for most Khampa families. This chapter explores 
how this process – usually associated with the Communist era – originated in 
the early twentieth century. As Stéphane Gros notes in the Introduction, the 
study of the borderlands allows us to challenge centrist narratives, including 
the cherished idea of the 1949 Revolution’s heralding a radically new era. Recent 
scholarship has demonstrated how ideas and institutions from the Republican 
era influenced minority communities into the 1950s and beyond (Mullaney 
2011). In the case of this chapter, our investigation into disempowered develop-
ment is critical for understanding China’s past and present because it suggests 
that the production of economic inequality, especially across ethnic lines, did 
not begin in the Communist period; instead, the sources of ethnic inequality 
were deeply integrated in Chinese institutions, both public and private, from 
the beginnings of modern economic and political development.
Disempowered Development in the Borderlands
In studies of China’s economic development, it is well known that the state 
and market have been used to disadvantage indigenous communities in their 
own homelands, but these studies are generally limited to the post-1949 or 
post-1979 eras.3 In her work on Tibet, for example, Emily Yeh (2013) describes 
3 See, for instance, Bhalla and Qiu (2006); Gustafsson (2016); Shih (2007); Sturgeon (2010). One 
notable study of earlier eras is Kinzeley (2018).
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how the Communist Party, after 1956, violently imposed state farms and 
communes in order to imprint Chinese authority over Tibet. In the reform 
era (1979-present), the state orchestrated investment projects and selective 
market reforms to ‘gift’ development to Tibetans; however, this gift has 
facilitated Han domination of new economic opportunities, leaving Tibetans 
both marginalized economically and victims of largely successful efforts 
to depict them as backwards and underdeveloped (Yeh 2013, 6, 21). One 
main cause of marginalization, Andrew Martin Fischer (2014) argues, is 
the Chinese state’s vision of development, which removes decision-making 
power from the region and its inhabitants. As a result, Tibet has an economic 
structure, says Fischer (2014, 24), that ‘is effectively very similar to that of a 
colonial-type economy’, meaning there are high degrees of aid-dependence 
and political disempowerment; the control of development funds usually 
rests in the hands of Han Chinese-dominated institutions.
The imposition of such economies on indigenous peoples is not unique 
to China. While statesmen and economists have long waxed lyrically on 
the benefits of development, its implementation in conquered communities 
is at best a tricky process and, at worst, an often intentional process of 
disempowerment and subjugation. In the United States, for example, Native 
American reservations have long been notorious for their levels of economic 
distress. For white Americans, these conditions became naturalized. Poverty 
and dependency, it was believed, were the inevitable outcome of primitive 
lifestyles and backwards cultures (White 1983, 315). But Native American 
dependency was not a product of culture. Many indigenous communities 
had successful and stable food security in the nineteenth century. But this 
food security was undermined by the growth of two crucial institutions: 
the American state and markets. Poverty and dependence were imposed 
from the outside (White 1983, 315-321).
In the U.S., the advent of market economics has long been linked to the 
patterns of dependence among indigenous peoples, and that dependence 
was exacerbated by the state. As early as the 1920s, the U.S. federal govern-
ment introduced economic development schemes onto Native American 
reservations, but policymaking and control of resources remained in the 
hands of outsiders. It was only in the 1980s, after a decade or more of efforts 
to return developmental autonomy to indigenous communities, that some 
tribes began to experience some economic successes. The White Mountain 
Apaches of Arizona, for example, developed nine tribal enterprises, including 
a ski resort and sawmill, that employed a mostly Apache workforce and 
brought in over U.S. $46 million per year. According to work by Cornell 
and Kalt, the White Mountain Apaches and other successful tribes share 
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one crucial trait – they all gained control over economic decision-making 
and institutions (Cornell and Kalt 1989, 24). Those tribes who lost control to 
outsiders found it hard to implement successful development plans. Cornell 
and Kalt could not f ind any other factor that was as uniformly important 
to success as developmental autonomy – not even resource endowment or 
culture (in the form of governance institutions and economic organization). 
The most important factor was local control over f irms and resources.
As did the U.S., the People’s Republic of China has usually prevented 
local communities from gaining control over resources and development 
decisions. In Xinjiang since the 1950s, the Party, state, and military have 
dominated the institutions of development and made Xinjiang a region run 
by State Owned Enterprises (Becquelin 2004, 44-64). In other borderlands 
provinces, where non-Han indigenous populations are numerous, State 
Owned Enterprises also control abnormally high percentages of the economy 
(Batson 2015). As in the U.S., there have been some efforts to return control to 
local communities. In 1985, for example, the Guizhou provincial government 
began to use tourism as a developmental strategy in impoverished areas, 
and planners focused on locating tourism in poor counties and facilitating 
local participation in new business opportunities. The Guizhou economy 
did not grow as quickly as did neighbouring Yunnan Province’s economy, 
where tourism was also being promoted as a development strategy, but in 
Guizhou poverty rates declined more rapidly than in Yunnan. One reason 
was Guizhou’s decision to facilitate local participation. In contrast, Yunnan 
allowed outside investors and f irms to dominate the growing tourism 
industry, thus excluding locals from many opportunities (Donaldson 2007).
Guizhou’s approach to poverty reduction seems to be an outlier in the 
history of modern China. Overall, the Beijing and provincial governments 
tend to pursue development policies that disempower non-Han inhabitants 
of the borderlands regions. As Fischer notes,
within the context of continued political disempowerment of Tibetan 
locals, centrally directed development strategies since the mid-1990s have 
channeled massive amounts of subsidies and subsidized investments 
[…] through Han Chinese-dominated state structures, corporations, 
and other entities based outside the Tibetan areas, thereby accentuating 
the already highly externalized orientation of wealth flows in the local 
economy. (Fischer 2014, 29)
Thus, Fischer and other scholars of development in contemporary China 
point to state decision-making and, as with Yeh (2013), to markets controlled 
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by migrant Han, in order to understand the disempowerment of indigenous 
communities.
The Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) is clearly responsible for the 
strategies of disempowered development over the last sixty years. But if 
this were the end of the story, then the solution would be clear (but not 
simple) – note how blame lies at the feet of the C.C.P. and then reform 
its development ideas and strategies. However, the problem is that the 
story does not begin with the C.C.P.’s socialist transformation in the 1950s 
and continue with the market reforms of the post-Mao era. The ideas and 
institutions that underpin disempowered development in China emerged 
in the borderlands at the same time as the concepts of Chinese nation-state 
formation and economic development themselves.
For Peldengyel and other ordinary Khampas, disempowerment was 
not something lurking in the future – once the Party gained control. They 
had already experienced major economic, political, and social changes 
caused by market economics and a powerful developmentalist state. To the 
south of Peldengyel’s Drakteng home, in the regions surrounding Dartsedo 
(Kangding), lay the old lands of the Chakla King. Like the king in Drakteng, 
the king in Chakla had owned vast swaths of farmland, which he granted 
out to tenants in return for labour and tax obligations. But the king did 
not survive the last dynasty’s modernization efforts of 1895-1911. Instead, 
the last Chakla king was deposed and died attempting to escape from his 
imperial captors (IOR L PS 10 884 [1922]). After removing the king from 
power, the state took over his lands, and local farmers now found themselves 
to be tenants to a new master. As f irst the Qing state and then subsequent 
provincial and national states sought to impose new forms of sovereignty 
and economic change on Khampas, they came to own property and gain 
access to natural resources, which concentrated the power of development 
in state, rather than local, hands.
Over the course of the early twentieth century, moreover, in and around 
Dartsedo, Khampa farmers found themselves increasingly to be neigh-
bours of Han settlers (see Relyea, this volume). Before the Communist 
state even began its violent and traumatic transformations, market, state, 
and Han migrants were already impacting the Kham regions (‘Kangding 
xian Wazexiang diaocha baogao’ 1963, 4-6). In Peldengyel’s home region of 
Drakteng, for instance, Han were increasingly present by the early 1930s. 
One estimate from the early 1930s places the Han population in Drakteng at 
2540; Khampas numbered 21,350 (Mei 1934, 281-285). As the Han population 
grew, however, Han merchants tended to gain more control over local trade, 
although Khampa trading companies and traders also grew in power and 
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reach (Galli, this volume). As this chapter will demonstrate, the growth 
of Chinese merchant activity ref lected important changes in corporate 
organization, which allowed f irms to gain power over resources in Kham. 
This, in turn, often limited ordinary Khampas’ ability to prof it from com-
mercial growth.
To understand these changes, we need to reevaluate the key elements 
of Chinese development by using a longer-range, multi-scalar historical 
framework that includes careful consideration of borderlands history. This 
chapter is therefore designed to prompt, but not complete, the process 
of reevaluation, and it is organized around a simple puzzle. In the early 
eighteenth century in Kham, there emerged for the f irst time a robust 
commercial economy. When the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722) designated 
Dartsedo as a trade mart, it was intended that trade benef it Khampas 
and central Tibetans, and there is no doubt that some were able to take 
advantage of trade to enrich and empower themselves (Booz 2011; Galli, 
this volume). In the long run, however, we know that the Chinese state 
and Han traders would gain control of development policy in the ways 
revealed by Fischer and Yeh, thus disempowering Tibetans. When did this 
turnaround begin?
The answer to this question is multifaceted and contingent. There was 
no immediate singular moment or process of change, but a series of con-
junctural changes in politics and commerce that were concentrated not 
in the post-1949 period, but in an earlier era, the 1880s-1940s. The chapter 
cannot examine all of the important changes of this era, so it focuses on 
commercial changes, charting the ways in which Khampa communities 
became enmeshed in more intense networks of regional and global trade. 
The larger book project, of which this chapter is a part, also considers the 
ways in which Khampas were subjected to powerful state-building projects 
emanating from the national and provincial capitals of Beijing, Nanjing, and 
Chengdu. There are two reasons for examining these conjunctures. First, 
I am interested in understanding the processes by which non-Han elites 
were transformed rhetorically from integral and legitimate local rulers in 
the High Qing imperium to denigrated and often illegitimate (in the eyes 
of the Chinese states) competitors for formal power in the modern Chinese 
nation state. This was clearly an effort to disempower indigenous elites 
and, only by looking at the long durée, can we see the effectiveness of the 
processes. Second, I am interested in analysing how commerce – both private 
and state-led – contributed, sometimes inadvertently, to the processes of 
excluding indigenous communities from controlling local resources and 
trade. Both of these developments constitute, I believe, core elements of 
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China’s particular transition to modernity. In other words, while most 
analysts look to coastal China and the interior to understand the most 
important reasons for China’s modern development, I am suggesting that 
the borderlands provide equally important insights, in part because the 
repercussions of disempowered development today are dire – for borderlands 
communities and for China as a whole.
To understand the commercial changes of the 1880s through 1940s 
requires a ‘kaleidoscopic view of […] historical trajectories’ (Gros, this 
volume) and actors, some local, some regional, and some global. I f irst 
explain the growth of commerce and powerful trade institutions, including 
newly powerful private corporations coming from Yunnan. These trade 
institutions were, in many cases, able to link more Kham producers to 
larger and more extensive networks of trade. Then, the chapter provides 
initial descriptions of the impact of the new trade institutions by exam-
ining the changing local dynamics of commodity production and sales. 
The lessons are these: As the Southwest borderlands became integrated 
into broader global markets, there emerged a contingent set of conditions 
that pushed for more intensive commercial development in the rugged 
areas of the Southwest, including Kham. Those conditions included the 
development of Chinese private trading f irms that were well capitalized 
and could reach more deeply into local communities to purchase and move 
highland products to Chongqing, Kunming, Mandalay, and even Shanghai 
and Hong Kong. Demand for highland products seems to have increased 
worldwide as musk was shipped to Paris to be used by the burgeoning 
perfume industry and Chinese Traditional Medicine products, such as 
caterpillar fungus, were increasingly in demand in Guangdong and Hong 
Kong. The ability of merchant f irms to extend their business in Kham was, 
perhaps counterintuitively, aided by the destabilization of the region by 
the Qing in 1905-1911. This destabilization was provoked by Qing adoption 
of Euro-American models of colonialism in the wake of the British invasion 
of Lhasa. There followed a brutal military campaign to suppress – and 
even eradicate – indigenous institutions of power in Kham. After the 
Qing regime fell in 1911-1912, Kham became an arena for competition as 
monasteries, former secular ruling families, merchants, and various forms 
of the new Republican Chinese state competed for power. While commerce 
was frequently interrupted by conflict, this period of competition actually 
allowed for new commercial entities to gain power, a process that, when 
combined with the political changes, laid the foundations for – but did not 
lead inevitably to – modern China’s long-term practices of development 
that disempowers local – especially non-Han – communities.
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The Growth of Commerce
Long-distance trade was not new in the modern era to Kham and the Qing 
empire’s Southwest borderlands. In fact, it was in the eighteenth century 
that migration, population growth, urbanization, and state promotion of 
mining had spurred on the rise of commerce. In the more remote past, 
southwesterners had been incorporated into the twelfth-century tea, horse, 
and salt exchanges.4 Nevertheless, the mechanisms of trade changed 
dramatically from the late nineteenth century onwards. Building on earlier 
business developments, men from Shaanxi, Sichuan, and, later, Yunnan 
developed more powerful f irms with the ability to reach deeper into the 
Southwest in general and Kham in particular, where they extracted a larger 
volume of goods that were in demand across a wider global geography.
In eighteenth-century Kham, it had been the Shaanxi merchants who 
were the f irst outsiders to make their mark. By the 1730s, Shaanxi merchants 
were increasing in Dartsedo, and they held the majority of the tea permits 
for shipping Sichuan tea via Kham to greater Tibet (Shi and Zou 2011, 
5-11). Patrick Booz reports that by the mid-Qing, eighty tea f irms, many 
of them Shaanxi-run, were operating out of Ya’an, Sichuan, with branches 
in Dartsedo, where the Shaanxi merchants often dealt with the famous 
achak khapa or guozhuang, Khampa innkeepers with roots as hereditary 
nobility tied closely to the Chakla king. The achak khapa served to mediate 
exchanges between the Chinese tea merchants and Tibetan wholesalers, 
many of whom were merchant representatives of monasteries both in Kham 
and Central Tibet (Booz 2011, 152; Tsomu 2016).
At f irst, Shaanxi f irms operated primarily in the off icial trade mart 
at Dartsedo, importing tea and cloth to trade for Kham products. By the 
nineteenth century, however, the geographical range of Shaanxi merchant 
activity was expanding. For instance, Shaanxi f irms developed the ability to 
set up branches in other Kham trade towns and to even purchase mountain 
products from low-level wholesalers, who, in turn, purchased directly from 
producers. The apprentices at many Shaanxi f irms were expected to learn 
Tibetan in Dartsedo before being sent out into the f ield, and many Shaanxi 
merchants also learned to dress, ride horses, and eat like Tibetans. Shi and 
Zou argue that the Shaanxi traders who left Dartsedo and entered smaller 
settlements acculturated to Tibetan ways, often intermarrying and even 
sending their sons into the monkhood (Shi and Zou 2011, 6, 8).
4 A number of works cover this earlier trade. To name just three of these works: Smith (1991), 
Ren (1997), Yang (2009).
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Shaanxi merchants were crucial to developing Kham markets, but there 
were other Chinese who followed them into Kham, most notably Sichuanese 
merchants. In addition, Muslim Chinese f irms worked through Chengdu, 
Songpan, and the northern routes to Qinghai and Gansu (Chengdu shi Yisi-
lanjiao xiehui in Duan and Yao 2002, 277). And, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, Yunnanese merchants began to extend their reach 
from northern Yunnan into Kham. Some travellers found Lijiang merchants 
in Dartsedo as early as 1890, but most Yunnanese caravans carried tea or 
textiles north from Dali to Gyelthang (Zhongdian) or, perhaps, to Dechen 
(Adunzi), where they would, without venturing further north, sell to Tibetan 
traders (Rockhill 1891 284-285; Hosie 2001 [1905], 76-77; Shen 2004, 260-262). 
This would change over the course of the early twentieth century as the 
Yunnanese scale of activity expanded, and the Yunnanese merchants thus 
provide a good case study for investigating the changing nature of Kham trade.
To trace the rise of Yunnan merchants in Kham and Tibet requires some 
detective work. This is because they were relatively late on the scene – at least 
in any numbers – and, like many merchant f irms, they are relatively poorly 
documented. Foreign observers began to note an increase in Yunnanese 
activity in the 1910s. In 1915, Oliver Coales reported that Yunnan f irms 
sold about £30,000 (200,000 taels) of opium in Dartsedo; the merchants 
reported that the opium was from Burma and, as a demonstration of their 
ties to Burma, the Yunnanese cashed checks drawn from Rangoon banks, 
revealing that international trade networks were helping capitalize their 
reach into Kham. In Dartsedo, the Yunnanese bought Indian rupees, which 
were imported into silver-poor Yunnan (Coales 1916).
According to Coales, the Yunnanese were able to expand into Dartsedo 
and challenge Shaanxi and Sichuanese merchant f irms because of political 
instability. What Coales meant by political instability was limited to the 1911 
revolution in Sichuan, which disrupted the old tea trade regime, significantly 
decreasing tea imports from Ya’an, Sichuan. The Shaanxi f irms in Dartsedo 
tended to control this trade, and, as tea imports declined, their numbers 
dwindled, from f ifty down to twenty (Coales 1916).
However, if we wish to understand commercial change in Kham, it is 
important to think about political instability in broader terms. In August 
1905, the Qing court had created the Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Affairs Com-
mission (Chuan Dian bianwu dachen), which was a new institution designed 
to implement direct control over Kham. At its head was the notorious Zhao 
Erfeng, an activist commissioner who would seek to turn Kham upside down 
in his effort to transform it. As in other borderlands around the empire, a new 
era had dawned, an era of direct governance that imitated Euro-American 
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colonial practices and rejected any signif icant cooperation with indigenous 
elites (Wang 2011, Chapter 4). From 1905-1911, the Qing state committed itself 
to implementing European concepts of sovereignty and direct rule in many 
borderlands territories, including Kham (Relyea, this volume). In Kham, 
these new concepts were, however, introduced with a level of brutality and 
barbarity rarely seen elsewhere. Under the leadership of Zhao Erfeng and 
his military commander, Ma Weiqi, Qing troops attacked Bathang, Lithang, 
and Chaktreng (Xiangcheng). In each place, leading secular and religious 
elites were executed as the Qing, in conscious imitation of Euro-American 
colonial policies, sought to seize control of politics, trade, and land (Coleman 
2002, 50-51; Sperling 1976, 10-36). Overall, then, the late Qing state sought 
to radically realign local administration, taxation, and land ownership. 
Whereas originally land ownership lay in the hands of secular rulers and 
monasteries, and those who worked the land owed rents, tax-in-kind, and 
labour, the state began to claim the power to rent land, to allow Han migrants 
to open new lands, and to encourage the monetization of rents as a way to 
undermine older, servile relationships. In these ways, the Qing worked to 
extend state power through administration, state-control of property, and 
the market (Wang 2011, Chapters 6 and 7).
Zhao Erfeng’s influence in Kham lasted for six years, and he met his end 
in December 1911 when he was executed by Sichuanese revolutionaries. That 
same year, the remnants of Qing troops in Kham were reorganized into 
the Sichuan-Kham Defence Force (Chuan Kang bianfang jun) and gained 
f inancial support from the Sichuan provincial government (Lawson 2013, 
300-302). In 1912, the newly autonomous Sichuan military government 
created the Office for Managing the Frontier (choubianchu), which, as Scott 
Relyea (2015, 996-1000) notes, was designed to continue implementing poli-
cies for transforming Kham. But the Sichuanese government faced two major 
challengers. First, the Ganden Phodrang sent troops into Kham, extending 
Lhasa’s control in western parts of the region (ibid.). And, second, the Yun-
nan Army invaded Sichuan proper and began extending their influence 
into eastern Kham as well (Lawson 2013, 300-302; Relyea 2015, 1006-1009). 
By 1916, the Yunnanese had gained control of the Frontier Commissioner 
position, appointing Yin Chenghuan, who had been trained in the Yunnan 
military college. Yin reached into the Yunnan Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy 
for help, bringing a leading monk from Lijiang to help oversee the Buddhist 
communities in Dartsedo (IOR L PS 10 435 [1916]; IOR L PS 10 435 [1917]). At 
the same time, Yunnanese troops were gaining control of the remains of 
the Defence Force, and, by 1917, there were Yunnanese off icers and troops 
controlling Bathang and Chamdo.
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Although the Yunnan Army’s influence in Kham did not last long, its 
short foray into Kham seems to have helped Yunnanese f irms, which were 
gaining the capacity to project their trade further af ield at this time. To 
accomplish this, Yunnanese f irms were developing the organizational 
means to raise suff icient capital, orchestrate trade across vast distances, 
and ensure prof its for their investors (Giersch 2014). Founded in 1903, the 
Yunnan f irm Yongchangxiang is an archetypical example. By the 1910s, 
the f irm was beginning its growth from a small partnership, with three 
managing partners, f ive investors, and approximately 11,000 taels in share 
capital, to a limited liability f irm with an estimated 32 billion (RMB) in 
f ixed and liquid assets distributed among its import/export businesses, 
its stake in silk-reeling workshops, and its investment in tin mines and 
refineries (Yang 1989, 50-52). Although founded at a later date, the Maoheng 
f irm shared a similar trajectory of growth from simple trading partnership 
to large, limited liability trading and holding company with interests in 
everything from transport to cotton textiles. What made these companies 
different from earlier, simple trading partnerships were their numerous 
permanent outposts in trading centres large and small. These outposts, in 
turn, provided these f irms with access to raw materials, f inished goods, 
whole-sale markets, f inancial capital, and currency remittance services that 
allowed them to cover remarkable distances throughout East and Southeast 
Asia. Part of their expansion included Kham and Tibet.
The Yunnan f irms’ expansion into Kham seems to have f illed part of the 
void left as Shaanxi merchants and the Sichuan-Kham tea trade declined. As 
Booz notes, the Yunnanese were busy becoming the largest supplier of brick 
tea to Lhasa and southern Kham – something that they would accomplish 
for the f irst time ever in the 1920s and 1930s (Booz 2011, 163-164). This was 
made possible by f irms such as Yongchangxiang, which developed the 
infrastructure to reach into Kham. Yongchangxiang’s managers, for example, 
learned to process southern Yunnan tea for the Tibet market in Xiaguan, 
Yunnan, as did a number of other Yunnan f irms, including Maoheng (Yang 
1989, 64-65; Huang 1991, 38).
From Xiaguan and Lijiang, the f irms began to project further north. If we 
examine the available company archives, we can begin to reconstruct these 
f irms’ major expansion into Kham, though it is still unclear when they f irst 
established permanent outposts. By the 1920s at the latest, Yongchangxiang 
was exporting from Kham thousands of ounces of silver worth medicines. 
We can tell this by examining the Yongchangxiang General Ledger (for 
the Kunming headquarters) in 1930. Among the commodities that were in 
stock by the end of this f iscal year were over 1300 kilos (2699 jin) of beimu, 
The origins oF disempowered developmenT in The TibeTan borderlands 267
worth 23,353.06 yuan silver and smaller amounts of zhimu and caterpillar 
fungus worth a total of 1576.87 yuan (YPA 132-4-93, 2-15). In other words, 
Yongchangxiang was tapping into the growing medicinal materials trade 
and relying on its extensive distribution networks in China proper in order 
to prof it from Kham products. Evidence from Maoheng’s company books 
reveals the f irm to have been a major importer of tea and cloth into Kham. 
With growing access to the traditional Yunnan tea production as well as 
imported yarns and textiles from India and Europe, Maoheng developed 
trading outposts and warehousing to distribute these goods into Kham from 
Jianchang (Xichang), to the southwest of Ya’an. Based on records from the 
1940 trading season, the company imported over 30,000 spools of yarn to 
sell in Sichuan and Kham; they also brought in over 3000 Indian piece-goods 
(YPA 132-4-17, 51-57). Meanwhile, the Xiaguan, Yunnan branch of Maoheng 
managed the tea trade into Kham (YPA 132-4-17, 51-57).
In all of these endeavours, Yongchangxiang and Maoheng were not 
alone. Merchants from some of the northern Yunnan (Lijiang and Heqing) 
f irms came to specialize in the Kham trade (Shu and Su 1988, 273). This 
specialization came to include the establishment of permanent branches in 
northernmost Yunnan and in Dartsedo, Bathang, and Lithang (Zhou 2006, 
226-228). Throughout the 1930s and into the wartime and post-war periods, 
the Heqing f irm of Hengshenggong maintained branches at Dechen and 
Dartsedo. These branches frequently shipped Kham exports via Lijiang to 
Kunming and beyond. To do so, they contracted with individual caravan 
companies and their leaders (ma guotou) (YPA 132-4-71, 43-51).
In addition, Hengshenggong was also doing business in Lhasa; however, 
they were not shipping goods via Kham but instead shipping Yunnan tea 
via Burma and India into Tibet from Kalimpong (Waijiaobu to Meng Zang 
weiyuanhui 1940). One 1943 government report claimed that Hengshenggong 
had been doing this since the early 1920s – and that a competitor, Hongsheng, 
had been doing it since the early 1910s (Liu and Cao 2005, 423-424). During 
the wartime period, moreover, when the Burma-India export route was 
blocked, both Maoheng and Yongchangxiang extended from Kham to engage 
directly in trade through Lhasa to Kalimpong and Kolkata (YPA 132-2-10, 4-7). 
Through the correspondence of Maoheng managers, we can also know that 
the Yunnan f irms of Renhechang and Hongxingyuan were operating in 
Kham and Tibet during wartime years (YPA 132-2-10, 4-7, 8).
Based on company and state archival evidence, then, Yunnan f irms were 
increasingly active in Kham, suggesting that they had built their networks 
into the region from approximately 1910 onward. But why were there such 
opportunities for extending directly into Kham? If we look to understand 
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why these firms were becoming more active in Kham, especially by the 1920s 
and 30s, then we must understand political changes taking place. This was an 
era of tremendous disruption, a period when power was being reconfigured, 
and yet, despite periodic disruptions of trade, the instability seems to have 
provided opportunities for businesses to gain more commercial power. These 
opportunities corresponded with a period in which Yunnan businesses were 
becoming better institutionalized and capitalized.
The Differential Impact of Commerce
The growth of Yunnanese f irms corresponded with increased Han Chinese 
involvement in the Kham economy. In the industry and commerce section 
of the Republican-era Kham Gazetteer, Zhou Taixuan argued that the late 
Qing and early Republican periods brought a major change in govern-
ment interference in trade, which, in turn, led to greater support for Han 
merchants in Kham. Zhou is vague about what policies were introduced, 
but he credits an early Sichuan off icer, Yin Changheng, with promoting 
migration, which led to more Han merchants and their spread into places 
such as Tawu (Daofu), Drakteng, and Yerkalo (Yanjing) (Zhou 1990 (n.d.), 
220-223).5 Their roles and impact can be explained by discussing the process 
by which medicinal materials were collected and exported.
In Kham, medicines could be collected from three different sources: veg-
etable, animal, and mineral. Plant-based medicinal materials included zhimu 
(Anemarrhena asphodeloides), beimu, qinjiao, Chinese rhubarb (dahuang), 
and huanglian (Chinese goldthread). The most expensive animal product 
was musk (shexiang), but other important animal products included pilose 
antler (lurong), deer antler (lujiao), bear gall bladder (xiongdan), leopard 
bones (baogu), and, of course, the famous caterpillar fungus. Mineral-based 
medicinal materials included sulfur, sodium borate, and mica (Zhou 1990 
(n.d.), 227).
In one of the increasingly numerous surveys of the Kham economy, in-
vestigators found in the late 1930s that these products were widely dispersed 
in terms of geography and ecology. Wild huanglian grew on the precipitous 
sides of the mountains, while beimu f lourished in the alpine meadows. 
Zhimu could be found among the debris in rocky crags (‘Xikangsheng yaocao 
diaocha baogaoshu’ 1939/2005, 407-410). The best musk, some said, came 
5 The original copy of this gazetteer is stored in the Sichuan archives, but there is no date of 
publication. It was probably published in the 1940s.
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from Kham’s river gorges and forests, not from the grasslands, and it was 
in demand in Shanghai and European markets (Zhou 1990 (n.d.), 227).6
The medicinal materials trade was worth a great deal of money. In the 
1940s, beimu might sell for about 250 yuan per liang (31.25 grams) or about 
half the price of musk. Zhimu sold for about one-third the price of musk, 
and, in the 1940s, the compilers of the Kham Gazetteer reported that exports 
might total 30,000 to 40,000 liang for each product, meaning that about a 
metric ton of each product was being exported (Zhou 1990 (n.d.), 227). If a 
liang of beimu was worth 250 yuan, then a kilo was worth 8000 yuan, and a 
metric ton was worth 80 million yuan. A metric ton of musk was worth 160 
million. If Khampa families collected all of the beimu to be exported and 
each family collected roughly the same amount as Peldengyel’s half kilo, then 
2000 families might be involved in the harvest and, theoretically, they might 
each earn 4000 yuan. This was not how it worked, of course. Khampas hunted 
musk deer, mostly likely in the spring and fall, when the bucks’ musk was 
considered to be strongest. Or they collected caterpillar fungus and beimu 
during the slack seasons, when they were not herding or tending their crops. 
They would then trade their medicines in return for tea and cloth, though they 
sometimes sold their products for money (Xikang tongzhigao, nongmupian 
1990 (n.d.), 231-232; ‘Xikangsheng yaocaidiaocha baogaoshu’ 2005 (1939), 410).
If we wish to understand who controlled the prof its of production in 
Kham, then we need to understand the variety and hierarchy of commercial 
institutions. If individual Khampa households occupied the bottom of the 
hierarchy, then the next level was occupied by the petty merchants. These 
small-time peddlers were called bachong, and they specialized in dealing 
with the primary producers. While there is no doubt that these bachong 
travelled widely in agricultural and pastoral areas, there is some doubt as 
to who they were. Most Chinese language reports list them as Han who 
lived among the Khampas, but at least one report notes that the bachong 
came from among the Khampas themselves (‘Xikangsheng yaocai diaocha 
baogaoshu’ 2005 (1939), 410; Zhou 1990 (n.d.), 221). Most likely there were 
some bachong who were Khampas, which the Communist noted in their 
surveys, but most were probably descendants of Shaanxi merchants who 
had, in some cases, acculturated to Khampa ways (Shi and Zou 2011, 7). 
The bachong, then, were permanent residents in Khampa areas, and they 
wandered among the large and small farming villages – or in the yak herding 
grounds – buying medicinal materials.
6 For a good listing of the markets that medicinal materials were shipped to, see ‘Xikangsheng 
yaocaidiaocha baogaoshu’ 2005 (1939), 413-414.
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The bachong made it easier for Khampas who did not live near markets to 
sell or trade goods, thus broadening the net of commercialization throughout 
the region. In one government investigation in 1947, for example, researchers 
found that itinerant merchants gathered animal products in grassland areas 
far from the nearest markets. In Sershül (Shiqu County), for example, there 
was no regular market, but the bachong facilitated the export of about 12,500 
pieces of cattle hide and 1000 kilos (2000 dan) of sheep wool to Dartsedo 
each year (ASIMH 20-00-63-016-03 1947). In selling their medicines or other 
products, however, local Khampas were often restricted to the prices that 
bachong offered, meaning that they rarely could earn high prices or make 
lucrative trades.
The bachong were, in turn, subject to the next layer of the collection 
hierarchy. The bachong (and sometimes producers who lived near markets) 
sold to the shopkeepers in the nearest market towns. An alternative was to 
sell to family-based or monastery-sponsored merchants. These shopkeepers 
then dealt with the larger merchant f irms based in Dartsedo and other big 
towns (Zhou 1990 (n.d.), 227-230). As we will see below, the shopkeepers in 
parts of Kham were increasingly Han.
As the twentieth century unfolded, the collection of medicines became 
professionalized. This was done by Han migrants, usually Sichuanese, who, 
in contrast to the Khampa agriculturalists and herders, could be classif ied 
as medicine workers (yaofu or yaofuzi). They formed teams called medicine 
sheds (yaopeng) and set out into the mountains each summer to harvest wild 
medicines under the oversight of their shed heads (pengzhang). The shed 
heads funded the venture, purchasing food and supplies. The shed heads 
also paid a mountain rent (shanzu) to whomever had rights to the land on 
which they gathered. Usually, however, they were not gathering in areas 
that were claimed. These independent harvesters did not work through the 
bachong, but had the autonomy to transport their goods to larger markets, 
something that the Khampa gatherers often could not do (‘Xikangsheng 
yaocai diaocha baogaoshu’ 2005 (1939), 410-411). Some of these Han medicine 
workers, moreover, were hired and capitalized by larger merchant f irms, 
who then were paid with the medicines after the yaofu came out of the 
hills at the end of the season (Xikang tongzhigao, nongmupian 1990 (n.d.), 
231). As medicine gathering was professionalized, Chinese f irms developed 
direct access to raw materials, thus bypassing the bachong and Khampa 
producers. While this did not eradicate the role of Khampa gatherers, it did 
provide them with competition.
Once goods arrived in Dartsedo or other larger trade towns like Bathang 
– whether through the bachong and shopkeepers or through the medicine 
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workers – the larger f irms gained control of them. While these larger f irms 
continued to include Tibetan and Khampa groups (monastic and secular) 
(Booz 2011, 299-304; Galli, this volume), the percentage of Chinese f irms 
increased over time, as did their absolute numbers. In 1890, notes Booz, 
Chinese controlled about 60 per cent of the business capital in Dartsedo, 
while Tibetan merchants controlled about 40 per cent (Booz 2011, 305). As 
the Sichuan tea trade declined after the 1911 Revolution, however, local 
Khampa businesses – including the famous achak khapa or guozhuang, 
went into decline (Tsomu 2016; Ren 1990 (1936), 258-259). Into their place 
came new Chinese f irms, including the Yunnanese f irms like Maoheng, 
which might bypass Dartsedo altogether.
Thus, Han Chinese merchants were increasingly influential in the import-
ing and exporting Kham’s commercial goods. This does not mean that Han 
Chinese f irms took over Kham. The important f irms were managed by 
people of several backgrounds – Shaanxi, Sichuanese, Yunnanese, specif ic 
monasteries, and particular Khampa families (‘Xikangsheng yaocao diaocha 
baogaoshu’ 2005 (1939), 411; Galli, this volume). In some areas, the large 
monasteries were among the largest traders and controllers of production 
(Xikang tongzhigao, nongmupian 1990 (n.d.), 231-232). Still, the trend was 
that Chinese merchant f irms were making greater inroads into Kham. The 
point is, moreover, that commerce, while opening opportunities for families 
like Peldengyel’s to supplement their livelihoods with the collection of 
medicines, was also limiting the possibilities that Khampa families might 
gain real economic leverage through the market.
If we expand our investigation to include other products, including miner-
als and metals, we see revealed yet another important transformation: 
various forms of the Republican state were gaining control over Kham’s 
resources (Zhou 1990 (n.d.), 226-227). We have already seen how the state, 
from Zhao Erfeng’s time, was increasingly involved in claiming rights to land. 
This process was supplemented by new mining policies which furthered 
state inroads into Kham. For example, the state promoted the creation of a 
number of large and small-scale companies that sought to develop Kham’s 
gold-mining areas. Some companies were well-capitalized, such as the Puyi 
gongsi or the Qunxing gongsi, and some were smaller-scale operations, 
but all were subject to new state claims on land and resources. The state 
itself put efforts into developing state-private mining concerns, including 
a gold-mining company in the Muli areas that was under the Ministry of 
Finance’s Xikang Gold Mining Bureau. In order to begin its operations 
in Muli, moreover, the Bureau wrested control of mining from the local 
monastic elite, a development that occurred in conjunction with efforts to 
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pursue the Red Army into the region in 1935 (ASIMH 18-24-05-63-001-01, 
1939). In Muli and other parts of Kham, the mining techniques remained 
traditional and production outputs low, and miners might be Sichuanese or 
Khampa, but clearly the state was extending its claims so that companies 
often petitioned the state for mining rights (Zhou 1990 (n.d.), 226-227).
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain all the changes throughout 
Kham, but we return to Peldengyel’s home of Drakteng to help us evaluate 
the increasing power of commercial f irms and the state. In 1913, Drakteng 
had been transformed into a directly-ruled county, and over the decades 
the state undermined the power of local indigenous elites. By the early 
1930s, the old hereditary elite still wielded some power, but the Republican 
state was able to implement some of its developmental policies. The state 
collected local taxes, enforced compulsory transport corvée service, and 
even created an experimental agricultural station. Locally, commerce came 
to be concentrated in the hands of Han shopkeepers in the county seat, who 
imported tea, cloth, and European products. They also exported to Dartsedo 
musk, beimu, and other medicines that had been collected by Khampas and 
bartered in return for tea, cloth, tools, and salt. For the most part, then, it 
was the shopkeepers and Han f irms that mediated Drakteng’s interaction 
with the larger commercial world. Locally, Han dominated commerce and 
the skilled professions (carpentry, wine making, silversmithing) despite 
the fact that, in the mid-1930s, there were only one Han for ten Khampas. 
Khampas farmed, herded, hunted, and collected medicines (Mei 1934, 281-
285; Zhang 2010 [1939]).
Thus, the outlines of Peldengyel’s life in the 1950s had already been put 
in place by the 1930s. The commercial economy was a powerful factor, and, 
though the C.C.P. work team did not emphasize it, Han merchants were 
some of the most powerful commercial forces in Drakteng. And, though 
this was not the case in Peldengyel’s village, Han settlers were increasingly 
prevalent, which the C.C.P. found in other parts of Drakteng. And the state 
was a powerful economic force, too.
It is important to clarify that not all of Kham was like Drakteng. In 
contrast, He Yong (1989) has detailed how the major Lithang monastery, 
Jamchen Chokhorling, continued its economic dominance of its region into 
the early 1950s. Various institutions within the monastery might invest in 
and manage trade, and the monastery extended its trade networks through 
Lhasa into India, as well as into Sichuan and Yunnan. The monastery’s basic 
approach was to collect local goods, especially medicinal materials and 
export them for sale. They then would import salt, tea, cloth, and daily-use 
items. The power of the monastery rested in its local status as both political 
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and religious authority, a power that was rebuilt in the wake of the Qing at-
tacks in 1905 (He 1989, 13-14). There were some Han merchant f irms active in 
Lithang, but it is clear that the most powerful trade institution was monastic.
Lithang was not unique, but neither was Drakteng, and when we consider 
both together, we begin to gain a kaleidoscopic picture of Kham in which 
larger-scale institutions were increasingly in control of commerce – and 
thus of people’s livelihoods. And these larger-scale institutions were often 
in conflict with each other long before the Communist Party arrived on 
the scene. In the early 1940s, Lu Yuxin worked for the Republican state as 
it sought to extend its cooperative loans programme into northern Kham 
(Gartar, Tawu, Drango, Kandzé, and Nyarong). Lu was, however, frustrated 
by the structures of the local economy in which headmen and monastic 
off icials exercised tremendous power. In terms of commerce and f inance, 
the monasteries dominated trade and moneylending. When the author went 
to Nyarong (Zhanhua) to disburse loans to the Cooperative (hezuo she), he 
found that the chair of the coop was a former headman and lama, and this 
raised Lu’s suspicions. He investigated and learned that before the coop was 
organized, this area of Dake (Dagai) had over 200 impoverished residents 
who were exploited through usury. Many wanted to join the coop but the 
lamas continued to try to prevent this. Only through decisive actions by the 
state was the coop established, but it was still diff icult to overcome local 
elite resistance (Lu 1942, 115-120).
While it is certainly accurate to note how monastic off icials, monasteries, 
and Khampa traders remained influential in trade networks (Galli, this 
volume), it is also important to recognize elsewhere the growing power of 
Han Chinese merchant f irms and the state. Based on this initial work, it is 
clear that outside forces, including both private f irms and state institutions, 
were making inroads into Kham and gaining control over resources. The 
power to make decisions about local economies was slowly being removed 
from these locales, although this was a process that, given a different set of 
conjunctural developments, might have been reversed. But, even in areas 
such as Lithang, where local influence was still strong, it has to be noted 
that the growing Han Chinese discourses on nation and development cast 
local secular and religious elites as opponents, as backwards f igures who 
were imagined to be obstacles to the development of both political and 
economic modernity. Thus, from the early twentieth century forward there 
were two crucial trends of exclusion and disempowerment at work in the 
borderlands of Kham, one in the realm of actual economic and political 
relationships and one in the ongoing evolution of the Chinese national 
imaginary. While neither trend was yet at the stage where it guaranteed 
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the levels of marginalization and disempowerment that manifested in the 
People’s Republic, both would come to shape the Sino-Tibetan borderlands 
for decades to come. To understand how these trends originated and devel-
oped, we need to develop multi-scalar, kaleidoscopic borderlands histories.
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Jamchen Chokhorling Byams chen chos ‘khor gling
Nyarong Nyag rong
Peldengyel Dpal ldan rgyal
Sershül Ser shul
Tawu Rta’u
Yerkalo Yar kha logs, var. Tsha kha logs
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8 Pastoralists by Choice
Adaptations in Contemporary Pastoralism in Eastern Kham
Gillian G. Tan
Abstract
The Chinese state’s categorical distinction between mumin (herder) and 
nongmin (farmers) views the former as a mode of production conducted out 
of environmental necessity in places unable to be productively cultivated 
by dominant agrarian settlements. Such a view has been integral in narra-
tives of Chinese state legibility. Focusing on a contemporary community in 
eastern Kham and their everyday practices as well as narrative choices to 
remain drokpa, or pastoralists, this chapter re-examines pastoralism as a 
degree of specialization. In the process, it seeks to demonstrate how local 
specif icities and experiences not only clarify a general understanding of 
Tibetan pastoralism but also complicate a presentation of Chinese state 
governmentality.
Keywords: mumin, pastoralism, degree of specialization, adaptation, 
state legibility, margins
Introduction
Among a group of nomadic pastoralists in the Minyak area of Kham (see 
Map 1),1 a recent development related to the scope of pastoral activity 
has occurred. Beginning around 2010, increased numbers of pastoral 
households have started to plant ‘leaves’ (loma) in the fenced enclosures 
of their winter houses. These fenced enclosures and winter houses were 
built in the 1990s as a direct result of the Chinese government’s ‘Four 
1 Minyak (also Minyag) derives its name from Minyak Rab, one of the six ranges that comprises 
the region of Kham, which is also known as ‘four rivers, six ranges’ (chushi gangdruk).
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dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
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Constructions that Form a Set’ (si peitao) policy that sought to introduce 
material improvements in pastoral areas. This policy saw the construction 
of winter houses, fenced enclosures for annual forage, barns for animals, 
and fenced winter pastures in an effort to reorganize pastoral populations 
from the cooperatism of the earlier period towards individual households 
and enhanced technical productivity. Presently, this group of pastoralists 
in Minyak Kham continues to herd yaks and to move with them from 
pasture to fresh pasture during the summer and autumn months. During 
the winter and spring months, the pastoralists live in simple stone-and-mud 
houses. By directing their efforts and labour primarily towards animal 
husbandry and orienting their lives towards movement, these pastoralists 
identify as drokpa, ‘people of the pastures’ who live on the hoof (Ekvall 
1968) and consider themselves different from both rongpa or farmers, 
and rongmadrok or semi-pastoralists. The latter especially have been 
written about in the literature as agropastoralists who engage in practices 
of animal husbandry but whose primary orientation is towards their 
agricultural f ields and the f ixity of residence in houses (Ekvall 1968). 
Given the pastoralists’ self-presentation as drokpa, the relatively recent 
attention to planting requires greater consideration.
The planting of these ‘leaves’, which are a small Chinese cabbage (Ch. 
xiao bai cai, Tib. tshal dkar, sp. Brassica rapa subsp. Chinensis), is not the 
f irst or only activity of small-scale planting by these pastoralists. In the 
early 2000s, an international development organization working in the 
area had initiated a grass-seed planting project. The organization handed 
out grass-seeds to each household and urged them to plant the seeds in the 
fenced enclosures of their winter houses in order to encourage pastoralists 
to supplement their animals’ annual forage by supplying fodder.2 A handful 
of households dutifully scattered the seeds in their fenced enclosures in the 
f irst year; yet despite the efforts of the organization, most pastoralists did 
not enthusiastically take up the grass-seeding project. Many regarded the 
seeds as ‘feeding the birds’ rather than resulting in fodder for the animals. 
Either because of lack of attention or skill, the seeds did not produce the 
harvest fodder expected and interest soon waned. While the grass-seeding 
project has now been left fallow, the planting of ‘leaves’ in recent times 
2 Bringing fodder to animals rather than leading animals out to pasture is an act that distin-
guishes ranching from pastoralism: by enabling greater capital investment in the animals, the 
rancher is able to achieve higher productive intensity in terms of milk and meat (Chang and 
Koster 1994, Ingold 1980). Pastoralism, on the other hand, refers to a set of unimproved activities 
around animal husbandry and produces relatively low yields (Asad 1978, Bates and Lees 1977).
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has gained steady momentum. Of the approximately 80 households in the 
community, around half of these have planted leaves in the past eight years. 
This chapter will probe the ethnographic reasons behind this example to 
better understand its overall import in the complex interplay between 
environment, livelihood, and culture for contemporary Tibetan pastoralists 
of Minyak Kham. It will demonstrate, moreover, how the ethnographic data 
reveal limitations of overly determined categories of livelihood and way of 
life, such as mumin (herder) and nongmin (farmer), as they play out in state 
policies and modes of legibility.
State delineations of what ‘counts’ as agriculture – with respect to 
labour required, kinds of crops planted, and scale in which the crops are 
cultivated – need to be probed further. This chapter picks up one thread in 
the literature, namely that what counts as agriculture is determined largely 
by state categories and measures of production intensity and volume, kind 
of crops planted, and sedentism, in other words, the ‘scientif ic agriculture’ 
proposed by Scott (1998) as part of high modernist ideology. Thus, in the 
context of the Chinese state, we have seen from Mark Frank’s contribution 
(this volume) that the ‘agrarian nationalism’ of the Republican govern-
ment favoured cereal farming and specif ic crops of wheat and corn, as it 
harboured the belief that scientif ic agriculture was an ‘improvement’ (Ch. 
gaijin, gailiang). Such nationalism assumed not only a binary opposition 
between ‘agrarian states’ and ‘industrial states’ but also an internal op-
position between a dominant farming population and marginalized herder 
populations. This internal opposition was shaped also by sentiments of 
superiority and civility by the Chinese state – built on Han agricultural 
sedentism – over the notable pastoral populations within its territoriality. 
This superiority is certainly echoed in Mark Frank’s presentation of Zhang 
Yunping’s manifesto (see Frank, this volume). From the perspective of state 
legibility, then, nomadic herders comprise a simplif ied and abstracted 
category that is articulated in opposition to sedentary farmers. Countering 
this perspective is not, however, to merely refute a state perspective but 
to pay careful attention to how empirical practices of pastoralism do 
not necessarily exclude other livelihood activities. It also demands an 
empirically-derived ref inement of state legibility to examine how processes 
of governmentality also include practices of illegibility, namely how Minyak 
drokpa not only resist but also adapt to policy implementations. This 
last point bears particularly on the question posed in Stéphane Gros’ 
Introduction to Part II of this volume about how state control is achieved 
and maintained in borderland regions, which often express realities that 
run counter to centrist narratives.
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State Legibility
In his work, Seeing Like a State (1998), the political scientist James Scott 
highlights how state governmentality works according to processes of leg-
ibility that include acts of simplif ication and abstraction. In order to control 
its subjects and engineer social projects, the state must f irst reduce complex 
realities to simplified and standard categories. The category most relevant to 
this examination of Chinese state legibility is the term mumin, or herder. It 
is a category that operates on several levels of definition and meaning, and 
these levels are often blurred, even in policy documents. At the productive 
level, the term mumin is drawn in clear distinction with nongmin, or farmer. 
As a mode of production, herding refers to the activity of keeping livestock as 
a primary source of livelihood. It may or may not entail nomadism. In terms 
of state legibility, it is distinct from farming, which refers to the activity of 
planting (and animal husbandry) as a primary mode of livelihood. Because 
of their reliance on f ields, farmers also denote a settled population. For the 
Chinese state, mumin applies to all populations (usually minority groups) 
that primarily herd and who, according to policy documents such as the 
Nomad Settlement Project (Ch. you mumin dingju), share similar conditions, 
including ‘having no fixed abode, lacking in production and living conditions, 
and suffering from the onslaught of natural disasters’.3 Such a categorization 
applies irrespective of whether those concerned are from Tibet, Xinjiang, 
or Inner Mongolia, of the kinds of animals herded, and of the historical or 
cultural factors that have influenced their lives as herders.
The term mumin is not only deployed in terms of mode of production, 
however. It is also and simultaneously a social category, one that is described 
in policy documents through often derogatory language. Mumin are gener-
ally portrayed as traditionalists who have relied on the heavens for good 
fortune (rather than on scientif ic and technical progress).4 For example, 
the Nomad Settlement Project policy document describes herders as ‘one 
of the weak links in building a well-off society in an all-rounded way’.5 The 
most consistent descriptor used in relation to mumin is ‘backward’ (luo hou), 
3 Chinese government document 2011, 2.
4 Interestingly, this attitude and language are reminiscent of the more general Han Chinese 
sense of self, ‘as the vanguard of the proletariat’ (Gladney 1998, 9). Harrell’s articulation of the 
three metaphors – sexual, educational, historical – that inflect how the civilizing centre (Han) 
regards its peripheral peoples (Others) offers another perspective on this view, particularly as 
the ethnic identif ication project (minzu shibie) occurred under Communist rule (Harrell 1995, 
23).
5 Chinese government document 2011, 2.
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which reveals the state’s generally derisive and superior attitude towards 
this group. That herders are often from minority nationalities adds to the 
emphasis of Han superiority.
Interpretive levels based on mode of production and social distinction 
of mumin are often conflated and collapsed in processes of Chinese state 
legibility. In his examination of Han Chinese ecological identity, Dee Wil-
liams (2002) writes that the Chinese term huang not only denotes unfamiliar 
ecological zones as ‘waste’ or ‘barren’, and therefore carries assumptions 
on the kinds of productive activity that can be achieved in such regions, 
but it also carries connotations for behaviour and character. On this point, 
references made towards the emptiness of the grasslands or the absence of 
domestication have been reinforced in Chinese idioms, such as ‘herders eat 
unethical grain’ (Ch. mumin chi kuixin liang), which criticized the herders for 
living off grain they did not produce (Hong 2005, 648). By extension, mumin 
were viewed as lazy and slothful because they were perceived as not tilling 
the land and not labouring productively (Williams 2002, 32). Being mumin 
is thus represented in policy documents through a set of collective physical 
and social problems, such as ‘poor hygienic conditions’ (wei sheng tiao jian ji 
cha), ‘breed degradation’ (pin zhong tui hua), and ‘weak disaster prevention 
and mitigation capacity’ ( fang zai jian zai nengli ruo). The category of mumin 
as one of state legibility contains assumptions of ecological determinism, 
social characterization, and moral def iciency.
For Scott, state legibility and the simplif ied, abstracted categories created 
are the basis on which the state develops its various projects of ‘improvement’. 
By ‘improvement’, Scott refers to efforts to achieve an assumed evolution-
ary pinnacle of civilization: organized nature, permanent settlements, 
maximized production, and social engineering informed by high modernist 
ideology. The last, in particular, is based on a confidence in ‘scientif ic and 
technical progress [and] the expansion of production’ (Scott 1998, 4) that 
undergirds Chinese state policies towards its pastoral populations. This 
echoes the observations made by both Mark Frank and Pat Giersch in this 
volume on state agricultural ‘improvement’ and state development initiative. 
It is observed by Emily Yeh (2007) in her article on how the trope of indolence 
combines with state development discourse to recreate notions of what 
constitutes ‘proper work’ in Lhasa, Tibet.6 In the case of the contemporary 
Chinese state, the language of science, of technical improvements, and of 
6 The specif ically local idioms of development and their role in allowing local manoeuvre of 
state discourses operate in ways not dissimilar to what I suggest here, following Das and Poole’s 
(2004) formulation of ‘margins’.
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intensive production is used liberally in plans to ‘improve’ the conditions 
of living and production for mumin. Starting from the policies of Four Con-
structions that Form a Set (si peitao jianshe) in the 1990s to the Develop the 
West (xibu dakaifa) and Restoring the Pastures (tuimu huancao) policies of 
the 2000s and the more recent policies of Ecological Migration (shengtai 
yimin) and Nomad Settlement (you mumin dingju), these policy templates 
have been explicitly designed to alter the material bases of livelihood and 
production for all herders (see Table 8.1). Therefore, the Nomad Settlement 
Project focuses on 1) building a well-off society in a well-rounded way, 2) 
transforming the development of animal husbandry in pastoral places, 
3) protecting grassland ecology, and 4) maintaining national unity and 
frontier stability. Specif ically, the Nomad Settlement Project promotes the 
construction of houses, livestock sheds, and storage huts for fodder in an 
effort to increase the productive yields of pastoral regions.
Table 8.1  Overview of selected government policies in Kham, 1990s-present
Three constructions that Form a set, san peitao jianshe 三配套建设 1990s-2000s
Four constructions that Form a set, si peitao jianshe 四配套建设 1990s-2000s
develop the west, xibu dakaifa 西部 大开发 2000
restoring the pastures, tuimu huancao 退牧还草 2003-2012
ecological migration, shengtai yimin 生态移民 2003 
nomad settlement, you mumin dingju 游牧民定居 2009
However, ‘improvement’ relates not just to the material conditions and 
environment of the mumin, but also to the mumin themselves, revealing 
more clearly the connections among ecological determinism, mode of 
production, and social and moral characterization of the state category 
of mumin. Therefore, while the san peitao and si peitao constructions and 
tuimu huancao policy focused on the construction and management of 
material grassland ‘improvements’, policy ref inements now extend to a 
‘transformation of people and methods’ (zhuan ren, zhuan fangshi) by 
‘raising eff iciency’ (di xiao). In order to achieve these measures, government 
departments increasingly conduct training sessions with local communities. 
For instance, the Animal Husbandry Bureau of Dartsedo County selects and 
trains people in targeted communities in order to set up ‘demonstration 
households’ (shi fan hu). Local nomadic pastoralists are increasingly called 
on to participate in meetings in which they register their households and 
livestock in order to receive subsidies of grain feed. Along with information 
from additional forums such as the National Conference on Pastoral Regions 
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and the creation of monetary schemes, current policies are clearly facilitating 
change with a different emphasis: intensifying pastoral production to achieve 
economic development. By moving from extensive herding to an intensive 
market-oriented livestock industry that takes advantage of growing condi-
tions in pastoral regions, the Chinese state intends to transform Tibetans 
from ‘backwards’ nomadic pastoralists to neoliberal, market-oriented, and 
governable subjects (Gaerrang 2015, Yeh and Gaerrang 2011).
Categories of mumin and nongmin, examined through policy documents, 
reveal modes of legibility. Yet, focusing only on state legibility runs the 
danger of presenting a state that is practically solid and coherent. This may 
be heuristically convenient, but as anthropologists of the state such as Veena 
Das and Deborah Poole (2004) have noted, the state not only functions to 
create and maintain order (to which categories belong) but also exists as 
a ghostly form, a ‘spectral state’ that looms as a power to be resisted or 
subverted (Mueggler 2001). In this conceptual articulation, and through 
its modes of legibility, the state appears as ‘a self-reproducing, totalizing 
constellation of forces’ (Kapferer 2010, 128). However, Das and Poole (2004, 
6, 9-10) observe that illegibility, where modes of legibility break away from 
intent, is part of the process of state governmentality, and practices of 
illegibility most frequently occur at the margins. These margins include 
borderland regions such as Kham, which – through processes of aligning 
with, yet also adapting, state policies – reveal state-margins relationships as 
dynamic and mutually constitutive, as I will discuss in the f inal section of 
this chapter. Actual practices of daily life as drokpa7, for one pastoral group 
in Minyak Kham, and the specif ic conditions that historically frame their 
continuing self-presentation as drokpa elaborate how being drokpa is equally 
about a way of life as it is about sustaining a livelihood. This self-expression 
goes beyond ecological and cultural determinants of the category of mumin, 
and instead, complicate simplif ied abstractions. Activities such as planting 
leaves, caterpillar fungus gathering, and trade, while fully coherent to drokpa 
themselves, are read as illegible in the context of state legibility.
Being Minyak Drokpa
The pastoralists in question live in the eastern section of the Hengduan 
mountain range on high-altitude pastures (3900-4200 metres above sea 
7 In this regard, I translate drokpa as pastoralist in order to signal a more inclusive def inition 
than that of mumin (herder).
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level) that are now part of the administrative township of Tagong (Lhagang) 
in Kangding (Dartsedo) County, Ganzi (Kandzé) Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture, Sichuan Province. During the winter and spring months, the com-
munity of around 80 households live in simple houses, variously constructed 
of mud and stone and of concrete. The location of the late autumn, winter, 
and early spring pastures is along a high valley (3900 metres above sea 
level) in the foothills of a snow-capped mountain named Zhamo (5270m). 
According to locals, Zhamo is the wife-mountain of a more dominant snow 
peak, Zhara Latse (5650 m). Ecologically, the pastures are in a ‘subtropical 
montane coniferous forest zone of southeastern Tibet, high-cold vegetation’ 
ecoregion (Chang 1981) with specif ic characteristics given by altitude and 
orientation. The Kobresia sedge is a currently dominant plant species in these 
pastures. During the late spring, summer, and early autumn months, these 
pastoralists move with their animals to higher elevation (4200 metres above 
sea level) and live in black yak-hair tents. While adaptations to household 
organization have seen growing numbers of elderly pastoralists remaining in 
winter houses during the summer and autumn months, the orientation of the 
community continues to be towards the herding and care of animals, mainly 
yaks, and movements with the herd. Pastoralists in the community often 
refer to themselves as ‘Minyak drokpa’, with drokpa displaying a primary 
orientation towards the herd and movement rather than towards the house 
and f ields as displayed by semi-pastoralists. Drokpa, therefore, is more than 
the practice of animal husbandry; it encompasses a way of life.
The specif icity in the way these pastoralists refer to the term Minyak 
requires some explanation. In common use, Minyak is a self-identifying 
term rather than one that refers to an abstract territory or region of clear 
boundaries. The identif ication is complex and relies on multiple factors, 
which may shift in emphasis depending on the community and context. 
For this community in a contemporary context, an important part of being 
Minyak drokpa is the mountain Zhara Latse. Zhara is a mountain with 
several meanings and practices attached to it: it is a zhidak or territorial 
master, which is part of the host of immanent deities in a Tibetan life-world; 
it is a lari or soul mountain, which houses the la, or soul, of a particular 
community; and it is also a néri or pilgrimage mountain/site, which is a 
site of ritual practice.8 As a néri, it is referred to as Minyak Latse in the 
nineteenth-century narrative map of the Nyingma master, Chogyur Lingpa, 
called the Twenty-f ive Great Sites of Kham. The map, which was further 
elaborated by Jamgon Kongtrul of Palpung monastery, contained sacred sites 
8 For more details on each of these terms, see Huber (1994), Tan (2016).
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that expressed the extent of the region of Kham (see Gros, this volume).9 
As one of the twenty-f ive great sites of Kham, Minyak Zhara Latse is the 
southeasternmost point of the region of Kham and is a focal ritual and 
narrative site for the pastoralists living in its vicinity. Pastoralists in this 
community enact the multiple meanings attached to Zhara as part of their 
continuing self-representation as Minyak drokpa.
Another aspect of identity lies in the community’s continuing self-presen-
tation as Minyak drokpa. To further understand this, we must appreciate the 
community’s history. ‘More than a hundred years ago’, as it was explained 
to me, this pastoral community moved from the vicinity of Nanglang lake 
in what is now Pelyul County to the grasslands where they currently live. 
To place this move in historical context, Nanglang lake is located in what 
was the area comprising the lower districts of Nyarong, and the grasslands 
presently occupied were part of the Chakla kingdom.10 To appreciate the 
cause of the move, some further historical details will be considered.
Prior to the creation of Xikang Province by the Chinese Republican 
government in 1939, the physical area delineated by the region of Kham 
was dominated by the presence of four large Tibetan kingdoms, known in 
Chinese as the ‘four great tusi’ (si da tusi).11 These kingdoms were Dergé, 
Lithang, Bathang, and Chakla, and they gave their allegiance to the Qing 
emperor. In addition to these kingdoms, there were also smaller f iefdoms; 
the British Consul Teichman (1922) noted that, in the early twentieth century, 
there were as many as twenty Khampa states ‘under Chinese protection’ 
(excluding the Gyelrong kingdoms). Such a proliferation of ‘states’ – both 
dominant and minor – created a historical situation where the rule of law 
of a central authority could not be guaranteed. Expressed at the level of 
self-identity, Khampas fought and resisted both the Chinese administration 
in Beijing and Tibetan administration in Lhasa. On a political level, the 
Chinese presence in Kham served as an immediate counter-manoeuvre 
to Central Tibet and its attempt to establish rule in Kham. Moreover, the 
9 Gardner (2006, 154) notes that Jamgon Kongtrul’s revision of the map was intra-sectarian 
because it combined sacred sites of the Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, and Bon traditions. However, 
it explicitly expressed resistance to the real enemy of the day, namely Lhasa and its dominant 
Gelukpa order.
10 While it is common to associate the Chakla kingdom with the area of Minyak, the two are 
not entirely coterminous.
11 The word tusi is an off icial Chinese title bestowed by the Qing emperor and refers to the 
Tibetan titles for gyelpo, depa, and ponpo. Teichman (1922) glosses the f irst as ‘king’, and the 
other two as ‘hereditary off icials’. The latter term, ‘hereditary off icials’, is how tusi and tuguan 
are generally glossed in English. However, Gardner (2003, 72) notes that the kingdoms that were 
off icially tusi and tuguan are diff icult to distinguish from each other.
290 gillian g. Tan 
involvement of foreign powers in Kham activated both a strategic use of 
resistance among the kingdoms and a system of patronage that was mirrored 
previously in the seventeenth century when the Mongols defeated in Lithang 
the Jang kingship of Lijiang and established priest-patron relationships 
with the Geluk sect of Tibetan Buddhism. The interplay between kings 
and foreign powers in maintaining local autonomy on the one hand, and 
in jostling for the right to rule on the other, characterized the historical 
struggles of Kham.
These historical struggles had direct bearing on nomadic pastoralists 
who were often recruited to f ight because of their prowess on horseback and 
with weapons. The struggles also influenced the movements of communities 
of pastoralists and, in some cases, instigated migrations across valley and 
mountain ranges. One struggle, noteworthy in relation to my f ieldsite, was 
an uprising that occurred in 1837. The military leader Gönpo Namgyel, also 
known as the ‘Nyarong demon’, began a military uprising in the valley of 
Nyarong. Gönpo Namgyel waged war in Nyarong and united the upper, 
middle, and lower districts under his control. He also succeeded in bringing 
together neighbouring nomadic tribes (Gardner 2003). By the early 1860s, 
Gönpo Namgyel had conquered most of northwestern Kham, taking Dergé 
in 1862. Shortly after, a counter-move to the authority of Gönpo Namgyel 
came from the Chakla kingdom based in Dartsedo and a trade bastion for 
the Chinese since the Ming dynasty (Tsomu 2016). According to oral history, 
this counter-move by the Chakla kingdom occurred at the approximate 
time – ‘more than a hundred years ago’ – that the pastoral community 
moved from the vicinity of Nanglang lake in the lower districts of Nyarong 
to the grasslands that were part of the Chakla kingdom.
When the pastoralists f irst moved from Nanglang lake, they f irst grazed 
their animals on the pastures that are now the location of their summer 
pastures. This explains why their monastery is located in the grasslands 
of the summer pastures since pastoral rotations once revolved around 
that location. As the community grew, it gradually incorporated other 
pastures at slightly lower altitude into their grazing rotations. Different 
parts of the community occupied different pastures in the area and, under 
the current Chinese system, the original community is divided into four 
administratively distinct ‘villages’ (cun), each with its own ‘village leader’ 
(cun zhang) and ‘village party secretary’ (cun shuji). The particular group, 
or ‘village’, of my f ieldwork eventually occupied its current winter pastures 
in the high valley at the foothills of the Zhara and Zhamo mountains that 
were once inhabited by farmers, or rongpa. Even now, households of farmers 
are located further along the valley towards the direction of Dartsedo. 
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Nonetheless, when the pastoralists eventually incorporated the pastures 
into their winter and spring grazing rotations, living in winter black tents 
woven from yarn made from the thick down of their animals, they continued 
a pastoral way of life. Their continuing identif ication as drokpa is – to no 
small extent – because they were drokpa in Pelyul and choose to persist 
with this way of life.
This point is especially relevant given that environmental conditions 
in these pastures allowed the planting of highland barley and other crops 
associated with small-scale agriculture. Moreover, the relative proximity 
of villages of farmers further along the valley made it important for these 
pastoralists to distinguish themselves by re-asserting their pastoral identity, 
echoing Robert Ekvall’s (1968, 85) observation in Golok that the drokpa 
identify as such, and usually by asserting a general superiority over farmers. 
Their assertion as drokpa is also practically manifest in their current pastoral 
movements: households typically move seven times a year over a maximum 
distance of approximately seven kilometres across an altitude range of 300 
metres (see Table 8.2). While several of the moves are dictated by ecological 
benef it such as the movement to pastures at a higher altitude at a later 
period of the summer season, the other moves – particularly the f irst move 
of around 100 metres from the winter house to winter-spring pastures, and 
the last move from one part of the winter pastures to another – are not 
ecologically necessary.
Table 8.2  Detail of pastoral movements
movement approximate month 
(according to Tibetan 
calendar)
approximate altitude 
(metres above sea level)
approximate distance 
(metres) from previous 
location
one Fourth 3900 100
Two Fourth 3900 500
Three Fifth 4100 7000
Four sixth 4200 1000
Five seventh 4100 5000
six seventh 3960 1000
seven eighth 3900 500
Thus, while literature on pastoralism has both explained movement in 
terms of ecological determinants such as altitude, herd size, access to land 
and water (Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980, Hjort 1981, Western 
and Dunne 1979), and analysed movement as crucial because it maximizes 
environmental resilience (by minimizing risk of disease, for example), this 
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group of pastoralists moves more than is ecologically required and, indeed, 
more than other groups of pastoralists in Kham. For instance, pastoralists 
of the Sershül tribes move four times in a year corresponding with the 
four seasons and distinct sets of seasonal pastures. Yet here in Minyak 
Kham, it would seem that pastoralists are committed to moving with their 
animals above and beyond what is ecologically necessary. Given that Minyak 
pastoralists are committed to pastoralism in a location where small-scale 
agriculture is viable, any argument that yak-rearing is a marginalized 
practice because of high altitude and unviable agriculture also does not 
apply. In Minyak Kham, pastoralists choose to continue moving with their 
animals because of cultural and historical self-identif ication as drokpa and 
not because of environmental factors.
Shifting Mumin
To return to the pastoralists’ increased attention to planting leaves, it is 
important to f irst appreciate that this activity supplies leaves for personal 
consumption rather than as fodder for animals. This point is signif icant 
because growing barley for animal fodder is one key policy measure of the 
Nomad Settlement Project. Yet while that measure has not been taken up 
by pastoralists in this community of Minyak Kham, the planting of Brassica 
rapa has been consistent over the past f ive to seven years. The larger context 
is that growing numbers of pastoralists elsewhere in Kham have increased 
their consumption of vegetables or ‘leaves’ and either decreased their meat 
consumption or removed meat altogether in their diet. The increase in 
instances of ‘vegetarianism’ among nomadic pastoralists in both Kham and 
Amdo has been addressed extensively by Gaerrang (2016), who notes that 
vegetarianism for nomadic pastoralists and Tibetans generally is enacted 
in different ways. For example, it may be practiced only during religious 
periods; it may involve abstinence from only certain kinds of meat; or it may 
involve abstinence only on certain days (Gaerrang 2016). Among Tibetan 
pastoralists, vegetarianism is a practice that is f lexible and, importantly, it 
is instigated out of respect for and obedience to the reincarnate lamas. The 
so-called vegetarian movement that is currently growing across eastern 
Tibet is the result of the efforts of one incarnate lama in particular, Khenpo 
Tsultrim Lodrö of Larung Gar, a Tibetan Buddhist complex in Serthar 
County, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Gaerrang (2012) has related 
the movement towards teachings on vegetarianism directly with a sharp 
increase in livestock sales to slaughterhouses in some pastoral communities. 
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Contemporary motivations towards vegetarianism has multiple aspects, 
but one clear motivation is to counter the increasing commodif ication of 
animals for meat production and its clash with Buddhist ethics on slaughter. 
In Kham, the teachings and influence of Khenpo Tsultrim Lodrö, who is of 
the Nyingma sect of Tibetan Buddhism, have extended beyond communities 
with high slaughter rates.
In this community of pastoralists in Minyak Kham, slaughter rates of yaks 
are relatively low, yet the general increase in consumption of vegetables and 
corollary decrease in meat consumption is the result of instruction from its 
own incarnate lama, also of the Nyingma sect of Tibetan Buddhism. Out of 
obedience to this lama, many households in this community now have at 
least one member who does not eat meat. To supplement the household’s 
growing consumption of vegetables, these pastoralists now use the enclosure 
of small plots from the ‘four that form a set’ constructions of the 1990s to grow 
vegetables for their personal use. Even though the sentiment of many who 
have increased their consumption of vegetables is that ‘leaves are not tasty’, 
they continue to follow the practice. Vegetables are consumed fresh when 
the harvest is recent and bunches are dried to be added to Tibetan noodles, 
in the cooler months. In most cases, the amount of vegetables planted and 
harvested is not suff icient for the entire year and households supplement 
their intake by also purchasing vegetables in the nearby township seat. 
The money used to purchase vegetables is derived from the household’s 
caterpillar fungus (yartsa gunbu) sales in the year.
Interestingly, the care of these plants has mainly fallen on male members 
of households, who tend to have more additional time and labour than female 
pastoralists to spend on ‘other’ activities – namely activities not directly 
associated with animal husbandry. This in itself reveals that planting (and 
consuming) leaves has not in any way replaced a pastoral mode of production 
and way of life. The care of animals and use of animal products, mainly milk 
but also hair and fur, for their daily sustenance and living needs continues to 
be the primary orientation of these pastoralists. As one older pastoralist has 
said in response to the household’s continued practice of animal husbandry: 
‘If we didn’t have our animals, how could we eat?’ This statement is not, of 
course, necessarily directed to the consumption of animals. Literature on 
pastoralist practices around the world has demonstrated that the primary 
product of animal husbandry is milk because it is a renewable product 
(Galaty and Johnson 1990), and not meat. For communities that do not 
necessarily have external capital to regenerate the herd and that practice a 
low-yield and low-intensity form of animal husbandry, a continued reliance 
on the renewable products of their animals is vital.
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In these pastures, small-scale agriculture is possible and growing ‘leaves’ 
has become important because of pastoralists’ increased consumption of 
vegetables. The growing period in this place is relatively brief with hail and 
frost still likely in June (typically the f ifth Tibetan month). Even though the 
‘leaves’ are generally frost hardy and adapted to cooler climates, Brassica rapa 
does require between 40 and 60 days from sowing to harvesting. For this 
reason, the best time to plant them in this place is in the sixth Tibetan month, 
which also coincides with the grazing rotation at the summer pastures. 
Depending on household demographics, the planting is done either by elder 
members of the household who increasingly do not move with the herd and 
other family members to the summer pasture or by male members of the 
household who travel back on horseback to the winter house to plant the 
‘leaves’. The fenced enclosure in front of the winter house, which is where the 
animals are herded into during the nights in the winter and spring seasons, 
is manure-rich despite daily clearing for dried yak dung (ciwa) during the 
winter and spring. As such, this fenced enclosure is rich with muck soil that 
is conducive for growing Brassica rapa. Environmental conditions support 
small-scale agriculture in this place, a fact also conf irmed by previous 
farming of highland barley by households of farmers.
Even though planting Brassica rapa for human consumption (and not 
as fodder for animals) is a practice of illegibility with regard to mumin 
and assumptions associated with this category of legibility, it is readily 
interpreted within pastoralism. Pastoralism is a way of life and sustenance, 
def ined generally as animal husbandry, or the breeding, care, and use of 
herd animals as a way to sustain life and as a mode of production. It is often 
viewed as ‘production for subsistence’ (Asad 1978, 58) because it does not give 
naturally high yields. Within these def initions, pastoralism emphasizes a 
set of unimproved productive activities to secure food in the form of milk, 
meat, and blood, and items for the maintenance of daily life. Despite a 
shared foundation in animal husbandry, pastoralism is generally thought 
to be different from ranching, although the factors for claiming difference 
vary by kind and degree. One suggested distinction is that ranching depends 
on a production system predicated on individual access to animals and 
individual appropriation of pastures (Ingold 1980). This def inition is often 
supported by the argument that ranching is based on a primary relationship 
to animals as capitalist commodity. By contrast, pastoralism highlights a 
production system where ‘pastoralists employ a system of social relations, 
which combines the principles of divided access to animals and common 
access to pasture’ (Chang and Koster 1994, 5). The methods for establishing 
common access vary: for example, Tibetan nomadic pastoralists in Serthar 
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had a grazing allocation that was redistributed every three years to ensure 
fair access to good or bad pastures (Gelek 2002). Additionally, pastoralism 
is thought to encompass a set of relationships to animals that is more than 
a relationship premised on the fundamental value of a commodity (Ingold 
1980). In the case of Minyak drokpa, animals are incorporated into the 
meaningful dimensions of culture as symbol, offering, and exchange such 
as Buddhist liberated life (tshe thar), where animals are ‘released’ from 
herding or capture for reasons associated with generating merit or offerings 
to worldly deities (Tan 2016).
In practice, animal husbandry readily combines with a variety of other 
activities such as agriculture. Thus, it is usually more fruitful to think 
about degrees of specialization of pastoralism and agriculture, rather than 
ideal-types based on the binary between mumin and nongmin. In this 
way, pastoralism is fully specialized when pursued as exclusive reliance 
on animal husbandry12 and generalized when the strategy is combined 
with raising at least some crops or pursing some other form of sustenance 
(Bates and Lees 1977).13 Specialization also depends on the analytic interac-
tion of people-animals-land. The ratio of animals to land area, also called 
density (Galaty and Johnson 1990, 12-14), is often represented by a low ratio 
in pastoralist communities. Moreover, a lower density corresponds with a 
greater degree of pastoral specialization. The ratio of people to animals is 
termed intensity, where high-intensity ratios are marked by low population 
density in proportion with large animal holdings. In this conf iguration, 
pastoral systems are relatively low-density and low-intensity systems in 
comparison with ranching, dairying, and mixed farming. In the case of 
pastoralism in Kham, increasing density expressed through a high ratio 
of animals to land area is impacted by a high rate of ‘non-productive’, that 
is male, animals in a herd. This means that, despite a comparatively low 
density, Tibetan pastoralists often have to resort to additional forms of 
livelihood activity; that is, they have a lesser degree of specialization for 
the low density displayed.
Contemporary pastoralism in Kham – even in those northern and 
western regions such as Sershül where unimproved agriculture is not 
possible – is generalized in that other activities are conducted alongside 
12 Using f ieldwork data among Baluchi pastoralists in Iran, Salzman (1972) argues against 
attributing pastoral identity to a model of ‘pure’ pastoralism or even to pastoralism as a fully 
specialized activity.
13 Transhumance would constitute a specif ic form of generalized pastoralism, with limited 
migration between two places, as analysed by Jones (2005).
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animal husbandry. Migrant jobbing in the form of road construction labour, 
driving tractors, and hire of motorcycle transport is a popular activity that 
generates supplemental household income. The gathering of grassland 
products such as a medicinal bulb (Ch. bei mu, Fritillaria sp.) and an edible 
tuber (Tib. gro ma, Potentilla anserina L.) continues to be done for personal 
consumption or small-scale trade with local doctors and other contacts. The 
gathering of yartsa gunbu, or caterpillar fungus, has increased exponentially 
in some pastoral areas, particularly in Sershül County, Kandzé Prefecture 
and in Yushul Prefecture, Qinghai Province, over the past twenty years. This 
phenomenal addition to pastoral income for some households is directly 
related with the similarly phenomenal growth in the Chinese market in the 
past two decades. When nomadic pastoralism is studied and evidenced in 
all its complexity, Philip Salzman (1972) suggests that it should be viewed as 
a mode of production that depends on multiple strategies of livelihood and 
multiple uses of resources, highlighting how pastoralism – in practice – relies 
on multi-resource nomadism.
In Kham, these corollary activities are not recent phenomena; patterns 
of multi-resource nomadic pastoralism can be traced historically. In the 
kingdom of Dergé, pastoralists of the estate of Zilphukhog had a reciprocal 
and complementary relationship with their hereditary masters (Thargyal 
2007) that allowed pastoral dependents freedom to move to other areas of 
the kingdom – when not assisting with the estate’s labour needs – for barter 
and trade of grassland products in exchange for tea, gunpowder, and musk. 
Lattimore reminds us that even the f iercely independent Golok pastoralists 
conducted trade with Muslims in Gansu (Lattimore 1962 [1951], 212). It 
was during the early-to-mid twentieth century that a trade embargo was 
placed on pastoral products from the Golok and Washul Serthar pastoralists, 
which restricted their ability to acquire tea, grain, and salt and thus led to 
predatory raids by these pastoralists. The trade embargo was placed on the 
pastoralists by Ma Bufang, the Muslim warlord of Qinghai. By imposing 
this embargo on pastoral products, Ma Bufang forced these pastoralists 
to raid others and attack caravans of wealthy merchants using both the 
Yushu-Songpan and Dartsedo trade routes (Gelek 2002, 45-48). Yet the Golok 
pastoralists were also more than predators since they strategically supplied 
animals for caravans in central Asia and were, in this regard, entrepreneurs 
(Lattimore 1962 [1951]). For the group of pastoralists in Minyak Kham, the 
relative proximity of their grasslands to Dartsedo – itself a trade bastion 
for the Chakla kingdom and the Qing empire – as well as the location of the 
grasslands along the northern Sichuan-Tibet road meant that they were in 
relatively early contact with Tibetan traders. One account in local folklore 
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is that the legendary Tibetan merchant, Tsongpo Norbu Zangpo, himself 
stayed in the grasslands of the winter pastures for some time and that one 
of his precious gzi stones14 was lost – and still remains – somewhere in the 
pastures.
Within the framework of multi-resource nomadism and generalized 
pastoralism, the practice of animal husbandry as a primary mode of pastoral 
livelihood incorporates other activities from migrant jobbing to gathering 
of grassland products and from trade to entrepreneurship. The planting 
of Brassica rapa in order to satisfy increased personal consumption of 
vegetables as a result of an edict by the local incarnate lama is readily 
interpreted within this frame. What this further implies is that the mode 
of livelihood – pastoralism as fully specialized, and therefore the only 
livelihood activity, or as generalized, and therefore one of different types 
of livelihood activity – is not always nor necessarily determined by en-
vironmental conditions. The choice to identify as drokpa is inf luenced 
by a complex of factors: historical movements and narratives, networks 
of relationships that involve animals and territorial masters (Tan 2018), 
strategies of mobility that allow for unexpected opportunities such as 
caterpillar fungus gathering, and a sense of identity that is distinct from 
others such as farmers and semi-pastoralists.
From the Margins
In their work theorizing the margins of the state, anthropologists Veena Das 
and Deborah Poole (2004, 8) suggest that margins are sites where nature is 
imagined as wild and uncontrolled at the same time as where the state is 
constantly refounding its modes of order and law-making. This resonates 
strongly with the Chinese concept of huang, as both geographic wasteland 
and social category of moral def iciency while simultaneously a place for 
state order and improvement. Yet they also argue against the idea that the 
state is ‘about’ its legibility, thus constituting an actor with full intentionality 
and insight. Rather, ethnographies of the state point to ‘the many different 
spaces, forms, and practices through which the state is continually both 
experienced and undone through the illegibility of its own practices, docu-
ments, and words’ (Das and Poole 2004, 10). In this f inal section, I consider 
how the practices of Minyak drokpa constitute margins – similar to the 
14 Gzi stones are a kind of natural agate that is used as beads in necklaces and bracelets. It is 
thought to have auspicious benef its for the wearer.
298 gillian g. Tan 
‘remote areas’ discussed by Gros in his introductory chapter – understood 
as sites of adaptation to state modes of legibility and expressed in ways that 
are ‘invisible’ to the state.
Referring again to the Nomad Settlement project, the associated policy 
document contains detailed specif ications about housing construction. The 
houses themselves must be at least 60 square metres.15 Livestock sheds 
are specif ied according to animal species, with sheep sheds required to be 
0.5-0.7 square metres, yak calf sheds to be 1.4-1.8 square metres, and adult 
yak sheds to be 2.5-3.0 square metres. Further specif ications on the costs of 
houses and sheds are provided, and disbursed through county-level animal 
husbandry bureaux. These specif ications and disbursements are practically 
neglected in actual construction. In one county of Sichuan Province, the 
county government offered RMB30,000 worth of materials and labour to 
each household through external building contractors, and the households 
themselves were expected to pay any remaining costs for the house. For that 
community, the specif ications were followed by the external contractors 
although there was concern about the quality of materials used. However, 
other households in another community took the money directly form 
the county government and used it to construct the houses themselves 
using traditional methods and materials. Individual households altered 
the specif ications, and many found ways to save on construction costs. 
Animal sheds and greenhouses were yet to be constructed in either of 
these communities.
Of the houses themselves, intended to be the primary residence for 
pastoralists, there were also adaptations that rendered the houses illegible 
in the context of the policy. In one community, many houses remained 
vacant or were used as storage for the household’s supply of tsampa and other 
sundry items. If the household had enough family members, then an elderly 
member of the house might take up residence in the newly constructed 
house while other members of the household continued living in their 
previous residence and herding animals. Not all households of a given 
community would take up the offer of money; some stated that they could 
not afford to contribute to the new houses because their caterpillar fungus 
harvest was not good enough, and they did not want to take up a state 
loan. More resourceful households were considering ways to include the 
new houses in a multi-resource strategy: one village leader thought it was 
possible to take advantage of the new houses’ location beside a new road 
and wondered if the houses could be used as accommodation for tourists. 
15 In Inner Mongolia, houses should be no less than 50 square metres.
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Both modif ications to the specif ications of houses as well as adaptations to 
their use are read, in this instance, as practices that remake state legibility 
in ways that render the margins as integral to processes of governmentality. 
Forms of illegibility and partial belonging that are found in the margins of 
the state may constitute its necessary condition as a theoretical and political 
‘object’ (Das and Poole 2004, 6).
To return, also, to the categories of mumin and nongmin, these have been 
employed by the state to simplify and abstract complex local realities. On 
the one hand, the Chinese state creates an internal opposition between a 
superior Han and agrarian-based majority with ‘backward’ minority pastoral 
populations. Yet a closer examination of state processes of legibility also 
reveals that Chinese state governmentality is not a static act but rather one 
that is able to incorporate local experiments to modify the way it implements 
its high modernist ideology. The environmental capacity for small-scale 
agriculture in eastern Tibet along with the coexistence of multiple sources 
of livelihood for pastoralists have long been known to the Chinese state. The 
contributions from Scott Relyea and Mark Frank (this volume) demonstrate 
how the state was testing agricultural improvements in the Republican 
period. One could read these ventures, where the borderlands were used 
as experimental sites, as a way of testing the limits, or margins, of the 
state and of state governmentality. A tension is displayed between two 
coexisting assumptions of how the Chinese state regards the minority 
pastoralists within its territoriality: 1) as a category of mumin articulated 
in opposition with nongmin and dependent on an ideal-type and 2) as a 
specif ic understanding of actual pastoral practices – including pastoralism 
as a degree of specialization and small-scale agriculture – that ref ines and 
modif ies policy plans and implementation.
For the most part, pastoralism in eastern Tibet has been approached 
from a perspective that prioritizes environmental conditions to explain 
a mode of livelihood and a way of life. Notwithstanding that there are 
undoubted ecological benefits to, and constraints on, the practice of mobile 
animal husbandry, environmental determinants do not always account for 
decisions to be drokpa. This chapter has demonstrated that pastoralism 
in Minyak Kham is based on a complex of reasons including cultural and 
historical factors and that pastoralism, as animal husbandry and way of 
life, is therefore not only environmentally determined. Understanding that 
pastoralists identify as drokpa both for a variety of cultural and histori-
cal reasons and through a range of actual practices opens up to a wider 
exploration of the concept of pastoralism itself. The everyday practices 
of those who identify as drokpa are more varied than is assumed under 
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an ideal-type model of pastoralism, particularly when def ined in opposi-
tion to agriculture. Under this def inition, activities such as planting are 
antithetical to pastoralism. Yet as the ethnographic example has shown, 
the activity is carried out by pastoralists and without any contradiction 
to how they continue to regard themselves as drokpa. Moreover, multiple 
strategies of livelihood and multiple uses of resources have been practically 
employed by pastoralists around the world, leading to a perspective that 
pastoralism is better understood as a degree of specialization, which 
ranges from fully specialized at one end to generalized at the other end. 
The data and analyses presented in this chapter suggest that processes of 
state governmentality and legibility themselves shift and adapt in order 
to remain viable. The shifts and adaptations – to some extent – respond 
to what unfolds in ‘the margins of the state’ (Das and Poole 2003), which 
are themselves never static or even, from the perspective adopted in 
this chapter, marginalized. The discursive processes occurring between 
the state and its margins continue to inf luence how pastoralism – as 
activity and way of life – offers important insights into Chinese state 
governmentality.
Glossary of Chinese and Tibetan terms





Dartsedo Dar rtse mdo
depa sde pa
di xiao 抵銷
Dokham Nechen Nyernga Mdo khams gnas chen nyer lnga
drokpa ‘brog pa
droma gro ma, gyo ma
fang zai jian zai nengli ruo 防災減災能力弱











Minyak Rab Mi nyag rab sgang
mumin chi kuixin liang 牧民吃虧心糧
néri gnas ri
Nyingma Rnying ma
pin zhong tui hua 品種退化
ponpo dpon po
rongmadrok Rong ma ‘brog
rongpa Rong pa
Sakya Sa skya
shi fan hu 示範戶
si da tusi 四大土司
si peitao 四配套
Tagong 塔公
tshe thar tshe thar
Tsongpo Norbu Zangpo Tshong dpon Nor bu Bzang po
weisheng tiaojian ji cha 衛生條件極差
yartsa gunbu dbyar rtswa dgun ‘bu
Zhamo Bzhag mo
Zhara Latse Bzhag bra lha rtse
zhidak zhing bdag, gzhi bdag
zhuan ren, zhuan fangshi 專人專方式
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The varied political entities in Kham exhibited forms of authority and 
legitimization that can in themselves be regarded as exemplifying different 
conceptions and formulations of sovereignty. Yet it is doubtful that an 
autonomous history of places could be written independently of the distant 
centres of power. The question then becomes: how are Tibetan and Chinese 
governments’ respective visions of sovereignty translated in practical terms 
and in the lives of the people inhabiting these borderlands that progres-
sively lost their own centrality and integrity? There is no straightforward 
answer to this question, but it can inform a more nuanced approach to 
the entanglement of local, national, and global political economies at the 
frontier. The chapters in this section emphasize forms of agency and local 
responses to past and present changes. A micro-sociological approach and 
attention to life trajectories of some key individuals help us to understand 
the lived worlds and the subjectivities of the actors engaged in – or caught 
in – the upheavals of the time, their fears, hopes, and projects alike.
The chapters consider a spectrum of strategic positionings that include 
forms of ‘declarations of dependence’ on the one hand and more active refusal 
on the other, rather than positing a reductionist or a priori framework of 
domination and resistance. In their respective take on the transformations 
that unfolded at the frontier or which are still ongoing, the chapters present 
us with various components of the dynamics of change. First, they make 
clear that the centres themselves are not static entities, nor are the means of 
control they deploy. Second, they show how the ‘state effect’ has influenced 
horizontal relations at local level, not just at the level of vertical power 
relations between centre and periphery. Finally, these chapters also show 
how practices at the periphery contribute to shaping to some extent the 
political institutions of the colonizing centre, and the state itself. Indeed, 
paying proper attention to Kham as a ‘f ield of relations’ that emerges in-
between power centres implies a particular view of state space. At the same 
time, it forces us to recognize the extent to which – in a similar fashion to 
what Guyot-Réchard (2017, 23-24) describes for the disputed frontier zone of 
North-East India – those living in the ‘shadow’ of the state actually found 
‘acceptable’ or ‘even welcomed’ ‘a certain kind of state presence’. In various 
ways the chapters in this section engage with the question of how people 
at the frontier deal with their state.
308 FronTier TibeT
Imperial ventures are projected but never fully realized; they are contin-
gent, ambiguous processes that meet with counter-strategies. This also holds 
true for China’s nation-building project which, while it creates a hegemonic 
landscape, is appropriated in different ways across the territory. In the early 
twentieth century, the emergence of regionalism and ethno-provincial 
politics further complicated forms of attachment and belonging and the 
very nature of nationalism. Local leaders found themselves entangled in 
border politics, adapting their political behaviour to this period of turmoil. 
In the chapters to follow, we also see the gradual influence of new ideologies 
from outside and how the terms of the relationship are being redef ined. 
The advent of the nation-state introduced some irrevocable changes that 
affected territories and ethnic groupings regarding the way they are now 
conceived and experienced. These have led to competing narratives of 
belonging and to the historicizing of statecraft that support claims of identity 
and sovereignty.
We start with an essay by Lucia Galli who examines the rising influence 
of eastern Tibetan merchants on political matters and their socio-economic 
role in the 1940s and 1950s. Her chapter complements the discussion on trade 
institutions and the development of trade networks offered by Giersch in the 
previous section, as she returns to the crucial role played by Khampa traders 
and the increasing political and economic power acquired by members of 
the most influential eastern Tibetan trading f irms. In referring to the travel 
journal of a Khampa trader spanning a period of thirteen years (1944-1956), 
her chapter adds an insider’s perspective. Furthermore, in her analysis we 
see the emergence of what she calls ‘proto-identitarian’ awareness among 
Khampa traders, as Tibetan merchants became increasingly present on a 
burgeoning political scene enlivened by a new educated elite.
The mobility of traders and the importance that commerce played in 
the wealth of power holders parallel the ‘bargaining’ that took place at 
political level. For example, in the border town of Dartsedo, the hub of 
commercial activity, such bargaining and shifting political alignments were 
common practice for the Chakla king. Following military intervention by 
the Sichuan Governor in Kham in the summer of 1912, the king’s concerns 
were summarized by Louis King, the British Consul, as follows: ‘He was not 
in sympathy with democratic ideas, and deplored the change from Empire 
to Republic […] He hoped that one day his kingdom would be restored to 
him – that was the leit-motif of his life’ (Kobayashi 2014, 101). Just as the kings 
had acquiesced in the past to the Qing tusi institution because it served 
their interests, integration into the new republic was not motivated by the 
political ideal of ‘the Republic of Five Races’ (wuzu gonghe) but represented 
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a possible opportunity of reclaiming a status lost as a consequence of Zhao 
Erfeng’s termination of the tusi off ice.
Local polities that had long established ties with Chinese central powers 
adapted to the political changes that had taken place after the collapse of 
the Qing dynasty. Fabienne Jagou explores one such case in her chapter: that 
of the little-known kingdom of Trokyap, located on the fringes of Sichuan 
province. As the small kingdom became a bone of contention between the 
Sichuan and Xikang authorities in the 1930s, we see how rivalries unfolded 
between regional and national power holders. The ambivalent position of 
the Trokyap king – whose voice can be heard by reading between the lines 
of the archive documents – shows how uncertain the state-building process 
was. Interestingly, the Trokyap king did not seek independence but seemed 
more interested in securing the stability of his position by maintaining a 
mutually beneficial form of allegiance.
This stance contrasts with that of an increasing number of Khampa 
Tibetans in the 1930s, who tried to shape the republican rhetoric to suit 
their own interests. ‘Applying the logic of “national autonomy” to their 
own situation’, as Yeh (2007, 83) put it, they launched the ‘Khampa rule of 
Kham’ movement and demanded autonomy from both China and Central 
Tibet (see Peng 2002). As Yudru Tsomu shows in her chapter, this period 
saw the emergence of a new elite of ‘political strongmen’ that did not rely 
on traditional hereditary and ascribed status. She focuses on the situation 
in Dergé, historically one of the most powerful polities in Kham, and on the 
rise to power of a local headman, Jagö Topden, who successfully challenged 
the established authority. A strongman like Jagö Topden formed alliances 
with various forces that contended for control of Kham and ultimately 
emerged as the dominant f igure to compete with the Dergé king. While 
Jagö’s ascendency reminds us of the charismatic f igure of Gönpo Namgyel 
who defeated several polities in Kham, including Dergé, their demeanours 
contrast signif icantly, as well as the conditions of their rise to power. Jagö 
did not prove to be a f ierce warrior but a f ine and somewhat opportunistic 
politician.
It becomes clear from these chapters that the ‘empire to nation’ transi-
tion is rather confused in the case of China, and in the frontier zone in 
particular one f inds some obvious continuities: republicans, no differently 
than communists, did not operate in a vacuum. Continuity, however, not 
in a rigid power structure but in the dynamic ways political cultures and 
institutions were generated, adapted, or transformed.
If we look back at China’s centuries-long politics of expansion, the initial 
Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) project must have seemed to be full of 
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promises for those who envisioned self-determination. Article 14 of the 1931 
C.C.P. constitution recognized the right to self-determination, including the 
complete separation and the formation of an independent state, for each 
minority ‘minzu’ (nationality). Indeed, Bapa Püntsok Wangyel, who was from 
Bathang and started his education in a Chinese school there, founded a secret 
Tibetan Communist Party in the 1930s, with the idea of an independent Tibet 
after a communist revolution (Goldstein, Sherap, and Siebenschuh 2004, 47). 
However, adoption of this new ideology was not often straightforward, if not 
simply rejected. In her chapter, Dáša P. Mortensen discusses the need to adapt 
to the changing political landscape and shows that even a f ierce defender of 
local autonomy in Gyelthang, such as Wangchuk Tempa, nevertheless had 
to join forces with representatives of the Chinese communist state in the 
1950s in response to mounting social and political pressure. She illustrates 
how Party off icials resorted to ‘political persuasion’ to prompt recalcitrant 
Khampa leaders to cooperate and to strengthen nascent Party control in 
Gyelthang. The particular political climate of the time makes the strategic 
positioning of a Wangchuk Tempa a revelatory example of the negotiated 
trajectories of the new educated elite Tsomu refers to in her own chapter. 
As D. Mortensen makes clear, a simplistic reading in terms of resistance, 
collaboration, or collusion distorts the intricate factors that led to certain 
kinds of compromises, and it also flattens the power of political education 
and propaganda. ‘Political persuasion’, as D. Mortensen calls it, and other 
types of ‘thought work’ have since gone a long way in many different spheres 
of public and political life in the P.R.C.
In the contemporary period, a revival of traditional historiography has 
contributed to revisiting the political entanglements of the past, and more 
fundamentally, to reconstructing local identities as Maria Turek shows with 
regard to Nangchen, one of Kham’s main historical kingdoms. She focuses 
on contemporary chronicles that are deeply rooted in Tibetan Buddhist 
orthodoxy and historical imagination. In these new historiographies, the 
kingship narrative recasts the kingdom of Nangchen as an autonomous 
power centre. As Turek rightly points out, there is a certain political sen-
sitivity in these attempts at regaining control of their own history and at 
recalling the past glory of kingship. Alternative futures are being formulated 
by looking into the past. This re-imagined centrality in the historiography 
of Kham’s polities is not limited to Nangchen but is part of a broader trend. 
Revivalist practices have gained prominence in the last three decades, 
and narratives about secular and religious power play a vital role in the 
promotion of local identity. The revival is predominantly active outside 
Lhasa and other areas within the Tibet Autonomous Region that are more 
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tightly controlled. Kham is well known for the diversity and vitality of its 
religious traditions, which have taken on new forms in the contemporary 
period. A particularly astonishing phenomenon is the emergence of religious 
f igures of treasure-revealers (tertön), as already described in Buffetrille’s 
chapter in the f irst section, whose teachings have attracted thousands of 
followers and whose institutes have grown exponentially to form extremely 
large monastic camps: with more than 10,000 practitioners, they outdo the 
largest monasteries in Central Tibet prior the 1950s.
Yasmin Cho examines in her chapter one of these most striking and 
distinctive forms of Buddhist community: the mega-sized encampment 
of Yachen, located in an isolated valley in Baiyu (Pelyul) County, Ganzi 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Many monks and nuns have come to settle 
in Yachen, originally founded in the mid-1980s, when the even larger-size 
encampment of Larung Gar in Serthar had been partly demolished in 2001. 
Both encampments have since been the object of new demolitions and 
evictions, and of various restrictions and forms of control. Cho addresses the 
transformations that are taking place in Yachen through the lived experience 
and ‘material engagement’ of its nuns. Indeed, Yachen is made up essentially 
of small individual-size huts most of which were built by nuns of different 
origins. Instead of focusing on the religious f igures who triggered this ongo-
ing religious revival, Cho pays ethnographic attention to the daily practices 
of the nuns who create, shape, and inhabit the space of the encampment. 
This perspective adds a rich sensitive texture to the experience of a form 
of autonomy beyond spirituality, making gender a key component of her 
exploration of the precarious efforts by some Tibetans to (re)claim spaces 
that belong to them. It is, of course, telling that the charismatic religious 
f igures who run Larung Gar or Yachen Gar are famous treasure-revealers, a 
form of visionary prophetic leadership that emerges in opposition to existing 
forms of authority. To be more precise, Cho’s analysis of the encampment in 
its evolving material form and in its inherent incompleteness and inclusive-
ness, sheds light on the spatial nature of state control and on the constraints 
it imposes on the astonishing density of this ‘island’ zone, as she calls it. As 
such, this ‘island’ brings to mind the image of the beyul, valleys hidden by 
Padmasambhava where Tibetans can seek refuge when dangers threaten 
the country. However, these encampments are not strictly speaking Tibetan 
enclaves, as many Han Chinese are attracted to this spirituality – instead 
they could be called ‘Buddhist Temporary Autonomous Zones’.
The burgeoning popularity of Tibetan religion among the Han is a growing 
state concern. It is seen as a potential threat to the internal foundations 
of social order – a threat that reveals the vulnerability of social order and 
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generates a form of uncertainty about where in fact the boundaries are. 
In the words of anthropologists Valentina Napolitano, Nimrod Luz, and 
Nurit Stadler (2015, 96), ‘borderlands avail partitions and segregation but 
may also generate processes of subversion (sometimes seductive) of state 
sovereignty’. Finally, with Cho’s chapter we return to some of the opening 
questions of this volume regarding space and power, and forms of inclusion 
and exclusion. The encampment captures our imagination as we seek to 
rethink the borderlands, and it perhaps offers a concrete image of the claim 
made by Gros in the introductory chapter that some processes exceed 
conventional geometric f igures.
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This chapter analyses the socio-economic role played by Khampa traders in 
twentieth-century Tibet, focusing in particular on the increasing political 
and economic power gained in the 1940s and 1950s by members of the most 
influential eastern Tibetan trading f irms. The discussion is enriched by 
information drawn from the travel journal of Khatag Dzamyag, an other-
wise unknown Khampa trader. The author’s recollection, spanning over a 
period of thirteen years (1944-1956), mainly spent journeying, trading, and 
pilgrimaging, provides the scholar with an insider’s perspective on events 
until now known only through the conventional historiographical writing.
Keywords: Khampa traders, twentieth-century Tibet, Khampa identity, 
travel journal.
Introduction
Recent developments in the f ield of Tibetan studies have forced an in-
creasing number of scholars – inside and outside the narrow conf ines 
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Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
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of the discussion on the Sino-Tibetan relationships – to move away from 
an assumptive framework based on a priori stipulation of identities and 
boundaries towards a recognition of the main role played by mobility and 
flux – rather than f ixity and stasis – in shaping those territories labelled 
as ‘borderlands’.1 In this chapter, I approach frontier territories such as the 
eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham in light of an understanding 
of ‘borderlands’ as ‘a dynamic, permeable, and shifting space’, following 
the definition proposed by Gros in his Introduction to the present volume.
The indisputable globalizing character of the world-empire system of 
the Qing (Brook 2009) determined the rules of cultural, economic, political, 
social, and military integration and exchange on the borderlands – and the 
same could be said, to a lesser extent, of the Ganden Phodrang. Nevertheless, 
the easternmost fringes of the Tibetan plateau were anything but ‘peripheral’. 
From the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, Kham in particular 
was, to use Gros’ (this volume) words, ‘a fragmentary politico-religious 
landscape and complex cultural matrix’, both ‘multivocal’ and ‘multilocal’. In 
the construction of a sense of Tibetanness, political identity failed to match 
the importance of its cultural and religious counterparts. While becoming 
de facto subjects of the Manchu Empire by the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Tibetans living in the multiethnic regions of Amdo and Kham consistently 
perceived themselves as connected to the central areas of Ü-Tsang by religious 
and cultural bonds rather than political aff iliations.2 Khampa identity, with 
its rich ecological, social, and religious diversity, constitutes a world of its 
own, diverse from Central Tibet and certainly distinct from China proper.
Whereas the heuristic and analytic convenience of labelling the regions 
along the Sino-Tibetan frontier as ‘borderlands’ is irrefutable, the question 
about the suitability of applying such a term to the whole extension of 
Kham remains. In his Introduction, Stéphane Gros convincingly broaches 
the context of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands ‘not as a regionally confined 
space but as process-oriented spatial formation’. By framing the region as 
‘a fragmentalized space of interconnected and interdependent locales and 
people’, Gros makes of Kham ‘a good-to-think-with category’; by operating a 
topological reversal, he invites us to move away from prior preconceptions 
based on a Lhasa-centric and/or Sino-centric historical perceptions. To 
1 On new takes on the historical, cultural, and socio-economic developments of the Sino-
Tibetan borderlands, see for instance Hayes (2014), Elliot (2014), Gros (2016), Giersch (2010b; 
2016).
2 The same concept applies to the westernmost Himalayan regions of Ladakh and the south-
ernmost areas of Bhutan and Sikkim, which fell into the British India orbit in the nineteenth 
century (Carrasco 1959, 12-13).
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see the Sino-Tibetan borderlands in terms of ‘frontier dynamics’ accom-
modates the inherent paradox of Kham, both ‘named regional category’ and 
‘heterogenous frontier zone and nexus of power’, a grey area where different 
forms of authority overlapped. Other frontier areas, such as that studied by 
C. Patterson Giersch in Southern Yunnan province, exhibit a similar pattern:
[F]rontiers […] were ‘borderlands’, or regions without clearly def ined 
political boundaries where multiple expansive powers competed for 
resources and indigenous allies. They were also ‘middle grounds’, places 
of f luid cultural and economic exchange where acculturation and the 
creation of hybrid political institutions were contingent on local condi-
tions. (Giersch 2006, 3-4)
The political fragmentation of Kham, internally divided into a variety of poli-
ties and communities, appears to support the perception of Tibet as intrinsi-
cally ‘stateless’ (Samuel 1982). However, the situation on the ground suggests 
that the main local polities ultimately conceived themselves as ‘centres’, 
despite external attempts at peripherization (see Turek, this volume). The 
seemingly chaotic patchwork of chieftainships, micro-states, and monastic 
estates presented within itself forms of secular administration of a certain 
bureaucratic sophistication. That was indeed the case of nineteenth-century 
Dergé3 and early twentieth-century Nangchen, ‘a self-referential sphere 
with a long legacy of religious and political power and autonomy’ (Turek, 
forthcoming).4 The establishment in 1939 of the Xikang province further 
supports the importance that ‘peripheral’ and ‘ethnic’ elements played, not 
only in China’s metamorphosis from empire to nation-state, but also in the 
emergence of a Khampa identity politics (Lawson 2011; Peng 2002).
Whilst the influence exerted by trade and commerce on the process 
of empire and state-building has been acknowledged by many scholars 
(e.g. Millward 1998; Perdue 2005; Kim 2008; Giersch, this volume), the way 
the intertwining of commercialization and political control affected the 
Sino-Tibetan borderlands is still very much uncertain. External inputs, 
such as the implementation of state-controlled interventions and the 
impact on China of European imperialist threats, have been for a long 
3 On the history and bureaucratic structure of the kingdom of Dergé, see Hartley (1997).
4 I would like to thank M. Maria Turek for making available to me a copy of her article ‘Monastic 
Obligations, Hat Change and Lhasa Encroachment: Notes on the Economic System in the Historical 
Kingdom of Nang chen’, presented at the Fontainebleau conference (December 2013) ‘When the 
Taxman Cometh: Tax, Corvée and Community Obligations in Tibetan Societies’, and soon to be 
published as part of the proceedings of the SHTS (Social History of Tibetan Societies).
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time presented as the only causes of change in the Sino-Tibetan frontier, 
yet recent studies prompt the scholars’ attention toward a new narrative of 
change, acknowledging the role of both insiders and outsiders as promoters 
of socio-economic innovations (Giersch 2010; Tsomu 2016a, 2016b; Bray, this 
volume). Fresh approaches to political and economic geographies have been 
recently proposed by different scholars. Whilst talking about the Songpan 
region of northern Sichuan, for instance, Jack Hayes (2014, xviii) offers a 
new perspective on the interpretation of trade networks, inter-cultural 
relations, regional economic cycles, and political and religious developments 
in Kham, by acknowledging their development as the outcome of indigenous 
efforts rather than the byproduct of external forces. Such a perspective is in 
continuation with that of Giersch (2010b) who focuses his attention on the 
foundations of trading networks and their impacts on the socio-political 
developments of local societies in Kham, seeing trade – and trade flows – as 
a heuristic device designed to challenge the confines of traditional spatial 
categories, moving away from preconceived geographical scales, such as 
civilizations, empires or nations, and regions.
The transformative power of trade, especially in the Sino-Tibetan 
borderlands, is better understood through the analysis of the impacts 
that trading networks have on the local societies. For instance, the local 
gentry of Dartsedo acted as brokers for Central Tibetan monasteries and 
merchants, using their indigenous status to safely navigate the cross-cultural 
environment of the borderlands (Booz 2011; Tsomu 2016a, 2016b). Whereas 
the tea trade was tightly controlled by Chinese companies in partnership 
with monasteries located in Yunnan, Sichuan, and Qinghai, the locals used 
their connections to the territory to act as go-betweens and interpreters 
between Central Tibetans and Han and Hui merchants.5 Trade networks 
in fact penetrated territories subject to the indirect rule of the Qing empire 
and the Lhasa-based government, crossing boundaries and incrementing 
the bargaining power of political representatives and local elites vis-à-vis 
the ‘centre’, whether the Manchu court or the Ganden Phodrang.
A Pilgrim’s Diary
The different frontier policies put in act both by the late Qing and the Na-
tionalist and Republican government in the Kham area – subject of many 
5 On the vital role of the trading houses (Ch. guō zhuāng) in Dartsedo prior to 1950s, see Booz 
(2011, 265-318) and Tsomu (2016a).
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recent studies (Wang 2011; Tsomu 2013, 2015; Elliot 2014; Relyea 2015a, 2015b, 
2016a, 2016b; Giersch 2014, this volume) – provide the political background 
to the present chapter. The rising influence of eastern Tibetan merchants on 
political matters, as well as the emergence of what could be called a ‘proto-
identitarian’ awareness among Khampa traders and their socio-economic 
role in the decades preceding 1959 are here examined through the lenses 
of the autobiographical travel journal of Khatag Dzamyag, an otherwise 
unknown chief-merchant (tsongpön).6 The text, originally written in a 
scroll-paper format and covering a span of thirteen years (1944-1956), mainly 
spent by the author journeying, trading, and pilgrimaging, was later edited 
by The Tibet House in Delhi and published by Indraprastha Press in 1997 
with a bilingual title – for the sake of convenience, I will henceforth refer to 
the text by its English heading, i.e. A Pilgrim’s Diary: Tibet, Nepal and India 
1944-1956. The word ‘diary’ loosely translates the Tibetan nyindep, a term 
indicating a category of texts, literary ‘day-books’ or ‘journals’, belonging to 
the wide genre of Tibetan life writing.7 Whereas the content and structure of 
Dzamyag’s nyindep – with its lists of private exchanges, monetary transac-
tions, days spent travelling, teachings and empowerments received – support 
its inclusion in the genre of journal writing, more cautious should be the 
identif ication of it as a ‘diary’.8 The topic concerning the categorization of 
Dzamyag’s work within the Tibetan literary corpus is beyond the scope of 
the present chapter, suff ice to say that the nyindep mirrors the author’s 
self-perception as trader and self-proclaimed pilgrim (né korwa).
Dzamyag’s travel account covers what is probably one of the most signif i-
cant decades in the history of Indo-Sino-Tibetan relationships, and it does 
so from the perspective of a Tibetan trader mostly interested in depicting 
himself as a simple pilgrim, in spite of the substantial economic means at 
his disposal. The problematic and oft-times outright ambiguous attitude 
shown by the author in regards to the exact amount of his wealth is at 
6 Known in Tibetan as tsongpön, these merchants handled trade and business affairs for 
hundreds of monasteries (Tsomu 2016b, 20). Khatag Dzamyag earned this title by acting as trade 
agent for one of the labrang of Ngor E wam chöden, a Sakya establishment in the central region 
of Tsang.
7 Forms of Tibetan life writing include, but are not restricted to, biography and autobiography 
(namthar), accounts of previous lives (kyérap, trungrap), personal histories ( jungwa, jöpa), 
receipt records (topyik, senyik), journals and daybooks (nyindep, nyinto) (Quintman 2015, 24).
8 Although the text has a diary format, the retrospective character of the recollecting process, 
as well as the absence of any ‘confessional’ features, suggest its categorization as a form of 
autobiography rather than a personal journal. Given such a diff iculty in reaching a clear taxonomy 
for the text, I will henceforth refer to the work either as ‘journal’ or nyindep. On Dzamyag’s 
nyindep and its position within Tibetan diary-keeping practices, see Galli (2019).
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the core of several inconsistencies related to the trader’s f inancial means, 
especially at the time of his departure from his ancestral land of Rabshi, in 
Gakok (nowadays Yushu prefecture),9 an event that marks the beginning 
of the trader’s journey and subsequently of his nyindep. The events leading 
to what will turn out to be a life-long exile – Dzamyag was never to return to 
Rabshi – support the notions of ‘multivocality’ and ‘multilocality’ proposed 
by Gros (this volume). Although nominally subsumed within the Xikang 
province, the territory of Nangchen was still under the political and juridical 
control of indigenous rulers, as the case of our trader clearly demonstrates. In 
the f irst lines of his journal, written in 1944 and recounting events occurred 
in 1940, Dzamyag briefly summarises his involvement in a feud between 
representatives of the local ruling family and some of the major reincarna-
tions of a Geluk establishment with which he was connected. Accused of 
complicity in the murder of the family’s heir, Dzamyag was incarcerated, 
put to trial, and, with no proof of his personal involvement, condemned to 
six months of prison at the end of which he was ousted as a ‘new beggar’ 
(sartrang). The confiscation of his wealth and estate by the lord of Rabshi is 
indicative of the unchallenged authority wielded by local rulers, regardless 
of the Nationalist government’s ban to any form of indigenous chiefdoms.
The loss of f inancial means and source of income, reported by the trader 
as the initial driving force behind his travels, appear to have been partially 
overcome three years later, when Dzamyag commissioned, as a propitiatory 
ritual for his departure, a full reading of the Kangyur, a task for which he 
donated 258 silver sang (Kha stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 12). It appears plausible to 
ascribe the monetary influx – presented in the journal as a fait accompli – to 
a fortunate combination of f inancial shrewdness and social expertise. In 
particular, the presence of several hints in the beginning of the nyindep 
reveals the trader’s plan to capitalize on the custom of carrying out business 
transactions on a credit basis. His journey from eastern Tibet to Lhasa 
was punctuated by continuous business dealings, necessary to settle old 
debts and loans, and to pay visits to some of the representatives of the 
local nobility. The socio-economic network built by Dzamyag in the years 
preceding his journey was not restricted to governmental off icials and 
local nobility but included many representatives of the mercantile world 
too; traders, tsongpön, and even members of the Sandutsang household, 
one of the wealthiest Khampa trading families, could be counted among 
his contacts.
9 On Rabshi and more generally on Gakok, see Jackson (2003), Gruschke (2004), ’Jam dbyangs 
tshul khrims (1995), and Yul shul rdzong (n.d.).
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Although Dzamyag never elaborates on the relationship tying him to the 
Sandutsang, the connections he made with representatives and brokers of 
the family suggest a certain familiarity with their dealings. Whereas the 
largest eastern Tibetan trading f irms are relatively well-known, an in-depth 
socio-historical study of minor trader households who moved their business 
to Central Tibet in the early twentieth century is still sorely missing. The 
Pangdatsang,10 the Sandutsang, and the Andrutsang paved the way to a 
substantial number of smaller Khampa trading families, of whose internal 
organization we know little to nothing. Scanty, yet fascinating, information is 
contained in an essay-memoir by a Lhakpa Döndrup, a novelist and previous 
trader, who provides a description of the inner structure of the Lhasa-based 
Khampa community in which eastern Tibetan trading households played 
a representative role. The wealthiest among the merchants were appointed 
as ‘headsmen’ (gotso) of their own co-regionals, in consideration of both 
their professionalism and loyalty to a common ‘ancestral land’, or phayül. 
According to Lhakpa Döndrup, the Pangdatsang acted as referents for 
those hailing from the areas of Markham and Sandu, the Gyanagtsang 
for those from Karzé and Trehor, the Andrutsang and the Jamatsang for 
the Khampas from Lithang, the Tsatrültsang and the Chödruktsang for 
those from Gojo, whereas the traders Dampa Lodrö and Abak were the 
representatives of the people from Tsaprong (Lhag pa don grub 2009, 369). 
This Lhasa-based community presented a clan-like inner structure, with a 
leader, recognized as a primus inter pares, acting as spokesman and regulator 
for his own co-regionals – each phayül maintained and preserved within 
a larger container fashioned in the terms of a Khampa proto-identity still 
largely understood by its own members in via negationis. In the light of 
this, Dzamyag’s dealings with the Sandutsang followed an expected line of 
action: although by then settled in Trehor, the trading f irm originated from 
the area of Gakok, at the easternmost borders of the kingdom of Nangchen, 
and they must have therefore appeared as the most suitable referents to 
the Rabshi-born Dzamyag.
As an active member of the Khampa trading communities in Central 
Tibet, Khatag Dzamyag belonged to the social stratum that Alice Travers 
(2013, 144) calls ‘elite commoners’.11 By the early twentieth century, the 
scale of operation of the trade networks connecting Inner Asia to South 
10 For more information on the Pangdatsang, see McGranahan (2002, 2015).
11 On social conditions of pre-modern Tibet, with particular attention paid to the central 
areas of Ü-Tsang, see Carrasco (1959), Stein (1972), Goldstein (1968; 1971; 1973; 1986; 1989a, 1989b); 
Miller (1987; 1988), Coleman (1998), Barnett (2008), Petech (2013), and Bischoff (2013).
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and Southeast Asia had sensibly increased; due to the expansion of the 
European influence in India, China, and South Asia, borderland regions 
became more and more involved in global trade flows (Coales 1919; Teichman 
1922; van Spengen 2000; Harris 2013; Giersch 2006, 2010b). Khampa trading 
families responded to the new market demands by opening branches in 
some of the most important trade hubs in Tibet, northern India, Sikkim, 
and Nepal and by shifting their main off ices to Lhasa, where they started 
mingling with the upper strata of the Lhasan society. Interactions between 
the upper middle stratum and members of the lower ranking aristocracy 
were common and often off icialized by marriage or ennoblement. It was 
in this fuzziness of social boundaries that Dzamyag and other aff iliates of 
the most important Khampa trading families moved their steps, carefully 
threading socio-economic networks that allowed them to gain a substantial 
political weight in a remarkably short amount of time. By opening the path 
for other ambitious eastern Tibetan traders, the largest trader households 
contributed, albeit indirectly, to the rise of other eastern Tibetan trading 
families and their agents, becoming instrumental in the socio-economic 
consolidation of the ‘intermediate class’ by fostering the creation of an 
environment conducive to Dzamyag’s business.
In the f irst eight years following his forced departure from Rabshi (i.e. 
from 1944 to 1952), Dzamyag struggled to reassert himself f inancially. He 
traded mainly on a small to medium scale, often cashing in old debts and 
resorting to friends’ help. Although the nyindep generally lacks detailed 
information regarding the author’s business dealings, the obsessive care with 
which the author lists the amount of his offerings to the various monasteries 
and shrines visited along the way contributes to our understanding of his 
f inancial conditions. The flow of money – barely a trickle in the 1944-1952 
period – increments substantially as from 1953, in the aftermath of a trip 
to Kalimpong that marked a watershed moment in Dzamyag’s life.
Such a change in fortune began in the last months of 1952, when the 
trader, at the time guest of the Sandutsang at their mansion in Shigatse, was 
summoned by the treasurer of the Khangsar labrang of Ngor E wam chöden 
and requested to supervise the investment of some of the abbot’s funds in a 
business venture to Kalimpong. Whereas every Tibetan could be virtually 
considered a ‘born trader’ (Bell 1928, 125), only a few had the resources and 
abilities to achieve the status of monastic trade agent. Interestingly, the 
call from the Khangsar labrang reached Dzamyag after a f ive-month stay 
at the Sakya establishment, where he had attended a series of teachings 
and empowerments. At the time, he was accompanied by Rinchen Dorje, a 
business partner and dharma brother from Trehor. Dzamyag’s relationship 
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with Rinchen Dorje, himself a tsongpön and renowned Sandutsang agent, 
represents a constant feature in the trader’s life, and it is representative of 
that intangible yet unbreakable network connecting Khampas throughout 
the plateau and beyond. Rinchen Dorje is in fact f irst mentioned in a note 
dated to 1946 in occasion of a visit paid by Dzamyag to Tashilhunpo, and his 
name appears time and time again as one of the author’s business partners 
(Kha stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 46; 61-62) and companions during his pilgrimage 
to India (Kha stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 143). Most of the subsequent journal 
entries are a testimony to the existence of a ‘familiar’ territory carved by 
Khampas in a ‘foreign’ – be it Central Tibetan or Indian – environment; 
it is through these cultural and social ‘corridors’ that most of Dzamyag’s 
business transactions occurred.12
At the time of his sojourn at Ngor E wam chöden, our trader claimed to 
have outdone his dharma companions with the generosity of his offerings, 
a factor that possibly contributed to attracting the attention of the labrang’s 
treasurer: prodigality towards religious institutions was in fact traditionally 
associated with trustworthiness, a feature expected from a monastic trade 
agent. It may also be argued that Dzamyag’s connection with well-known 
agents of the Sandutsang may have increased his status in the eyes of his 
clients. Be as it may, the Khangsar labrang invested in the trading venture 
more than 15,000 yin gor (dbyin sgor).13 Only scanty information is provided 
in the nyindep regarding the hiring of a caravan leader and two assistants 
12 As the journal tells us, from Tashilhunpo, the trader moved to Shalu where he attended the 
celebrations for the saga dawa (the fourth month of the Tibetan calendar) of the Fire Dog Year 
(May 1946), together with another companion from Trehor, a monk named Pema Namgyal. Once 
back in Shigatse, Dzamyag acted as a trade agent for a certain Tashi Norbu, the treasurer and 
government appointed trader of the Dra’u household, the strongest lord of the Yushu area. At the 
time he dealt mainly in butter; he transported from Shigatse to Lhasa about 600 kg and bought 
on his way back more than 10,500 kg of butter packed into 96 leather bags, paying for each load 
(c. 13 kg) 33 silver coins (sang). In addition to those, he bought further 990 kg of butter, paying 
for them 780 silver coins; by selling these goods, he earned more than 26,297 silver sang (Kha 
stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 68). Again in 1946, he handled trade for a certain Tashi Tsering, an off icial 
appointed with the title of secretary and treasurer (drön nyer) (Kha stag ʼDzam yag 1997, 74). 
Tashi Norbu makes another appearance in a note dated to the second month of the Iron Tiger 
Year (March 1950), when Dzamyag made a donation to Ngor E wam chöden on his behalf (Kha 
stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 189)
13 The term yin gor is generally used in Tibetan language to indicate British currency, yet 
in this context its reading as ‘rupees’ appears more likely. Indian rupees are usually rendered 
in Tibetan as hin gor, but at the time of Dzamyag’s business venture (1952) the relatively new 
independence of India could have justif ied the use of yin either as a near-homophone for hin 
or as a slight anachronism for the [British]-Indian rupee. I am grateful to Charles Ramble for 
clarifying the diff icult interpretation of the term for me (private conversation, June 2017).
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for the loading of the pack animals; in spite of the lack of details recorded, 
it is clear that the author was acutely aware of representing the abbot’s 
interests. In his journal he reports to have kept track of all the exchanges 
on a separate ledger,14 presented to the Khangsar treasurer upon his return 
to the Sakya establishment in Tsang, and to have personally ensured that 
the goods were safely allocated (Kha stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 224).
From 1953 onwards, Dzamyag’s business increased sensibly,15 with a 
ripple-down effect that also affected his religious behaviour. The substantial 
offerings made by the trader in the decade following 1952 demonstrate the 
f inancial importance that wealthy sponsors, such as the tsongpön and the 
largest trading families, had for masters and monastic communities, as well 
as their increasing weight in internal political matters. In the late 1940s, 
whilst the government of the Ganden Phodrang was desperately evaluating 
the possibility of a Chinese encroachment on the Tibetan territory, the 
economic, and consequentially political, influence of largest Khampa trading 
f irms continued to increase. It is evident from Dzamyag’s notes that the 
trade flows connecting the Sino-Tibetan trade hubs (e.g. Dartsedo, Dergé, 
Jyekundo) to the towns of Central Tibet (e.g. Lhasa, Shigatse, Gyantse) and 
the market places of India (e.g. Kalimpong, Calcutta) were still very active, 
despite the political uncertainty. Already in 1947, the Sandutsang were 
exporting wool directly to the United States and to England (Goldstein 
1989b; Sadutshang 2016, 95), a business Dzamyag himself was very familiar 
with. By 1950 he had already travelled several times to the nomadic areas 
of Nagchu to collect wool loads to be transported by pack animals to the 
towns of Shigatse and Lhasa, and from there to Kalimpong. In his business 
ventures, Dzamyag was often helped either by his nephew Lojam, who acted 
as his proxy in Kham, or other chief-merchants working for the Sandutsang, 
mostly hailing from the family’s estate in Trehor. As remarked above, the 
influx of eastern Tibetan traders to the bustling towns of Central Tibet 
contributed to the creation, already in the early twentieth century, of small 
bubbles of Khampa identity. Khampa traders, such as Dzamyag, could 
thus easily f ind familiar places and names recreated by the expatriated 
14 During the trading trip, Dzamyag kept a separate ledger where he noted every transaction, 
from the goods loaded and unloaded to his own personal expenses; it is unfortunate that he 
did not include this information in his personal journal. The reference to other textual sources 
ascribable to the author may explain the general lack of details concerning his business, which 
could have been recorded on separate ledgers to which the trader had no longer access at the 
time of writing his nyindep.
15 Like many other traders from the Ü-Tsang, Dzamyag dealt directly with the nomads living 
in Nagchu and Barkham.
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community. The embedment of the largest trading f irms in the social and 
economic fabric of the Lhasan society did not weaken their perception of 
their own identity. Acculturation and adaptation were skills necessary 
to navigate the intricate trade f luxes (Giersch 2010b, 220; Tsomu 2016a, 
2016b), but under the Central Tibetan clothing, the language prof iciency, 
the ability to juggle with different cultural schemes, the core of the Khampa 
merchants’ identity never faltered. The identitarian awareness shared by 
eastern Tibetans clearly transpires from the nyindep as well. Throughout 
his account, Dzamyag never questions his identity; he is f irst and foremost 
a Khampa, and his relation to his homeland deeply influences the way he 
perceives himself and his surroundings. It is evident in the author’s narrative 
that, to borrow Ovid’s words, ‘our native soil draws all of us, by I know not 
what sweetness, and never allows us to forget’.16
Political Weight of Traders in Mid-Twentieth-Century Tibet
Whereas the impact of state policy on Kham is undisputable, even more 
interesting is the way local people, and especially traders, influenced the 
political and social developments of the Lhasa-based government in the 
decades preceding and following the incorporation of Tibet into the People’s 
Republic of China in 1950.
Dzamyag does not discuss political events in his journal, yet passing 
mentions are made both to the Communist invasion and the Khampa 
resistance. In an entry dated to the third day of the fourth month of the 
Earth Pig Year (5 May 1959), the trader records in his nyindep that early in 
the morning news of calamities caused by ‘red flames’, as the author calls 
them, trickled to Shigatse, where he was based. Dzamyag left in a hurry, 
taking with him only some cloth-wrapped texts and leaving to his nephew 
Lojam the dispatch of pack animals loaded with food and beddings to the 
Ngor Luding labrang. From Ngor E wam Chöden, they set off in the direction 
of Kalimpong, a trip that marked the beginning of their exile in India (Kha 
stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 248). Despite the pathos transpiring from this brief 
note, the author does not remark on the dramatic events following the 
Chinese occupation, and more information on the ensuing events must be 
gathered from the introduction to the edited version of his journal. Here it 
is said that, due to such a hasty departure, one of the scroll-papers on which 
16 Nescio qua natale solum dulcedine cunctos ducit et inmemores non sinit esse sui (Ovid Ex 
Ponto III, 35-36).
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the nyindep had been recorded, namely that covering the events from the 
twenty-f ifth day of the sixth month of the Fire Monkey Year (1 August 1956) 
to the thirteenth of the tenth month of the Earth Dog Year (24 November 
1958) was lost in Shigatse, and no trace of it was to be found at the time of 
publication in 1997 (Kha stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 8).17
Direct allusions to the political situation of the time may be lacking, yet 
Dzamyag’s nyindep is f illed with valuable socio-economic and religious 
information. By the mid-twentieth century, the largest Khampa trading 
f irms had moved their headquarters to Lhasa; whereas branches were still 
active along the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, the heads of the households 
played their cards mainly on the political tables in Lhasa. In the 1940s, 
members of the Pangdatsang and the Sandutsang were raised to the ranks of 
the Lhasa government, holding positions as off icials, an honour traditionally 
reserved to the Lhasan nobility (Tsomu, 2016b, 25; Sadutshang 2016, 100-101). 
While some representatives of the Khampa trading f irms made their way 
into the Ganden Phodrang government, others pursued a more radical 
aff irmation of their local identity, by fostering the ideal of a ‘Khampa rule 
of Kham’. Proposed in 1935 by Gara Lama and enthusiastically embraced 
by several of the most powerful chieftains and headsmen of eastern Tibet, 
among whom there was Pangda Topgyal, the movement for a Khampa 
‘self-determination’ and ‘self-rule’ failed to gain momentum, and it was 
only in 1949 that the so-called ‘Association for the Promotion of Autonomy 
of Kham and Tibet’ was established in Dartsedo (Tsomu 2016b, 32-33). By 
that time, the Sino-Tibetan borderlands had already become theatre of 
warfare guerrilla that later developed into the volunteer force group known 
as ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ (Chushi Gangdruk), led by another representa-
tive of a Khampa trading family, Andrug Gönpo Tashi (Andrutsang 1973; 
McGranahan 2010).
Interestingly, the frenzy of the time finds no room in Dzamyag’s notes. The 
years 1950 and 1951 are remarkably devoid of any political or social events. He 
spent most of his time travelling back and forth between Lhasa and Shigatse, 
visiting monasteries and keeping up with his business transactions. In 1953 
the socio-political situation in Rabshi must have appeared quite unfazed, 
so much so that Dzamyag wrote a letter to the new incarnation of the local 
monastery, asking about an ailment for himself and one of his sisters in 
exchange for the livestock still in his possession (Kha stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 
17 A brief account of the events that occurred between 1956 and 1961, year of the author’s death, 
is provided in the last of the scrolls preserved by Dzamyag’s relatives and handed down to the 
editors of The Tibet House in the 1990s.
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225). It was clear to the trader which entity wielded authority at the local 
level: due to Mao’s gradualist approach, monasteries and chieftains were 
still recognized as agents of power in most of the borderlands as late as the 
mid-1950s. Not much appears to have changed since his imprisonment in 
1940; the real power was f irmly in the hands of chieftains and reincarnates, 
who ruled over a complex, ‘multivocal’ region (Gros, this volume).
As it often occurs with autobiographical writings, minor narratives lay 
underneath the main one, waiting to be discovered, contextualized, and 
interpreted against the historical backdrop of the time. As an active member 
of the trading community, Dzamyag was involved in various communal 
activities, such as the offering of a golden throne to the Fourteenth Dalai 
Lama as a sign of appreciation for the 1957-bestowal of the Kālacakra and 
Lamrim Chenmo teachings to the traders of Kham and Amdo, an event held 
concurrently with a tenshug (Kha stag ’Dzam yag 1997, 8).18 The author 
seems sincerely unaware of the underlying political signif icance of the 
offering, presented in his journal as a pious gesture in a time of uncertainty 
and struggles. In reality, the ritual, originally proposed and strongly desired 
by Gönpo Tashi Andrutsang, was part of a carefully planned project.19 The 
news regarding the Dalai Lama’s willingness to bestow a three-day initiation 
with teachings spread like wild f ire throughout the Tibetan regions, quickly 
assuming a nationalistic nature and threatening the Chinese control over 
the plateau. Gönpo Tashi’s initiative, at f irst restricted to the sole Khampa 
traders, gained the approval of Jyampa Gyatso, a prominent merchant from 
Labrang, and consequently the economic support of the whole Lhasa-based 
Amdowa community. Riding the wave of excitement and public expectations, 
the committee in charge of the event proposed the donation of a golden 
throne to be realized with the offerings coming not only from the wealthy 
traders of Amdo and Kham, but from all the good-willing people of Tibet, in 
a show of loyalty and faith towards the figure of the Dalai Lama (Andrustang 
1973, 51-52; Jamyang Norbu 2014).
18 Elaborate longevity ritual consisting in the making of offerings to the protector deities to 
ensure the long life of the Dalai Lama (Ardley 2002, xii).
19 One of the most powerful and wealthy Khampa trading households in Lhasa, the Andrutsang 
played an important role in the years following the Chinese invasion, when their head Gönpo 
Tashi, a businessman turned into a freedom f ighter, created a network of merchants united 
against the Chinese. Their group, initially focused on exerting pressure over the P.R.C. for the 
release of political prisoners and spreading support to the Dalai Lama, evolved in 1958 into a 
guerrilla army, the ‘Khams Four Rivers, Six Ranges Tibetan Defenders of the Faith Volunteer 
Army’, best known as ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ (Chushi Gangdruk). For more information on the 
Chushi Gangdruk, see Andrugtsang (1973), Ardley (2002), Goldstein (2007), McGranahan (2010).
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The involvement of traders in the political scene was not restricted to 
members of the most important trading families. In 1956, a merchant from 
Lithang named Alo Chödze Tsering Dorje,20 together with two low-ranking 
government officials, promoted the creation of a group claiming to represent 
the masses in their desire for a free Tibet.21 The leading organizers of the 
movement were mainly traders and government off icials: Gönpo Tashi 
Andrutsang himself was among the activists (Powers and Templeman 2012, 
439). Despite not having been an active part of the movement, Dzamyag 
enthusiastically joined the project for the realization of the golden throne, 
thus adding his economic weight to the political inf luence the trading 
community was able to exert on the political scene.
Dzamyag’s disconcerting lack of concern regarding the volatile political 
situation of the time appears less problematic once we keep in mind that, 
after the signing of agreement, several prominent Tibetans favoured the 
accommodation with the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.). Furthermore, 
the years between his appointment as tsongpön and his flight into exile saw 
Dzamyag’s focus turning inwards: whereas on a mundane level he actively 
took advantage of the volatile economic conditions of the time, his narrative 
persona appears completely absorbed by esoteric rituals and initiations, 
the money perceived as a mere means towards the accumulation of merit. 
The news of an imminent arrival of the ‘red flames’ breaks in on a routine 
made of offerings, circumambulations, and prayers, suddenly and violently 
bursting the atemporal bubble created by Dzamyag in his nyindep.
Before concluding my discussion of the political power gained by Khampa 
traders in twentieth-century Tibet, I would like to brief ly pause on the 
intertwining of religious and economic interests. It is worth noting that there 
are several references in the nyindep to the presence and direct involvement 
of representatives of Khampa trading f irms to rituals held in the largest 
monasteries of Central Tibet, regardless of their sectarian denomination. 
The unbiased approach to all Tibetan Buddhist traditions – a common 
feature among the eastern Tibetan traders in general, and Khampas in 
particular – appears to be one of the factors promoting their socio-economic 
paramountcy in twentieth-century Tibet, as demonstrated by the ease 
20 Successful trader, Alo Chödze Tsering Dorje’s fortunes came primarily from the commerce 
between Tibet and India. He was famous for having introduced the use of iron supports, thus 
revolutionizing the traditional construction techniques (Powers and Templeman 2012, 439).
21 The principal activities carried out by the group consisted in the putting up of posters calling 
for the end of the Chinese rule, the sponsorship of long-life rituals for the Dalai Lama and the 
propitiation of wrathful deities, and welfare initiatives in support of the refugees escaped from 
eastern Tibet (Powers and Templeman 2012, 439).
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with which Pangdatsang Nyigyel dealt with various monastic institutions, 
regardless of his own family aff iliation. Whereas the fostering of religious 
tolerance and intellectual liberalism has been repeatedly associated with 
the non-sectarian (rimé) movement,22 the economic impact that the non-
sectarian values had on the socio-cultural environment of the plateau in the 
twentieth century appears to be surprisingly understudied. As pointed out 
by Turek (2012, 429), the rimé masters cultivated spiritual goals that ‘did not 
exclude some hints of a political agenda, as they promoted eastern Tibetan 
cultural value and autonomy’; since non-sectarianism did contribute to the 
emergence of a socio-political Khampa identity, it may not be far-fetched to 
ascribe to members of the trading community the application of a similar 
attitude for the sake of economic gain.
A certain pragmatism was, after all, present since the very beginning of 
the rimé movement; in the nineteenth century, the royal family of Dergé 
had prized religious tolerance by supporting six large monasteries of various 
religious denominations, i.e. Sakya, Nyingma, and Kagyü. At a closer look, 
though, it is clear that the royal sponsorship was mutually convenient; 
whereas the establishments enjoyed an off icial protectorate and could 
influence the court through the dispatch of royal chaplains, the king could 
in turn rely on the presence of strong local monasteries to contain the rise 
of influence of the Geluk school, and, with it, the political encroachment 
of the Ganden Phodrang government. Dergé and Nangchen are but two 
instances where realpolitik used the rimé values to pursue non-religious 
aims; I would suggest, as a working hypothesis, that the same could be said 
of the economic pragmatism shown by Khampa traders, such as Pangdatsang 
Nyigyel and Dzamyag himself, in their dealings with establishments of 
diverse religious denomination. Prodigality towards monastic institutions 
was in fact traditionally associated with trustworthiness, a feature expected 
from a monastic trade agent; by proving their religious piety and supporting 
the ‘f ield of merit’23 that was the religious community, the traders increased 
their social status and influence.
22 The mid-nineteenth century saw the reinvigoration of a non-sectarian approach and the revival 
of minor lineages and practices; this tendency, controversially def ined in Western scholarship 
as a ‘movement’, deeply imbued the socio-cultural environment of eastern Tibet, thus providing 
unifying values to the growing Khampa trading communities that had relocated to Ü-Tsang. On the 
rimé movement, see Samuel (1993), Gardner (2006), Powers (1995), Smith (2001), and Turek (2013).
23 The idea of monastic communities (Skt. saṅgha) as a ‘f ield of merit’ (Skt. puṇyakṣetra; Tib. 
tsok zhing) is found in many Pāli texts. The laymen’s offerings to the monastic community are 
conceived as seeds of good karma sown in the ‘f ield of merit’; by bringing them to fruition, the 
saṅgha allows the donors to reap the benef its of their actions (Mills 2003, 61).
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Conclusion
It is said that history is made of personal stories, and Dzamyag’s is certainly 
one of them. The perspective provided by his journal is rather unique: 
trader and pilgrim, Khampa and Tibetan, sponsor and protégé, the text 
offers the scholar of pre-modern Tibetan history a different point of view 
on events mainly known through the formal channels of history making. 
The emergence of a proto-identitarian awareness among the Khampas 
in the f irst decades of the twentieth century goes hand in hand with the 
increasing political influence exerted by the largest trading f irms hailing 
from eastern Tibet. As early as the 1930s and 1940s, indigenous movements 
aimed at local independence appeared in southwest China – in particular in 
Sichuan and, from 1939, in the Xikang province. The majority of the Khampa 
self-rule movements evolved militantly toward the goal of autonomy, a 
sentiment that kept simmering even during Mao’s gradualist approach in 
the early 1950s (Peng 2002, 77). In the f irst half of the twentieth century, 
the combination of the Khampa ‘ancient sense of centrality’, as Michael 
Aris (1992, 13) aptly puts it, and the concepts of ‘self-determination’ and 
‘self-rule’ that began to circulate globally created an explosive situation. The 
establishment of the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’, a resistance group set up by 
Gönpo Tashi Andrugtsang, was met with enthusiasm by the representatives 
of the other trading families; Lo Gendun Sandutsang joined the guerrillas 
and died helping the Dalai Lama to flee Lhasa in 1959; Rapga Pangdatsang, 
despite maintaining his pro-Kuomintang view, actively participated in the 
revolts against the Communists.
Dzamyag’s journal offers an insider’s glimpse of two decades – the 1940s 
and the 1950s – that had been crucial to the history of Tibet. Member of 
the ‘elite commoners’ and active participant of the expatriated community 
of Khampa traders in the central regions of Ü-Tsang, the author does not 
dwell on the political events of the time, providing the scholars with cause 
for reflection on the perception harbored by those sections of society not 
involved in the decision-making process regarding the rapid changes oc-
curring in the Sino-Tibetan relationships. At the same time, his account 
bears testimony to the correlation between economics and politics: the 
heavy reliance of the Tibetan government on the services of the Khampa 
traders gave them considerable bargaining power in the political f ield. 
The role played by commerce and trade networks in shaping the empire 
and nation-building in China was partially replicated in Tibet as well: the 
tight-knit communities of Khampa traders living in the Central Tibetan 
towns of Lhasa, Shigatse, and Gyantse used their economic influence to 
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shape the nation-building process, strengthening in the meanwhile their own 
sense of local centrality. As noted by Giersch (2014, 379-380) ‘transfrontier 
merchants were people who engaged with new ideas, created new types of 
families, and, ultimately, were actively engaged in the major transformations 
of China, Burma, and – to a lesser degree – India.’ In this chapter, I have 
tried to highlight the transformative power exerted by other transfrontier 
merchants, namely the Khampa traders, in shaping the politics of Tibet in 
the f irst half of the twentieth century.
Glossary of Tibetan Terms
Abak A bag
Andrustang A ’brug tshang
Chamdo Chab mdo
chö yön mchod yon
Chödruktsang Chos drug tshang
Chushi Gangdruk Chu bzhi sgang drug
Dampa Lodrö Dam pa Blo gros
dowo do bo
drön nyer mgron gnyer
Dzawa Pomda Rdza ba Spom mda’
Gakok Sga khog
Ganden Phodrang Dga’ ldan pho brang
Geluk Dge lugs
gotso ’go gtso
Gyanagtsang Rgya nag tshang







Lhakpa Döndrup Lhag pa don grub
namthar rnam thar
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nyinto nyin tho
Pangdatsang Spang mda’ tshang
rimé ris med
Saga dawa sa ga zla ba
Sakya Sa skya
Sandutsang Sa ’du tshang
sang srang
sartrang gsar sprang
sen yik gsang yig
Tashilhunpo Bkra shis lhun po
top yik thob yig
trung rap ’khrungs rabs
Tsatrültsang Tsha sprul tshang
tsok zhing tshogs zhing
yin gor dbyin sgor/hin sgor
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Located on the Sichuan-Xikang border, Trokyap was targeted by local 
authorities after the Guomindang (G.M.D.) placed this Tibetan kingdom 
under Xikang jurisdiction in the late 1930s. Documents from Academia 
Historica shed light on the affair – including the Trokyap king’s response 
when faced with attempts by China’s central government to control its 
southwestern border. These events are analysed nationally with regard to 
the G.M.D., provincially concerning Sichuan and Xikang authorities, and 
locally for the Trokyap king. How each party pursued its own military, 
political, and economic goals is discussed. Control of Trokyap reveals 
the balance of power between the protagonists and demonstrates how a 
small Tibetan kingdom could have jeopardized the state-building process 
implemented by the G.M.D.
Keywords: Trokyap, Sichuan, Xikang, Kham, Guomindang (G.M.D.), 
state-building process.
Introduction
The beginning of the twentieth century was a major turning point in the 
history of Sino-Tibetan relations. In 1904, the British invaded Tibet; beginning 
in 1906, there was the Manchu military intervention in Kham; and 1912 
marked the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the foundation of the Chinese 
Republic. Subsequently, relations between Qing Emperors in Beijing and the 
Dalai Lama as head of Tibet came to an end. From then on, both Tibet and 
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
doi: 10.5117/9789463728713_ch10
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China sought to build modern nation states with competing sovereignty 
claims (see Gros and Relyea’s chapters in this volume).
The Tibetan government set up a War Department and implemented 
new policies that would allow it to form an army (Travers 2015, 2016). It then 
dispatched military and administrative off icials all over its territory, includ-
ing the eastern region of Kham. These efforts to strengthen administrative 
control encountered a great deal of resistance both in Central Tibet and 
in remote areas. In Central Tibet, religious authorities, such as the ninth 
Panchen Lama (1883-1937) and many civil off icials, refused to join this 
national effort (Jagou 2011). Kham, a patchwork of fragmented political 
entities made up of a number of kingdoms headed by local independent 
chieftains, resisted any interference from Lhasa (Peng 2002).
China itself was far from fully united: the period from 1912 to the founda-
tion of the Nanjing government in 1928 was a time of great unrest with 
provincial warlords f ighting each other. When faced with the Japanese 
invasion in 1937, nationalists, communists, and warlords reluctantly joined 
ranks under the nominal authority of the Chinese Nanjing government. 
Nevertheless, in its efforts to become a nation-state, China attempted to 
keep intact the Qing Empire’s territory beyond China proper – including 
Tibet and its borderlands. At the very beginning of the twentieth century, 
the Manchus had already tried to implement administrative, political, 
and economic policies in Eastern Tibet. This area – and the Kham region 
in particular – took on paramount geopolitical importance (Sperling 1976, 
Coleman 2002, Wang 2011). Because the British in India had rapid access 
to China via Tibet, the Chinese built a buffer zone to protect China proper. 
This resulted in creating the short-lived Chinese province of Xikang (1939-
1955) to govern Kham. The process of establishing Xikang revealed the 
Chinese Chongqing government’s diff iculty in implementing its policies 
and in exercising its authority over its southwestern border (Epstein 2002, 
McGranahan 2003, Jagou 2006, Relyea 2015).
Kham was not a discrete uniform regional entity; rather, its various 
kingdom-centred realms constituted a discontinuous landscape. When faced 
with Central Tibet’s tentative take-over and with China’s claim to authority 
over particular territories, Kham offered a polyphonic response. Moves to 
grant Khampas self-rule in the 1930s – despite their claim to f ight under 
the slogan ‘Kham for the Khampas’ – did not involve the whole of Kham.1
1 Khampas, as individuals, were not necessarily f ighting for Kham province as a whole. Rather, 
their priority was the autonomy of their own territory within Kham. For example, Kelzang 
Tsering (Tib. Bskal bzang tshe ring, died in 1941) was a member of the nationalist government 
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Against this historical background of overlapping or conflicting sover-
eignty claims, the case of Trokyap, a small kingdom located in northern 
Kham, sheds some light on the strategic position that local rulers had to 
adopt at the time. As I will show in this chapter, the Trokyap king did not 
choose self-rule. He sought to maintain the Manchu privileges he had 
benefited from since the beginning of the twentieth century under Qing 
rule. He asserted this by requesting to remain part of Sichuan province, 
as though the political situation had not changed. The Trokyap example 
expands upon the role a former constituency (Tibet) of the Qing Empire 
played in the process of shifting from a specif ic imperial organization to 
a modern nation-state. It is also interesting to see how the Trokyap king 
was able to influence Chinese central government’s policies regarding the 
kingdom’s borders.
The tentative administrative incorporation of this Tibetan territory 
into China proper was by no means a straightforward process. Besides the 
Trokyap king who rejected Chinese central government’s decision to include 
his territory in Xikang province, there were two other key protagonists. 
Liu Xiang (1890−1938), the Sichuan governor, based his own claims on the 
prevailing situation of his province at the end of the Manchu dynasty; thus, 
he totally rejected the policy his government implemented in the 1930s 
to revise some of the province’s territorial demarcations. By contrast, Liu 
Wenhui (1895−1976), governor of Xikang, tried to take advantage of the new 
policy to acquire a larger territory. As one of the many Tibetan principalities 
in the fragmented landscape of the Tibetan Kham area, the case of Trokyap 
sheds light not only on the confrontation that occurred between Xikang 
and Sichuan authorities. It also reveals diff iculties the Chinese government 
experienced in managing its provincial governors.2
and well aware of its national policy. Taking advantage of his position as Xikang Party Affairs 
Special Commissioner (Xikang dangwu te pai yuan), he tried to get rid of Liu Wenhui in Bathang; 
from Bathang, he expected to establish himself as the new Xikang Provincial Commander of 
the nationalist army in 1932 (Peng Wenbin, 2002).
2 Trokyap (khro skyabs) is one of the eighteen kingdoms of Gyelmorong. Gyelmorong is the 
abbreviation for Shargyelmo tsawa rong, meaning ‘The Hot Valley of the Queen in the East’. The 
eighteen kingdoms of Gyelmorong are: Chakla, Tsenla (Xiaojin), Trokyap, Chuchen (southeast 
of Dzamtang), Gotang, Gomé, Gotö (east of Dartsedo), Drakteng, Pawang, Geshitsa, Gyelkha, 
Okzhi, Lunggu (Wenchuan), Muchi (on the southeastern fringe of Gyelmorong region), Somo, 
Choktsé, Dzigak, Tenpa (in the northeastern part of Gyelmorong). Today, Trokyap (Ch. Chuosi 
jiabu) kingdom is located northwest of Jinchuan County within the Aba Autonomous Prefecture of 
Sichuan province. It should be distinguished from Trokyab, which is the Tschokiab of Tafel (1914, 
vol. II, 224) and the Choschia of Zhonghua Minguo xin ditu (1943, Scale 1:2500000) located on the 
bank of the Dajinchuan river about 110 miles due north of Dartsedo (Wylie 1980, 103; 184n.638).
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The events discussed here began in 1937. At that time, the Nationalist 
government decided to integrate Trokyap into Xikang against the will of 
Sichuan provincial authorities. The events end in 1940 with the endorsement 
of this decision by the Ministry of Home Affairs.3 Both the manner in which 
this dispute between the two provinces unfolded and the intervention of 
the Chongqing government set the Trokyap case apart from other Tibetan 
polities in Kham that actively sought to maintain self-rule during the 1930s 
(Peng 2002). Emphasis is often laid on the forms of resistance to state integra-
tion; however, the case of Trokyap is not a plea for self-rule. Rather, it is an 
appeal to remain outside Xikang province but still under the administration 
of Sichuan province. It also can be seen as a prelude to what would happen 
much later.
Two sets of archival records about the incorporation of Trokyap kingdom 
bring this case to light. The exchange of correspondence between the two 
provincial governments (Sichuan and Xikang), the Ministry of Home Affairs 
in Chongqing, and the Trokyap king is characteristic of the negotiations that 
took place between the parties involved. The archived documents help to 
analyse the motivations and arguments of all the parties involved in the 
dispute. Underlying the conflicting positions adopted by the protagonists 
was the question of the Nationalist government’s capacity to implement 
its policies and to impose its authority over the Tibetan border area and 
provincial authorities. Published and edited in 1984 – well after the events 
themselves – the collection Selections of Historical Materials (wenshi ziliao 
xuanji) reveals the economic importance of Trokyap in terms of its gold 
production.4 Included in this collection is a testimony left by Li Hou’an, 
one of the actors in the 1930s negotiations. This witness account completes 
the record in the archived documents, which only mention in passing the 
f ight over the kingdom’s gold mines.5
3 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, order of the Executive yuan 
(xingzheng yuan), 26 September 1937, conf irmed on 11 October 1937 and order of the Executive 
yuan, 15 October 1940.
4 Selection of Historical Materials is a collection of witness accounts of events that occurred 
in this area of the Republic of China. These accounts were collected from the 1950s onwards 
by members of the Chinese Communist Party and edited by the National Committee of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 1980. I would like to thank Tenzin Jinba 
for providing me with this material.
5 Archive f ile number 026000009629A/B from the Academia Historica, Xindian, Taiwan. The 
titles given to these two f iles are the following: the question of the administrative subordination 
of Trokyap (lishu wenti’an) and the incorporation of Trokyap within the regular administration 
(gai liu’an). The f irst f ile includes documents from every protagonist; the second f ile mainly 
contains correspondence issued by Sichuan provincial authorities.
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In order to determine whether the Trokyap king’s arguments were heard 
and understood by the Nationalist government, this chapter presents each 
party’s irreconcilable arguments for imposing its own will and for striving 
toward different goals.
Centre Stage: Nationalist Government’s Southwestern Policy
Territorial Control and the Creation of Xikang
During the period that ranged from the beginning of the new Republic 
proclaimed by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) on 1 January 1912 to the establishment 
of the Nanjing government (1928), negotiations took place to def ine the 
border between China and Tibet, but to no real avail. The Simla Convention 
(1913-1914) was never ratif ied by China. The Chinese government had to 
appoint military officials to control the region because its own authority had 
not been fully established. Nevertheless, the Beijing government continued 
to differentiate the administrative status of the Tibetan areas of Amdo and 
Kham as separate from the status of Central Tibet.6 Central Tibet remained 
‘Xizang’ (Tibet) and the Kham Tibetan territory became the ‘Sichuan Border’ 
(Chuanbian). In fact, Chuanbian did not correspond to a Chinese government 
administrative unit; rather, it seemed to be a geographical term to qualify 
the territory situated beyond the western border of Sichuan province. When 
Chuanbian was used to name parts of Kham, it was precisely because Kham 
was not yet under the Nationalist government’s administrative control. 
Once it had been integrated – and only then – would an administrative 
denomination and structure be def ined. In 1914 the Republicans granted 
administrative status to Kham for the f irst time referring to it as ‘Sichuan 
Frontier Special Administrative Region’ (Chuanbian tebie xingzheng qu). 
Later on, it became the ‘Xikang Special Administrative Region’ (Xikang tebie 
xingzheng qu), and troops were subsequently stationed there (see Relyea, 
this volume). This territory was divided into two circuits (dao): the ‘Eastern 
Border Circuit’ (bian dong dao) and the ‘Western Border Circuit’ (bian xi 
dao). In 1916 both circuits merged to form a single circuit called ‘Sichuan 
Border Circuit’ (Chuanbian dao). After the Nanjing government had been set 
up in 1928, the Nationalist government added to the twenty-two provinces 
that were remnants of the Qing dynasty’s four provincial-level ‘Special 
6 Tibet is divided into four major regions: southwestern Tibet (Ngari), Central Tibet (Ü-Tsang), 
southeastern Tibet (Kham) and northeastern Tibet (Amdo).
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Administrative Regions’ (tebie xingzheng quyu): Jehol, Suiyuan, Chahar, 
and Chuanbian. This move allowed them to recover the Manchu Empire’s 
entire territory. In August of the same year (1928), Xikang’s status of Special 
Administrative Region was changed to ‘province’ (sheng). However, still no 
civil provincial government was tasked with administering Xikang province 
even though some counties were administered by military off icers. It was 
only several years later that a Preparatory Committee for the establishment 
of Xikang province (Xikang jiansheng weiyuanhui) was created (1935) and 
set up in Ya’an, headed by Liu Wenhui. He was one of the most powerful 
ex-warlords in southwestern China and its provincial governor (Liu Ziqian 
1944, 21). The headquarters of this Preparatory Committee were transferred 
to Dartsedo (Ch. Kangding), which became the capital of Xikang in 1936.7 
A year later the government introduced its policy to lay claim to Trokyap.
At the time of the promulgation of its Provisional Constitution in June 
1931, the Nanjing government strove to implement new policies regarding the 
management of all its provinces and the de facto integration of independent 
regions of Mongolia and Tibet into its territory (Lin Hsiao-ting 2006, 21).8 
The attempt to include parts of Kham in the new Chinese administra-
tive structure contributed to the reorganization of powers on the latter’s 
southwestern border. The policy was f irst geared toward controlling local 
warlords and then toward their integration into the Chinese administrative 
or military hierarchy. In order to control the f ive subnational militarists 
based in Sichuan or on its borders, f ive ‘garrison areas’ ( fangqu) were created, 
each under the responsibility of an army commander ( junzhang), who was 
an ex-warlord (Kapp 1973, 34, 36).9 Moreover, the most powerful warlords 
were removed and/or made provincial governors. A f inely tuned strategy 
had to be implemented to ensure that the local ex-warlords’ power would 
be recognized in such a way that they would serve the interests of the 
Nationalist government without acquiring too much power. For example, the 
Chinese government did not want Liu Wenhui to become Sichuan provincial 
governor. Instead, Liu Wenhui was ordered to form Xikang province and not 
to interfere in the affairs of Sichuan province. Once ousted from Sichuan, 
this new off icial responsibility still allowed him to acquire power on the 
7 On the choice of Dartsedo as the capital of Xikang, see Ren Naiqiang 1933, 77-80.For the 
discussed limits of Xikang province, see Jagou 2006.
8 Before the war with Japan, the Nanjing government administered 28 provinces with the 
addition of Ningxia and Qinghai provinces.
9 Yang Sen’s army was known as the Twentieth National Revolutionary Army, Liu Xiang’s as 
the Twenty-f irst, Liu Wenhui’s as the Twenty-fourth, Deng Xihou’s as the Twenty-eighth, and 
Tian Songyao’s as the Twenty-ninth.
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southwestern border of China. Throughout the Republican period, two 
options were equally favoured: to make Kham the territorial basis for the 
new Xikang province or to integrate these territories into Sichuan province. 
The Trokyap case illustrates how crucial this question was for both Chinese 
provinces, especially in terms of income.
Defining the Border Between Sichuan and Xikang
While Nanjing’s inf luence over the two southwestern provinces was 
practically non-existent until the Japanese invasion (from 1937 to 1945), 
the Chinese government’s retreat to Chongqing in Sichuan in 1938 offered 
it new perspectives regarding Tibetan territories. New laws governing the 
Sichuan border were promulgated. Xikang and Sichuan provinces disagreed 
about the delimitation of their respective borders. Thus, the same year an 
advisor to the ‘Ministry of Home Affairs’ (neizheng bu) asked both Xikang 
and Sichuan provinces to send emissaries to def ine their joint border in 
accordance with Article 8 of the general law ‘Conditions for Drawing the 
Borders of Provinces, Towns and Sub-prefectures’ (sheng shi xian kan jie 
tiaoli). A particularly f ierce dispute over Trokyap kingdom broke out after 
the Ministry of Home Affairs placed this territory under the jurisdiction of 
Xikang province. This arbitrary partition acted like a detonator. In this type 
of case the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (M.T.A.C.) should 
have settled the matter because its purpose and objective were precisely 
to integrate Tibetan and Mongolian territories: in this case, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs remained the only intermediary. Its intervention shows how 
this case received special attention.
The off icial decision to incorporate Trokyap territory into Xikang was 
taken in 1937. Archived documents do not mention the advance of com-
munist troops as a factor in this decision. However, the Long March took 
communist troops through Kham. They fled southern China and began their 
Long March to the North to escape the threat represented by nationalists. 
One of their armies, the Fourth Front Army entered Xikang territory. There 
the communists set to work to create a revolutionary base and strove to 
control the Tibetan population by setting up several Tibetan revolutionary 
bases. The most important of these was the ‘Böpa People’s Republic’ which 
was established in Kandzé in May 1935.10 However, these attempts proved 
10 According to Jinba Tashi, whom I thank for sharing this information, the Communist 
Committee of Jinchuan (Gele desha gongheguo) was founded in 1935. The Tibetan Communist 
Committee (Boba renmin gonghe guo) was created in Kandzé County in 1936.
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unsuccessful and the Tibetans were soon regarded as ‘indomitable’ (Liu 
2004, 85, 95; Dreyer 1995, 199-200). Save for one document that recounts 
how the Red Bandits (chifei) burned the county archives in Daofu in reac-
tion to the local people’s refusal to levy taxes for communist soldiers,11 the 
archives about the Trokyap case say nothing of these developments. They 
do not even mention the burden the Fourth Front Red Army imposed on 
the Tibetan people in the form of its 45,000 soldiers and their subsequent 
food requirements. Nonetheless, the communist presence from 1935 to 1936 
in the Gyelmorong area where Trokyap was situated turned out to be an 
opportunity for the Nationalist government to drive out the communists 
and to establish itself f irmly in this area (Aba Zangzu zizhizhou gaikuang 
comp. 1985, 86-93; Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou gaikuang comp. 1986, 111-112); 
it was perhaps no coincidence that the off icial limit between Xikang and 
Sichuan was drawn the next year (1937).
The advance of the communists in Sichuan and Xikang clearly provided 
the Nationalist government with an opportunity to strengthen its relation-
ship with the Lhasa government. After the death of the Thirteenth Dalai 
Lama in 1933, Lhasa had agreed to meet and negotiate with representatives 
of the Nationalist government. The Tibetans responded positively to Chiang 
Kai-shek’s (1887−1975) plea to resist the advance by the communist army 
across the Jinsha River to the West (by then the off icial border between 
Central Tibet and China). However, for fear that the Tibetans would be swept 
up in the military offensive, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Liu Wenhui, who was 
acting as his decentralized agent, to station his army on the opposite bank of 
the Jinsha River to ensure that the Tibetans would not take this opportunity 
to cross it eastwards (Aba Zangzu zizhizhou gaikuang comp. 1985, 102-105; 
Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou gaikuang comp. 1986, 113-119).
Trokyap as a Buffer County
For the Nationalist government, the Trokyap was problematic due to its 
strategic position between Xikang and Sichuan. As was the case for other 
kingdoms in Kham, such an ‘interstitial’ or ‘in-between’ area was viewed as 
a no man’s land (outuo) by the Nationalists who wished to turn the whole 
area into a buffer zone. Trokyap was regarded as a natural border between 
the two provinces as its terrain is marked by steep wooded mountains 
11 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion expressed by the Prepara-
tory Committee for the establishment of Xikang Province to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 6 May 
1937. About the levy of taxes in Daofu (Liu 2004, 97).
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and river valleys. However, keen to prevent local power from developing 
or strengthening and reassured by the fact that it had granted positions 
of authority to ex-warlords, the Nationalist government concentrated its 
efforts on creating intermediate administrative units called ‘Administrative 
Inspection Districts’ (xingzheng ducha qu) (Fitzgerald 1999, 105). Provincial-
level authorities were expected to act as a link between central government 
and the counties. The Nationalist government suggested that the main 
issues regarding the future of Trokyap kingdom were its subordination 
and the question of the preservation or dissolution of Jinghua County in 
which Trokyap was included. In addition, there was also the question of 
administering Trokyap once it fell under Xikang’s jurisdiction.
Map 10.1  Localization of the Kingdom of Trokyap, c. 1940
source: based on academia historica, archive file number 026000009629a; srTm (nasa) and 
modern administrative borders extracted from gadm database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
author: rémi chaix
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As a matter of fact, a document dated 22 October 1937 mentions the 
administrative history of Trokyap: Trokyap became part of Sichuan’s Jinghua 
County along with two county-level tun, Suijing and Chonghua, at the 
beginning of 1937.12 Xikang provincial authorities contested this earlier 
appropriation by Sichuan.
The set of documents about the Trokyap dispute helps to trace the Chinese 
administrative history of Trokyap since the end of the Qing dynasty from the 
point of view of the parties involved. Xikang authorities acknowledged the 
need to reform the territorial administration and accepted the rationale be-
hind Trokyap’s joining the new Jinghua County. Nevertheless, they advanced 
practical arguments for maintaining the kingdom under its administration. 
For them, before the creation of Jinghua County, Trokyap was managed by 
the military garrison from Suijing (Suijing tun) and indirectly by Maogong 
sub-prefecture (Maogong zhili ting). In 1913, following government guidelines 
to simplify provincial administrative divisions, sub-prefectures (ting) and 
prefectures ( fu) became counties. While Maogong sub-prefecture became 
Maogong County, Trokyap remained under the jurisdiction of the Suijing 
military garrison. The kingdom was therefore automatically included in 
the newly created Jinghua County. Owing to Trokyap’s modest population 
and territory, Xikang authorities argued that its integration into Jinghua 
County was not the best option. They contended that it would be easier to 
merge Trokyap with other neighbouring territories to create another district 
within Xikang province. Hence the Chinese central government envisaged 
integrating Trokyap into Xikang while pondering the validity of Jinghua 
County’s existence without it. To them, the latter’s surface area would then be 
insufficient to form a county.13 It ultimately suggested adding another town, 
Fubian (at that time under Maogong County’s administration), to Suijing and 
Chonghua to form Jinghua County to allow Trokyap to join Xikang province, 
the latter thus becoming a county in itself. The Nationalist government 
pointed out that Xikang was a new province with only 32 counties; Sichuan, 
which was large and overpopulated, included 150 counties. The government 
concluded that, unlike Xikang, Sichuan had admirably fulf illed the task of 
tracing its new borders and of sending emissaries to check them, and that 
Sichuan had encountered no opposition from Gansu and Qinghai. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs insisted that Trokyap was large and diff icult to 
manage. Thus, were Trokyap to join Xikang, it would be easier to control, 
12 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion expressed by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs to the government of Sichuan, 22 October 1937.
13 Without Trokyap kingdom, Jinghua County would have lost one third of its area.
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though the reasons behind this rationale were not fully explained. The 
Ministry also stated that from the very beginning Sichuan had agreed to 
the creation of Xikang and that the two respective provinces’ roles had been 
clearly def ined: the very purpose of creating Xikang was to control and 
protect the Sichuan border. As far as the Ministry was concerned, defining 
the inner limits and deciding on which of the two provinces Trokyap should 
belong to was not a major issue or a real concern at national level.14 The 
prime objective was to incorporate Trokyap in the Republic’s administrative 
framework, to establish the Tibetan kingdom as a county, and to make it part 
of the Chinese territory. All of these were in keeping with the government’s 
purpose of implementing the state-building policy.
The integration of Trokyap into Xikang was not without its own problems. 
Discussions took place about merging this kingdom with Luhuo (Drango) 
County or with Daofu (Tawu) County. Both of these counties were part of 
the ‘Administrative Inspection District’ independently administered by Liu 
Wenhui but still part of Sichuan Province. However, Xikang had already 
started implementing a policy to define its territory’s inner administrative 
limits and had decided to turn the ex-tusi kingdoms into counties. Hence, 
administratively speaking, Trokyap had already become a county. The Minis-
try of Home Affairs accepted this course of events, because Trokyap was rich 
in natural resources and in livestock and could therefore be self-suff icient. 
It also considered that it would be an opportunity for Xikang to oversee 
the exploitation of its own mineral resources.15 From the perspective of 
Sichuan authorities, Kham – the so-called ‘Sichuan Border’ territory – was 
part of Sichuan at the time the Republic of China was founded (1912) and 
should remain within its borders.16
Sichuan provincial authorities suggested that Trokyap kingdom become 
part of Daofu County, which at the beginning of the twentieth century lay 
within the Sichuan Border Area and belonged to Sichuan.17 They claimed 
that the Chinese government was backing Xikang province regardless of 
the historical facts. From their point of view, historical precedent justif ied 
14 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion expressed by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs to the government of Sichuan, 22 October 1937.
15 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion expressed by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs to the government of Sichuan, 22 October 1937.
16 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion expressed by the Prepara-
tory Committee for the establishment of Xikang Province to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 6 May 
1937.
17 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, copy of a letter by Liu Xiang in 
an internal missive of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 20 April 1937.
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the integration of Trokyap into Sichuan. In fact, both parties made reference 
to the policy that Manchu off icials had adopted on the Sichuan border at 
the end of the Qing dynasty but disagreed with the implementation of the 
gaitu guiliu policy. Often glossed as a form of ‘bureaucratization’, this policy 
consisted in modifying (gai) the status of a local ruler (tu, here the Trokyap 
king) to make him join (gui, literally rally) the regular administration (liu, 
literally mainstream).18
As far as the Ministry of Home Affairs was concerned, both Sichuan and 
Xikang advanced valid arguments. However, the Ministry stressed that both 
authorities had to adapt to present conditions and that the law governing 
the delimitation of provinces, counties, and towns should prevail.19
After listening to the arguments put forward by both parties, the Chong-
qing government decided in favour of Xikang, citing the Kham territories’ 
strategic position. In July 1938 Chiang Kai-shek approved the transfer from 
Sichuan to Xikang of seventeen districts (see also Frank, this volume), 
a request that Liu Wenhui had been making since 1934 and which had 
been repeatedly turned down by Nanjing (Lin 2006, 109). This concession 
came with an effort to better integrate Xikang. As Lin Hsiao-ting argues, 
‘in exchange for the additional tax revenues from the new territories and 
abundant natural resources, Liu Wenhui agreed to accept that his Xikang 
territory be upgraded from “preparatory” status to a formal province, and 
henceforth to recognize orders and instructions from the KMT government’ 
(ibid.). Liu Wenhui shared the nationalists’ interest in bureaucratic reform 
because this could give him total control over a given area and extra tax 
revenues. At the time, he was contending with diff iculties in maintaining 
his power in Sichuan after being challenged by other Sichuan warlords from 
the beginning of the 1930s (Kapp 1973, 35).20 From then on, the Chongqing 
government was able to intervene in Sichuan’s internal affairs. On 5 October 
1940, it accepted Liu Wenhui’s f inal proposal that Trokyap kingdom be 
included for the time being in Danba County (Tib. Rongdrak), part of Xikang 
province.
The question of defining the inner administrative borders, as mentioned 
above, may seem rather trivial compared to the other issues the Nationalist 
government had to address. Indeed, the delimitation of counties was still 
being discussed when the Nanjing government retreated to Chongqing 
18 See Gong Yin (1992), Herman (1997).
19 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, Minister of Home Affairs to the 
Preparatory Committee for the establishment of Xikang Province, 8 May 1937.
20 Liu Wenhui transferred his headquarters from Chengdu to Xikang in 1933.
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and was struggling to survive there, faced with much greater challenges 
than the demarcation of inner territories. Although Chongqing was one of 
the biggest trade centres on the Yangtze River above Hankou, the strategic 
road to Burma was of vital importance and concern at that time for the 
Nationalist government. The Nationalists used it to bring in vital supplies 
from outside. And when the road was closed in 1939, as James Leibold points 
out, Chiang Kai-shek envisaged building another road that would link India 
to southwestern China via Xikang and Tibet (Leibold 2005, 189). As a matter 
of fact, Chiang Kai-shek needed Liu Wenhui’s full support to implement 
this policy. Thus, they made some concessions to him independently of any 
other considerations. In fine, the survival of the Nationalist government 
depended on how well it controlled the local authorities. In fact, Chiang 
Kai-shek readily succeeded in manipulating the local authorities regardless 
of the powers of the local Chinese or Tibetan authorities. Furthermore, 
the example of Trokyap throws new light on the rivalry between Xikang 
and Sichuan and on a specif ic Tibetan reaction to the creation of Xikang 
province.
The Decentralized Centre: Local Chinese Authorities and 
Chinese Central Government Policies
For any provincial ex-warlord, to lose a county was inexcusable. Although 
supposedly part of the military and administrative structure of the National-
ist government, the different ex-warlords continued to act as independent 
leaders, at least within the limits of their own territories. The reaction of 
Sichuan provincial off icials to the Nationalist government’s decision to 
relinquish a kingdom (or a county) – which they originally considered 
their own – to Xikang province was therefore intolerable. And, as expected, 
their arguments totally contradicted those put forward by the Nationalist 
government.
Contrary to their government that strove to regain Qing imperial territory 
and to unite this territory, local authorities blatantly defied the Nationalist 
government. However, they sought its approval in the case of Trokyap king-
dom; indeed, both the government and local authorities said the provinces 
had failed to reach an agreement.
In keeping with its decision to include Trokyap in Xikang, the Ministry 
called to order the Sichuan authorities, stressing the fact that the question 
concerned China’s territory and the delimitation of its inner divisions, 
and that knowing what belonged to A or B was not the overriding issue: 
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the transformation of the former Qing Empire territory into a Chinese 
nation-state was the issue at stake.21
The Validity of the Arguments
Archived documents make no mention of the troubled times of Zhao Erfeng 
(1845-1911) and Fu Songmu (1869-1929). Border Commissioners for Sichuan 
and Yunnan (duban Chuan Dian bianwu dachen) respectively, Zhao and 
Fu were tasked with implementing the gaitu guiliu policy. The main bone 
of contention between Sichuan and Xikang authorities was the validity of 
the sources that attest to the arguments put forth by both parties. Both 
authorities contributed to writing the history of Trokyap by marshalling 
historical facts and evidence. For example, Liu Wenhui accused the Sichuan 
authorities of spuriously quoting the book Account of the Establishment of 
Xikang Province (Xikang jian sheng ji) by Fu Songmu. This is because Liu 
Wenhui viewed this book not as a historical document but only a private 
account.22 He saw the need to reference archived documents that could 
serve as irrefutable proof. According to him, there was no factual evidence 
to prove that Trokyap had become part of Daofu County because Daofu 
County archives had been destroyed by the communists. Furthermore, 
there was counter evidence in the Dartsedo archives, which dated from 
the time of the ‘Sichuan Border area’. According to the Xikang authorities, 
sources in these archives helped prove that Trokyap was not part of Daofu; 
the latter did not receive taxes from Trokyap, and the king of Trokyap was 
not in possession of a seal that proved he was part of the regular Chinese 
administration.23 The Xikang authorities conducted archive research and 
discovered that three f iles on the gaitu guiliu policy adopted by Zhao Erfeng 
and Fu Songmu still existed. One was about Kongsa (Tib. Khang gsar), and 
two others dating from 1911 pertained to the incorporation of Trokyap into 
the regular administration. The Xikang authorities also addressed the issue 
21 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion expressed by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs to the Sichuan government, 22 October 1937.
22 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion expressed by the Prepara-
tory Committee for the establishment of Xikang Province to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 6 May 
1937.
23 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, copy of a letter by Liu Wenhui 
in an internal missive of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 20 April 1937; Opinion expressed by 
the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of Xikang Province to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, 6 May 1937; memoir sent by the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of Xikang 
Province to the Minister of Home Affairs, 5 June 1937.
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of the seal that the king of Trokyap should have been granted as proof of 
his siding with the Manchu administration and which in the end he did 
not receive. These documents refer to the sense of urgency at the time on 
both (Tibetan and Manchu) sides in receiving or granting off icial status as a 
member of a new administrative structure or in preventing a local rebellion 
against Qing authorities. The unrest in China had prevented the Trokyap 
king from receiving this seal. As such, doubts were expressed about the fate 
of Trokyap at the very end of the Manchu dynasty.
According to secondary Chinese sources, the Trokyap king recognized 
the authority of the Qing in 1700 and received the title of Pacif ication Com-
missioner (anfusi) in 1702. Then, at the end of the Second Jinchuan War 
(1771-1776) during which he sided with the imperial armies, he was promoted 
to Pacif ication Propagator Commissioner (xuanfusi).24
However, as noted by the Sichuan authorities and confirmed by their Xikang 
counterparts, nothing is known about the title this local chieftain supposedly 
received between 1904 and 1911 when the gaitu guiliu policy was implemented 
by Zhao Erfeng. The Trokyap king himself attributed the fact that he had never 
officially received his title to the move by the ‘Sichuan border area’ office to 
Dartsedo that took place at that time.25 In fact, in the archived documents 
the Trokyap king is still addressed as Chuosi jiabu tusi at least until the end of 
1939. Indeed, even the Xikang authorities referred to the king of Trokyap as 
tusi, even though he himself did not sign any letters in this capacity.26
The Trokyap king signed one of his letters (translated into Chinese; the 
Tibetan version is not in the archives) as the Pacif ication Propagator Com-
missioner (xuanfushi).27 In fact, the incorporation of Trokyap is discussed in 
the documents, but there is no reference to a discussion about the title the 
Trokyap king would have received after the decision had actually been taken. 
24 ‘An Overview of Trokyap’ by Yudru Tsomu (13 July 2011), unpublished manuscript, previously 
available at url: http://places.thlib.org/features/23689/descriptions/1297.
25 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, translation into Chinese of a 
letter from the Trokyap local chieftain to the County Off icer of Jinghua, 8 March 1937.
26 The Xikang authorities referred to two tusi: the father, Lawang Norbu, was locally called 
‘senior local chieftain’ (lao tusi); the son, Kelsang Gyeltsen (Ch. Sigerangjia canyidan lejianzan) 
was locally called ‘junior local chieftain’ (xiao tusi). Due to the father’s advanced age, the son 
became the acting local chieftain before actually inheriting this position.
27 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, translation into Chinese of a letter 
from the Trokyap local chieftain to the County Off icer of Jinghua, 8 March 1937. Nawang Le’erwu 
is likely an alternative transliteration of Lawang Norbu; copy of a letter from the Preparatory 
Committee for the establishment of Xikang Province, 26 January 1937 and included in an opinion 
expressed by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Preparatory Committee for the establishment 
of Xikang Province, 20 April 1937.
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It is possible there was no need to discuss it because when Zhao Erfeng had 
implemented the gaitu guiliu policy, he had promised the ‘distinguished’ 
(gongshun) local chieftains, then simply known as tusi, that he would grant 
them a ‘hereditary Chinese off icial position’ (shixi Han guan zhi zhi) in 
order to gain their support.28 Ultimately, after the f inal decision to include 
Trokyap into Xikang, this change of status implied an obligation to ‘rally 
the regular Chinese administration again’ (chongxing gailiu).29
Faced with these arguments and given that territorial reorganization was 
already under way, the Nationalist government decided to send emissaries 
to Trokyap to meet with the Sichuan and Xikang authorities.
Nationalists Emissaries to Trokyap
Although the Chinese government had been based in Chongqing since 1938, 
it still relied on local authorities to implement its southwestern border policy. 
For example, Liu Xiang, the Sichuan governor, had made repeated demands 
from the government to send emissaries from Nanjing to the border. In 
response, the Chongqing government claimed that the matter should first be 
settled at the local level and therefore asked the provincial authorities to carry 
out their own inspections; only after that, if necessary, would it send its own 
emissaries. The aim of these missions was to draw Trokyap’s border in keeping 
with Nationalist government guidelines.30 One of the two off icials from 
Xikang was Du Dediao, commander of the peace preservation forces. Du had 
been specially appointed to Trokyap (Chuosi jia tezhong bao’an daduizhang) 
after initially being posted to Jinghua County. The other was Zhou Wenzao, 
the Xikang emissary (Xikang zhuanyuan) who had been escorted by Du 
Dediao in the course of his survey. Their duties consisted in collecting data on 
the situation of every local chieftain territory (population, territorial limits, 
natural resources, etc.). Sichuan province sent to Trokyap Yan Guangxi, the 
emissary of the sixteenth district of Sichuan province (Sichuan sheng shiliu qu 
28 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629B, translation into Chinese of a letter 
from the Trokyap local chieftain to the County Off icer of Jinghua, 8 March 1937. This policy was 
called ‘reform of the hereditary rank’ (shixi yange) and is explained in Wu Yongzhang (1988, 
261-262); see also Gong Yin (1992, 123-124). I translate gongshun tusi as ‘distinguished’ because 
this title indicates that the said person received a salary and sometimes a military escort from 
the Manchu government as a form of reward.
29 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629B, order from the Executive yuan, 
17 January 1939.
30 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, opinion of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, April 1938.
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xingzheng ducha zhuanyuan), which was an intermediate unit that ensured 
communication between the province and the counties.
The Xikang emissaries’ reports are largely quoted in the archives and give 
details of Trokyap’s geographical situation and natural resources. They also 
mention the ‘vile acts’ people from Jinghua County carried out on behalf of the 
Sichuan authorities who had already relayed rumours about what they called 
‘the unscrupulous intentions’ of Xikang people three years earlier.31 The Sichuan 
authorities reported the local point of view that the Trokyap people would never 
agree to become part of Xikang province and were ready to fight the Xikang 
army by involving many other Tibetan kings. Sichuan warned Chongqing 
that the border situation might become a national issue if Japan seized the 
opportunity to cross this fragile border and to advance into Chinese territory.32
Economic interests
Nevertheless, the key question for the Xikang emissaries was whether the 
Trokyap kingdom was economically self-suff icient. Trokyap had already 
been described as sparsely populated, with no fertile land, but very rich 
in natural resources and livestock.33 The latter were potential sources of 
revenue for both Sichuan and Xikang provinces. With two gold mines already 
in operation, Trokyap had much to offer.34 These mines were objects of envy 
to both the Chinese and Tibetans throughout the f irst half of the twentieth 
century. Indeed, the Trokyap king had defeated the Chinese – who were 
all too keen to take over these mines – and subsequently remained on the 
alert.35 He managed this after having mobilized soldiers from among his 
own people and from other Tibetan kingdoms which, thanks to marital 
31 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, advice from the Xikang government 
and transmission of reports from the f ield, 15 December 1940.
32 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, memoir from the Sichuan govern-
ment, 26 October 1937.
33 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, report from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, 26 October 1937.
34 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, report from Zhou Wenzao, 1939.
35 A letter from the sixteenth district of Sichuan, an enclosure to a letter from the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, 20 April 1937, which recalls that the events happened at the beginning of the 
twentieth century: as early as the 1910s, during Yuan Shikai’s rule (1912-1916), people from Yuhua 
Company were sent to open the gold mine in Ere. The company met with resistance from the 
Sichuan warlords well before reaching the heart of Trokyap. According to the archives, this 
company exceeded its rights and started competing with a Sichuanese f irm called Zhuokai 
Company that was already operating the mine. The Yuhua Company, whose manager was the 
Minister of Finance in the Peking government, therefore compromised the interests of the local 
f irm. Finally, the whole mine operation project was abandoned for some time.
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alliances, maintained close ties with him. At the end of the 1930s, when 
Trokyap reappeared on the political and military scene, control of the gold 
mines once again became a key issue, this time between the two provincial 
governments. However, for the Trokyap king, who had already refused to 
grant access to the gold mines to either the Chinese or the Tibetans from 
Central Tibet, the determining issue concerned the taxes and corvée service 
that Xikang province would inevitably demand (Li 1984, 45-48).
The Local Situation: The Trokyap King’s Opinion
In the archives, the Trokyap king’s opinion is mentioned only indirectly. All 
of the letters, save one, are written in Chinese. Written in Tibetan and dated 
28 February 1941, this particular letter came directly from the king of Trokyap. 
Though for G.M.D. the matter was already closed, this letter requested in rather 
vague terms that the border of Trokyap be (re)defined. In the letter, the king 
agrees with the Chinese central government’s plan to reorganize its territory, 
but he does not disclose his opinion about whether Trokyap should belong to 
Xikang or Sichuan. His view, as quoted by the Sichuan authorities, was that he 
did not want to see his territory become part of Xikang. Again, according to 
the Sichuan authorities, his arguments were that his kingdom had been under 
the administration of Daofu County since the reform implemented by Zhao 
Erfeng and Fu Songmu; therefore, it belonged to Sichuan province. According 
to the Sichuan provincial government, the king went even further to say that 
he preferred to remain in Jinghua County within Sichuan province. However, 
let us not forget that this was before the Xikang province project had ever 
been scheduled. At the time this area was called the ‘Sichuan Border’.36 The 
Sichuan authorities went on to add that Trokyap threatened to oppose the 
decision to include it in Xikang province. Their resistance could be traced 
to when Liu Wenhui and his men had retreated to Xikang in 1935 and had 
got as far as Trokyap. This military intrusion had seriously affected Trokyap 
and its population who had had to provide for this army.37
36 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, copy of a letter signed by the 
assembly of local chieftains of Gyelmorong, 8 March 1937, an enclosure to a letter disclosing the 
opinion of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Preparatory Committee for the establishment 
of Xikang Province, 15 May 1937.
37 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, quotation from a letter from the 
Sichuan province government in a letter disclosing the opinion of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
to the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of Xikang Province, 15 May 1937; Memoir 
from the Sichuan government, 26 October 1937; Opinion of the Sichuan government, 1939.
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In fact, the excessive taxes, especially the transportation corvée (ulak) 
levied by Xikang, were the main reason that Trokyap wished to remain 
under the administration of the Sichuan Border. Indeed, it would seem 
that the Trokyap king attempted to negotiate tax exemptions with the 
Xikang provincial government and threatened to start a war with China if 
his demands were not met. The emissary of Xikang province conveyed this 
opinion after meeting with the Trokyap king:
In April 1939, the Xikang provincial government sent an emissary to Jinghua 
County in Sichuan province to negotiate the Trokyap affair with the Jinghua 
authorities. The Trokyap king, having been influenced by others, asked to 
be exempted from taxes forever. The Xikang government directly answered 
this request by arguing that Trokyap should f irst agree to become part of 
Xikang province. A year later, the Xikang government agreed to abstain 
from levying taxes for a three-year period. The Trokyap king answered in 
an ambiguous manner: the border had still not been drawn, and therefore 
Trokyap wanted to keep its current privileges and particular situation that 
it had always had. Regarding the delimitation of the border, it wanted to 
remain free of any engagement; otherwise it would inform all the Khampa 
kings of the Chinese decision to incorporate its territory into Xikang and 
would form a coalition that would destabilize the development policy.38
A witness account of the affair was even more specif ic. Li Hou’an, a protago-
nist in this affair, writes that the Trokyap king did not want his territory to 
be assigned to Xikang. He preferred Sichuan because taxes were extremely 
high in Xikang and the corvée even more substantial. According to this 
testimony, the Trokyap king justif ied his arguments by taking as an example 
the journey made by the Xikang emissary: the latter had taken advantage 
of the corvée system and had requisitioned people from three different 
kingdoms to carry his luggage. He particularly insisted that such high taxes 
and corvée labour would be a terrible burden on his people. He concluded 
that the people of Trokyap would prefer to die rather than belong to Xikang 
(Li 1984, 49).
There were considerable economic interests at stake, as illustrated by the 
gold mine issue mentioned above and by the fact that Liu Wenhui made 
this a priority as soon as he had secured Trokyap’s integration in Xikang 
(Li 1984, 50). The excessive taxes and the obligation to do corvée labour 
38 Academia Historica, archive f ile number 026000009629A, report from Zhou Wenzao, the 
emissary of Xikang province to Trokyap, to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 15 April 1940.
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which would have been imposed on the people of Trokyap deterred their 
king from allowing his kingdom and his subjects to become part of Xikang.
It is true that the Trokyap king maintained close ties with other rulers 
through matrimonial alliances. Nevertheless, it is still diff icult to determine 
whether he was trying to protect himself against other Khampa rulers, or 
if he simply wanted to create his own delimited territory. He undoubtedly 
used Khampa forces to oppose the Xikang authorities.
Conclusion
The case of Trokyap kingdom, a small principality on the fringes of the 
eastern Tibetan Kham region, exemplif ies the situation in which more 
and more political entities, though relatively independent vis-à-vis Central 
Tibet, were being swallowed up by Chinese territory in the early twentieth 
century during the transition from an empire to a nation-state. Tibetan 
efforts to build a nation-state and to draw Kham into its new administration 
system are not even mentioned in the Trokyap archive f ile, and we do not 
know what the Tibetan government’s opinion on this case was. The priority 
of the Chinese central government was to def ine the border territory and 
consolidate Xikang province. Any arguments regarding the ethnicity of the 
protagonists (Tibetan or Chinese), not to mention Sun Yat-sen’s political 
thoughts on race equality, were ignored.
Caught up in the dispute between the two provinces, the Trokyap king 
attempted to retain his previous Manchu privileges and had little concern 
for whether the nation-state became Tibetan or Chinese. However, as his 
interests converged with those of the Chinese central authorities, he was 
the only one among the three local protagonists of this territorial dispute 
to actually take part in the state-building policy implemented by the new 
Chongqing government. In contrast, Sichuan and Xikang authorities sought 
to defend their own interests independently of their government policy. The 
king did not even consider acquiring autonomy, a status that Sun Yat-sen 
granted the border areas of China and which others in Kham tried to assert 
in vain. The fragmented organization of the Kham Tibetan province and its 
former organization into various kingdoms prevented the unification of the 
area. Had this been possible, it would have allowed the creation of a Kham 
Tibetan autonomous province, just as Inner Mongolia became autonomous 
in 1947. However, the subsequent creation by China of Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures and counties in the former Tibetan Kham province is a visible 
sign of today’s recognition of the entire Tibetan territory and of its unity.
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11 The Rise of a Political Strongman in 
Dergé in the Early Twentieth Century
The Story of Jagö Topden
Yudru Tsomu
Abstract
This chapter discusses the emergence of a new elite class of ‘political 
strongmen’ in Kham in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The case of Jagö Topden demonstrates a shift from authority based 
on traditional hereditary and ascribed status to political recognition 
achieved through diverse political strategies, based on individual cha-
risma, ambition, and consummate political skills. Unlike traditional 
forces in Kham, Jagö Topden had a relatively clear understanding of the 
general political situation of the time, and he appropriated new ideas 
for reforms. He formed alliances with various forces that contended 
for control of the region and adopted the regional identity of a united 
Kham. Ultimately, he emerged as the dominant f igure to compete with 
the Dergé king.
Keywords: Jagö Topden, nationalism, Xikang, new elite, political strong-
men, Dergé
Introduction
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Kham polities 
were undergoing a period of upheaval and radical changes due to both 
exogenous and endogenous factors. The disruption fostered growing 
contention over the control of polities in Kham, a buffer zone between 
the larger political entities of Central Tibet and Qing China as well as 
an in-between area. As I have argued elsewhere (Tsomu 2015, 1), this 
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
doi: 10.5117/9789463728713_ch11
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made Kham a contingent region, with a host of political, cultural, and 
economic complexities.1 During this period, the Kham region became 
a zone of contestation, resulting from the growing assertion of power 
and authority by both Qing and Nationalist China and the attempt to 
check the Chinese penetration by the Tibetan government (the Ganden 
Phodrang). The situation created political f lux where belongings and 
allegiances of various polities in Kham were put to the test (Gros 2016, 
209).
The struggle for authority was also endogenous, in that this period also 
saw a newly emergent elite that sought to wrest power from traditional 
hegemonic hereditary ruling families, i.e. families of the local gyelpo 
(king), depa (governor), or pönpo (chief), or from monasteries represented 
by religious leaders such as reincarnated lamas or khenpos (abbots). Part of 
this new group of leaders, the so-called ‘modern educated elite’2 that had 
received a modern education, was well represented by Kelzang Tsering, 
the well-known Khampa off icial working in the Nationalist government. 
By climbing Kham society’s traditional hierarchy thanks to their modern 
education, this elite group achieved upward social mobility and turned 
its attention toward a wider national stage and social changes.3 The new 
elite also included Khampa trader families such as the Pangdatsang 
in Markham, located in western Kham, west of the Drichu River (Ch. 
Jinshajiang). After having become part of a modern middle class that 
1 I examine the geo-political situation of Kham at length in my book The Rise of Gönpo Namgyel 
in Kham: The Blind Warrior of Nyarong (2015).
2 I refer to the emergent elite in Batang as modern because they were different from the 
traditional elite in that they had received a modern education and had ventured beyond the 
traditional cultural milieu. This elite formed a close alliance with the Nationalists. Within less 
than f ive years, from November 1907 to June 1911, during gaitu guiliu (the policy of ‘substituting 
chieftains with state appointed civilian off icials’), over 200 schools were opened in the Sichuan 
borderlands. However, after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912, except for schools in Luding 
(Chakzamkha), Kangding (Dartsedo), and Bathang, most of them stopped recruiting students. 
For details about the impact of modern education in Kham, refer to Zhang Jingxi (1939, 1-85); 
Wang Di (1986, 55-62); Lin Junhua (1993, 39-46, 17); Liu Xianqiang (2007, 90-95; 2008); Ma Tinzhong 
(2008, 68-74; 2012, 205-209); Xue Jiangang (2013, 1-54).
3 As off icials in the Nationalist government, Kelzang Tsering and other Khampa elites who 
had received a ‘modern education’ were deeply inf luenced by ideals of social and political 
modernization. Their political ambition had also shifted beyond narrow local perspectives, and 
they were inf luential in shaping the Nationalist government’s Tibet policies. They were also 
instrumental in initiating the ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ movement, which targeted the Sichuan 
warlord and encroachments on Kham by Central Tibetan troops. For details about the movement, 
see Peng Wenbin (2002, 57-84); You Zhen (2010, 104-108); Wang Juan (2013, 25-30); Luo Shaoming 
(2015, 1-5).
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had emerged in Lhasa, the Pangdatsang also began to become actively 
involved in local Kham politics and larger politics regarding Sino-Tibetan 
relations since the 1930s.4
In addition, former headmen, such as Jagö Topden in Dergé – a powerful 
kingdom in northern Kham – and others subordinate to aforementioned 
hegemonic traditional rulers such as gyelpo, pönpo, and depa rose to become 
dominant rulers in various regions of Kham. Some of these new authority 
f igures replaced traditional hegemonic rulers.5 In contemporary sources 
these new political actors are referred to as jöntang chenpo, which literally 
means ‘men of ability’.6 A man of ability is a term generally applied to a 
person capable of achieving success. However, in the case of Jagö, describing 
him simply as ‘an able man’ does not do him justice. He could be considered 
a ‘great man’, but the Tibetan term mi chenpo (literally meaning ‘a person 
with high rank/status’, i.e. great man) is usually equated with hereditary 
hegemonic rulers or people of noble birth. One of the secondary Tibetan 
sources describes Jagö Topden as a khadrak wangshechen, which literally 
means ‘a person who is domineering/dictatorial’ in Kham (Lodrö Püntsok 
1994, 191). I consider that the indigenous term used to refer to Jagö comes 
very close to the English term ‘strongman’. Thus, I will refer to these new 
political actors as ‘strongmen’, a coinage that also emphasizes that they are 
not from traditional hereditary families and constituted a newly emerg-
ing category of leaders in Kham politics. These ‘strongmen’ came to the 
fore in Kham politics by adapting to and negotiating with the broader 
political milieu. With initial support from a small coterie of like-minded 
followers, these men drew on their strong character, personal ambition, 
charisma, and ability to negotiate and ‘collaborate’ with power holders at 
4 For the rise of the family and its role in the politics of Kham and Central Tibet, refer to 
Goldstein (1989, 180); McGranahan (2005, 253-274); Zhang Faxian (2011, 25-30, 138); Meilang 
Zongzhen [Mönlam Tsöndrü] (2005a, 15-21; 2005b, 50-55; 2009, 71-80); Tsomu (2016, 177-210); 
Galli, this volume.
5 After the collapse of Qing rule in 1912, except for a few low-ranking commanding Off icers 
(zhangguan si) who restored their rule over remote areas in Lithang and Nyachukha (Yajiang), 
the Bathang and Lithang depas were unable to restore their authority; see Wu Fengpei (1984, 195). 
In southern Kham, in particular Chaktreng and Dabpa regions that used to be under Bathang 
and Lithang depas (governors), new political actors came to the fore after the collapse of Qing 
rule in 1912. These groups, consisting of former headmen who were subordinate to the traditional 
rulers, rose to f ill the power vacuum after the traditional rulers were unable to restore their 
power.
6 For example, Jagö Topden is described as ‘wise in political decision-making’ (chapsi kyi 
chawar khedzang denpa) in Lodrö Püntsok et al. (1995, 191). Furthermore, Püntsok Wangyel 
portrays Jagö as namrik denpa, literally meaning ‘the wise’; see Chung Tsering (2006, 83).
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different levels to build their power. Like certain former headmen, these 
strongmen distinguished themselves by their outstanding leadership and 
bravery in predatory raids against neighbouring areas and/or sometimes 
in military exploits against Nationalist troops stationed in local regions. 
Consequently, they emerged as the new ruling elite.7 Here it might be 
worthwhile comparing the local strongmen represented by Jagö Topden in 
Dergé in 1900s with another strongman – Nyarong Gönpo Namgyel, who rose 
to become a dominant power in Nyarong and Kham in the mid-nineteenth 
century. These two shared similar traits – such as being strong-willed, 
very ambitious, charismatic, and capable of taking advantage of popular 
sentiment and of establishing a collaboration network with various forces. 
However, the latter rose to power under very different circumstances. At 
the time of the Gönpo Namgyel’s ascendancy (1836-1865), external forces 
such as Qing China and Central Tibet were powerful but distant centers. 
In most cases, their control of various Kham polities was nominal, weak, 
and indirect.8 Affairs in Kham and those in various Kham polities were 
determined by the local context. This included Kham’s social-political 
milieu, the local structure of authority, the local political culture – kinship 
loyalty, regional allegiance, moral and political commitments, worldview, 
as well as culturally specif ic values and beliefs such as machismo, honor, 
and revenge.9
This chapter examines the way political authority shifted in Kham 
in the early twentieth century through the case study of the rise of Jagö 
Topden, a charismatic headman who successfully challenged the power 
of the Dergé king in the early part of the twentieth century. The case of 
Jagö Topden is particularly revealing about Kham as a political territory 
and the shifting nature of authority and the growing legitimacy of Kham 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The situation in the 
1920s, at the start of Jagö’s ascendancy, was unlike the aforementioned 
circumstances in which Gönpo Namgyel ascended to power. In this later 
period, Kham found itself at the center of growing competition over its 
control between the Tibetan government in Lhasa, the Chinese Nationalist 
government, the Chinese warlord Liu Wenhui, and the Khampa elite that 
was striving for the ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ (Tib. Kangpé rangsi rangkyong 
7 For details about these self-made strongmen in Chaktreng and Dabpa counties, refer to van 
Spengen (2002, 7-29); Qin Heping (2007, 1-9); Wang Haibing (2013, 69-74).
8 One exception to the general situation is the Qing control in Batang. For details, refer to 
Coleman (2014).
9 For details, refer to Tsomu (2015, 81-118).
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or Kangpé rangdé rangpön; Ch. Kangren zhi Kang). Thus, as a new emergent 
strongman with ambition, it was imperative for Jagö to strategize and 
operate not only in the conf ines of Dergé court politics but also to be 
cognizant of the broader politics of the Kham region, Central Tibet, and 
China. This case study shows the agency of the local elite in responding 
to the Chinese government’s efforts to incorporate the contested Kham 
region as an inalienable part of Chinese national space. In doing so, it 
reveals the complicated interactions between local Chinese authorities 
and local society in the process of establishing a nation state in modern 
Chinese history.
This case study also demonstrates how the nature of authority based on 
traditional hereditary and ascribed status began to shift to the recognition 
of achieved status. In addition to the external forces discussed above, the 
challenge to traditional authority also came from indigenous strongmen 
and their reliance on personal charisma, ability, and ambition, as typified by 
Jagö. The latter’s ascendancy resulted from the weakening of the Dergé king’s 
power and authority due to increasing control by the Qing administration 
(following the gaitu guiliu policy) since 1909, and by the direct rule of a 
commander sent by the Central Tibetan government in 1918 following its 
military intervention. Through his personal ambition and political skills 
of aptly mediating and collaborating with various forces he rose to become 
an alternative focus of power in the 1930s and started to increasingly usurp 
the power and authority of the royal family following the death of the 
Dergé king, Tsewang Düdül (1916-1942). For the purpose of this chapter, I 
will f irst briefly introduce the Dergé polity and provide an overview of the 
court politics and decline of the Dergé royal family. Next, I will focus on 
how Jagö Topden gradually rose to prominence in Kham where there was 
constant strife and describe how he eventually became a dominant local 
force who was on a par with the Dergé king. Through his upbringing and 
education among children of aristocratic families in Lhasa, Jagö became 
familiar with the workings of the Lhasa government and with some Tibetan 
off icials. Furthermore, his studies at the ‘Institute of Public Security and 
Administration of Xikang’ (Xikang bao’an xingzheng jiangxihui) run by Liu 
Wenhui in Dartsedo helped him not only to understand the Nationalist 
ideology and the working of the Chinese administration of Kham but also 
to embrace new ideas. All this experience forged his cosmopolitan view of 
the world and enabled him to have the upper hand. Astute and resourceful, 
Jagö took full advantage of various opportunities to establish formal and 
informal alliances with various forces as a means of extending his own 
power and authority.
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The Authority of the ‘Dergé Kingdom’ and Its Decline
The Political Structure and Authority in Dergé
Before any discussion can take place about the political competition that 
ensued in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a brief outline 
of the structure of the political system in Dergé needs to be given. Located 
in the river basin of the Upper Yangtze in northwestern Kham, the Dergé 
kingdom was believed to be the most densely populated area and the ‘richest 
agricultural and manufacturing district of eastern Tibet’ (Rockhill 1891, 227) 
(see Map 11.1). In the mid-eighteenth century, when Dergé was ruled by king 
Lodrö Püntsok, there were 25 districts with a total of 33 local chiefs/headmen 
(dzong go) and 43 nomadic tribes.10 Dergé could be described as a feudal state 
with a decentralized bureaucracy formed by a system in which land was 
granted to hereditary officials in exchange for administrative responsibilities.
Although the personalities and management methods might have 
changed during different periods, the core principle of the right of heredi-
tary ruler remained constant. The highest levels of bureaucracy consisted 
of 200 aristocrats. Each of the four larger designated districts – Yilhung 
in the east, Garjé in the south, Drongpa in the west, and Sershül in the 
north – had a chief or head off icial/minister (nyerchen, literally ‘the chief 
steward’) who was selected from families of aristocratic retinue appointees 
(dünkörkhak/dünkör). These off icials served on the highest secular political 
body in the king’s court known as the Council of Ministers and Stewards 
(nyerchak lhengyekang). They were known as pöngozhi (four chief off icials) 
or pönchenzhi (four great off icials) (Tubten Püntsok 2010, 78). Together with 
the treasurer (chakdzö), secretary (drungyik), and chamberlain (zimpön), 
they formed the f irst rank of off icials and resided mostly in the capital itself 
(Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 49-50; Tubten Püntsok 2010, 78).
The second level of off icials consisted of 33 local chiefs/headmen (dzong 
go) that headed the 25 districts (dzongkhak or dechok), who were also selected 
from among aristocratic retinue appointees and were mostly hereditary.11 
10 Its domain included present-day Dergé, Pelyül, Sershül, and Jomda counties as well as the 
western part of Kandzé County.
11 Among the 33 local chiefs, four ‘outer off icials’ (chipöngo) from four leading families retained 
power during most of Dergé’s history. These four ‘outer off icials’ were from Gamongna, Sokmot-
sang, Nyakshik Setsa, and Gojo Samdrup. These four off icials were responsible for providing 
soldiers to protect Dergé borders when necessary. See Karma Gyeltsen (1994, 78-79). However, 
Tubten Püntsok calls them pöngosum; he also holds that Gamongna Sokmotsang should be one 
instead of two as listed in Karma Gyeltsen. See Tubten Püntsok (2010, 80).
The rise oF a poliTical sTrongman in dergé in The early T wenTieTh cenTury 369
The second strata of off icials also included another 41 aristocratic retinue 
appointees.12
Lastly, the third rank of off icials consisted of 80 local representatives or 
village headmen (hördra), who functioned as the king’s representatives or 
deputies responsible for administering corvée labour (ulak).13 Under the 
local representatives, there were leaders (gopa) who did not have an off icial 
rank. These leaders were chosen from among the common people to assist 
the local representative in collecting taxes, administering labour services, 
and requisitions. The f irst two ranks of off icials were required to perform 
administrative services in Dergé’s central government in exchange for the 
land granted to them by the king. However, except for the f irst rank of 
off icials, most hereditary chiefs were not required to reside in the capital. 
12 Tubten Püntsok states that there are 43 aristocratic retinues. For a detailed list, refer to 
Tubten Püntsok (2010, 86-89).
13 Tubten Püntsok lists 88 hördra. For details, see Tubten Püntsok (2010, 90-93).
Map 11.1  Dergé at the Time of Jagö Topden
sources: based on srTm (nasa) and modern administrative borders extracted from gadm 
database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 july 2015)
author: rémi chaix
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Thus, it was likely that chief officials/ministers (nyerchen), local chiefs (dzong 
go), or aristocratic retinue appointees (dünkörkhak) in Dergé set themselves 
up as territorial rulers on their own estates and became excessively powerful. 
Consequently, these hereditary chiefs and aristocratic retinue appointees 
maintained a high degree of local autonomy. The division of land among 
hereditary local chiefs resulted in alternative foci of power that could counter 
the authority of the king. This would make the king primus inter pares, if 
local districts became exceptionally powerful or allied with one another 
(Hartley 1997, 25).
The political system of the Dergé Kingdom is commonly portrayed as 
‘the alliance between secular and religious powers’ to differentiate it from 
‘the merging of religion and politics’ (Tib. chösi zungdrel; Ch. zhengjiao 
heyi), by later Chinese researchers (Du Yongbin 1989, 85-99; Zeng Wenqiong 
1988, 17-25). The royal family of Dergé, through close alliance with monastic 
hierarchs, assumed secular power and had religious power in its service. To 
balance the power of local hereditary chiefs, the kings accommodated and 
patronized monasteries of different traditions (Hartley 1997, 30, 38). Until 
the early nineteenth century, the king of Dergé usually served as the abbot 
of Lhundrupteng monastery, commonly known as Dergé Gönchen, which 
belonged to the Sakya school of Tibetan Buddhism. Yet, the royal family 
also kept close ties with chaplains (üla) from f ive head monasteries (ügön) 
that belonged to Nyingma and Kagyü traditions.
The Decline of the Power and Authority of the Dergé King’s Family
Dergé had flourished as a cultural center with the patronage of the Dergé 
royal family and the Manchu court. In the late eighteenth century, the power 
and authority of the Dergé kingdom began to wane. The chief reason for its 
decline is worthy of a Shakespearian drama. The main source of discord 
involved rivalry for the throne within the royal family as well as competition 
for power between the king and his subordinate headmen. In 1790, as the 
Dergé prince Tsewang Dörjé Rikdzin (1786-1847) was still young, his mother, 
the dowager queen Tsewang Lhamo served as the regent (Ronis 2011, 61-81; 
Tubten Püntsok 2010, 50). During her reign (1790-1806/1808),14 Dergé battled 
with its northern neighbour Lingtsang, and the queen’s rule was challenged 
by a number of lamas and aristocrats who were highly displeased with her. 
Eventually, war with the Kharnang tribe in Dzatö in 1808 forced her to leave 
14 Though her son was enthroned in 1798, she ruled as before until 1806. See Tubten Püntsok 
(2010, 51).
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the capital (Tsewang Dörjé Rikdzin 1989, 100-101; Ronis 2011, 61-81).15 The king, 
who later authored The Genealogy of the Dergé Kings,16 was said to have taken 
no interest in governing, preferring instead to devote his time to religion by 
becoming a fully ordained monk in 1826 (Tubten Püntsok 2010, 52).17 The 
combination of internal strife and a disinterested king naturally undermined 
the power and authority of the kingdom. The situation barely improved during 
the reign of the eighteenth king, Damtsik Dörjé (1811-1853), from 1847 to 1853. 
This weak king was unable to restore the authority of the royal family.
While internecine strife undoubtedly undermined the royal family’s ability 
to assert control over the region, the situation was further aggravated by the 
emergence of Nyarong chief Gönpo Namgyel as the key figure on Kham’s local 
political scene in the nineteenth century.18 Gönpo Namgyel’s occupation of 
Dergé19 in the mid-nineteenth century forced the Dergé king, Chimé Tapei 
Dörjé (1840-1896), to seek military assistance from both the Qing and Lhasa 
authorities (Tsomu 2015, 169-172). However, help from Lhasa did not come 
without a price. Having defeated Gönpo Namgyel, Lhasa began to exert a 
certain degree of authority over the northern Kham region – including Dergé – 
via the Tibetan High Commissioner’s Office in Nyarong (Nyarong Chikhyap) in 
1865-1866. Thereafter, the Dergé king’s family forged a closer relationship with 
Lhasa authorities and the latter began to exert growing influence in Dergé.20
15 Dege xianzhi explicitly mentions that resentment towards the mother was caused by her 
impropriety in her private life and by unduly trusting the monks of Dzokchen monastery. It 
also recounts that in 1799, when the headmen failed to persuade the king’s mother to return the 
political power to her son, they successfully mobilized armed forces to oust the royal mother and 
to crown the young thirteen-year-old king. However, as Jann Ronis (2011) convincingly argues, 
this was in fact a misreading of a passage in the Royal Genealogies about a ceremony for the 
crown prince, Tsewang Dorjé Rikdzin, which was performed in 1798. The Genealogy of the Dergé 
Kings written by the king himself clearly states that he did not take over the government until 
1806 or 1808. See Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (1995, 445).
16 The king wrote the work in 1828, and its full title in Tibetan is Dpal sa skyong Sde dge chos 
kyi rgyal po rim byon gyi rnam thar dge legs nor bu’i phreng ba ’dod dgu rab ’phel bya ba.
17 In 1826 in the presence of Ngör khenchen Jampa Kunga Tendzin, he took the gelong (bhiksu, 
fully ordained with 253 precepts) vow and became a fully ordained monk. When the king was 
ordained, he was given the name Jampa Künga Sanggyé Tenpai Gyeltsen. He was considered 
to be a great scholar well versed in the teachings of Ngör sub-school of the Sakya school. See 
Tubten Püntsok (2010, 52).
18 For a more detailed study of the rise of Gönpo Namgyel, refer to Tsomu (2015).
19 At the time Dergé was ruled by its nineteenth king, Chimé Takpé Dörjé, who was only nine 
years old in 1860. To prevent the whole Dergé region from revolting against his rule, Gönpo 
Namgyel took the king, his mother, and local revered lamas as hostages to Nyarong. See Yelé 
Tsültrim (n.d., 26); Kongtrül Yönten Gyatso and Karma Trinlé (1997, 293).
20 For details about the authority of the Tibetan commissioner over Dergé, see Tsomu (2015, 
224-26).
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By the 1870s, competition for power and authority between the Dergé king 
and his subordinate headmen – a common recurring theme in the history 
of Dergé since the late eighteenth century – reemerged. In particular, a 
weak king gave local chiefs (dzong go) ample opportunity to become foci 
of power to contest his authority. The intensif ication of internal unrest 
resulted from resentment on the part of the king’s 30 chiefs (dzong go) 
toward the king for handing over a follower to the amban during their 
pilgrimage to Central Tibet in 1871. The follower was accused of killing a 
Chinese member of staff under the amban’s responsibility; eventually he 
was executed by the latter. The king’s action was probably interpreted as an 
act of cowardice and weakness. The event deepened the rift between the 
king and his subordinate chiefs. By the late 1870s, all 30 chiefs were believed 
to have increasingly def ied the king (Ge Le 1984, 259; Sichuan sheng Dege 
xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 1995, 471).
Furthermore, in the 1890s, amidst the intense competition for power 
between the king and his subordinate headmen, great discord arose between 
King Chimé Tapei Dörjé and Queen Tseten Drölkar from the aristocratic 
family known as Ragashak in Lhasa, which led to an intense struggle between 
the king’s two sons for succession to the throne. This plunged Dergé into 
factional politics which lasted until the 1940s. The two factions associated 
with the Dergé brothers – Dörjé Senggé (commonly known as Aja), who 
succeeded his father and his brother Ngawang Jampel Rinchen (commonly 
known as Baba), who received support from the queen – resorted time after 
time to their old strategies of seeking assistance and support from either 
successive Sichuan or Lhasa authorities.21 Late Qing Sichuan authorities and 
the Ganden Phodrang under the Thirteenth Dalai Lama had both launched 
projects to strengthen their control and authority in Kham. Both also actively 
participated in the succession struggles and attempted to settle their favored 
candidate on the throne (Lu Chuanlin 2001a, 467-470; 2001b, 474-479).22 In 
the end, with the support of General Zhao Erfeng, Dörjé Senggé was able to 
21 For details about the Chinese off icial Zhang Ji’s attempt to replace the Dergé king and his 
headmen with government-appointed off icials by taking the king, the queen, and their two 
children to Chengdu, see Tubten Püntsok (2010, 56-57); Lodrö Püntsok (1994, 79-80).
22 It is interesting to note that the Lhasa authorities seemed to have supported both candidates 
at one point or another, depending on their interests at a particular time. With the support 
of the Tibetan government, the two brothers were able to return to Dergé in 1897 after their 
parents had passed away in Chengdu in the previous year. The Tibetan government had Dörjé 
Senggé succeed to the Dergé throne. They also had him married to Sönam Tsomo, the daughter 
of an aristocratic family known as Nangsotsang from the Penpo area near Lhasa. See Tubten 
Püntsok (2010, 57). For instance, though the Tibetan troops stationed in Nyarong dispatched 
representatives and cavalry to Dergé in 1906 to support Ngawang’s claim to the throne, the 
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force his brother Ngawang and his followers to flee to Golok (Zhao Erfeng 
2001, 504-505). Later, they followed the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to Central 
Tibet (Karma Gyeltsen 1994, 61; Ge Le 1984, 262; Baima Dengdeng and Xiake 
Zelang 2008, 189), where Ngawang was granted the title of theji of third rank23 
and became an official of the Ganden Phodrang (Baima Dengdeng and Xiake 
Zelang 2008, 189; Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 1995, 472).
Meanwhile, when the Dergé kingdom underwent gaitu guiliu (the policy of 
‘substituting chieftains with state-appointed civilian officials’) in 1909, Dörjé 
Senggé was granted the hereditary civilian position of dusi (commander) 
and took up residence in Bathang (Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan 
weiyuanhui 1995, 446).24 When the Qing collapsed in 1912, many indigenous 
kings, chieftains, and headmen in the Kham borderland re-established 
their rule at the time, with Dörjé Senggé also returning to Dergé. Chinese 
off icials in Dergé continued to rely on Dörjé’s authority to preside over the 
common people and the headmen in Dergé. He was given off icial titles such 
as ‘the battalion commander of indigenous soldiers’ (tubing yingzhang) and 
‘the commissioner in charge of the corvée labour and grain tax’ (chailiang 
zongban) (Ren Naiqiang 2009, 186-187). In 1918 when Tibetan troops invaded 
Kham, they occupied Dergé. At that time, the Lhasa government escorted 
Dörjé Senggé and his wife to Central Tibet, placing them under house arrest 
(Ren Naiqiang 2009, 187; Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 
1995, 16). Dörjé Senggé passed away in 1919 in Central Tibet, leaving a son 
and three daughters (Lodrö Püntsok 1994, 86; Tubten Püntsok 2010, 62; 
Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 182).
Jagö Topden’s Rise to Power
As we have seen, from the end of the nineteenth to the early twentieth cen-
tury, the Dergé royal family was caught up in rivalry over the administration 
Lhasa authorities also supported his brother Dörjé Senggé in f ighting against Jampel. See Ma 
Guangwen (1990, 493-497); Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (1995, 472).
23 Theji was originally a Mongol title that referred to a prince and was similar to the Chinese 
term taizi (crown prince). It later became an off icial title with the third rank within the Tibetan 
government. The relevant accounts in Chinese about the title granted to Ngawang maintains he 
received the title of theji with the fourth rank, which seems to be based on oral sources and is 
because these authors do not know that the off icial with the title theji is the one with the third 
rank with the Tibetan government. Interestingly, Tubten Püntsok (2010, 60) simply states that 
Ngawang was given the off icial position with the f ifth rank, without specifying the actual title.
24 His annual salary was 3000 taels of silver. See Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan 
weiyuanhui (1995, 446).
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of the kingdom. This resulted in decades of social unrest amidst growing 
contention for the control of Kham between the Ganden Phodrang and the 
Qing court as well as the successive Chinese regimes. It also created a conflict 
of interest among the elite and provided an opportunity for ambitious 
local f igures to become alternative foci of power, usurping the power and 
authority of the royal family. One such f igure was Jagö Topden, one of the 
Dergé dünkör (aristocratic retinue appointees).
Jagö Topden’s Family Background
Jagö Topden was born in Hakhok in Dergé in 1901. His family had been 
very much involved in the internal wrangling within the Dergé royal 
family throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His 
grandfather, Jagö Pema Ledrup, served as chief steward at the Dergé king’s 
court.25 Later, his father, Jagö Tashi Namgyel, inherited the position of the 
chief minister of Dergé and championed the cause of the younger Dergé 
brother, Ngawang. He was believed to have been poisoned by the faction 
supporting the elder Dergé brother, Dörjé Senggé, in 1906-1907 (Lodrö 
Püntsok 1994, 189; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 179; Tubten 
Püntsok, 2010, 58). Since Jagö Topden and his older brother Jagö Tsenam 
were too young to be chief minister of Dergé, his mother Tsewang Drölma 
inherited her husband’s position and continued to be loyal to Ngawang’s 
faction.26 Having been defeated by Dörjé Senggé’s faction and the Qing 
troops under Zhao Erfeng in April 1909 (Zhao Erfeng 2001, 504; Sichuan 
sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 1995, 14-15; Baima Dengdeng and 
Xiake Zelang 2008, 189), Tsewang Drölma, together with all her children, 
followed Ngawang and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to Lhasa. They first settled 
in the Nakchu region in northern Tibet (Ge Le 1984, 262; Karma Gyeltsen 
1994, 61; Baima Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang 2008, 189). As stated above, 
while Ngawang was granted the title of theji, the head of the Jagö family 
was appointed gopa (headman) of Janggyap in Nakchu region. Thereupon, 
25 Pema Ledrup, known to be brave and resourceful, gained the king’s trust for having rescued 
the king from Nyarong in the 1860s. According to oral traditions, as he had directly intervened in 
the regent mother Chöying Zangmo’s illicit affair with a subordinate headman, it was believed 
that the regent had poisoned him. For details about Jagö Pema Ledrup’s role in bringing down 
Gönpo Namgyel and rescuing the king, see Tsomu (2015, 187, 215).
26 Jagö Topden’s mother was considered to be one of the three most powerful women during 
the period, popularly known as ‘three demonesses of Kham’. The other two were the seventh 
chief of Khangsar Yangchen Khendro (also known as Khangsar Yangchen Drölma) and Gyari 
Chimé Drölma of Upper Nyarong. For details, refer to Tsomu (2018).
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they all became part of the Ganden Phodrang.27 In 1910-1911, Ngawang and 
his subordinates assisted the Lhasa troops to f ight against the Qing troops 
in Gyantsé. Their bravery and outstanding performance in the f ight against 
the Qing troops established their reputation and earned them recognition 
from the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama granted estates (zhika) to 
the Jagö and Drebö families near Sera monastery in Lhasa and near Yardrok 
Yumtso in Tsang, respectively. He also assigned over a dozen khölpa families 
to each of the two families (Baima Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang 2008, 191; 
Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 179-180; Lodrö Püntsok 1994, 190).
The Jagö family’s goal of restoring their authority in their home region 
in Dergé coincided with the period when the Lhasa government under the 
Thirteenth Dalai Lama was engaged in nation-building projects to extend 
their control and to strengthen their authority in Kham. With new-found 
patronage from the Dalai Lama, Tsewang Drölma made a great effort to 
restore her family’s power and authority in Dergé. In 1918 when the Ganden 
Phodrang army seized Chamdo, at Tsewang Drölma’s request the Thirteenth 
Dalai Lama wrote to Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar, Kham’s high commissioner 
(Domé chikhyap), whose off ice was f irst established in 1913 (Tu Ga 2009, 
164), demanding that Tibetan troops restore power to the Jagö family in 
Dergé and exempt the family from all corvée labour and taxes. Fearing the 
threat posed by Dörjé Senggé’s faction, the Jagö family temporarily settled 
in Wangpotö to the west of the Drichu River. To ensure that her sons Jagö 
Tsenam and Jagö Topden would receive the best education, she took the 
farsighted action of sending them to Tsé Lopdra, a school that prepared the 
Lhasa aristocracy for service in the Ganden Phodrang. This training, which 
Jagö Topden completed within three years with excellent results, enabled 
him not only to become familiar with the Tibetan government’s affairs and 
the situation in Central Tibet but also to become acquainted with future 
Ganden Phodrang off icials (Lodrö Püntsok 1994, 190; Lai Zuozhong 1996, 
97; Baima Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang 2008, 192; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé 
and Dayang 2009, 181). What happened later proves that this training was 
very useful for the Jagö family’s restoration of their power and authority in 
Dergé (Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 181; Baima Dengdeng and 
Xiake Zelang, 2008, 192; Lai Ziozhong 1996, 97). Since 1918, Lhasa troops 
had been occupying areas such as Dergé, Pelyül, Sershül, and Jomda – all 
27 Having f irst f led to Golok, following a recommendation from Jamyang Zhepa, the head 
lama reincarnate of Labrang Trashikhyil, they sought refuge with warlords in Qinghai and 
temporarily settled in Tsolho (Ch. Hainan). With the assistance of Jamyang Zhepa, they followed 
the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to Central Tibet.
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under the rule of the Dergé king (Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan 
weiyuanhui 1995, 445-446; Baima Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang 2008, 192). 
By 1921, when Jagö Topden returned to Dergé as a headman, he became 
a useful ally for the Ganden Phodrang. In addition, his familiarity with 
Lhasa nobles and the Ganden Phodrang’s strategies provided him with a 
secure footing in dealing with Lhasa and in his effort to restore his family’s 
power and authority in Dergé. In 1926 Dörjé Senggé’s son Tsewang Düdül 
(1916-1942) was authorized by Domé chikhyap to rule Dergé (Tubten Püntsok 
2010, 62; Lodrö Püntsok 1994, 86).28 But military and political power was 
still controlled by the Dergé Commissioner’s Off ice (Dergé chikhyap) that 
had been set up in 1918 and was headed by the dapön (the regimental 
commander) of Tibetan troops in Dergé.29 To restore his family’s power, 
Jagö had to do his best to gain the support of the dapön of Lhasa troops 
stationed in Dergé. As Jagö was unable to forge a good relationship with 
regimental commander Chungrangpa, a Lhasa aristocrat, he had to settle 
for the position of minor headman (a common dünkör) (Lodrö Püntsok 
1994, 190; Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang, 2008, 192; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé 
and Dayang 2009, 182).30
The Gradual Rise of the Jagö Family
Jagö’s fortune changed when Khemé became regimental commander in 
1929. They were old acquaintances from Lhasa, and Khemé entrusted Jagö 
with handling some important matters in Sershül and Pelyül. Jagö was not 
only shrewd, capable, and experienced, but also decisive in handling affairs; 
hence, he was able to win Khemé’s trust. Around 1930, he was eventually 
28 Tubten Püntsok (2010, 63) states that in 1919 the young king was enthroned by Domé chikhyap. 
Since he was only four years old, Situ rinpoché Pema Wangchok of Pelpung monastery served as 
regent. Furthermore, in 1926 the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s decree of enthroning Tsewang Düdül 
was shown at the assembly attended by the regiment commander of Tibetan troops stationed 
in Dergé, the king and all the off icials under the king. This is probably the reason that the 
Gazetteer of Dergé (16) maintains that Tsewang was chosen to accede to the Dergé throne by 
the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1926.
29 According to an oral source, Dergé King Tsewang Düdül and others could only have had 
rather low living expenses, and even the ‘tribute’ paid by the various major and minor headmen 
all belonged to the Tibetan troops. See Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang (2009, 182).
30 At the time ministers in charge of the Off ice of Ministers and Stewards included Nyerchen 
Gyangkhang rinpoché, Hörcho Peldo, headman of Tsari called Tsari Nyergé, the Great Chamdzö 
Namsé Tsega, the Minor Chamdzö Wokma Sonam Tsering, and others. Later, the Great Chamdzö 
Namsé Tsega was removed from off ice for accepting bribes in Jomda. Wokma Sonam Tsering was 
promoted to Great Chakdzö. See Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang (2009, 182); Baima Dengdeng 
and Xiake Zelang (2008, 192).
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appointed chief minister (nyerchen) of the Dergé royal court under King 
Tsewang Düdül. With this appointment, Jagö had accomplished the f irst 
step of restoring his family’s power in Dergé. He was said to be courageous, 
insightful, very eloquent, and good at socializing with all kinds of people. 
Jagö now positioned himself in the inner circle of the Dergé court and 
gradually consolidated his power.
Jagö also made great efforts to gain the trust of King Tsewang Düdül 
after the latter had regained control of Dergé in 1932. The Dergé royal family 
regained some stability with the support of the Ganden Phodrang. However, 
the Ganden Phodrang’s position in regions east of the Drichu River had not 
been completely secured; hence, there was constant f ighting between Lhasa 
and Chinese troops. In 1932 the two parties reached what became known 
as the ‘Kamtok Agreement’ (Kamtok dröchö/Kamtok dröching). According 
to this agreement Lhasa consented to withdraw its troops from the regions 
east of the Drichu River.31 Jagö managed to gain the king’s trust, and he in 
turn appeared to be loyal to the king. He led forces to suppress the rebellion 
against the Dergé king by headmen from Hörpo and other areas in Pelyül 
(Sichuan sheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 1995, 19; Lai Zuozhong 
1996, 98).
Although the Lhasa government had withdrawn its troops from the Kham 
region, including Dergé, it continued to seek to levy grain taxes from Jomda, 
the regions to the west of the Drichu River that remained under the Dergé 
king’s authority. As Jagö began to mobilize the local populace against the 
Ganden Phodrang’s authority (Lodrö Püntsok 1994, 191; Lai Zuozhong 1996, 
98; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 179; Chengdu junqu silingbu 
1957, 6), the people of Dergé recognized him as an able and loyal minister 
of the Dergé court.32 The king also came to be dependent on him to carry 
out many of the affairs of the court.
The aforementioned actions show that Jagö was fully aware that his 
own position in Dergé at that time depended on the king’s patronage. In 
the meantime, Jagö also fully understood that he would not be able to 
31 At that time Tsewang Düdül was seventeen years old and was appointed to positions such 
as Supervising Off icial in Charge of the Militia Affairs of the Five Counties including Dergé, 
Pelyül, Denkhok, Sershül and Battalion Commander of the Indigenous Troops by the Dergé 
County government under Liu Wenhui’s control. Like any other government-appointed off icial, 
he was given a monthly salary. Jagö Topden and others also arranged to have Tsewang Düdül 
take the daughter of the Nangchen king named Jamyang Pelmo as his wife.
32 Many years later, in 1945 or 1946, he also incited the local people in Jomda to the west of 
the Drichu River to refuse to pay grain taxes to the Lhasa government. See Lai Zuozhong (1996, 
98) and Chengdu junqu silingbu (1957, 6).
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totally secure his position in the king’s court without a strong power base 
in Dergé itself – especially when key subordinate headmen under the Dergé 
king were competing for the position of head of the Off ice of Ministers and 
Stewards in Dergé. To further consolidate and expand his power base, like 
many other elites in Kham, Jagö resorted to the common strategy of forming 
matrimonial alliances. In 1933, he married Sönam Chömtso, the daughter 
of the Lhari chief Kelzang Püntsok in Yilhung, who was powerful and ruled 
over 1000 households (Lai Zuozhong 1996, 98; Baima Dengdeng and Xiake 
Zelang 2008, 192-193; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 183; Lodrö 
Püntsok 1994, 151-152).33 After the Lhari chief’s only son died in a riding 
accident, he soon controlled the region itself. Later, one of his sons-in-law, 
Pomkha Namgyel Dörjé, served as commander-in-chief of Yilhung (Lhalung 
Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 184). In addition, he also arranged for some 
of his relatives and his trusted followers to establish marriage alliances 
with families of powerful headmen in Dergé as well as with Khangsar and 
Mazür chieftain families in Kandzé.34
Jagö Topden and the ‘Khampa Rule of Kham’ Movement
In the mid-1930s Jagö was quick to grasp the political situation in inland 
China, and fully understood the signif icance of the political developments. 
His appreciation of Chinese politics differentiated him to some degree from 
other more conservative traditional Khampa elites who were ill-informed 
of the dramatic changes taking place in China at the time. With political 
aspirations that went beyond simply restoring his family’s authority and 
position in Dergé, he began to turn to larger affairs relevant to the entire 
Kham region. Extending his interest and participation in political activities 
outside of Dergé, he became one of the key political f igures in Kham.
In 1935 Jagö became actively involved in the ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ 
movement launched by Gara Lama (also known as Nörla Hutuktu), an 
33 See Lai Zuozhong (1996, 98); Baima Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang (2008, 19-23); Lhalung Chimé 
Dörjé and Dayang (2009, 183); Lodrö Püntsok (1994, 151-152). Jagö Topden took two daughters of 
the Lhari chief as his wives. See Genzao Fashi and Mixian Fashi (1995, 30).
34 Jagö Topden also established a good relationship with important people from other regions 
by arranging marriage alliances between his trusted followers and other powerful chiefs and 
headmen. He had Juchung Tsedör of Juchung family become the son-in-law of the Khangsar 
chief ’s family in Kandzé; he had Jamga of Dimgo family become the son-in-law of the Atup 
Lakartsang family; and he had Rapga of the Zhingmo family marry into the family of Mazür 
chief in Kandzé. Thus, he had the support of chiefs and headmen in Kandzé. See Lhalung Chimé 
Dörjé and Dayang (2009, 184-185); Lai Zuozhong (1996, 98).
The rise oF a poliTical sTrongman in dergé in The early T wenTieTh cenTury 379
influential lama from Riwoché monastery who harbored the ambition of 
driving both Lhasa troops and the warlord Liu Wenhui’s troops out of Kham. 
In the 1930s, Khampa elites began to oppose interference from the Ganden 
Phodrang and the Nationalist authorities and also to promote the idea of 
self-rule for Khampas. Launched in 1932 by Kelzang Tsering, a representative 
of the modern ‘educated elite’, the movement strove for local autonomy with 
the aim of creating a unif ied Kham identity by asserting local power based 
on ethnicity. This represented a major strategy for Khampa elites to assert 
their influence in regional affairs. In 1935, when Gara Lama was dispatched 
by the Nationalist government to block the advance of the Red Army in 
Kham, he summoned powerful f igures from various regions of Kham to 
Dartsedo (Kangding) to an assembly in which Jagö Topden participated 
(Jiang Anxi et al. 1983, 65; Feng Youzhi 1994, 145). Deeply attracted by the 
Gara Lama’s idea of local autonomy, Jagö regarded ‘the Khampa rule of Kham’ 
movement not only as a means to restore the stability of Kham but also as a 
way to enable the Kham region to avoid interferences from both the Ganden 
Phodrang and the Nationalist government. According to the recollection of 
his brother, Jagö Tsenam, during the aforementioned assembly convened 
by Gara Lama, Jagö himself noted f ive guiding principles of ‘implementing 
regional autonomy; striving for equality for all minzu; eliminating the ulak 
system; improving farming and herding techniques; and developing culture 
and education’ and some tentative ideas and plans.35
At the beginning of 1936, Jagö, together with Pangda Topgyé, Gara Lama, 
and a key headmen under the Beri king in Kandzé known as Döndrup 
Namgyel (known as Deng Dejie in Chinese), secretly formed the group ‘four 
harmonious friends’ (tünpa pünzhi) to realize the political aspirations of 
the ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ movement that had been influenced by both 
Nationalists’ and Communists’ rhetoric. Jagö formed a close alliance with the 
Gara Lama and backed the latter’s subordinates in killing Chen Rongguan, 
the Dergé Country magistrate; Zhang Ziyu, the Denkhok County magistrate; 
and others appointed by Liu Wenhui. However, the movement eventually 
had to be suspended due to the death of the Gara Lama. Nevertheless, Jagö 
Topden, Pangda Topgyé, and others continued to promote the ‘Khampa 
rule of Kham’ idea. However, the premise that Jagö would support and 
participate in the ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ movement was a guarantee that 
no external forces would interfere in the politics of Kham. This principle was 
reflected in how he dealt with another ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ movement 
launched by Panchen Lama’s camp (zhükgar) and the Khangsar family in 
35 An anonymous scholar’s interview with Jagö Topden’s brother Jagö Tsenam; see Anon. (1982).
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1939. Armed clashes broke out between the ninth Panchen Lama’s camp 
and the Khangsar family on the one side and troops under the Chinese 
warlord Liu Wenhui stationed in Kandzé on the other side. The former, in 
the name of openly advocating ‘the Khampa rule of Kham’, sought military 
assistance from Jagö and the Dergé king, but Jagö refused to be involved in 
the conflict. Even though the ninth Panchen Lama’s camp had appointed 
magistrates in Kandzé, Nyarong, and Drango counties, they were unable to 
interfere in Dergé affairs (Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 191-192; 
Tsewang Düdül 1990, 492; Jagö Topden 1990, 492). This fully attests to the 
status and power that Jagö enjoyed at the time in Kham.
Jagö’s stand during this period is noteworthy. Earlier he had actively 
supported Gara Lama’s ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ movement and his military 
actions to oust the Chinese warlord Liu Wenhui’s troops. For a number of 
reasons, Jagö began to shift his allegiance. First, Jagö changed his perception 
of the strength of Liu Wenhui’s troops and understood that it was very dif-
f icult to dislodge them. Second, he was unwilling to jeopardize, as shown in 
the next section, his newly established ties with Liu Wenhui. Another reason 
for Jagö’s distancing himself from the ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ movement 
was that he did not want Panchen Lama’s camp to be the paramount force 
in northern Kham. In accordance with Püntsok Wangyel’s recollection, 
like Kelzang Tsering, Jagö also viewed Khampas as a different ethnic group 
from Tibetans who lived to the west of Drichu River.36 He did not like the 
conduct and deeds of Lhasa aristocrats and of the Ganden Phodrang troops 
in Kham. In his view, when the Dergé chikhyap ruled Dergé at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, central Tibetans were regarded as the oppressors 
of Khampas (Goldstein et al. 2004, 54).
Jagö Topden’s Connection with the Red Army
The Red Army’s journey through the Kham region during their ‘long march’ 
provided Jagö with an opportunity to come into contact with and to learn 
about the Red Army’s viewpoints and policies. When the Red Army reached 
Tawu, Drango, and Kandzé in the spring of 1936, Jagö was dispatched by the 
Dergé king to Kandzé to block their advance (Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and 
Dayang 2009, 188; Lai Zuozhong 1996, 98-99; Zhonggong Ganzi zhouwei 
dangshi yanjiushi 2012, 185).37 Dergé forces were defeated by the Red Army, 
36 The term mirik in Tibetan can be translated either as ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnic group’.
37 Other off icials include Wokma Chamdzö Sönam Tsering, Nyerchen Lodrö Jamyang, Drumo 
Tubten, Dekha Chimé. See Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang (2009, 188).
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and Jagö was injured and captured (Baima Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang 2008, 
194; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 188).38 It appears that Jagö was 
well treated by the Red Army, and Li Xianian himself, the political commis-
sar of the No. 30 Red Army met with Jagö (Li Xiannian zhuan bianxiezu deng 
2011, 136; Lai Zuozhong 1996, 99; Zhonggong Ganzi zhouwei dangshi yanjiushi 
2012, 186). The commander-in-chief of the Red Army, Zhu De, also met with 
Jagö, introducing to him the Communist Party’s policies toward minzu and 
religion as well as its political opinions. While captive, Jagö sent a letter in 
Tibetan to the Dergé king, asking the king not to oppose the Red Army. He 
was later authorized by the Dergé king to sign a ‘Non-Aggression Pact’ with 
Wang Weizhou under the leadership of the Red Army representative Li 
Xiannian (Deng Junkang and Li Kunbi 2009, 1, 190; Lai Zuozhong 1996, 99; 
Zhonggong Ganzi zhouwei dangshi yanjiushi 2012, 186). In May 1936, under 
Zhu De’s initiative, the Central Tibetan People’s Government of the Chinese 
Soviet was established in the town of Kandzé,39 and Jagö was elected as 
head of the military affairs department (Zhonggong Ganzi zhouwei zuzhibu 
1991, 16-17; Den Junkang and Li Kunbi 2009, 190; Zhonggong Ganzi zhouwei 
dangshi yanjiushi 2012, 187).40 Without contemporary sources attesting 
to how the Khampa elites, including Jagö, understood the programme, it 
would be hard to determine whether the Kham elites genuinely believed in 
the Communists’ vision or were simply being opportunistic. It seems clear, 
however, that the Khampa elites joined ‘the Böpa Soviet’ to oppose the 
warlord Liu Wenhui and the G.M.D. government rather than simply for the 
sake of an ideological conversion. Jagö and other Khampa leaders wanted 
Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) support to advance their own cause of 
achieving Kham self-rule. It is also possible that these Khampa elites were 
compelled to support the Red Army as the latter was the strongest military 
force at the time.41 Nonetheless, Jagö assisted Red Army soldiers and helped 
38 Jagö Topden’s troops mainly consisted of reincarnated lamas and monks from Gönchen 
monastery. They established their camp at Atup Ripuk in Rongpatsa; the forces under Wokma 
Chakdzö and Lodrö Jamyang set up their camp at Getok. The Red Army launched a surprise 
attack at night and defeated the Dergé forces. Wokma Chakdzö led his f leeing troops back to 
Dergé. See Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang (2009, 188).
39 The name of the soviet in Tibetan is krung hwa su’u we ed bod pa dbus sde pa mi dmangs srid 
gzhung, and in Chinese it is known as Zhonghua Suwei’an boba zhongyang renmin zhengfu.
40 For details about the Communists’ visions for the pan-Tibetan organization and the Central 
Tibetan People’s Government, refer to ‘Guiding Principles of the Central Government of Tibetan 
People’s Soviet’ (Zhonggong ganzi zhouwei dangshi yanjiushi 2012, 112-113).
41 It seems that some of the Khampa youth, such as the educated Göngpo Tsering (Hai Zhengtao) 
and Trashi Wangchuk, who were appointed as directors in charge of military affairs, later became 
communists, and in particular Trashi Wangchuk, who joined the Red Army to travel north.
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the communists collect badly needed resources in Kham. It is reported 
that with Jagö’s help the Red Army secured 400 yaks and 100 horses in the 
Kandzé area alone. He also provided guides and interpreters for the Red 
Army (Lai Zuozhong 1996, 99; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 190).42 
Jagö’s strong ties with the Communists and his ability to mediate between 
the Communists and Khampas enhanced his fame among both (Lhalung 
Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 189-190; Lai Zuozhong 1996, 98-99; Baima 
Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang 2008, 194).43
Jagö Topden’s Relationship with Liu Wenhui
After the Red Army had left the region, the Sichuan warlord Liu Wenhui 
began to reassert his power, and he had many reasons for targeting Jagö. 
He resented Jagö’s involvement with Gara Lama, and Jagö’s increasingly 
close contact with the Communists. In 1937, fearing that Liu Wenhui would 
retaliate against him, Jagö made plans to flee to Central Tibet. Liu Wenhui 
fully understood the importance of benefiting from the support of the Dergé 
king and other indigenous chieftains and headmen to ensure stability in 
Kham. Thereupon, he dispatched Fan Changyuan, Pelyül County magistrate, 
to meet with the Dergé king and his ministers. It was said that Fan brought 
a message from Liu that sought to win over the king and his ministers (Deng 
Junkang and Li Kunbi 2009, 190; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 
190). Liu declared that he would not take action against those who had 
rallied behind Gara Lama in his attempt to drive Liu’s forces out of Kham. 
It appears that the king was convinced by Liu’s message, and he urged Jagö 
to apologize to Liu Wenhui in person (Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 
2009, 190; Lai Zuozhong 1996, 98-99). Although the situation appeared to be 
humiliating to Jagö, he was able to turn it round in his favour. The meeting 
between Jagö and Liu in Dartsedo provided an opportunity for Jagö to 
establish a personal relationship with Liu.44
42 It is interesting to note that the article written by Deng Junkang and Li Kunbi states that Jagö 
Topden gave 150 yaks, over 50 horses, and some grain to the Red Army. The amount mentioned 
in Lai Zuozhong’s article is somewhat different, and it is possible that the amount provided in 
Deng Junkang and Li Kunbi’s article refers to the amount provided by Jagö Topden himself. See 
Deng Junkang and Li Kunbi (2009, 190).
43 To block the advance of the Red Army, in 1936 the forces of the Qinghai warlord Ma Bufang 
also began to station in Dergé, Denkhok, Pelyül, and Sershül. This caused the Dergé king and 
his family to f lee to Jomda west of the Drichu River.
44 They blamed Gara Lama for killing the magistrates of Dergé and Denkhok (Lhalung Chimé 
Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 190).
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Having realized the growing influence of Liu Wenhui in Kham compared 
to the declining authority of the Ganden Phodrang, Jagö saw the need to 
establish strong ties with Liu and also to become familiar with viewpoints 
of various Chinese authorities in Sichuan province. Thereupon, in 1938 Jagö 
attended the ‘Institute of the Public Security and Administration of Xikang’ 
(Xikang bao’an xingzheng jiangxihui) run by Liu Wenhui in Dartsedo. The 
institute was a modernist project aimed at bringing in local leaders for 
training in what were regarded as modern administrative skills. Although 
all local Khampa leaders were encouraged to attend the institute, they 
usually sent their servants or subordinate off icials for training instead. 
Demonstrating his willingness to forego status and to actively learn modern 
knowledge, Jagö was the only senior leader who attended it (Ren Naiqiang 
2009, 188). His participation proved to be beneficial. Not only did he begin to 
learn Chinese, but his time at the institute also provided f irsthand contact 
with emerging Chinese off icials in Kham.
In 1939, Liu Wenhui became the chairman of the newly established Xikang 
province, which comprised the region of Chuankang (the Kham region in 
Sichuan province), the No. 18 administrative region of Sichuan province (the 
Xichang Yi region), and the No. 15 administrative region of Sichuan province 
(Ya’an). As a way of coping with Japanese attempts to invade Sichuan, Xikang 
province was established thanks to efforts to promote the construction of the 
area under G.M.D. rule far from the battlefront during the Anti-Japanese War 
of Resistance. As a result, Liu Wenhui began to further strengthen Kham’s 
political rule, integrating more and more former indigenous chieftains 
and headmen in its administrative system. Impressed by Jagö’s attitude 
and actions, Liu Wenhui appointed him deputy commander of the Xikang 
Special Public Security Brigade (xikang tezhong bao’an fu duizhang): this 
off ice gave Jagö the same rank as the Dergé king in the administration 
and made him one of the most powerful f igures in Kham. Liu was later 
informed by Dergé County magistrate that Jagö could not occupy the same 
position as the king. The king was, therefore, given the title of regional deputy 
commander (Qu fuzhihui). On the surface, it seemed that power rested with 
the Dergé king, but Jagö Topden was the one who wielded the real power. 
This was demonstrated not only by outside groups negotiating with him 
but also, increasingly, by local people beginning to view him as such (Ren 
Naiqiang 2009, 188). Jagö’s role and status in Liu’s administration of Kham 
grew quickly. He occupied positions such as Councilor of Xikang Province 
(Ch. Xikang sheng canyiyuan) and Head Councilor of Dergé County (Dege 
xian canyizhang), etc. (Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 190-191). 
Jagö accordingly made great efforts to implement all Xikang Provincial 
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government’s decrees and ordered the children of his family and relatives 
to take the lead in enrolling in Chinese schools in the region. All Chinese 
off icials who had any contact with Jagö were believed to have praised him 
highly, and in Kham he enjoyed a great reputation (Ren Naiqiang 2009, 188).
Another means used by Jagö Topden to expand his power and author-
ity was to join the Nationalist Party,45 and his action coincided with the 
period when the Nationalist Central Committee was making great efforts 
to extend the Nationalist Party’s influence in Kham. After the Chinese 
warlord Liu Xiang, Chairman of Sichuan province, passed away in 1938, 
Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Qun governed Sichuan successively. With 
efforts to control Sichuan and Kham, and to weaken the power holders in 
these regions intensifying after the creation of Xikang province in 1939, 
they took the measure to recruit new party members among the local elite 
and to establish Nationalist Party committees at provincial and county 
levels. Under the circumstances, Jagö also began to form a close association 
with other Khampas in the G.M.D., such as Pangda Topgyé, Kelzang Yeshé, 
Kelzang Chönjor (also known as Liu Jiaju, secretary-general of the ninth 
Panchen Lama’s camp), and Döndrup Namgyel (Lai Zuozhong 1996, 99; 
Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 191).
By 1940 Khampa politics became increasingly drawn into larger rivalries 
between the Communist and Nationalist Parties. Khampa elites were divided 
into three factional groups: those allied to the Nationalists, those in favor 
of the Communists, or those who sought to maintain the status quo and 
preserve local rulers. In particular, a new group of Khampas who allied with 
the Communists were those who had embraced new ideas and sought noth-
ing less than total transformation of the social system. A notable example is 
Bapa Püntsok Wangyel, commonly known as Pünwang. He wrote: ‘I began 
by developing a relationship with Chagö Tomden (Jagö Topden), one of the 
most famous aristocrats in Dergé. He was a member of one of the wealthiest 
and most powerful families and a top minister in the Dergé government. He 
had the ability to call up at a moment’s notice an armed militia of hundreds 
[…]’ (Goldstein et al. 2004, 53). Pünwang tried to wean Jagö away from Liu 
Wenhui, stating that Liu would not safeguard Dergé’s independence. Liu’s 
acceptance of Dergé’s independence was merely temporary, as Liu had 
more pressing problems to deal with. Pünwang also began to propose a 
45 Having been recommended for party membership by the Republican off icial Wan Tengjiao 
and the abbot of Nyintso (Nyatso; Nyi mtsho/Nya mtsho) Mawang Chöndzé (Machöwang; 
Mawur Chöndzé; Ma dbang chos mdzad/Ma chos dbang/Ma bur chos mdzad), Jagö joined the 
Nationalist Party. See Lai Zuozhong (1996, 99); Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang (2009, 191).
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new idea of establishing a pan-Tibetan movement that would encompass 
all Tibetan-speaking regions. Jagö was suspicious of the idea. Moreover, as 
Pünwang wrote, he ‘had doubts about trying to dislodge the Chinese. He 
and his family would have a lot to lose by trying to expel the Nationalist 
troops and off icials. He worried that if anything were done to remove the 
Chinese county government, more Chinese were sure to come into Kham’ 
(Goldstein et al. 2004, 54-55). However, Jagö’s falling out with Liu came from 
a more traditional form of political concern.
In 1942, King Tsewang Düdül passed away. The heir to the Dergé throne, 
Urgyenkyap (also known as Wuga), was only four years old. At the time, Jagö 
saw an opportunity to impose his choice of the candidate to the throne of 
Dergé; he proposed that Jampel Rinchen’s son Kelzang Wangdül (1912-1984) 
marry his cousin’s widow Jamyang Pelmo and succeed to the throne of 
Dergé.46 The proposal was unacceptable not only to Liu Wenhui but also to 
the faction supporting the Dergé family that descended from Dörjé Senggé. 
Kelzang Wangdül had been brought up as a member of Lhasa’s aristocracy.47 
Liu feared that the Lhasa government would be able to extend its influence 
to Dergé again through Kelzang Wangdül. Instead, the faction supporting 
Dörjé Senggé’s line suggested that the highly respected and revered Situ 
rinpoché of Pelpung monastery should act as temporary regent. Jagö’s faction 
opposed their proposal for a number of reasons. First, it seemed that Dörjé 
Senggé’s faction maintained closer ties with Pelpung monastery. Second, 
Jagö’s faction feared that once a lama had been appointed it would be difficult 
to remove him from power (Lai Zuozhong 1996, 99; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé 
and Dayang 2009, 191-194). The issue was f inally settled by having Tsewang 
Düdül’s widow, Jamyang Pelmo, act as regent until the heir reached majority. 
Liu Wenhui knew clearly that Jagö Topden was craving a power base for 
himself and was increasingly becoming one of the most influential f igures 
among the Khampa leaders. In addition, Liu was not sure whether Jagö was 
loyal to him. In 1944, Jagö had one of his rivals, the Atup chief Wangga in 
Kandzé assassinated. Wangga was ‘the indigenous battalion commander’ 
appointed by Liu Wenhui and was also a loyal follower of Liu. It was a 
well-known fact that Jagö was behind the assassination. Thus, Liu ordered 
46 Jagö is also believed to have proposed to take charge of Tsewang Düdül’s illegitimate son, 
whose name is unknown. He was brought up by Jagö to succeed to the throne of Dergé, but this 
was also opposed by the other party. See Chengdu junqu silingbu (1957, 8).
47 In 1943, when appointed as the attendant with the fourth rank for Yutok dzasak Trashi 
Döndrup, the Commissioner of Domé, Kelzang Wangdül accompanied the latter to take up 
position in Chamdo. In 1946 he became the ninth regiment commander, who was dispatched 
to garrison Drayap f irst and was later stationed in Markham.
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Gong Gengyun, the commander-in-chief of the Security Forces of Region 
Six in Dergé, to execute Jagö for the crime. Before Gong could carry out 
the order, Dergé magistrate Fan Changyuan, who was also an intelligence 
off icer of the Military Commission of the G.M.D. Government, informed 
Jagö of Liu’s order and allowed him to escape arrest and execution.
Contesting the Authority of the Regent
When Jamyang Pelmo began to serve as regent in Dergé, she seemed to be 
well aware of Jagö’s growing power and authority, and considered the latter 
as a major threat to her son’s future rule. To counter Jagö, Jamyang Pelmo 
relied on his rivals, including two chief ministers Wokma Chakdzö Sönam 
Tsering and Juchung Tsedör. With these off icials wielding the actual power 
at Dergé royal court, Jagö was to a certain degree pushed aside by them 
(Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 197).48 In 1946, Wokma Chakdzö 
instigated his subordinates to hold a feast for Jagö Topden and planned to 
poison the latter on this occasion. Because Jagö became aware of the plan, 
the conspiracy failed. This intensif ied Jagö’s conflict with the Dergé king’s 
faction even further. Having refused to return to the Dergé king’s central 
government in Gönchen, Jagö returned to his family seat in Yilhung, thereby 
openly breaking with Jamyang Pelmo (Chengdu junqu silingbu 1957, 6-7; 
Den Junkang et al. 2009, 190-191; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé and Dayang 2009, 
195, 201-214; Lodrö Püntsok 1994, 197-200).
In the same year, a dispute over pastureland led to the assassination 
of Drebö Lhagyel, a headman in Pelyül, by two families in Menshör – the 
Sokmo and Juchung families. The two headmen’s families were supported 
by the Dergé king’s family, while the Drebö family had been on friendly 
terms with the Jagö family for generations. Thus, the rift between the Dergé 
king’s faction and the Jagö faction deepened further.49 At the time, having 
realized the importance of establishing his own power base, Jagö began to 
adopt a more populist approach. He redefined himself as a social reformer 
48 In reality, when Jagö Topden became chief minister (nyerchen) in charge of daily affairs in 
Dergé in 1929 and later when he gained the trust of King Tsewang Düdül, it caused his rivals to 
resent him. The rivals formed an alliance to compete against Jagö for power and authority.
49 The Drebö family was Ngawang Jampel Rinchen’s loyal supporters who, together with Jagö’s 
family, followed the latter to Central Tibet. Jagö harbored great animosity toward the headmen 
who had assassinated Drebö Lhagyel and were also hostile toward and harbored grudges against 
Jamyang Pelmo. See Lai Zuozhong (1996, 100); Den Junkang et al. (2009, 191); Baima Dengdeng 
and Xiake Zelang (2008, 197-199).
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and defender of ordinary people against the royal family. Thus, in 1947 he 
openly advocated deposing the Dergé royal family, eliminating the ‘tusi 
system’, and abolishing the corvée labour system.50 He also called himself 
‘Yilhung tusi’ and ‘gyalo gyelpo’ (literally meaning ‘A-hundred-year-old 
king’) (Chengdu junqu silingbu 1957, 9). He further proposed to establish 
‘Miser Gyelkhap’ (The People’s Nation), where ‘the Khampa rule of Kham’ 
would be implemented (Lai Zuozhong 1996, 100; Baima Dengdeng and 
Xiake Zelang 2008, 201). The use of the term miser (originally meaning ‘serf’ 
or ‘subject’; in this context, having the connotation of common people or 
citizen)51 is interesting and clearly signif ies a radical transformation. In 
the same year, Jagö urged local people not to provide corvée labour to the 
Dergé king’s family to repair the government off ice. As a consequence, 
only one third of trelpa (tax-payer) families provided corvée labour. In one 
or two places armed resistance even emerged against providing corvée 
labour (Zhongkeyuan minzu yanjiusuo Sichuan diaochazu 1963, 32). After 
the three major families in Menshör went into exile following their dispute 
with the Drebö family, Jagö also distributed their land, houses, and grain to 
their tenants. This action was warmly welcomed by poor households and 
began to attract other farmers to his cause (Lai Zuozhong 1996, 100; Baima 
Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang 2008, 201).
Soon after the Dergé regent dispatched her subordinate off icials to levy 
grain taxes in Hörpo of Pelyül dzong, Jagö Topden ordered various villages to 
refuse to hand them over. The regent decided to dispatch troops to levy the 
grain taxes, and Jagö assembled local forces to resist them. With the support 
of the common people, he had the dzongpön (magistrate) dispatched by 
the Dergé king driven out of Hörpo.52 Jagö’s strategy proved to be popular, 
and people of many areas under Dergé’s influence began to follow him. His 
power and authority also gradually increased. Consequently, in one of his 
articles published in 1947, Ren Naiqiang, the famous Chinese ethnologist 
and Tibetan Studies expert of the Republican period, portrayed Jagö as the 
50 See Jagö Topden’s letters to He Long and Deng Xiaoping dated 5 January 1951, in the Sichuan 
Archives.
51 For the meaning of the term miser, refer to the relevant entries in Goldstein (2001, 805).
52 The villagers elected the commoner Pema Chömpel as dzongpön with support from 
Jagö. While Jagö dispatched Nyaktrük Rinchen to serve as zhinyer (manager in charge of 200 
households) in Hörpo of Pelyül, he also sent Dzakhok rinpoché Pema Ngenam to be dzongpön of 
Rakha in Pelyül. In addition, he also appointed his close follower Nyaktrük Lhagyel, a leading 
headman, as dzongpön of Dzinkhok, and appointed the commoner Wola Wangdzin as zhinyer 
of Barong in Pelyül. See Lai Zuozhong (1996, 100-101); Baima Dengdeng and Xiake Zelang (2008, 
201).
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most powerful indigenous leaders in Kham (Ren Naiqiang 2009, 188). In 1947, 
the Chinese masters Genzao and Xianmi spent over a year at Jagö’s home in 
Yilhung, when they went to study esoteric Buddhism in Kham. Jagö’s great 
reputation and strong links with other Khampa leaders and reincarnated 
lamas was reflected in their account. During their stay at his home, Genzao 
and Xianmi reported that many guests came to visit him. In particular, many 
reincarnated lamas came to recite prayers and scriptures (Genzao Fashi 
and Xianmi Fashi 1995, 30). In addition, a Chinese monk named Tongxiao 
Fashi, who had studied for ten years in Lhasa, learned that Jagö Topden was 
a famous person in Kham and came to pay the latter a visit at home on his 
way to Kandzé via Yilhung (Genzao Fashi and Xianmi Fashi 1995, 50).53
By the 1950s, Jagö’s faction consisted of nearly 100 major and minor head-
men, with over 17,000 households under their jurisdiction. Their power and 
authority predominated in Pelyül, Denhok, Sershül, and Dergé counties, 
thereby becoming a major political network in northern Kham. In contrast, 
the Dergé king’s family had only 50 or so major and minor headmen under 
its control, with approximately 5000 households under their jurisdiction. 
The Dergé king’s family had power and authority mainly over most parts 
of Tangpuk (present-day Jomda County), such areas as Gönchen, Menshör 
(also known as Meshö), Pelpung and Pewar in Dergé County, as well as 
regions under the jurisdiction of the Atup family in Denkhok. (Qin Heping 
2014, 65-79; Chengdu junqu silingbu 1957, 1, 18).
As mentioned above, the campaign launched by Jagö in 1947 exemplif ied 
an apparent switch in his political strategy in terms of mobilizing and 
appealing directly to the people. He campaigned under the slogan ‘Don’t 
provide corvée labour for the tusi and don’t hand in grain tax to the tusi’ 
(bugei tusi fu chaiyi, buxiang tusi jiao fushui).54 Realizing that Jagö was 
gaining popularity and was becoming a growing threat to the Dergé court, 
the Dergé regent, Jamyang Pelmo, planned to assemble her subordinates 
and to unite with the troops of her brother (i.e. the Nangchen king) so as 
to counter Jagö’s rise by force. The growing influence of Jagö in Kham also 
presented a challenge to the warlord Liu Wenhui, who secretly ordered 
the regimental commander Fu Dequan to gather his troops in Kandzé and 
to prepare to make a move against Jagö as well. In 1949 the Communist 
53 According to Masters Genzao and Mixian, they were introduced to Jagö Topden by Döndrup 
Namgyel (Deng Dejie) whom they met in Dartsedo. In 1954, at Jagö Topden’s invitation, they 
again travelled to study under Gyelsé rinpoché at Ngazang monastery in Tromtar, Pelyül. See 
Genzao Fashi and Mixian Fashi (1995, 10, 85, 94-100).
54 These slogans were probably originally in Tibetan, but the Chinese source provided them 
in Chinese.
The rise oF a poliTical sTrongman in dergé in The early T wenTieTh cenTury 389
Party defeated the Nationalist Party and ultimately became victorious. In 
November of the same year, Jagö Topden, Getak rinpoché, and others sent 
representatives to Beijing to pay respect to the Chinese Central Govern-
ment and Chairman Mao Zedong, by presenting them with banners. They 
requested that Tibetan regions be liberated.55 The Dergé court and Liu 
Wenhui’s campaign against Jagö collapsed as the No. 18 army of the P.L.A. 
took over Dergé in June 1950 (Lai Zuozhong 1996, 101; Lhalung Chimé Dörjé 
and Dayang 2009, 215).
Both Jagö Topden and Jamyang Pelmo dispatched their representatives to 
welcome the P.L.A., expressing their willingness to support the Communist 
Party and the Chinese central government. At the time, Jagö served as deputy 
director of Kangding Military Control Commission (Kangding junguanhui). 
He contacted Getak rinpoché, Pangda Topgyé, and others, and they wrote 
a letter to General Liu Bocheng (1892-1986), chairman of the Southwest 
Military and Political Commission (xinan junzheng weiyuanhui zhuxi). In 
the letter, they expressed their willingness to support the Communist Party 
and requested that national autonomy and self-management be implemented 
in Tibetan areas in Xikang.56
Uninterested in allying themselves with particular factions in Kham, 
the Communists, unlike previous Chinese regimes, were not bothered 
about playing one faction against another. They were motivated by broader 
issues of bringing the entire Kham region within the realm of the central 
administration. They could achieve this only by co-operating with differ-
ent Khampa factions and interest groups. Thus, through mediations with 
multi-parties, Jagö Topden and Jamyang Pelmo eventually ended their 
estrangement and resolved their conflict.57 Meanwhile, the Communists 
realized that each Kham faction had to be appeased without seeming to 
favor one particular group. While Jagö Topden was appointed member of the 
Southwestern Military and Political Commission as well as vice-chairman 
of the People’s Government of Xikang Provincial Tibetan Autonomous 
55 The representatives dispatched by them stated ‘Tibetan compatriots’ longing for being liber-
ated quickly’, and their willingness to accept the leadership of the Chinese Central Government. 
Zhu De met with these representatives on 19 February 1950. See Wu Dianyao (2006, 1367).
56 See the original letter written by Jagö Topden and others to Liu Bocheng of the Southwest 
Military and Political Commission, in the Sichuan Archives.
57 Jagö Topden wrote to He Long and Deng Xiaoping, thanking them for sending a message 
to him. In his letter, he mentions that in their message they hoped he would make an effort 
to get along with Jamyang Pelmo and to achieve unity between them. He also expresses his 
willingness to take the lead in resolving the conflicts between the Dergé king’s family and the 
common people. See Jagö Topden’s original letter to He Long and Deng Xiaoping on 5 January 
1951, in the Sichuan Archives.
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Region (Xikang sheng zangzu zizhiqu renmin zhengfu), Jamyang Pelmo was 
appointed deputy director of the Chamdo Regional Liberation Committee 
(Changdu diqu jiefang weiyuanhui) (Deng Junkang and Li Kunbi 2009, 191).58
In the early period of Communist rule, unlike in Chinese provinces that 
were populated by Han Chinese, in ethnic minority areas the Communists 
did not seek to eliminate traditional ruling families, as they were aware 
that the Communists had very little support or organizational bases. Com-
munist rule in minority areas would be achieved through appeasement 
and incorporating the ruling elite. The Communists’ dealings with Jagö 
Topden provide a good example of this strategy. In the early 1950s, Jagö 
was appointed to be a member of the National People’s Congress (quanguo 
renda daibiao), vice-chairman of Sichuan Provincial Political Consultative 
Conference (Sichuan sheng zhengxie fuzhuxi), deputy governor of Kandzé 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou fuzhouzhang), 
and vice-chairman of Kandzé Tibetan Autonomous Prefectural Political 
Consultative Conference (Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zhengxie fuzhuxi). 
Jagö played a crucial role in helping the government of the People’s 
Republic of China establish political power in Kham, and this is why 
he surpassed other monastic and lay elites in Kham (Qin Heping 2014, 
65-79). In particular, given his cooperation with the C.C.P., later Chinese 
sources credit Jagö with having made great contributions to the regional 
autonomy of Tibetan areas of Xikang province and having provided 
assistance to P.L.A.’s march toward Central Tibet (Deng Junkang and Li 
Kunbi 2009, 191-192).59
58 Jamyang Pelmo was successively appointed member of the People’s Government of Xikang 
Provincial Tibetan Autonomous Region and vice-chairman of Xikang Provincial Tibetan 
Autonomous Regional Political Conference (Xikang sheng zangzu zizhiqu zhengxie). She also 
served as deputy-director of Kangding Regional National Consultative Conference (Kangding 
diqu minzu xieshanghui), member of Southwest Democratic Women’s Federation (xinan minzhu 
funü lianhehui), deputy-director of Xikang Provincial Women’s Federation (Xikang sheng fulian), 
executive committee member of All China Democratic Women’s Federation (Zhonghua quanguo 
funü lianhehui), etc. See Deng Junkang and Li Kunbi (2009, 185-187).
59 Tibetan areas of Xikang province were equivalent to present-day Kandzé Prefecture. As Qin 
Heping has pointed out, Jagö’s attitude toward ‘democratic reform’ is ambivalent. He basically 
accepted the reform and did not cause too much ‘trouble’. However, the reform affected his 
personal vital interests and those of his respective class. As such, his words and actions were 
inconsistent with his understanding. It was said that Jagö began to have misapprehensions 
about the reform and became undecided about it. He even adopted some ‘extreme’ measures 
concerning the reform. The reason for his ambivalence about the reform was not only due to his 
personal concerns but also to the ambiguity of the reform’s principles and policies adopted at 
the time. These principles and policies influenced his words and actions. See Qin Heping (2014, 
65-79).
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The victory of the Communists meant a total shift in the nature of 
politics in Kham. Neither Jagö nor any other Kham leaders were able to 
deal effectively with the Communists. In part, this was because of the vast 
superiority of the Communist forces in terms of both their number and 
fighting capacity. More importantly, the Communists were united by a clear 
ideological objective. The arrival of the Communists marked the end of the 
traditional political system in Kham and of Jagö’s personal ambition. Jagö 
died of an illness in 1960, thereby ending his legendary life.
Conclusion
The figure of the ambitious and charismatic Jagö Topden and his rise in both 
the politics of the kingdom of Dergé and that of the larger Kham region, is 
an exceptional example of the new elite that emerged in Kham at the end 
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. As 
a representative of the new educated elite in Kham who challenged the 
traditional authority, Jagö Topden however differs from other representative 
f igures of this new elite group. Many of the Khampa elite, such as Kelzang 
Tsering, were politically active in inland China itself; similarly, the religious 
elite in exile in inland China, represented by Gara Lama, were active not only 
in Kham but also in inland China. Although Jagö Topden had to contend 
with various political forces outside the Kham region, his political activities 
were mainly concentrated in Kham.
The ascendancy of Jagö Topden, who was a subordinate headman under 
the Dergé king, is also the epitome of the declining power of the traditional 
hegemonic rulers and the rise of their subordinate headmen during the 
Republican period. The rise of these headmen was partly the consequence 
of the weakening and even destruction of the traditional hegemonic ruler’s 
power in Kham in the aftermath of the policy of substituting chieftains with 
state-appointed civilian off icials that was implemented by Zhao Erfeng in 
the 1900s. It was also closely related to the traditional political structure 
of hegemonic rulers, such as the Dergé king, which was decentralized and 
based on the hereditary hierarchy. In particular, the decentralized political 
structure caused hegemonic rulers to divide the land among local hereditary 
headmen, and this enabled the latter to form alternative foci of power 
that could counter the authority of hegemonic rulers. Consequently, these 
headmen were able to set themselves up as territorial rulers in the regions 
under their jurisdiction, to become excessively powerful, and to maintain a 
high degree of local autonomy. We can see that a similar structure allowed 
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for the emergence and rise of headmen in Gyelrong regions during the 
Republican period.
This case study reveals how the negotiated space of the Kham frontier was 
transformed into the f ixed ‘place’ of the newly established modern Chinese 
nation. It also demonstrates the complex, multivariant interactions between 
the local Chinese governments and the local power holders and indigenous 
chieftains (tusi) in the frontier zone. During the Republican period, Kham 
formed special internal political and cultural frontiers of the Republic of 
China together with other regions in the half-moon-shaped zone extending 
from Gansu and Qinghai regions in the northwest to the Yunnan-Guizhou 
plateau in the southwest. At the time, in the newly imagined geo-space of 
the Republic of China, frontier people were inscribed as co-nationals and 
the contested Kham region emerged as an inalienable part of the Chinese 
national space (Tsomu 2012).
As exemplified by the case of Dergé discussed in this chapter, successive 
warlords who governed the Kham region, such as Liu Wenhui, managed to 
extend the administrative control of the state over Kham polities and incorpo-
rate into the bureaucratic system the former hegemonic rulers and headmen 
who had only temporarily restored their power and authority at the beginning 
of the Republican period by appointing them at different levels of the new 
administration (Kangding minzu shizhuan bianxiezu 1994, 49). Meanwhile, they 
similarly integrated newly risen self-made leaders in southern Kham in local 
government institutions (Chen Peibin 2014, 174). In addition, the representative 
reincarnated lamas and eminent monks in Kham had been appointed to various 
government and party positions, including commissioner and adviser of Xikang 
province, councilor and alternate councilor of the First Provisional Council of 
Xikang province, among other important positions (Wang Chuan 2006, 81-82).60
The Republican period is characterized by a regionalization process 
involving the emergence of forms of regional consciousness and regional 
politics (Duan Jinsheng 2014, 31-40). Consequently, as this chapter shows, 
the Nationalist central government’s inf luence was rather limited due 
to f ierce resistance by local warlords in Kham, who remained dominant 
60 They also held positions such as delegate of the National Assembly of Xikang province, 
member of the Supervisory Committee of the Nationalist Central Committee, and member of the 
Supervisory Committee of Sichuan Provincial Nationalist Party Headquarters, etc. Furthermore, 
while some of them were also elected president of the Buddhist Society at county level, others 
were selected to serve as master to propagate Buddhism (xuanjiao shi/xuanhua shi) and master 
to safeguard Buddhism ( fujiao shi), who were responsible for assisting in supervising local 
government affairs and playing the role of helping local military and government organizations 
to pacify local society. See Wang Chuan (2009, 80-81).
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in the administration of the region. Indeed, local secular and religious 
leaders were not passive participants. As the case of Jagö shows, to adapt 
to the new political order and to consolidate their own position in local 
society, local leaders took the initiative to maintain good relations with the 
Chinese authorities in order to play a more important role in the Chinese 
administration of the region. Thereupon, during the Republican period, 
three major forces co-existed: the Nationalist bureaucratic warlords, the 
former tusi (indigenous chieftains), and the headmen and the new self-made 
leaders as well as major monasteries.61 No matter which force was dominant 
in handling government affairs, as the case of Dergé shows, local leaders and 
monasteries still controlled local society; government off icials had to rely 
on them to levy corvée labour and grain taxes. The relationship between 
the Chinese governments and the tusi in the Kham region was entirely 
similar to that of other frontier regions in the northwest and southwest 
where tusi ruled, as described by Lin Chunsheng, the Chinese ethnologist 
and anthropologist of the Republican period (Lin Chunsheng 1944, 8-9).
The new twentieth-century Kham elite represented by Jagö Topden was 
the product of this particular historical period in Kham – an era of enormous 
political and social change. Unlike the majority of traditional forces in 
Kham, who had a parochial outlook and only cared about what happened in 
territories under their jurisdiction, Jagö Topden and other new Khampa elites 
were more open-minded and farsighted. Therefore, they were able to emerge 
as the new leading f igures in Kham politics at that time. After Jagö’s return 
to Dergé in the early 1920s, over the following 30 years during which various 
powers competed for control of the Kham region, he continuously fought 
on several fronts against the Dergé king’s family, the Ganden Phodrang in 
Lhasa, the Chinese warlord Liu Wenhui of Xikang, and the Muslim warlord 
Ma Bufang of Qinghai Province. By competing and negotiating with these 
different political f igures, he acquired an understanding of their respective 
political views, and also constantly extended his power and authority by 
collaborating with them whenever possible. Thus, in the 1930s and 1940s 
he became one of the most influential leaders in the history of Kham and 
was able to contest the authority of the king of Dergé. Jagö Topden also 
legitimized his authority through both the construction of a regional identity 
of a politically united Kham and the appropriation of new ideas and reforms. 
In this guise, Jagö appeared to be both modern and progressive. He was 
certainly aware of the undergoing ideological and social changes in inland 
61 As for which force was dominant in the administration of the local counties in Kham, there 
were distinctive regional differences. For details, see Chen Peibin (2014, 173-174).
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China. He effectively adopted the populists’ cause of social reform, was able 
to wrest power from the king, and positioned himself as the paramount 
authority in Dergé. In the dispute for control of Kham in general, and over 
Dergé in particular, the successive Chinese regimes, from the Qing to the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the Ganden Phodrang 
under the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, created a period of instability. Amidst this 
unrest, Jagö Topden, regarded as the ‘political strongman’ who had kept up 
with the times and was adept at acting as mediator between different power 
holders at local, regional, and state levels, proved to be a skillful player on 
the political chessboard as demonstrated by his connivance with external 
powers as well as by his appeal for popular support. As Dáša Mortensen’s 
study of Wangchuk Tempa, another prominent local leader in southern Kham 
(in this volume), shows, Jagö Topden’s savvy negotiation and ‘collaboration’ 
with various powers also demonstrates the degree of control exerted by 
local leaders in Kham during this turbulent era. The people of Dergé were 
tired of the instability and saw Jagö as a leader who could ensure peace in 
the territory. Thus, they allowed Jagö to emerge as the new independent 
ruler of Dergé. Had it not been for the victory of the Communists and the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Jagö Topden might well 
have become the new ruler of Dergé.




Atup Lakartsang A thub l’a dkar tshang
Atup Ripuk A thub ri phug
Adzom A ’dzom
Baba Ba ba






Chakdzö Namsé Tsega Phyag mdzod Rnam sras tshe dga’
Chakdzö Wokma Sönam Tsering Phyag mdzod ’Ok ma Bsod nams tshe 
ring
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Chakzamkha Lcags zam kha
Chamdo Chab mdo
chapsi kyi chawar khedzang denpa chab srid kyi bya bar mkhas mdzangs 
ldan pa
Chaktreng Phyag phreng
Chimé Tapei Dörjé ’Chi med rtag pa’i rdo rje
chipöngo phyi dpon ’go
chösi zungdrel chos srid zung ’brel
Chöying Zangmo Chos dbyings bzang mo
Chungrampa Khyung ram pa
Dabpa ’Dab pa
Damtsik Dörjé Dam tshig rdo rje
dapön Mda’ dpon
Dartsedo Dar rtse mdo
Dechen Wangmo Bde chen dbang mo
dechok Sde phyogs




Dergé chikhyap Sde dge spyi khyab
Dergé Gönchen Sde dge dgon chen
Dilgo Dil mgo
Dimgo Dis mgo
Domé chikhyap Mdo smad spyi khyab
Döndrup Namgyel Don grub rnam rgyal
Dörjé Namgyel Rdo rje rnam rgyal
Dörjé Senggé Rdo rje seng ge
Drango Brag ’go
Drebö Bre ’bod
Drebö Lhagyel Bre ’bod Lha rgyal
Drichu ’Bri chu
Drongpa ’Brong pa
Drumo Tubten Gru mo Thub bstan
drungyik drung yig
dünkör mdun skor
dünkörkhak mdun skor khag
Dzakhok rinpoché Pema Ngenam Rdza khog rin po che Pad ma nges 
rnam
Dzatö Rdza stod




dzong go rdzong ’go
dzongkhak rdzong khag
dzongpön rdzong dpon
Gamongna Rga mong sna
Ganden Phodrang Dga’ ldan pho brang
Gara Lama Mgar ra bla ma
Garjé Sgar rje
Gelong Dge slong
Getak rinpoché Dge rtag rin po che
Getok Gad thog
Gojo Samdrup Go ’jo Bsam grub
Golok ’Go log
Gönchen Dgon chen
Gönpo Namgyel Mgon po rnam rgyal
Göngpo Tsering Mgon po tshe ring
gopa ’go pa
Göza Mgos gza’
Göza Wanggyel Mgos gza’ dbang rgyal
gyalo gyelpo bgya lo rgyal po
Gyantsé Rgyal rtse
Gyangkham Dechen Gyang khang bde chen
Gyari Chimé Drölma Rgya ri ’chi med sgrol ma
gyelpo rgyal po
Gyelsé rinpoché Rgyal sras rin po che
Hakhok Hya khog
Hörcho Peldo Hor cho pad rdor
hördra hor ’dra
Hörpo Hor po
Jagö Pema Ledrup Bya rgod Pad ma las grub
Jagö Tashi Namgyel Bya rgod Bkra shis rnam rgyal
Jagö Topden Bya rgod Stobs ldan
Jagö Tsenam Bya rgod Tshe rnam
Jamga ’Jam dga’
Jampa Künga Sanggyé Tenpai  
Gyeltsen
Byams pa kun dga’ sangs rgyas bstan 
pa’i rgyal mtshan
Jampa Tendar Byams pa bstan dar
Jamyang Pelmo ’Jam dyangs dpal mo
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Jamyang Zhepa ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa
Janggyap Byang rgyab
Jomda ’Jo mda’
jöntang chenpo ’jon thang chen po
Juchung ’Ju chung
Juchung Tsedör ’Ju chung Tshe rdor
Kagyü bka’ rgyud
Kalön Lama Bka’ blon bla ma
Kamtok dröching Skam thog gros chings
Kamtok dröchö Skam thog gros chod
Kangpé rangdé rangpön Khams pas rang sde rang dpon
Kangpé rangsi rangkyong Khams pas rang srid rang skyongs
Kandzé Dkar mdzes
Kelzang Chönjor Bskal bzang chos ’byor
Kelzang Püntsok Bskal bzang phun tshogs
Kelzang Tsering Bskal bzang tshe ring
Kelzang Wangdül Bskal bzang dbang ’dul
Kelzang Yeshé Bskal bzang ye shes




Khangsar Kyamgön Khang gsar skyabs mgon
Khangsar Yangchen Khandro Khang gsar Dbyangs can mkha’ ’gro





Labrang Trashikhyil Bla brang bkra shis ’khyil
Lhari Lha ri
Lhasa Lha sa
Lhundrupteng Lhun grub steng
Lingtsang Gling tshang
Lithang Li thang
Lodrö Jamyang Blo gros ’jam dbyangs
Lodrö Püntsok Blo gros phun tshogs
Machöwang Ma chos dbang
Markham Smar khams
Mawang Chöndzé Ma dbang chos mdzad
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Mawur Chöndzé Ma bur chos mdzad
Mazür Ma zur
Meshö Sme shod/Sman shor
Menshör Sman shor
mi chen po mi chen po
mirik mi rigs
miser mi ser
Miser Gyelkhap Mi ser rgyal khab
Nakchu Nag chu
namrik denpa rnam rig ldan pa
Namsé Tsega Rnam sras tshe dga’
Nangchen Nang chen
Nangsotsang Nang so tshang
Ngawang Jampel Rinchen Ngag dbang ’jam dpal rin chen
Ngör Ngor
Ngör khenchen Jampa Künga  
Tendzin
Ngor mkhan chen Byams pa kun dga’ 
bstan ’dzin
Nörla Hutuktu Nor bla/lha Hu thug thu/Ho thog thu
Nyachukha Nyag chu kha
Nyarong Nyag rong
Nyarong chikhyap Nyag rong spyi khyab
Nyarong Gönpo Namgyel Nyag rong Mgon po rnam rgyal
Nyakshik Setsa Nyag shig se tsha
Nyaktrük Lhagyel Nyag phrug Lha rgyal
Nyaktrük Rinchen Nyag phrug Rin chen
nyerchak lhengyekang gnyer phyag lhan rgyas khang
nyerchen gnyer chen
Nyerchen Gyangkhang rinpoché Gnyer chen Gyang khang rin po che




Pangda Topgyé Spang mda’ Stobs rgyas/Spom mda’ 
Stobs rgyas
Pangdatsang Spang mda’ tshang
Pelpung Dpal spungs
Pelyül Dpal yul
Pelyül dzong Dpal yul rdzong
Pema Chömpel Pad ma chos ’phel
Pema Wangchok Pad ma dbang mchog
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Penpo ’Phan po
Pomda Topgyé Spom mda’ Stobs rgyas
Pomdatsang Spom mda’ tshang
Pomkha Namgyel Dörjé Spom kha Rnam rgyal rdo rje
pönchenzhi dpon chen bzhi
pöngozhi dpon ’go bzhi
pönpo dpon po
Püntsok Wangyel Phun tshogs dbang rgyal
Pünwang Phun dbang
Ragashak Ra ga shag
Rakha Ra kha
Rapga Rab dga’
Raru Jamyang Lobdrö Ra ru ’Jam dbyangs blo gros
Riwoché Ri bo che




Situ rinpoché Si tu rin po che
Sokmo Sog mo
Sokmotsang Sog mo tshang
Sönam Chömtso Bsod nams chos mtsho








Tsari Nyergé Rtsa ri Gnyer dge
Tsang Gtsang
tsé lopdra rtse slob grwa
Tseten Drölkar Tshe brtan sgrol dkar
Tsewang Dörjé Rikdzin Tshe dbang rdo rje rig ’dzin
Tsewang Drölma Tshe dbang sgrol ma
Tsewang Düdül Tshe dbang bdud ’dul
Tsewang Lhamo Tshe dbang lha mo
Tsolho Mtsho lho
tünpa pünzhi mthun pa spun bzhi




Urgyenkyap O rgyan skyabs
Wangga Dbang dga’
Wangpotö Dbon po stod
Wokma Chakdzö Sönam Tsering ’Og ma phyag mdzod Bsod nams tshe 
ring
Wola Wangdzin ’O la dbang ’dzin
Wönpoteng Dbon po steng
Wuga O dga’







Glossary of Chinese Terms
Anzhang (si) 安章（寺）
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Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou fuzhouzhang 甘孜藏族自治州副州長











Kangding diqu minzu xieshanghui 康定地區民族協商會
Kangding junguanhui 康定軍管會
















quanguo renda daibiao 全國人大代表
Ren Naiqiang 任乃强
Sichuan 四川
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Xikang 西康
Xikang bao’an xingzheng jiangxihui 衛行政講習會
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12 Harnessing the Power of the Khampa 
Elites
Political Persuasion and the Consolidation of Communist 
Party Rule in Gyelthang
Dáša Pejchar Mortensen
Abstract
The fascinating life story of Wangchuk Tempa (1886-1961), a f ierce defender 
of local autonomy in Gyelthang, illustrates how the Chinese Communist 
Party utilized the power and charisma of local political and religious leaders 
to consolidate its rule in southern Kham between 1950 and 1958. Wangchuk 
Tempa’s legendary actions reveal that ‘collaboration’ is too simplistic a 
concept to explain why some local leaders joined forces with representatives 
of the Chinese state in response to mounting social and political pressures 
in the 1950s. Party off icials turned to ‘political persuasion’ to entice recal-
citrant Khampa leaders, such as Wangchuk Tempa, to cooperate, and they 
strategically granted pre-revolutionary local elites positions in the post-1950 
government, in order to strengthen nascent Party control in Gyelthang.
Keywords: Gyelthang, tusi system, Khampa rebellions, political persua-
sion, political tourism, land reform
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Introduction
Numerous accounts of the early years of Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) 
involvement in Gyelthang mention the exploits of Wangchuk Tempa (1886-
1961), an early-twentieth-century political and military leader in northwest 
Yunnan Province.1 While a few short testimonials written by C.C.P. off icials 
who interacted with Wangchuk Tempa in the early 1950s recall him as a 
‘bandit leader’ and ‘anti-revolutionary rebel’ who later came to see the error 
of his ways (Liao 1987 and Sun 1987), Gyelthang residents today often refer to 
his legendary actions in laudatory and mythic terms.2 Wangchuk Tempa’s life 
story illustrates the extent to which certain members of the Tibetan political 
and religious elite played crucial roles in the C.C.P.’s consolidation of their 
rule in Gyelthang. A close examination of these local elites’ actions reveals 
that the C.C.P.’s use of ‘political tourism’ and ‘political persuasion work’ 
to control Gyelthang was far more penetrating than the level of political 
control that could have been achieved through military conquest alone.3
Aside from competing monastic powers in the area, not a single unif ied 
political authority or hierarchical social organization formed the basis of 
collective identity and governance in Gyelthang until the Chinese Com-
munist government exerted its control over the region in the mid-1950s. In 
the late seventeenth century, the desirability of the area led the Fifth Dalai 
Lama to dispatch troops from the Central Tibetan (Ganden Phodrang) army 
1 Gyelthang is located in the easternmost foothills of the Himalaya Mountains in the northwest 
corner of present-day Yunnan Province in southern Kham. From 1724 until 2001, this area was 
referred to as Zhongdian in Chinese. In 2001 Zhongdian County was renamed Xianggelila 
County. Some of the more detailed Chinese-language sources that describe Wangchuk Tempa’s 
resistance to the Chinese Communist government in Gyelthang in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
include Sulang 1990, Huang 1998, and Gesang 2010.
2 Interviews with Gyelthang residents in July, 2012, October, 2012, and June, 2014. Jamyang 
Norbu (Norbu 2009) maintains that Gyelthang residents called Wangchuk Tempa by his Tibetan 
nickname, Aku Lemar, meaning ‘Uncle Hairless’, since he was bald, whereas Tibetans from other 
areas called him Wangchuk Tempa. According to the Zhongdian County Gazetteer, villagers 
in Termarong (Ch. Dongwang) and Ketsak (Ch. Geza) called him Wangchuk Tembu, whereas 
villagers from Gyelthang and Yangthang (Ch. Xiao Zhongdian) referred to him affectionately as 
‘Uncle Wangchuk Tempa’. Yangthang is located 40 kilometers south of Gyelthang’s administrative 
centre, which the Qing government named Zhongdian ting after establishing their garrison there 
in 1724. The Chinese Communist government later renamed this administrative centre Zhongxin 
zhen. Tibetans in other areas allegedly insulted Wangchuk Tempa by calling him Wangchuk 
Tempa Lemar, meaning ‘Wangchuk Tempa with the Red Forehead’ (Zhongdian xianzhi 1997, 
909).
3 For an explanation of ‘political tourism’, see Bulag (2012). For more on ‘political persuasion 
work’, see Mullaney (2010, 105).
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to support the growing influence of the Geluk school of Buddhism (Tsomu 
2015, 22-23). Although the Karma Kagyü monasteries in Gyelthang resisted 
this Geluk influence, the Fifth Dalai Lama successfully ordered subjects 
of the Muli king, located just to the southeast of Gyelthang, to unite with 
Tibetan-Mongolian allied forces and suppress the Kagyü monasteries’ 
armed insurrection (Wang 1995, 89-151). By the end of the seventeenth 
century, the Ganden Phodrang had converted many important Kagyü 
monasteries to the Gelukpa tradition, and due to kinship ties between 
monastic and secular rulers in Gyelthang, the political influence of the 
Gelukpa monastic institutions soon became closely intertwined with that 
of the local wealthy secular rulers (Schwieger 2015, 69). However, despite 
its inf luence over the monastic institutions in the region, the Ganden 
Phodrang government never exerted direct political control over Gyelthang 
in any consistent manner (Schwieger 2011; Holmes-Tagchungdarpa 2015, 
348). In 1724, after successive campaigns in the region by the Qing military, 
the Qing government stationed garrisons in Gyelthang (Ch. Zhongdian), 
Dechen (Ch. Deqin), and Balung (Ch. Weixi) and formally incorporated 
these three districts into Yunnan Province (Wang 1995, 108-109, 159, 171). 
Yet, even after it came under the nominal jurisdiction of Yunnan Province, 
day-to-day issues of governance were still largely resolved at the local level in 
Gyelthang. Up until the Chinese Communist Party consolidated its control 
over the area in the mid-twentieth century, villages in Gyelthang bonded 
together primarily for the purpose of dealing with external threats and 
maintaining social cohesion at the local level.4 The way that Wangchuk 
Tempa mediated between different power holders at the local, regional, 
and state levels vividly demonstrates how savvy local leaders managed to 
exert a great deal of control in southern Kham during an era of enormous 
political and social change.5
Wangchuk the Rebel
Lobsang Nima, or Wangchuk Tempa as he was known later in life, was born 
into a relatively poor household in Termarong (Ch. Dongwang xiang) in 
4 Yudru Tsomu (2015, xxviii-xxix) maintains that a similar system of social organization 
existed in Nyarong in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Also see Mueggler (2001) 
for interesting parallels amongst the neighbouring Lòlop’ò.
5 For an account of another charismatic and savvy Khampa strongman, see Yudru Tsomu’s 
chapter in this volume on Jagö Topden. See also Pirie and Huber, eds. (2008).
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1886.6 At ten years old, Wangchuk Tempa entered the monastic life, and after 
receiving ten years of monastic training at Ganden Sumtseling Monastery in 
Gyelthang, he moved to Lhasa to continue his education one of the monastic 
colleges (kangtsen) in Sera Monastery for one year (Zhongdian xianzhi 
1997, 909). He returned to the Termarong monastic college in Sumtseling 
Monastery in Gyelthang in 1907, and eight years later he became a teacher 
in that monastic college.
At the time, Gyelthang was frequently targeted by bandits from Chaktreng 
and Termarong, where villagers formed bands based on kinship ties and 
frequently engaged in raids on neighbouring towns.7 A group of nearly 100 
Sumtseling monks were organized in 1916 to defend the monastery against 
such bandit attacks, and the leaders of the eight monastic colleges appointed 
Wangchuk Tempa the leader of this bandit defense force (Zhongdian xianzhi 
1997, 909; Gesang 2010, 425-426).
In 1919, after the Chinese Nationalist army stationed in Gyelthang 
(Zhongdian Town) levied a heavier grain tax on Gyelthang residents in 
order to support their troops in the area, villagers from 300 households in 
Termarong rebelled (Zhongdian xianzhi 1997, 909).8 Wangchuk Tempa and 
eleven other Sumtseling monks from Termarong returned to Termarong 
to participate in the uprising, and villagers soon selected Wangchuk to 
6 Wangchuk Tempa was born in the present-day village of Zhalujiangzhong Wang Xueding 
Village, located in Xinlian Administrative Village in Termarong, which is currently part of 
Xianggelila County in Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province. The previous 
name for this village was Kenading, meaning ‘above the stockade’. According to the Zhongdian 
County Gazetteer, the local pronunciation of the name of this village closely resembled the word 
‘Kanading’, which in the Gyelthang Tibetan language had the inauspicious meaning of ‘Black 
Mouth’. When Lobsang Nyima travelled to Lhasa as a young man to continue his studies, he 
consulted with monastic authorities and was told that Kenading residents had long suffered from 
poverty because they had the misfortune of living in this ill-named village. Lobsang Nyima was 
therefore advised to change the name of his village to Wangchuk Tempa, meaning ‘wealth and 
power’. From then on, people in his village started referring to him as ‘the one from Wangchuk 
Tempa Village’ (Yunnan sheng difangzhi 2002, 452; Zhongdian xianzhi 1997, 909).
7 According to Yudru Tsomu (2015, 20), it was conventional in this region for bandits f irst to 
compensate the families of bandits who had died or been wounded during raids, and then to 
divide what was left of the spoils of war amongst the surviving raiders. For more on banditry 
in Chaktreng, Termarong, and Gyelthang, see Van Spengen (2002, 15-22); Goullart (1955, 91-92); 
and Wong (2002a, 17-19).
8 Van Spengen (2002, 19) claims that in 1922 ‘Chungtien [Zhongdian] fell to the Tongwa 
[Dongwang people] from Konkaling [Gongling near Yading]. It had already fallen into the 
hands of regular Tibetan troops in 1917, but had been handed over again to the Chinese in 1918. 
The Tongwa drove out the Chinese off icials and robbed the Chinese soldiers of their rif les’. In 
compiling this historical narrative, van Spengen draws on Rock (1947, 251, 257) and Kingdon 
Ward (1923, 29).
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lead the rebellion (Zhongdian xianzhi 1997, 909; Yunnan sheng difangzhi 
bianzuan weiyuanhui 2002, 452; Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi 2003, 141). In the 
aftermath of the Termarong rebellion, Wangchuk Tempa and his rebel troops 
turned to banditry, and by the mid-1920s he had recruited a well-armed 
militia of 2500 men on horseback (Zhongdian xianzhi 1997, 910).9 This local 
militia not only protected Gyelthang from roaming bandits and Chinese 
military incursions, but also led prof itable raids on neighbouring towns 
(van Spengen 2002, 19). Wangchuk Tempa acquired more military, political, 
and economic influence over the next few years. In 1923, Luo Shuchang, 
the provincial garrison commander of Balung, travelled to Termarong to 
meet with Wangchuk Tempa and appointed him the Deputy Commander 
of the District Defense Force (tuanfang) for Gyelthang, Balung, and Dechen 
(Zhongdian xianzhi 1997, 909). Wangchuk Tempa set up his government 
headquarters in Zhongdian Town and used his considerable political and 
military clout to enforce strict security in the region (Gesang 2010, 426).
Bandit raids from Termarong and Chaktreng continued to plague 
Lijiang and the Tibetan areas just to the south of Gyelthang, and in 1927 
the Zhongdian County Governor appointed Wangchuk Tempa the com-
mander of Zhongdian’s monk and layperson militia (sengsu tuanwu zhihui) 
(Zhongdian xianzhi 1997, 910). Due to Wangchuk Tempa’s willingness to 
ruthlessly suppress all uprisings in the area, his military, political, and 
economic power base quickly surpassed that of any of the 23 tuguan and 
county governors in Gyelthang, Balung, or Dechen (Zhongdian Xianzhi 1997, 
910). The Nationalist government appointed Kelzang Tsering, a Khampa 
from Bathang, to be the Commissioner for Guomindang Affairs of Xikang, 
and in 1932 the Nationalist government sent him to Bathang to establish a 
Nationalist Party organization in the region and weaken the influence of 
the Sichuan warlord Liu Wenhui (Tuttle 2005, 147-150).10 Kelzang Tsering 
joined with local people to launch the ‘Khampa rule of Kham’ (Kangren 
zhi Kang) movement from his home town of Bathang, and in 1932 he gave 
9 Joseph Rock (1925, 453) reports on one battle in 1923, in which 1200 Tibetan ‘bandits’ crossed 
the Yangtze River and fought the ‘Battle of Peshwe Bridge’ within 20 miles of Lijiang, killing 
many Chinese soldiers. Van Spengen (2002, 19) urges us to be cautious about the accuracy of 
Rock’s report, since Rock indicates that almost the entire Chinese army was killed, compared 
to only one of the reportedly 1200 Tibetan ‘bandits’ who fought in this battle.
10 Nationalist government off icials, Chinese de facto military leaders in Kham (such as Liu 
Wenhui), and Republican intellectuals (such as Ren Naiqiang) referred to Kham as ‘Xikang’ 
well before the province of Xikang was off icially established in 1939. Tsomu (2013) and Relyea 
(this volume) describe many of the competing political discourses regarding the Kham frontier 
during the Republican era.
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Wangchuk Tempa the power to investigate all incidents of unrest in the 
southern Kham regions of Gyelthang, Dechen, and Balung and use his local 
militia to restore peace (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 910; Gesang 2010, 428).11
Encountering the Communists
When the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army passed through 
northern Yunnan Province in May, 1936, Wangchuk Tempa commanded 
his militia to attack the bedraggled and half-starved Communist troops.12 
A total of 160 soldiers and f ive off icers were killed and many more were 
wounded during armed skirmishes with Wangchuk Tempa’s militia during 
the seventeen days that the Red Army spent gathering supplies or crossing 
the mountain passes in Gyelthang (Sun 2011).13 While many Gyelthang 
residents joined Wangchuk Tempa’s militia in f ighting against the Red Army, 
others appear to have been at least partially won over by the Red Army 
soldiers’ actions, speeches, and musical performances in town.14 A growing 
11 For more on Kelzang Tsering’s role in the Guomindang government, the ‘Khampa rule of 
Kham’ movement, and the power struggle between Liu Wenhui, the Nationalist government, 
and Kelzang Tsering in Xikang, see Goldstein et al. (2004, 10-14), Peng (2002, 72), Tuttle (2005, 
148-149), and Lawson (2013).
12 As various Communist armies in the south attempted to evade being captured by Nationalist 
troops, different divisions of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Zhongguo gongnong 
hong jun) took part in a series of marches that later came to be known collectively as the ‘Long 
March’. Arguably the best known division of the Red Army is the First Front Army of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic, which marched from Jiangxi Province to Shaanxi Province between October, 
1934 and October, 1935. In Yunnan, the Long March took place much later, as Commanders He 
Long and Xiao Ke led 18,000 troops in the Second and Sixth divisions of the Red Army through 
Gyelthang and into Sichuan Province between 25 April and 9 May 1936. As an important landmark 
in the history of the Communist Party, the Long March is currently commemorated in the 
Diqing Red Army Long March Museum in Gyelthang, as well as at other former sites along the 
Red Army’s route. One of the main streets that runs from north to south in Zhongxin Town was 
named Long March Road (Changzheng lu) in 1982 (Sulang 1990, 108; Diqing zhouzhi 2003, vol. 
1, 22). The Second Front Army described the challenges that it faced in securing adequate food 
provisions in Kham during the Long March in ‘Zhongguo gongnong hongjun er fangmian jun 
zhengzhi bu’ (1991). Sperling (1976a) and Liu (2004, 96-98) analyze the major linguistic, political, 
and logistical obstacles that the Red Army faced in Kham.
13 The Yunnan Provincial Gazetteer reports that over 200 Red Army soldiers and f ive off icers 
were killed during battles with Wangchuk Tempa’s militia in 1936 (Yunnan sheng difangzhi 
bianzuan weiyuanhui 2002, 452).
14 Some Gyelthang residents joined the Red Army as translators when the army came through 
town and seven of these translators died in battles just a few days after joining the army. Interview 
with the director of the Diqing Red Army Long March Museum in Gyelthang in July, 2014. There 
are also (somewhat questionable) accounts of pregnant Tibetan slaves, who were so impressed 
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underground Communist Party (dixia dang zuzhi) gained support among 
young, well-educated, and relatively wealthy Tibetan and Naxi residents 
in Gyelthang during the fourteen years between the Red Army’s departure 
from Gyelthang in 1936 and the People’s Liberation Army’s arrival in 1950.15
A small group of Tibetan Communist activists proposed to use Dechen as 
their base of operations from 1945-1946, since there were not any permanently 
stationed Guomindang troops in Dechen at that time. Moreover, the de 
facto governor of Dechen was Gönpo Tsering (Ch. Hai Zhengtao), a Tibetan 
Communist Party sympathizer who had joined the government of the 
short-lived independent ‘Böpa People’s Republic’, or ‘Greater Tibetan State’ 
(Ch. Da Xizangguo) set up by the Red Army in Ganzi (Kandzé) in Sichuan 
Province, when the Red Army crossed through Kham during the Long 
March (Wangyal 2007, 5; Goldstein et al. 2004, 94; Liu 2004, 95-99). In order 
to stave off an invasion by the Japanese military, which was in control of 
nearby Burma in 1945, the Guomindang sent Gönpo Tsering to Dechen with 
a supply of 300 guns and a mandate to establish a local Tibetan guerilla 
force to defend the area. Gönpo Tsering soon became the commander of 
the Dechen military and the governor of Dechen County; Han Chinese 
residents of Dechen called him ‘Commander Hai’ (Hai siling) (Deqin xian 
zhi 1997, 343; Goldstein 2004, 94).
In September, 1946, Gönpo Tsering, Bapa Püntsok Wangyel from Bathang, 
Ngawang Kesang from Xikang, and He Qichang from Gyelthang secretly 
established the ‘Eastern Tibetan People’s Autonomous Alliance’ (Böshar 
gyümi mang rang kyong na tün; Ch. Dongzang renmin zizhi hui) in Yunniang 
Village, located in Shengping Town in Dechen (Sun 2011).16 The Charter of 
the Eastern Tibetan People’s Autonomous Alliance cited Sun Yatsen’s Three 
Principles of the People as its guiding philosophy and announced the alliance 
members’ intentions to improve Khampas’ lives by introducing new farming 
techniques, building roads, and abolishing the corvée tax system. Chinese 
Communist-style guerrilla warfare tactics would be utilized to overthrow 
by the Red Army commanders’ speeches about the need to do away with social inequality in 
Gyelthang that they named their newborn children ‘Communist’ (Le’an 2003, 84).
15 The biographies of Tashi Tsering and Bapa Phüntsok Wangyel provide useful insights into 
why some young Tibetans found communism attractive in this early period (Wangyal 2007; 
Goldstein et al., 1997; Goldstein et al., 2004). On Naxi support for the underground Communist 
movement in Lijiang in the 1940s, see White (2002, 134).
16 He Qichang was a Tibetan merchant who came from a powerful and wealthy family in 
Gyelthang. His father, He Rongguang, served as the Police Chief of Zhongdian County and the 
company commander (qianzong) of the defense force in Ketsak during the Republican period 
until he was assassinated by the monk warlord Ajian from Termarong in 1930 (Feng 2013, 151; 
Zhuoma 2015, 4).
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local Guomindang-backed warlords and establish a truly autonomous region 
for Tibetans in southern Kham (Goldstein et al. 2004, 99-100, 319-324). The 
leaders of this alliance intended to recruit Dechen Middle School students 
to join their organization and to f inance their expanding organization by 
taking control of the Guomindang tax off ice in Dechen. However, their plan 
was foiled when the Guomindang preemptively discovered their intentions 
and killed Gönpo Tsering.17
In the wake of this failed uprising against the Guomindang-backed 
Chinese warlords in southern Kham, the number of Gyelthangpa in the 
Communist Party gradually grew in the late 1940s, but the majority of 
Gyelthang’s secular and religious leaders remained wary of joining the un-
derground C.C.P.18 Ever since the Guomindang government had appointed 
Wangchuk Tempa the Vice Governor of Zhongdian County in the early 1940s, 
it had become increasingly dangerous for revolutionary-minded Gyelthang 
residents to agitate for local political, social, or economic change. Throughout 
the 1940s, Wangchuk Tempa continued to consolidate his power by engaging 
in well-planned attacks on his enemies, including a highly-esteemed lama 
from his home town of Termarong. In the aftermath of one particularly 
vengeful attack, during which Wangchuk Tempa’s troops looted and burned 
72 houses in a village near Ganden Sumtseling Monastery, Ngawang Lobzang 
Tendzin (1899-1967), the seventeenth reincarnation of the Zangbum Lama 
of Ganden Sumtseling Monastery in Gyelthang, reportedly became very 
alarmed. He summoned Wangchuk Tempa to ask him when he intended 
on turning his wrath against the Rinpoche himself (Zhongdian xian zhi 
1997, 911; Wong 2002b, 11).
Wangchuk Tempa allegedly expressed remorse for the hundreds of lives he 
had taken in battle, and in 1947 he travelled to Lhasa to rededicate himself to 
17 The C.C.P. posthumously awarded Gönpo Tsering membership in the Communist Party 
(Deqin xian zhi 1997, 6; Le’an Wangdui 2009, 17). Püntsok Wangyel subsequently f led and spent 
the next few months in hiding; he eventually ended up becoming one of the most influential 
and controversial Tibetan leaders in the Communist Party (Goldstein 2004).
18 Apart from He Qichang, a few other young Gyelthangpa joined the underground Communist 
Party in Lijiang in 1947 and quickly rose through the ranks of the Party. One such student was 
Liu Hanxun (1918-1972), the second son of Liu En (1888-1967), a powerful tusi in Gyalthang. As 
a young man, Liu Hanxun travelled to Lijiang to take the entrance exam for high school. Upon 
failing the exam, he became a horse caravan (mabang) leader and merchant on the Tea Horse 
Road (cha ma gu dao) that ran from southern Yunnan, through Gyelthang, and west to Lhasa 
(Yang 2013). Leather workers in Gyelthang, as well as Nyishar potters, who had become famous 
for their beautiful black clay pottery, also used the Tea Horse Road trade network to sell their 
commissioned wares to Tibetan patrons in Lhasa (Interview with Nyishar potter on 26 April 
2013).
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Buddhist studies. However, just one year later, he returned back to Gyelthang, 
since monastic leaders in Lhasa had urged him to defend his home town 
from Communist aggression after the P.L.A.’s recent military successes in 
other areas of Kham (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 911).
In April 1949, Li Liesan, the leader of the Snow Mountain Society (Xue-
shanshe), a trade insurance association (baoshangdui) based in Lijiang, 
invited Wangchuk Tempa’s nephew, Wang Qupi, to dinner and appointed 
him the director of the Gyelthang off ice of the Snow Mountain Society.19 
The next month, at the invitation of the Snow Mountain Society, Wangchuk 
Tempa sent one of his trusted embassaries to Lijiang to meet with He Qichang 
and inquire about cooperating with the underground Communist Party to 
expel a bandit gang from southern Kham (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 911).
In late August 1949, the Communist Party sent ten members of the 
Western Yunnan Work Group to meet with Wangchuk Tempa and the 
monastic leaders of Ganden Sumstenling Monastery and discuss the C.C.P.’s 
ethnic and religious policies (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 911; Song and Tao 
1992a, 39). The Party representatives were prepared to write a very glowing 
report about the progress the Party had made in Tibetan areas of Yunnan, 
when they were blindsided. On 3 September 1949, as they rode through 
the south gate of Zhongdian town, accompanied by a security retinue of a 
dozen members of Gyelthang’s City Defense Volunteer Militia (chengfang 
yiwu dadui) – including founding members of the Gyelthang branch of the 
underground Communist Party – they were intercepted by Lobsang Wangdü, 
Wangchuk Tempa’s trusted friend and the commander of the Yangthang 
Civilian Corps (Xiao Zhongdian mintuan dadui).20 According to a f irst-person 
19 In the late 1940s, two of the most successful traders in southern Kham were Li Liesan, a 
wealthy merchant from Lijiang who controlled much of the horse caravan trade in Gyalthang 
in the 1940s, and the Heqing merchant Bao Pinliang. Li and Bao joined together in 1947 to form 
a very successful trade insurance association (baoshangdui), called the Snow Mountain Society 
(Xueshanshe), which expanded its membership base to over 40,000 merchants across Kham and 
into southern Yunnan Province by the late 1940s. Liu Hanxun and He Qichang worked directly 
under the command of Li Liesan and engaged in a thriving horse trade caravan business (Feng 
2013, 119). Many prominent members of the Snow Mountain Society also joined the underground 
Communist Party in Heqing and Lijiang in 1948 and 1949.
20 During the late 1940s, wealthy landholders in Southern Kham frequently worked together 
to fund privately-run Civilian Corps (mintuan dadui) to military defend their regional interests 
and protect their towns from bandit raids. The leader of the Yangthang Civilian Corps was 
Lobsang Wangdü, who much like Wangchuk Tempa, was a former monk-turned-brigade leader. 
In 1927, after the Zhongdian County Governor appointed Wangchuk Tempa the commander of 
Zhongdian’s monk and layperson militia, Wangchuk Tempa turned over the job of defending 
Yangthang to his trusted friend, Lobsang Wangdü (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 
2005, 9).
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narrative account written by Song Guozhu, one of the commanders of 
Gyelthang’s City Defense Volunteer Militia and the squad leader (bazong) of 
Gyelthang, Lobsang Wangdü announced that Wangchuk Tempa insisted his 
Yangthang Civilian Corps should escort the Western Yunnan Work Group 
members from Gyelthang to Jiangbian to ensure their safe passage. The 
Gyelthang City Defense Volunteer Militia members were wary of Wangchuk 
Tempa’s intentions, and they refused Lobsang Wangdü’s offer three times, but 
eventually they were persuaded to hand over responsibility for the security 
of the Western Yunnan Work Group to the Yangthang Civilian Corps (Song 
and Tao 1992a, 41). Later that afternoon, local bandits launched a surprise 
raid on the Western Yunnan Work Group, killing six members of the work 
group, including Li Liesan, and injuring f ive others (Zhongdian xian zhi 
1997, 911). Although Wangchuk Tempa adamantly denied responsibility at 
the time, he was widely rumoured to have orchestrated the attack (Song 
and Tao 1992a, 41).21
On 20 October 1949, Wangchuk Tempa assembled the chieftains from 
Gyelthang, Dechen, and Balung, along with the monastic leaders of Sumt-
seling and the surrounding monasteries, to discuss the region’s future. At 
the meeting, Rinpoche Ngawang Lobzang Tendzin of Ganden Sumtseling 
Monastery, and Zhao Baohe, the Tibetan commander of Gyelthang’s City 
Defense Volunteer Militia and a relatively new member of the Communist 
Party, tried to convince Wangchuk Tempa that the P.L.A. was too powerful 
and that he should try to negotiate rather than f ight a losing battle (Le’an 
2003, 18). Wangchuk Tempa ignored this advice and organized a number 
of local militias to engage in a well-coordinated attack on the P.L.A. on 
29 October 1949. The attack was successful, and Wangchuk Tempa’s coalition 
militia killed many P.L.A. soldiers and work team members, burned Party 
off ices, and stole valuable P.L.A. property.22
One of the C.C.P.’s most strategic moves in governing ethnic minority 
regions was its United Front policy of incorporating local ethnic lead-
ers into its post-1949 government. From 29 August 1950 until 31 January 
1951, the central Chinese government in Beijing dispatched a delegation 
21 In a confession he wrote in 1959, which he most likely penned under duress after undergoing 
a series of interrogations during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Wangchuk Tempa expressed 
remorse for having planned this deadly ambush (Wang 1989, 615).
22 According to the Zhongdian County Gazetteer, Wangchuk Tempa met with the tusi and 
monastic leaders in Gyelthang, Dechen, and Balung, to raise funds and support for a militia 
to repel the P.L.A. from the region. Many battles took place during the winter of 1949-1950, 
including one battle in which 330 houses were burned in Judian (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 
911).
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of anthropologists, linguists, and Party workers to learn more about the 
social and economic conditions in northern Yunnan Province (Mullaney 
2010, 8). The delegation’s 1951 report provided the foundational knowledge 
necessary to implement its United Front policy designed to win over the 
support of local elites.23 Under this policy, the C.C.P. off icials gave Tibetan 
religious leaders and wealthy traders prominent positions in the Zhongdian 
government in the early 1950s, while the People’s Liberation Army worked to 
fully secure this frontier region. Some of the founding members of the C.C.P. 
in Zhongdian were the educated sons and grandsons of wealthy landlords 
and tusi (native chieftains).24 Young Tibetan C.C.P. members utilized the 
United Front policy to ensure that their own relatives retained their pre-
1949 political authority in the region.25 The C.C.P. hoped to minimize the 
possibility of resistance in ethnic minority areas where Party control was 
weak and its ignorance of local customs was potentially dangerous. This 
policy of cooperation with the ‘patriotic upper strata’ also enabled the C.C.P. 
to handle a dire expertise gap, as local elites often served as translators, 
mediators, or cultural brokers, and were used to smooth relations between 
the Party and the populace.
According to Communist Party historiography, Gyelthang was off icially 
‘peacefully liberated’ (heping jiefang) on 10 May 1950 (Zhongdian xian zhi 
1997, 911). Two days later the P.L.A. sent Wangchuk Tempa’s good friend, 
Lobsang Wangdü, who had already been persuaded to work on behalf of 
the C.C.P., to urge Wangchuk Tempa to negotiate with the new Communist 
government. Flanked by his personal bodyguards, Wangchuk Tempa met 
with the P.L.A. General, Liao Yunzhou, and the Zhongdian County Governor, 
Sun Zhihe, along with Liu En and Nyetsang Tsering Püntsok, two Tibetan 
native liutenants (tuqianzong) who had begun working with representatives 
of the underground Communist government the previous year, on the 
23 The Visitation Team published their results in July, 1951 in a document titled The Report 
of Sub-group Two of the Central Visiting Delegation to Investigate the Conditions of the Ethnic 
Minorities in Yunnan Province. In 1986 the Yunnan Nationalities Publishing House reprinted 
this document for general circulation; see Yunnan sheng bianji zu 1986. For more on the United 
Front policy, see Smith (1994, 55); Bulag (2010, 17), and Weiner (2012).
24 For more on the tusi system in Zhongdian, see Qi (1993, 198).
25 On 28 August 1949, the f irst underground Communist Party branch was established inside 
the town limits of Zhongdian. By the time the P.L.A. arrived in Gyelthang in May, 1950, more 
than thirty young Tibetan, Naxi, Bai, and Han residents of Gyelthang had joined the Communist 
Party or the Communist Youth League (Feng 2013, 138, 151; Le’an Wangdui 2009, 17). The Khampa 
elites that were in power in the 1930s and 1940s in Gyelthang, Termarong, and Nyishar either 
remained in power or passed their positions of power onto their sons in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
until many of them were killed during struggle sessions at the height of the Cultural Revolution.
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Jingkou mountain pass and negotiated his surrender to the P.L.A.26 As a sign 
of good will, Wangchuk Tempa presented General Liao with four yaks and a 
Tibetan blanket piled high with gold and silver coins. According to General 
Liao, who published his account of this meeting in Diqing Prefecture’s f irst 
volume of off icially-collected ‘Cultural and Historical Materials’ (wenshi 
ziliao), Liao agreed to accept the four yaks and the blanket out of respect for 
local gift-giving customs, but he turned Wangchuk Tempa’s gold and silver 
over to the P.L.A. f inance off ice (Liao 1987, 13).27 General Liao congratulated 
Wangchuk Tempa on being appointed to the position of Vice-Governor of 
Zhongdian County, and he tried to persuade Wangchuk Tempa to accept 
this post, but Wangchuk Tempa was reportedly reticent to do so (Zhongdian 
xian zhi 1997, 912).
26 All told, between 1948 and 1953, Wangchuk Tempa battled the P.L.A., surrendered, and 
then fought them again before professing to surrender again, betraying his allegiance to the 
P.L.A. and the C.C.P. at least four times. Each time, Chinese Communist Party organizers in 
Gyelthang tried hard to win Wangchuk Tempa over by giving him even more prominent off icial 
government posts (Wong 2002, 11). Liu En was born in the Gyelthang town centre in 1888. He 
was f luent in both Chinese and Tibetan, and in 1904 he became the native second lieutenant 
(tubazong) of Yangthang. In 1912, when the Yunnan Republican army came through Gyalthang 
on its westward march, Liu was given the responsibility of provisioning the Republican 
army with grain. According to Zhongdian County records, Liu carried out his off icial duties 
honorably, and he was awarded a medal of distinction by the Republican government. In 1913 
he was appointed to be the native lieutenant (tuqianzong) of Nyishar. In 1932 he successfully 
organized a local Gyelthang militia to defend the town from Chaktreng bandit attacks, and in 
acknowledgement of his success, the Guomindang government subsequently appointed Liu to 
be the Governor of Zhongdian County. In 1944 he was appointed to a new post as Vice-Governor 
of Zhongdian County (Diqing zangzu zizhizhou minzu zongjiao shiwu weiyuanhui, ed. 2001, 
236; Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, ed. 2003, 144-147; Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi 
xiesheng huiyi, ed. 2005, 32-33). Nyetsang Tsering Püntsok (Ch. name: Qi Yaozu), was born 
in 1927 in the Gyelthang town centre. He inherited the post of native lieutenant of Nyishar 
after his father passed away in 1946 (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xiesheng huiyi, ed. 2005, 
68-70).
27 Starting in the early 1980s, Political Consultative Conference members in the Diqing 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province began to compile carefully edited, detailed 
accounts of early Communist Party involvement in this area. Nine volumes of testimonies 
penned by Tibetan, Naxi, Bai, Han, and Hui religious and political leaders in Diqing were 
published as wenshi ziliao (cultural and historical materials) between 1987 and 2013. Many of 
these published documents were local Political Consultative Conference (zhengzhi xieshang 
huiyi) members’ recorded recollections of critical moments between 1949 and 1957 when the 
People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese Communist Party faced local armed resistance in 
Diqing. These accounts all conclude with the ultimate triumph of the Communist Party after 
P.L.A. commanders and C.C.P. cadres negotiated with landholders, monks, and warlords, and 
assured them of the Party’s benign religious and ethnic policies. For more on the United Front 
and the political goals of wenshi ziliao production in the reform era, see Mortensen (2017) and 
Fromm (2019, 110-153).
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It is likely that Wangchuk Tempa surrendered to the P.L.A. in order to 
buy time to plan a series of well-coordinated militia campaigns, since he 
organized two more armed rebellions against P.L.A. troops and Communist 
leaders in the region in late May, 1950, leading to the deaths of many P.L.A. 
soldiers, work-team members, and self-defense forces.28 On 21 May 1951, 
Wangchuk Tempa supported a rebellion in the ethnically Naxi area of Sanba, 
located approximately 120 kilometers to the southeast of Termarong, by 
sending troops, weapons, and supplies, but the rebellion was suppressed 
by the P.L.A. (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, ed. 2003, 62). 
His nephew, Wang Qupi, started another uprising in March, 1952, when he 
killed six merchants from Zhongxin Town who were travelling through 
Yangthang under the protection of General Liao (Sulang 1990, 112; Zhongguo 
renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, ed. 2003, 62). This uprising lasted until 
Wangchuk Tempa’s troops bore the brunt of a particularly lengthy and 
devastating exchange of f ire in Barlungdrong village (Zhongguo renmin 
zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, ed. 2003, 63; Thondup 1992; McGranahan 2010, 
67).29 The injured Wangchuk Tempa f led with his nephew and 60 of his 
surviving militia members to a mountain cave in Termarong (Zhongdian 
xian zhi 1997, 912).
In order to persuade Wangchuk Tempa to come out of the mountains, 
surrender, and join the new C.C.P. government, General Liao asked one of 
Wangchuk Tempa’s former bodyguards, a Tibetan monk from Yangthang, 
to join Liao in explaining the C.C.P.’s religious policy to Wangchuk Tempa 
(Song and Tao 1992b, 86). General Liao also requested Liu En and Nyetsang 
Tsering Püntsok, the two native liutenants who had been working for the 
Communist government in Gyelthang since 1950, to negotiate again with 
Wangchuk Tempa. These Tibetan leaders promised Wangchuk Tempa that 
if he surrendered to the Communists, he would not be harmed or pros-
ecuted, but instead made a member of the Lijiang Special District United 
28 For more on the organizational work that the Communist Party did in Gyelthang to support 
these predominately Tibetan self-defense forces (ziwei dui yuan), which were referred to locally 
as the hulu dui, and which later became part of the broader national coalition army known as 
the ‘people’s militia’ (minbing), see Zhongdian xian zhi (1997, 409).
29 The extent of local resistance to the People’s Liberation Army’s advances is on display today 
in Gyelthang’s Memorial Park, where numerous P.L.A. soldiers who were killed during the 
so-called liberation of Gyelthang have been buried. Located at the entrance to the Old Town at 
the southern end of Long March Road, Memorial Park has recently been remodelled. It now boasts 
an impressive bronze statue of a P.L.A. soldier, a colourful mural with inscriptions observing 
the event in both Tibetan and Chinese, and newly-planted f lowers and trees near the tombs of 
the fallen soldiers. Every year on Tomb Sweeping Day (Qingming jie), teachers bring their pupils 
to the Memorial Park cemetery and require them to sweep the P.L.A. soldiers’ tombs.
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Government Committee (Lijiang zhuanqu lianhe zhengfu weiyuan). In the 
end, Wangchuk Tempa capitulated and, accompanied by his four most loyal 
bodyguards, travelled to Zhongdian Town to meet General Liao and other 
members of the Lijiang-based United Front Department (Zhongdian xian 
zhi 1997, 912). The C.C.P. cadres’ patience and tenacity in repeatedly engaging 
in prolonged negotiations with Wangchuk Tempa, despite frequent setbacks 
and betrayals, demonstrates the extent to which the Party was willing to 
go to entice powerful Khampa elites to join the United Front.
Wangchuk’s Adventures as a Political Tourist
Wangchuk Tempa was initially very wary of the Party’s policies and skepti-
cal that the Communists had the Tibetans’ best interests in mind, but he 
attended United Front off icials’ lectures in Zhongdian and Lijiang about 
the Party’s ethnic minority policies and eventually, in 1953, he agreed to 
go on a trip to Chongqing. In Chongqing, Wangchuk Tempa encountered 
Commander He Long for the f irst time since they last met on the battlef ield 
in 1936 during the Second Red Army’s Long March through Yunnan. Accord-
ing to Communist Party wenshi ziliao sources, much to Wangchuk Tempa’s 
surprise, Commander He expressed little animosity toward Wangchuk 
Tempa for his past actions, including his violent attack on Commander 
He’s own caravan in 1936 (Gesang 2010, 443-444). Instead, Commander He 
assured Wangchuk Tempa that the Party would not prosecute him for his 
past crimes, maintaining that Wangchuk Tempa had actually assisted the 
Communist Party by adroitly defending the autonomy of the Gyelthang 
people. Commander He listed three ways that Wangchuk Tempa had resisted 
the imposition of Nationalist government policies in Gyelthang: he had 
opposed the Nationalist government’s efforts to conduct land surveys in 
Gyelthang, prevented the Nationalist army from conscripting Gyelthang 
residents, and blocked the circulation of Nationalist-government-issued 
currency in 1948 (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 912).
After a lengthy conversation and many cups of tea, Commander He 
made arrangements for Wangchuk Tempa to attend Party education classes 
in Chongqing for the duration of the week (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 912). 
The next week a different battalion commander accompanied Wangchuk 
Tempa to Beijing to attend Party classes. In Beijing he was welcomed by 
representatives of the United Front Department and the Nationalities Affairs 
Committee. Over the course of the next few years, Wangchuk Tempa joined 
United Front Department cadres and other ethnic minority leaders on 
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off icial tours to schools, factories, and farms in Hunan Province, Beijing, 
and Kunming. The purpose of these tours was to show the former elite 
class the progress that China was making under a new socialist system.30
Travel and sightseeing, or what the anthropologist Uradyn Bulag has 
termed ‘political tourism’, played an important role in the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s attempt to win over and transform ethnic minority leaders 
(Bulag 2012, 147-148). After the C.C.P. came to power, Communist leaders 
made a concerted effort to invite so-called ‘representative f igures of the up-
per echelon’ – ethnic minority members of the traditionally elite strata who 
had not joined the Communist Party – to participate in political tourism. The 
most important quality for selection as an invitee was the person’s ‘radiating 
power’ ( fusheli), which was measured by the number of people that this 
person could directly or indirectly influence (Bulag 2012, 143). Although the 
delegates’ attitudes toward the Communist Party were investigated ahead of 
time, hostile attitudes did not necessarily exclude elites from being invited 
to participate in political tourism. In fact, as Bulag points out, ‘the more 
powerful or hostile they were, the greater the chances of being invited to 
Beijing’ (ibid.). Certain elites, like Wangchuk Tempa, were even permitted 
to bring their bodyguards.
The rationale for these political tours originated in a proposal that Ren 
Naiqiang (1894-1989), a Chinese ethnologist specializing in southwestern 
frontier issues, made to the Sichuan warlord, Liu Wenhui, in 1934. Ren sug-
gested that ‘sightseeing’ (guanguang) would be one of the most effective ways 
to promote the assimilation of Tibetans into a newly constituted Chinese 
nation. He maintained that ethnic minority leaders who had been to China 
proper and interacted with the Chinese over a long period of time tended 
to be more politically submissive, whereas those with limited knowledge of 
China were more arrogant. Ren alleged that, living in isolation, the frontier 
people were ‘like frogs in a well’, convinced that the small circle of sky visible 
above them was actually the entire heavens. When ethnic minority leaders 
were ‘told about the great size of China and the large population of the Han 
Chinese people by outsiders who had visited Nanjing and Shanghai’, Ren 
explained, ‘they roared with laughter, dismissing it as a lie’ (Ren 1934, 232). 
By Ren’s reasoning, the frontier people’s resistance to integration was not a 
political request for maintaining a separate polity for themselves; rather it 
stemmed from their ignorance of Chinese political and economic policies. 
30 In an interview with Melvyn Goldstein in 2003, a Khampa recalled how popular these 
political tours were amongst young Khampas living in Kandzé in the early 1950s (Goldstein 
2014, 117).
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Their alleged belligerence was attributed to geographical isolation, and 
the only way out of it was for the frontier people to travel to China and 
personally observe the country’s modernity.31
Building on Ren’s civilizing logic, the United Front Department designed 
political tours to positively shape minority leaders’ impressions of China. 
Bulag maintains that:
Prior to each visit, minority leaders would be fed with particular lines 
of information, and after the visit, they would be organized to have a 
seminar discussion, not to explore issues from different angles, but to 
achieve a unif ied understanding or consensus of what they had seen. 
Should one of them have a different, or rather ‘wrong’ opinion, he or she 
would be ‘helped’ to understand why they were in the wrong. At the end 
of the tour, minutes would be drafted, which would then be sent to the 
provincial or prefectural party committee for approval. The minutes were 
usually f illed with lines of how elite visitors were impressed by Chinese 
hospitality, how advanced Chinese regions were, and most importantly 
how powerful the Chinese were. […] The minority visitors would each 
be given a copy of the minutes and then charged with going back to their 
villages to make oral reports on what they had seen. (Bulag 2012, 145-146)
Party documents suggest that Wangchuk’s tour of inland China may have 
helped convince him of the power of the Communist government, or at least 
of the futility of f ighting against it (Gesang 2010, 444). A few months after 
returning back to Gyelthang in 1953, Wangchuk expressed his willingness 
to work with the leadership of the Communist Party, and later that same 
year he agreed to serve as the Vice Governor of Zhongdian County under 
C.C.P. rule.
The Socialist Transformation of Gyelthang
As the C.C.P. worked to incorporate Gyelthang into their vision for a new 
‘modern’ Chinese Communist nation-state in the early 1950s, the C.C.P. 
initially adopted a ‘gradualist approach’ to implementing socialist reforms, 
31 As Yudru Tsomu points out, ‘historical analogy was useful for Ren to justify the assimilation 
of the people of Kham into China’, as it suggested that ‘frontier peoples are living in an earlier 
stage of historical development’ and ‘civilizing them is simply a matter of bringing them forward 
in time’ (Tsomu 2013, 336).
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since Party off icials recognized the importance of gaining the support of 
local Tibetan, Naxi, Bai, and Han residents while they worked to secure 
administrative control over the region.32 The C.C.P. leaders understood 
that winning the trust and loyalty of the Gyelthang elites would require 
patience and perseverance during numerous discussions, private meetings, 
and public speeches.
The C.C.P.’s United Front Department was responsible for using a variety 
of tactics to co-opt local elites and build a broad consensus among non-Party 
members and ethnic minority residents for Party-supported programs 
and goals. One such tactic was political tourism. Another was ‘political 
persuasion work’ (zhengzhi shuifu gongzuo), which entailed lengthy meetings 
between recalcitrant Tibetan leaders and other local elites who had already 
been won over by the Communists. Treaties were signed and ceremonies 
were held to mark the success of winning over particular elites. Rather than 
deposing, imprisoning, or killing these elites, Communist Party off icials 
encouraged them to join the new government’s efforts to govern Gyelthang.
However, while many C.C.P. off icials who arrived in Gyelthang after 1950 
believed that a policy of compromise was crucial to forming good relations 
with the local elites, they nevertheless remained suspicious of the political 
loyalties of these elites.33 With rare exceptions, the older generation of 
wealthy and powerful local elites were not invited to join the C.C.P.; they 
were instead given government positions that corresponded with the Party’s 
assessment of their potential future value. The C.C.P.’s intent was to maintain 
traditional symbols of power while gradually changing the content that 
they symbolized. The Party’s policy of compromise was never intended 
to be permanent; it was only meant to be implemented until the Party’s 
position had been consolidated in Gyelthang. As the Party gained support, 
as young Gyelthang residents completed their training as new C.C.P. cadres, 
and as recently-arrived Chinese cadres became familiar with the situation 
in Gyelthang, the Party envisioned having more room to manoeuvre against 
the will of the local elites.
The early stages of Communist Party consolidation and state making were 
welcomed by some residents of Gyelthang, as they seemingly represented 
a new Chinese administration willing to work alongside local leaders and 
power holders. Other Gyelthang elites remained wary of C.C.P. rule, having 
32 Mao and others within the central Party leadership initially supported this national strategy 
of gradualism in Yi and Tibetan regions of western China (Goldstein 2014, 4-16, 88).
33 For more on the Communist Party Central Visitation Team’s concerns in 1951 about the 
political loyalties of the former tusi leaders in Zhongdian, see Wang 1987, 18-20.
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learned early on that landlords in neighbouring Jiangbian had been subjected 
to violent struggle sessions, tortured, and killed.34 Tibetan elites feared 
that if land reform was implemented in Gyelthang, they would also be 
struggled against and perhaps killed. They knew very well that they would 
be targeted by the so-called ‘democratic reforms’ (minzhu gaige) – the 
version of land reform (tudi gaige) deemed appropriate for ethnic minority 
areas – despite the fact that the C.C.P. leadership had insisted land reform 
would be introduced only after consultation with local power holders.
In order to assuage the local elites’ concerns, the C.C.P. gradually intro-
duced social and political reforms in Gyelthang. Fearing that a strong em-
phasis on class would alarm the upper social strata, C.C.P. officials appointed 
Tibetan elites – often the same people who had served as intermediaries 
under the Guomindang and its allies – to posts in the newly-established 
C.C.P. government in Gyelthang, where they served both as f ilters and 
conduits between the masses and the state.35 While there were obvious risks 
in allowing the secular and religious elites to retain real power in the short 
term, the long-term benefits of winning over the Tibetan population were so 
signif icant that the C.C.P. was willing to make extraordinary concessions. 
It was a shrewd strategy that traded short-term setbacks (permitting local 
religious leaders to retain power and the manorial estate system to continue) 
for the achievement of longer-term national interests (Tibetans’ gradual 
acceptance of political and economic reforms under Chinese rule).
But from the earliest days of the C.C.P. there had been a f ierce debate 
within its ranks about how long to wait before enacting radical reforms in 
ethnic minority areas. Leftist voices within the Party leadership argued that, 
since the elite are rarely won over anyway, there was no point in delaying 
radical reforms, such as land redistribution and class struggle. Since the 
Central Committee had not provided clear guidelines for determining 
when conditions were ripe for reforms, provincial leaders initially had 
latitude to interpret Mao’s instructions as they wished (Goldstein, 2014, 93). 
However, by late 1955 Yunnan provincial leaders found themselves under 
increasing pressure to evaluate when local conditions would be appropriate 
for launching land reform in Gyelthang.
34 Wangchuk Tempa wrote a letter to General Liao on 8 May 1951, expressing his concern that 
landlords had been struggled against in Jiangbian, just to the south of Gyelthang. Representatives 
who had returned from a meeting with other ethnic minority leaders in Kunming reassured 
Wangchuk Tempa that they had been told class struggle would not be carried out in Gyelthang 
(Wang 1994, 166-167).
35 Benno Weiner notes that a similar gradual approach was used in Tsékhok (Zeku County) in 
Amdo (Weiner 2012, 33-34).
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In a speech to provincial Party secretaries on 31 July 1955, Mao proclaimed 
that widespread collectivization would provide the surge in agricultural 
production necessary to meet the targets outlined in the C.C.P.’s f irst 
Five Year Plan. Mao’s electrifying speech effectively ended the gradualist 
approach to reforms in most ethnic minority areas and ushered in a nation-
wide push for partial collectivization known as the ‘High Tide’ in socialist 
transformation (Barnett 2014, xxx).36 Provincial leaders were encouraged 
to begin implementing reforms by December, 1955, so that they would have 
enough time to report their concrete achievements at the next meeting of 
the National People’s Congress in Beijing in March-April 1957 (Goldstein 
2014, 102).
The C.C.P. embarked on a new strategy in particularly politically-
challenging ethnic minority areas of the country, designed to persuade 
local religious and secular elites to accept reforms in exchange for main-
taining their current standard of living and social status. These reforms 
were referred to as ‘peaceful democratic reforms’ (heping minzhu gaige), 
to distinguish them from the methods that had been used during ‘land 
reform’ (tudi gaige) in other regions in China, where landlords and wealthy 
peasants were subjected to humiliating public struggle sessions.37 The 
Chinese Communist Party announced its new policy of ‘adjusting land 
ownership, renegotiating rent, and liberating the slaves’ (tiaotian yizu, jiefang 
nuli) in Diqing Tibetan Autonomous District in late 1955. However, efforts 
to demonstrate that the Tibetan masses were demanding these reforms 
and that the Tibetan elites in Zhongdian would therefore welcome them 
quickly proved to be problematic.
36 It was during this closed-door speech that Mao famously criticized colleagues who favored a 
more cautious approach by remarking that ‘some of our cadres are tottering along like a woman 
with bound feet, always complaining that others are going too fast’. Mao complained that 
these colleagues seemed incapable of taking the bold step of increasing the size and number of 
agricultural cooperatives (Mao 1977, 184).
37 Goldstein (2014, 91-92) explains some of the main differences between, peaceful democratic 
reforms, and the kinds of land reform carried out in other areas of China:
The salient difference was that [peaceful democratic reforms] were to be done without the 
humiliation, physical beatings, demeaning tasks, and expropriation of wealth and property 
that characterized reforms done in inland China – that is, without the elite suffering material 
impoverishment, social degradation, and political isolation. With peaceful reforms, the 
former elite who did not oppose reforms would have the status of full citizens, and the 
state would provide them a standard of living equal to what they had before. Moreover, 
in many cases, they would be given leadership positions in government. The key leverage 
when pressuring the Tibetan elite to accept reforms, therefore, was that there would be 
no struggle sessions and that their standard of living would not decline after reforms were 
implemented.
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The f irst stage of reform entailed categorizing the local population ac-
cording to the Chinese Communist Party’s class categories. Local leaders 
and off icials were ordered to collect information about every household in 
the area and then assign each household one of the following class labels: 
chieftain (tusi), slave owner (nuli zhu), serf owner (nongnu zhu), land owner 
(dizhu), wealthy farmer ( funong), middle-class farmer (zhongnong), poor 
farmer (pinnong), serf (nongnu), or slave (nuli).38 In Gyelthang, as in many 
other parts of Kham, Tibetan society was far less strictly divided than in 
Central Tibet. Unlike in Lhasa, there were not any aristocratic families in 
Gyelthang, and neither were there ‘unpure’ (Tib. drib) outcast families, 
such as blacksmiths and corpse cutters. However, there were wealthy 
landowners, some of whom held hereditary servants, known locally as 
shenyog, which could be bought and sold by their owners.39 In 1955 it was 
announced that land that belonged to chieftains, owners of slaves or serfs, 
landowners, and wealthy farmers would be confiscated and either kept as 
government-controlled communal lands or redistributed to the poorest 
members of society (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 302-306). This announcement 
set the stage for a series of armed conflicts between the P.L.A. and wealthy 
Tibetan farmers, landowners, and monks.
38 The Zhongdian County Gazetteer provides statistics on several of the class categories 
introduced by the C.C.P. off icials during this period. It also provides information about the 
amount of farmland that was transferred from wealthy landowners to the government or poor 
peasants. Nearly 80 per cent of Zhongdian County’s households were affected by the land 
reform campaigns (Zhongdian xian zhi 1997, 304). According to Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang, a 
Tibetan trader from Lithang who led the Khampas in the Chushigandru insurgent army, the 
C.C.P. implemented reforms as early as 1953 in Gyelthang. Andrugtsang likely is referring to the 
predominately ethnically-Han, Bai, and Naxi area of Jiangbian, located just north of Lijiang, where 
reforms were carried out a full two years before they were implemented in ethnically Tibetan 
areas of Gyelthang (Goldstein 2014, 119). In his autobiography, written in exile and published in 
1973, Andrugtsang claims that the population of Gyelthang in 1953 was ‘divided into f ive strata 
and a terror campaign of selective arrests launched by the Chinese. People belonging to the f irst 
three strata were either publically humiliated or condemned to the f iring squad’ (Andrugtsang 
1973, 38).
39 Chinese historians have tended to translate the local Tibetan term, shen, as ‘slave’ (nuli), 
while taking yog to mean ‘servant’. The term nang’zin was used locally as a more general term 
for servant (Kolås 2008, 42). In an interview the author conducted in Hala Village in April 2013, 
one 93-year-old Tibetan resident of Nyishar claimed that she spent the f irst 30 years of her life 
as a slave working for a wealthy family in a village near Feilai Temple (Feilai si) in Deqin County. 
She maintained that after the Communist ‘liberation’ of northern Yunnan Province, she and 
seven of her siblings were given a document granting their freedom. A great deal of controversy 
remains regarding the extent and variety of slavery and serfdom in Kham prior to the Chinese 
Communist Party’s involvement in the area (Goldstein 1986, 79-112, Miller 1987, 65-67, Goldstein 
1988, 61-65, and Gros 2016).
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The Khampa Rebellions of 1955-1957
In order to introduce new land reform policies, Chinese Communist 
cadres accompanied by P.L.A. escorts entered Tibetan villages in the 
Chaktreng area in February 1954. According to a monk from Chaktreng 
Sampheling monastery, most people in the villages refused to cooper-
ate with the cadres, and in a few cases, they attacked the cadres and 
P.L.A. troops.40 Tibetan villagers later managed to block the Chinese 
cadres and P.L.A. troops’ access to a brook for f ifteen days, cutting off 
the Chinese camp’s sole source of water. After months of f ighting in the 
surrounding areas, by February 1956, thousands of villagers had taken 
refuge in Chaktreng Sampheling Monastery, living alongside the nearly 
3000 resident monks. The P.L.A. sent airplanes to drop leaflets urging the 
monks and villagers to surrender, and following an intense and lengthy 
standoff, the P.L.A. sent a military jet to bomb Chaktreng Sampheling 
Monastery. The monastery was ruined and the Tibetans who survived the 
attack either surrendered to the P.L.A. or f led overland to Lhasa (Shakya 
1999, 140; Goldstein 2014, 236).
Meanwhile, in 1955, the abbot of Ba Chödeling Monastery (Dingningsi) 
in neighbouring Bathang sent a letter to Ngawang Lobzang Tendzin, the 
abbot of Ganden Sumtseling Monastery in Gyelthang, asking him to 
send troops to support this revolt aimed at protecting Tibetan religion 
in Kham. The abbot of Ba Chödeling Monastery also sent messengers to 
monastic off icials in Lithang and Chaktreng requesting all Khampas to 
unite against the Chinese. The letter carried by the Bathang messengers 
stated:
Lingkha shi of Ba is already engaged in f ighting against the Chinese. 
No matter what the Chinese Communists say, their aim is to occupy 
Tibet in the name of Ngabo’s Seventeen-Point Agreement. Therefore, 
every Tibetan must unite and f ight until even if there are no men left, 
women will have to take up weapons. If we let China do whatever it 
wants, Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan race will become extinct. 
Our property will be conf iscated. Evil people will be the leaders and 
good people will be the servants. It is clear that things will happen 
which have never before happened in this world. Therefore, we must 
not be deluded by the Chinese deceit, and we must rise up in unison. 
We must completely forget personal and collected resentments that 
40 Tsering Shakya’s interview with Chatrimpa Tenzin Tsultrim (Shakya 1999, 140).
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exist between our different areas, and confront together the enemy of 
our region. (Lobsang 1971, 134)41
The letter asked that Tibetan rebels coming through Gyelthang be given 
necessary supplies. According to Sulang Jiachu, a Tibetan historian of 
Gyelthang, the letter also stated that Bathang rebels threatened to burn 
the homes of villagers in Gyelthang who refused to aid the rebels (Sulang 
2007, 276). When this letter arrived in Gyelthang, Ngawang Lobzang Tendzin 
was meeting with Tibetan abbots and Chinese government representatives 
in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Before Ngawang Lobzang Tendzin left 
Gyelthang to take part in this meeting, he supposedly told his assistant at 
Sumtseling Monastery: ‘We are located along the Han-Tibetan border and we 
are different from other Tibetan districts. We must be prudent and refrain 
from participating in the southern Kham rebellion’ (Sulang 2007, 277).42 
As a result, lamas in high positions of authority at Sumtseling Monastery 
did not initially participate in the early stages of the Khampa uprisings.
In 1956, Wangchuk Tempa received letters from monastic leaders and 
secular leaders in Lithang, Bathang, and Chaktreng, asking him to lend his 
support to the Kham rebellion against Chinese rule and the Communist 
policy of land reform.43 According to a former Communist Party off icial 
in charge of implementing land reform in Gyelthang, Wangchuk Tempa 
responded that he had learned a lesson from his failed rebellions of the past 
and that he thought it best for the monastic leaders in Kham to compromise 
and submit to Communist rule in the area (Huang 1998, 37). Wangchuk 
Tempa refused to join the rebels; instead he held meetings with village lead-
ers to persuade them that the Communist Party had their interests at heart. 
He reportedly claimed that the C.C.P. had treated him fairly, considering all 
41 Cited in McGranahan (2010, 87). For the full text of the ‘Seventeen-Point Agreement’ that 
Tibetan and Chinese government representatives signed on 23 May 1951, see Shakya (1999, 
449-452).
42 The 1955-1956 uprising in Eastern Tibet is often called the ‘Southern Kham Unif ied Rebellion’ 
(kangnan lianhe panluan) by Gyelthang-based historians writing in Chinese. Chinese scholars 
based elsewhere in China have termed this rebellion the ‘Kangding Rebellion’, since Kangding 
was the headquarters of Eastern Tibet.
43 According to published Communist Party histories, armed uprisings against land reform 
took place in early 1956 in Derong, Chaktreng, Daocheng, Liangshan, Yanbian, Yanyuan, and 
Muli in Sichuan Province (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, ed. 2003, 63). Based on 
an exile Tibetan history of Lithang, along with a 2003 interview he conducted in India with a 
Lithang villager who was involved in the uprising, Goldstein maintains that Khampa rebels sent 
letters to Lithang, Bathang, Gyelthang, Chaktreng, Derge, Nyarong, and Horkhok in January-early 
February, 1956 (Goldstein 2014, 125).
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of the grief he had caused the Party in the past (Gesang 2010, 445). Wangchuk 
Tempa allegedly declared that the Party never forced him to write a self-
criticism or engage in a ‘speak bitterness’ (suku) meeting, and he was never 
made the target of a class struggle session. According to Communist Party 
accounts, the C.C.P. had a track record of treating cooperative members of 
the Gyelthang upper-class well, and Wangchuk Tempa purportedly assured 
the village heads and the monastery representatives that they had nothing 
to fear (Huang 1998, 37).
It is possible that Wangchuk Tempa felt pressured to serve as a state-
community intermediary and support land reform after accepting a position 
as Vice Governor of Zhongdian County under C.C.P. rule in 1953 (Sulang 
1990, 113). Wangchuk Tempa’s decision to maintain a neutral stance on land 
reform may also have been influenced by the fact that, having been privy 
to many internal government brief ings, he understood that the Chinese 
Communist government was capable of easily suppressing any rebellion 
with armed force, if necessary. Faced with escalating tensions in the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region and outright armed rebellion in many areas of Kham, 
the C.C.P. had gradually abandoned the strategy of the nationalities policy in 
favor of coercion (Smith 1994, 67). In order to carry out ‘democratic reforms’ 
in Gyelthang, the C.C.P. organized peasant self-defense forces that would 
be responsible for taking control of the guns and ammunition taken from 
the landlords and rich peasants. By 1956, the C.C.P. had provided guns, 
ammunition, and basic weapon training to more than 2000 villagers in 
Gyelthang, including local members of the police force, work team members, 
and a self-defense troop, with the goal of creating a strong local security 
force to suppress uprisings (Huang 1998, 37).44
In November, 1956, the f irst rebellion took place at Ganden Sumtseling 
Monastery after monks publically decreed that all Gyelthang residents 
should ‘Oppose the Peaceful Negotiation of Land Reform and Maintain 
the Tuguan System, Protect People’s Rights and Their Freedom to Practice 
Religion’ (Sulang 2007, 277). Sumtseling monks protested on the streets 
of Zhongdian, carrying banners proclaiming: ‘Protect Ethnicity, Protect 
Religion’ (baozu, baojiao). The People’s Liberation Army eventually dispelled 
this rebellion after a lengthy armed stand-off.
On 3 March 1957, one day after the start of the Tibetan New Year, the 
Diqing Party Committee announced that necessary preparations had been 
44 These people’s militias expanded rapidly and by 1959, Gyelthang had 12,117 people’s militia 
members, comprising nearly 39 per cent of the entire labour force in the region (Zhongdian xian 
zhi 1997, 409).
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completed and land redistribution could now begin in Gyelthang. Three days 
later, a second major uprising commenced. According to a Gyelthang Tibetan 
historian of C.C.P. history, village leaders, wealthy farmers, and monks in two 
of the monastic colleges within Sumtseling Monastery organized an armed 
rebellion and 1525 rebels, including 364 monks, attacked C.C.P. work teams in 
the area over the next few weeks (Sulang 2007, 278). The Lijiang Prefectural 
Party Committee consequently sent Wangchuk Tempa, Ngawang Lobzang 
Tendzin, and another Tibetan representative to order the rebels to hand over 
their weapons and horses and attend an off icial meeting to discuss land 
reform. However, the rebels not only refused to meet, they insulted and swore 
at the Tibetan leaders representing the Communist government, denouncing 
them as ‘traitors’ (Gyelthang Tib. jya ga) (Huang 1998, 35). Any attempt at 
reconciliation between the C.C.P. and the rebels ceased at this point.
The Lijiang Prefectural Division of the P.L.A. surrounded Sumtseling 
monastery with their army vehicles and sent their soldiers to f ight the 
monks and villagers who had barricaded themselves inside. The rebels 
were defeated after a few days of heavy f ighting, and after the battle, the 
Party stationed Tibetan cadres at the monastery to serve as translators for 
the P.L.A. soldiers guarding the monastery’s valuables. These cadres were 
also responsible for confiscating the more than 100 weapons they found in 
the monastery (Sulang 2007, 279).
By early autumn, 1957, resistance to land reform in Zhongdian had been 
fully suppressed, ushering in a marked decline in the region’s autonomy, 
an irony that was compounded by the establishment of the Diqing Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture in September 1957. Out of consideration for their 
refusal to support the Sumtseling monks’ revolts against land reform earlier 
in the year, Ngawang Lobzang Tendzin was appointed the Governor of Diqing 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and Wangchuk Tempa was made the Vice 
Governor of this newly established autonomous prefecture. In order to crack 
down on the power of Sumtseling Monastery and to make sure that the 
monks could not join with villagers to yet again foment unrest, 46 monks 
at Sumtseling were arrested. Land deeds that had been stored inside of the 
monastery were destroyed, additional weapons were confiscated, and the 
majority of the monks residing at the monastery were sent back to their 
villages or f led to the mountains (Le’an 2009, 83).45
45 Interview with a monk at Dokhar monastic college (kangtsen) in Sumtseling Monastery, 
July 2014. This locally highly respected lama, who f led to India in 1959, was allowed to return to 
Sumtseling Monastery in 2006 after he signed a document promising the Chinese government 
that he would refrain from giving tantric initiations in Gyelthang.
harnessing The power oF The khampa eliTes 435
Land reform in Gyelthang not only redistributed land, it also made obso-
lete previously hegemonic cultural orderings of the local social landscape, 
since it eliminated the political and economic power of the monks and the 
other elite members of Gyelthang society.46 Party documents from the 1960s 
present the Land Reform Campaign as the f inal blow to local structures of 
religious and political power.47 Like Wangchuk Tempa, most village elites 
in Gyelthang held onto their power or passed their positions of authority to 
their sons as C.C.P. influence grew in the area in the 1940s and 1950s, until the 
old shuka and tusi administrative systems were f inally dismantled during 
land reform. Many of the religious and secular leaders, such as Ngawang 
Lobzang Tendzin and Liu En, who accepted off icial positions under the new 
government in the early 1950s, served as intermediaries and negotiated on 
behalf of the Communist government right up until they became targets 
during the Cultural Revolution in late 1966.
The implementation of land reform in Gyelthang overlapped with the 
national Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958, and while the C.C.P. work teams 
implemented land reform between January and September, 1958, Wangchuk 
Tempa and other senior local off icials and formerly wealthy landlords in 
Gyelthang were taken to Kunming to participate in struggle sessions and 
undergo ‘rectif ication’ (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 2003, 
64).48 After one particular struggle session, Wangchuk Tempa expressed his 
46 Tsering Shakya supports this claim, maintaining that ‘the dissolution of the economic 
power base of the monasteries was the most signif icant social and political event in the history 
of Tibet since the introduction of Buddhism’ (Shakya 1999, 254).
47 The timeframe for land reform in Gyelthang closely followed that of Lithang, Bathang, 
and Chaktreng in the neighbouring Ganzi Autonomous District of Sichuan Province. In Ganzi, 
reforms for agricultural areas were initially propagandized in January 1956 and by September 
1958, 95 per cent of the Tibetan and Yi population of Sichuan was reported to have undergone 
‘democratic reforms’ (Sangye Yeshi, 1958 [1968], 322). See also Goldstein (2014, 233-277) and the 
documents reprinted in Diqing zangzu zizhizhou gaikuang bianxiezu, ed. (1960).
48 The Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957-1958 ushered in a much more hardline nationality policy 
that equated ‘local nationalism’ (difang minzu zhuyi) with anti-Party, anti-socialist opposition. 
Deng Xiaoping f iled a report in 1957 attacking ‘reactionary’ ethnic minority cadres, who had 
supported special policies in ethnic minority areas in order to undermine socialist policies in 
general. Deng argued that: 
social education and anti-Rightist struggles among the minorities have the same content as in 
the Chinese areas, but stress should also be laid on opposition to tendencies of local nationalism. 
It should be clearly recognized that all those who make use of local nationalist sentiments and 
the estrangement between nationalities left over from the past in order to divide national unity 
and undermine the unif ication of the motherland act contrary to China’s Constitution and 
jeopardize the socialist cause of our country. They are all anti-socialist Rightists (Deng 1957, 41). 
For more about the C.C.P.’s attack on ‘local nationalism’ during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, see 
Smith (1994, 59-60), Weiner (2015).
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regret for all of the ‘anti-Party acts’ in which he had previously engaged as a 
trader, businessman, and warlord in Gyelthang.49 He was permitted to return 
to Gyelthang once the Rectif ication Campaign ended, and on 30 June 1961, 
he allegedly fell ill and passed away at the age of 76. On 2 July, religious and 
political ceremonies were held in his honor. The Diqing Prefectural Party and 
government, Zhongdian County Party and government, the military, and the 
local schools all participated in the government-affiliated funeral ceremony 
(Qi and Xiluo 1990, 45). The Yunnan Provincial government also publically 
displayed their respect for Wangchuk by placing his funeral announcement 
in the Yunnan Daily newspaper on 9 July 1961 (Sheng minwei 1961).
Conclusion
Wangchuk Tempa’s life experience as a monk, bandit, strongman, anti-
Communist resistance f ighter, and eventually a government off icial who 
worked to implement Chinese Communist Party-state policies in Gyelthang 
helps complicate the notion of what constitutes ‘the Chinese state’ in rural 
ethnic minority areas. In ‘L’état, c’est nous, or We Have Met the Oppressor 
and He Is Us: The Predicament of Minority Cadres in the PRC’, Stevan Harrell 
(2007) explores how China’s cadres have often been called upon to play a dual 
role that involves representing the state to the community and representing 
the community to the state.
Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China, the ability of 
cadres to negotiate state-community relations has been crucial to the success 
of policy implementation. Harrell argues that ‘if state-minority relations, or 
state-community relations in minority areas, were [simply] Han-minority 
relations, there would be very little to write about’ – it would be a ‘situation 
of clear and direct colonial rule’ (Harrell 2007, 223). Yet, in the early 1950s, 
the C.C.P. government brought ethnic minority citizens into the state as 
cadres at various levels – not only at the brigade or village level, but also 
‘as salaried government cadres at the […] township, county, prefectural, 
and provincial levels of the administration’ (ibid.). As state-community 
intermediaries, influential local leaders like Wangchuk Tempa increasingly 
found themselves in double-bind situations.
As this chapter has discussed, Communist Party off icials in Gyelthang 
used the dual strategies of ‘political tourism’ and ‘political persuasion 
49 A condensed version of this confession letter, which Wangchuk Tempa wrote in April 1959, 
is reprinted in Wang (1989, 615-616).
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work’ to entice Wangchuk Tempa and other recalcitrant members of the 
‘pre-liberation elite’ to accept their offers to join the new government. In 
addition, work team members attempted to cultivate a sense of revolutionary 
consciousness among non-elite residents of Gyelthang. Patient ‘thought work’ 
(sixiang gongzuo) was a crucial component of the Communists’ efforts in 
Gyelthang to create a sense of the voluntary and natural participation of 
the people in land reform and collectivization.
After land reform was implemented in Gyelthang, local residents were 
required to attend ‘speak bitterness’ (suku) meetings and produce testi-
monials ascertaining their consciousness of class-based oppression in the 
so-called ‘old society’ and their present ‘liberation’ in the ‘new society’.50 
‘Speak bitterness’ testimonials from young, female Tibetan villagers, in 
particular, were very effective weapons that enabled state cadres to directly 
attack Gyelthang’s Tibetan Buddhist monastic order. These testimonials were 
public performances designed to radically upend local hierarchies, which 
had traditionally mandated respect for elder Tibetan men and lamas. Monks 
who participated in the 1956-1957 rebellion were also forced to take part in 
these ‘speak bitterness’ sessions in late 1958. Some willingly admitted that the 
pre-liberation era was one of bitterness while others, who refused to speak 
ill of the pre-land-reform era, were sent away to join production brigades 
in the villages.51 The ‘speak bitterness’ meetings therefore served to create 
a new form of socialist consciousness while simultaneously transforming 
the very structure of local society.
By harnessing the power and charisma of local Khampa religious and 
secular leaders, the C.C.P. was able to consolidate its political control in 
Gyelthang during the 1950s. Yet, how appropriate or theoretically useful is 
the concept of ‘collaboration’ when it comes to explaining why some religious 
and secular leaders joined forces with representatives of the C.C.P. in the 
post-1949 period (Barnett 2006)? Can and should the choices, adjustments, 
and compromises that Tibetans made under Chinese Communist rule be 
50 As many scholars have pointed out, these f irst-person testimonials of the rural masses’ 
experiences of feudal exploitation and then liberation from class oppression were the narrative 
backbone of the Chinese Communist revolution (Anagnost 1997, Hershatter 2011, Sun 2013, 
Makley 2005, and 2008).
51 Only 367 monks were permitted to live at the monastery after 1958. They were required to 
work on a collectivized production brigade and to elect one representative from each monastic 
college to serve on a new monastery democratic organizing committee. Under a new C.C.P. 
policy titled ‘Let the Monastery Take Care of Itself ’ (yi si yang si) these remaining monks were 
ordered in 1958 to prepare uncultivated land for farming, maintain fertile f ields year-round, 
and supply their own food, water, and fuel (Qi and Xiluo 1990, 47; Kolås 2008, 43).
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viewed as ‘collusion?’ Attempting to navigate a binary between resistance 
and collaboration/collusion may not be the most fruitful way forward when 
it comes to exploring what actually occurred in Gyelthang during the 1950s. 
As James Leibold reminds us, and as many of the contributors to this volume 
demonstrate, in the ethnically diverse Sino-Tibetan borderlands, ‘political 
actors operated in a complex, circuitous, and multilayered environment with 
multiple centers of authority’ (Leibold 2005, 196). These f lexible political 
webs of interaction reveal the limitations of using static ‘centre-periphery’ 
or ‘state-local’ models to describe the dynamic and contingent processes 
that resulted in new forms of political allegiances in Kham in the 1950s.
When underground Communist Party agents first started negotiating with 
Tibetan elites in Gyelthang in the late 1940s, it is unlikely that many Tibetans 
suspected that these negotiations would turn into a lengthy and much more 
intrusive form of Chinese political involvement in Kham. After all, Gyelthang 
residents had become accustomed to being ruled by whichever military 
leader, village head, tusi, or Guomindang government representative held 
power in the area at any given time. The day-to-day struggles that villagers 
faced were roughly the same regardless of who held the reins of power, so 
people often got on with their lives, even when doing so meant adjusting to 
the demands of external powers. This made the fact that they were being 
governed by Tibetan village heads who reported to the Chinese Communist 
government as plausible as the fact that they used to be governed by the 
same elite group of Tibetan leaders who reported to the Guomindang-backed 
warlords, and prior to that, Qing government off icials. Indeed, Gyelthang’s 
religious and secular leaders could not have foreseen in the late 1940s how 
complicated their lives would quickly become in the decades ahead.
Glossary of Chinese and Tibetan Terms
Ajian 阿坚
Axi dukou 阿喜渡口
Ba Chödeling Monastery (Tib.) ’Ba’ chos sde gling, (Ch.) Ding-
ningsi 丁宁寺
Balung (Tib.) ’Ba’lung, (Ch.) Weixi 维西
Bao Pinliang 鲍品良
baoshangdui 保商队
baozu baojiao 保族, 保教
Bapa Püntsok Wangyel (Tib.) ’Ba’ pa phun tshogs dbang rgyal, 
(Ch.) Pingcuo Wangjie 平措汪阶 / 
Min Zhicheng 闵志成
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Barlungdrong (Ch.) Bunonggu cun 布弄谷村
Bathang (Tib.) ’Ba’thang, (Ch.) Batang 巴塘
bazong 把总
Böshar gyümi mang rang kyong na tün, (Tib.) Bod shar rgyud mi dmangs 
rang skyong mna’ mthun, (Ch.) 
Dongzang renmin zizhi hui 东藏人
民自治会 / Dongzang renmin zizhi 
tongmeng jianzhang 东藏人民自治
同盟简章
cha ma gu dao 茶马古道
Chamdo (Ch.) Changdu 昌都
Changzheng lu 长征路
Chaktreng Phyag phreng, (Ch.) Xiangcheng 乡城
chengfang yiwu dadui 城防义务大队
Dali 大理
Dechen (Tib.) Bde chen, (Ch.) Adunzi / Deqin 
阿墩子 / 德钦
difang minzu zhuyi 地方民族主义
Diqing Zangzu zizhizhou 迪庆藏族自治州





Ganden Phodrang Dga’ldan pho brang
Gelukpa Dge lugs pa
Gönpo Tsering (Tib.) Mgon po tshe ring, (Ch.) Gongbu 
Zeren 恭布泽仁 / Hai Zhengtao 海正

















Kangnan lianhe panluan 康南联合叛乱
Kangren zhi Kang 康人治康
kangtsen (Tib.) khang tshan
Kelzang Tsering (Tib.) Bskal bzang tshe ring, (Ch.) 
Gesang Zeren 格桑泽仁
Kenading 克那顶
Ketsak (Tib.) Skad tshag, (Ch.) Geza 格咱
Liao Yunzhou 廖云周




Lithang (Tib.) Li thang, (Ch.) Litang 理塘
Liu En 刘恩
Liu Hanxun 刘汉勋
Lobsang Nyima (Tib.) Blo bzang nyi ma, (Ch.) Lurong 
Nima 鲁茸尼玛







Ngawang Kesang (Tib.) Ngag dbang Skal bzang, (Ch.) 
Angwang Gesang 昂旺格桑  / Liu 
Shaoyu 刘绍禹
Ngawang Lobzang Tendzin (Tib.) Ngag dbang Blo bzang Bstan 
‘dzin, (Ch.) Songmou Angwang Luo-






Nyetsang Tsering Püntsok (Ch.) Niancang Zeren Pingcuo 念仓 
泽仁平措 / Qi Yaozu 七耀祖
Nyishar (Ch.) Nixi 尼西






sengsu tuanwu zhihui 僧俗团务指挥
Shengping zhen 升平镇




Termarong (Tib.) Gter ma rong, (Ch.) Dongwang 
东旺






Uncle Wangchuk Tempa (Tib.) Dbang phyug Bstan-pa akhu, 
(Ch.) Wang Xueding Agou 汪学鼎阿沟
Wang Qupi 汪曲批 / Wang Chuipi汪吹匹 / Wang 
Xuepi 汪学批
Wangchuk Tempa (Tib.) Dbang phyug Bstan-pa, (Ch.) 
Wang Xueding 汪学鼎/ Wang Xued-
ingba 汪学鼎巴








Yangthang (Tib.) Yang thang, (Ch.) Xiao Zhong-
dian 小中甸
yi si yang si 以寺养寺
Yunnan 云南
Yunniang cun 酝酿村
Zhalujiangzhong Wang Xueding cun 扎路江仲汪学顶村
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Zhao Baohe 赵宝鹤
zhengzhi shuifu gongzuo 政治说服工作
zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 政治协商会议
Zhongdian 中甸
Zhongdian mintuan 中甸民团
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13 Return of the Good King
Kingship and Identity among Yushu Tibetans since 1951
Maria Turek
Abstract
This chapter focuses on history writing about the Eastern Tibetan kingdom 
of Nangchen based on newly published local chronicles that legitimize 
Nangchen as an autonomous power centre, opposing off icial state views on 
its peripherality. These historical narratives centre on an idealized concept 
of kingship deeply rooted in the Tibetan Buddhist orthodoxy, myth, and 
ritual. The contemporary remembering of the legitimate Nangchen kings’ 
lineage transcends a revival of traditional historiography or nostalgia, 
and has the capacity to repair the broken connection with local tradition 
and to re-emphasize the value of the landscape as its container. The 
narrative return of the good kings becomes an important factor in the 
reconstruction of local identity.
Keywords: Nangchen, Qinghai, historiography, kingship, identity, revival
Introduction
The Eastern Tibetan kingdom of Nangchen, whose location today roughly 
corresponds to Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (T.A.P.), Qinghai 
Province, remains one of the least studied Tibetan polities so far. This chapter 
is one of the very f irst attempts to draw up an ethnohistory of Nangchen by 
taking into consideration newly composed or republished local material.
The sources that reconstruct local history represent Nangchen as 
a self-referential sphere with a f lourishing religious life and as being of 
great influence over religious culture throughout Eastern Tibet (Kham). 
These historiographic projects centred on ‘place memory’ (Casey 1987), 
in this example understood as a combination of local identity and a 
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mnemonic process, take manifold forms and may at times challenge each 
other. However, at the heart of a great many of these narratives lies the 
idealized concept of kingship, recounted through written practices that 
transcend factualist historiography. In post-Mao Yushu T.A.P. and for 
many exiled Nangchenmi (‘people of Nangchen’), as the locals refer to 
themselves, remembering Nangchen kings re-positions the kingdom from 
the periphery of China or Tibet to an autonomous centre. Through and in 
the local narratives themselves, kingship also becomes an argument in 
the reconstruction of identity, which has the capacity to heal the broken 
connection with local tradition and, since Tibetan memory practices often 
evolve around specif ic places, to re-emphasize the value of the landscape 
as the container of traditional narratives. The kingship narrative proves 
useful in the reconstruction of identity because it re-engages with local 
self-description in terms of subjecthood to the Nangchen kings. A similar 
phenomenon has been described for another kingdom located in Kham, that 
of Gyelrong (Ch. Jiarong) (Prins 2007). In this contribution, I would like to 
draw attention to the fact that in Tibetan societies, subjecthood to a king 
implies belonging to a larger constellation of social and religious-mythical 
meanings of both pre-Buddhist and Indic Buddhist origins. These meanings 
provide a comprehensive explanation about the origins of and dynamics 
between human and non-human actors. These meanings are contained in the 
native place, which is very much emphasized in Tibetan culture in general. 
Therefore, because the cosmology of kingship is linked to the landscape 
and to places, the literature which resurrects this cosmology may have a 
profound effect on Nangchenmi in Yushu T.A.P. and in exile, and can assist 
them in reaff irming the ties to their homeland. The power of the kingship 
narrative to reconstruct local identity is especially visible in cases like 
Nangchen, where the king wielded little or no real political authority. The 
power was divided among a network of hereditary headmen with the king as 
primus inter pares. Above this on-the-ground structure was the sovereignty 
of the Qing (since at least 1725) and later, of Republican China and Qinghai 
warlords. However, as a sacred form of rule, the local institution of kingship 
was probably the most pervasive, yet symbolic, force, which determined the 
moral unity and local identity in the land. Parallel to several other Khampa 
kingdoms like Dergé and Trokyap described in this volume, kingship in 
Nangchen was crucial to defining its own centrality and cultural specif icity. 
In Nangchen, this perceived autonomy was re-produced simultaneously 
with its marginalization by external power centres. However, these ‘outer’ 
forces were also internalized in the local kingship and power structures. 
This non-linear although historically consistent process is representative 
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of the production of place in Kham, discussed throughout this volume, 
which emerges in a relational manner and which argues for a ‘processual 
geography’ of the region (Gros, this volume).
Authority of the Local Narrative, Authority of the King
As has been observed by Stevan Harrell (1995), China’s government’s ‘civiliz-
ing project’ targeted at minorities with the premise that they are in need 
of assistance in order to become truly civilized and fully integrated in the 
nation-state can lead to a reinforcement of or a focusing of ethnic identity 
(Harrell 1995, 27). Previous writings have also situated the memory practices 
of China’s minorities in the context of Deng’s reforms and the subsequent 
awakening of ethnic pride (Litzinger 1998; Harrell and Li 2003). The Tibetan 
minority is also engaged in negotiating their origins and pasts based on their 
new historiographies. The renewed interest and pride in local history can 
be observed throughout Kham, and the Nangchen materials discussed here 
should be seen against the background of this larger process.
Historians, whose work has informed this contribution, are descendants 
and revivers of the traditional historiographic discourse deeply rooted 
in Tibetan Buddhist orthodoxy and historical imagination. These native 
scholars therefore often position themselves differently from those who 
write the history of the neighbouring Dergé kingdom. Authors of the history 
of Dergé are employed at large Chinese universities and/ or represent an 
active local government and Party leadership. Their schooling has enabled 
them to also quote excerpts from Chinese sources on the history of Dergé. 
Unlike these Tibetan intellectuals, Nangchen historians are all monks, save 
one, Denma Jamyang Tsultrim (b. 1943). However, even the aforementioned 
author was trained in a traditional monastic environment. Traditional 
training has influenced the way these authors recollect and re-codify the 
past as history. This calls upon a world view dominated by religion. Perhaps 
as a parallel to medieval European chroniclers, who ‘believed in God as 
being the cause of all historical processes’ (Misztal 2003, 33), the Buddhist 
experience of history, associated with circular epochs of the rise and decline 
of Buddhist teachings, meant that the past and memory ‘were not seen as 
models for understanding the present or the future but as sources of evidence 
of divine intervention in history’ (Tosh 1991, 11-12 in Misztal 2003, 33). The 
opening pages of one of our Nangchen sources illustrates this orthodox view: 
the book begins with an image of Avalokiteśvara, the protective-deity of 
the Land of Snows, followed by the three dharma-kings of Tibet, then by 
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images of protective deities associated with the author’s clan, and f inally 
local places said to be the abodes of those deities (Gedrong Logyü, 2-4). At 
the same time, we learn what constitutes an authority on this historical 
narrative: f irst, non-human beings ranked in a classic order from totally 
enlightened to locally bound deities and suprahuman forces associated 
with the local landscape. Next are photographs of an archive record and 
two edicts which are said to be one of the sources for the current chronicle, 
and lastly, a full-page photograph of the last ruling Nangchen monarch, 
King (gyelpo) Trashi Tséwang Dorjé (1910-1961) with the caption: ‘Dharma-
king Tashi Tséwang Dorjé, the sixty-seventh generation of Dru lords, and 
twenty-f ifth in the line of kings: Photograph taken in 1950’ (Gedrong Logyü, 
7). The strategic position of the king directly after the divine, non-human 
actors and the authoritative archive materials (which include a certif icate 
of award granted by one of the earlier kings) highlights the central theme 
of kingship in contemporary writings about Nangchen history. Since the 
revival of local and ethnic identity is simultaneous ‘with the emergence of 
religion’ (Sørensen 2015, 155) in these traditional narratives, kingship itself 
is viewed from a Buddhist perspective. That the genealogy of the kings is 
frequently recounted in the opening chapter of the local chronicles resonates 
with the traditional Tibetan idea about how these types of narratives serve 
as the universally sanctioned representation of history (Sørensen 2015, 159).
How is the revival of traditional historiography positioned within Chinese 
state-endorsed historical scholarship? On the one hand, China is engaged in 
its project of civilizing Tibetans and in writing their off icial historiography, 
for which I provide examples below. On the other hand, some Tibetan 
writers are in the process of negotiating this viewpoint by using practices 
that I will describe. However, the accounts of Tibetan history that contest 
the state narrative were published in the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) 
by large off icial publishing houses. The fact that the state would endorse, 
or at the very least, tolerate this kind of literary production testif ies to the 
complex relations that exist between the government’s stance on history 
writing and the Tibetans themselves as one of China’s minorities. Although 
these links should not be viewed in black and white, it is indeed a fact that 
any off icial scholarship about Tibetan history is expected to reflect Tibetan 
societies’ long-standing dependency on China and on the Han as China’s 
most advanced group. The narratives described in this chapter need to be 
seen against a backdrop of practices of historical appropriation, such as the 
notif ication in English, Chinese, and Tibetan that Kham’s most beloved 
legendary hero, King Gesar of Ling and his epic story, originated ‘in the 
highlands of Qinghai, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture’, as seen on a 
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Figure 13.1  The last ruling Nangchen king, Trashi Tséwang (Topgyel) Dorjé (1910-
1961)
anonymous photographer
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signpost at the recently erected Gesar monument in Jyekundo on the former 
territory of the Nangchen king. Khampa kingship narratives have not only 
been the object of appropriation but also of denigration, as evidenced by 
the English and Chinese renderings of the term chögyel (dharma-king) 
into ‘headman’ and ‘tusi’ , with reference to the 42nd Dergé king, Tenpa 
Tsering, and inscribed on entrance tickets to the famous Dergé Printing 
House. Despite these examples of politics of historical representation, we 
might perceive the traditional Nangchen historian as engaging in the re-
construction of an alternative history in a creative effort to renegotiate 
their understanding of the local past with the dominant, communist and 
Han-centric narrative (compare Harrell and Li 2003).
Khamtö Logyü (History of Upper Kham), one of the main sources used here, 
opens with a black-and-white photograph of the royal family that was taken 
in 1951. It portrays the last, newly deposed, Nangchen king, Trashi Tséwang 
Dorjé with his spouse, the Dergé princess Yudrön, and their offspring in the 
role of envoys of the new communist regime under the watchful eye of a 
People’s Liberation Army off icer. Dressed in traditional Tibetan clothing, 
the king and his family are seated on a row of chairs in the centre of the 
photograph. The soldier is carrying a long rifle, and the sign on the concrete 
gate, high above their heads, reads: ‘People’s Government of Qinghai Province, 
Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture’ (Khamtö Logyü II, n.pag.). Although 
the last ruler was granted the position of leader of the new local regime, the 
king was more a captive than a collaborator, and he died a decade later under 
house arrest. Unlike other Khampa leaders from the neighbouring Dergé: the 
queen regent (his own sister) and the strongman Jagö, the Nangchen king 
was much less proactive in the reception of the communist forces. The king’s 
chaplain Adé Rinpoche remembers that the gyelpo initially contemplated 
flight into exile, but eventually settled on staying and adopted a passive 
attitude towards the new regime (Adeu 2011, 90).
A glance at this particular photograph reveals the stark contrast between 
traditional expressions of local leadership, especially in such a symbol-laden 
form as kingship, and the brave new order imposed from outside. This raises 
a number of questions about the recent local past and about how it has 
affected present-day ideas about belonging and identity. It also prompts 
the reader to think about history and its writing. When the last Nangchen 
gyelpo was coerced into representing the new communist power structures 
and, especially later, when he was not only stripped of his authority but 
also of his highly revered status and held in confinement, history too, in 
the words of Carole McGranahan (2010), was arrested. Modern Tibetan 
historiographies, such as Khamtö Logyü, have attempted to reverse this 
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process, or at least to compensate for the crisis that arose with the abrupt 
rupture in the continuity of the local socio-political structure and with the 
erasure of its authority. By recounting Nangchen’s kingship narrative, Tibetan 
authors from Yushu or those in exile aim to restore the kings’ elevated status 
and fundamental role in the history of Nangchen. However, to over-write 
the off icial view of local histories that portray Eastern Tibet as backward 
and relevant only in its capacity as tributary to regimes ruling from China, 
Nangchen historians f irst had to reinstate the authority of the local historical 
narrative as a valid mode of remembering the past and thus regain control 
of their own history and territory.
The authors address their histories to the local elite and those exiled 
Nangchen Tibetans, who take interest in their past. In the new Nangchen 
chronicles, the power of the kings is constantly recalled, born in the reader’s 
mind and engages with the present in ways which do not threaten the 
coherence of the off icial state narrative which presents Nangchen Tibetans 
as one of China’s minorities. Many Tibetan authors publishing their works 
in China might f ind such an agenda too politically sensitive to express their 
opinion openly; but this subtle critique is reminiscent of what James Scott 
(1990) has called the ‘hidden transcripts’ practised by people of subaltern 
status, voicing their claims in ways that go unnoticed by power-holders.
Reviving the memory of legitimate kingship, as reflected in publications 
produced today in Yushu T.A.P. and among Nangchen Tibetans living abroad, 
compensates not only for the loss of royal authority but for what is more 
disruptive to local identity: the loss of recollection of this authority. Recount-
ing elements of legitimacy formation therefore means ‘re-membering the 
dismembered’ as David Germano (1998) aptly described post-Mao Tibetan 
revivalist practices. In the process of this revival, narratives and especially 
those involving secular and religious power play a vital role in effectively 
re-codifying local identity. The image that is recreated when Nangchen 
is remembered as a self-referential sphere under the revered lineage of 
Tibetan monarchs comprises several elements: proto-Tibetan myths and 
legends, the foreign mandate, and Buddhist elements such as the Mahāyanā-
Dharmaraja/Cakravartin ideal and, more specif ically, the ritual power of 
Tantric hermitism.
The Kingdom of Nangchen: A Brief History
The territory of the historical kingdom of Nangchen was made up of a largely 
pastoral area surrounding the upper reaches of the Dzachu (Mekong) and 
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Drichu (Yangtze) rivers. Prior to the thirteenth century Nangchen had been 
incorporated into the territory of the Tibetan Yarlung Empire (seventh-ninth 
centuries A.D.). Sometime in the mid-twelfth century the Dru clan, which 
claimed direct descent from one of the six ancient proto-Tibetan families, 
settled in Ga in what was later to become northeastern Nangchen and 
developed its influence over most of the Jyekundo (Yushu) area (Nangchen 
Gyelrap [The Royal Nangchen Chronicle], 20-21 and 32; Khamtö Logyü, 38). 
It was this very clan whose descendant would be enthroned as the f irst 
Nangchen king almost two centuries later.
By way of introducing the origins of the Dru lineage, Nangchen Gyelrap 
quotes the story of the matrix egg, a widespread Tibetan cosmogonic myth. 
It narrates how the six classes of beings hatched from the egg and then 
gave birth to all forms of life from which the six human clans came forth. 
The clans were divided into eighteen branches. Sixteen of these branches 
scattered in all directions. One of them was said to be the Dru. Another well-
established mythical account in Nangchen Gyelrap, and which is repeated 
after Maṇi Kabum and other Tibetan classics, tells the story of an ogress 
(an emanation of Tārā) who had six children with the Monkey Meditator 
(who in reality was Avalokiteśvara). Their six children were the progenitors 
of the six clans, including the Dru (Nangchen Gyelrap, 20-22). This source 
also mentions specif ic legends involving the Dru in particular, one of which 
portrays early clan patriarchs as culture heroes, a cross between Yarlung 
emperors, a divinity and the legendary master Padmasambhava who brought 
Tantric Buddhism to Tibet:
Lord Dru, a divine prince with a white turban slaughtered a black, rapa-
cious human demon, […] and a hoard of demons headed by crab-sprits 
with eyes on their shoulders […]. Lord Dru stole [from them] a bleating, 
conch-coloured lamb, a talking turquoise-coloured parrot and eighteen of 
the demon’s yak bulls. In the course of a f ierce battle he was the opponent 
of the vicious Viṣṇu […]. (Nangchen Gyelrap, 21).
Not unlike chronicles from Central Tibet, where myths and legends are 
intertwined with historical facts, which is particularly obvious in accounts 
dating back to the time of the Tibetan emperor Songtsen Gampo (seventh 
century), Nangchen Gyelrap (22) also describes how the Dru were of ‘divine 
lineage’. These literary borrowings feed on a sense of timelessness and other 
mythic elements, a skilful technique for reconstructing both the history of 
the kings and also the cosmology of kingship – a necessary strategy for the 
successful negotiation of identity in the present revival.
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Furthermore, we learn that one of the early Dru patriarchs by the name of 
Kyehu Khorlo Zangpo was minister (Tib. nanglun) to an emperor, supposedly 
from the Tibetan Yarlung dynasty (Barom Namthar, 260-261). Nangchen 
Gyelrap (23-24) refers to Kyehu Khorlo Zangpo as a great (Tib. che) man. 
The combination of the two syllables nang and che led him to be known 
by the name Nangchenpa (and later prompted the name ‘Nangchen’ for the 
kingdom). As Amy Holmes-Tagchungdarpa observed in her work on another 
Khampa kingdom, Lhatok, historiographic techniques such as the appropria-
tion of authority from broader Tibetan cultural narratives can highlight the 
autonomy and the distinctiveness of the local process, while at the same 
time emphasizing the sense of belonging to a larger Tibetan constellation 
of polities. In the case of the Nangchen royal genealogy, we f ind a similar 
process by which the format of the royal genealogy ‘presents an alternative 
way to write and understand history as a political tool to create physical and 
imaginative boundaries around a place’ (Holmes-Tagchungdarpa 2010, 19). In 
this way the narrative itself acquires historical legitimacy since it is based 
on another account which is seen locally as authoritative. Consequently, a 
narrative that has been renegotiated as history can be used as a proclamation 
of political power.
The following passages briefly recount the local story of state formation, 
governance, and the situation inside the kingdom. They are useful in our 
discussion about remembering kingship in Nangchen because they allow 
us to appreciate the complexity of the canvas onto which local historians 
placed kingship as a social practice.
Making reference to former places of power can be a way of capitalizing 
on knowledge about the landscape in order to reassert local identity and 
to position the native place vis-à-vis practices of peripheralization. Our 
sources frequently recall the earliest power centre in what was to become 
Nangchen – the Barom Kagyüpa monastery of Kumbum, known as ‘Barom 
root’. Kumbum was founded by the Tangut master Repa Karpo (1198-1262), 
a disciple of the Tibetan imperial preceptor at the Tangut court, Tishi Repa 
Sherap Senggé (1164-1236). Around 1240, a few years after Tishi Repa’s death, 
during a reconnaissance expedition under commander Doorda that Geng-
ghis Khan’s grandson Godan Khan had dispatched to conquer Tibetan 
areas, Kumbum became the scene of an encounter between the Mongols 
and the local authorities. Consequently, parallel to developments at Sakya 
in Central Tibet, Repa Karpo was established as the main religious authority 
along with a Dru lord, a layman called Driwo Awu, who was tasked with 
overseeing secular matters (Khamtö Logyü II, 39-41, 50; Barom Namthar 
[Life Stories of the Barompas] 220, 235). The Mongols therefore introduced 
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an administrative structure which guaranteed their control of Nangchen, 
and Kumbum monastery started to develop into a local power centre with 
authority to rule over twelve myriarchies (Barom Namthar, 234-236). To lend 
weight to this, Repa Karpo further extended the Kumbum complex with 
Nangso Chenmo – an impressive palace including a remarkable temple and 
a monastic compound. It was probably during this period, with the advent 
of Mongol administrative divisions, that Nangchen was organized into 25 
pastoral clans and eighteen monastic districts (Khamtö Logyü II, 40, 79-87; 
Tsomu 2006, 37). These religious units, each governed by a main monastery, 
are all said to have originally been of the Barom Kagyü denomination, 
perhaps owing to early Barom supremacy in the region. Thereupon Nangchen 
grew to become a Kagyü stronghold and the Barom tradition, which was to 
undergo a substantial decline in later times, became the principal religious 
and political force in the kingdom in the initial stages of its existence. In fact, 
the rise, decline, and successive revivals of Barom Kagyü were inextricably 
bound to the secular history of Nangchen.
Consolidation of the religious and secular dominance of the Barom school 
in Nangchen as well as the centralization of power took place during the 
reign of Tsangsar Lümé Dorjé (1226-1292), Repa Karpo’s principal heir. After 
Repa Karpo’s demise, Chögyel Pakpa (1235-1280), whose success at the court 
of Kublai Khan and the resulting supremacy over Ütsang and other Tibetan 
areas are well documented, sanctioned Lümé Dorjé to exert both religious 
and temporal rule over upper-central Nangchen. This no doubt transpired 
in 1274 when Pakpa was passing through Nangchen (Khamtö Logyü II, 164). 
However, it must be emphasized that Lümé Dorjé originated from a local clan 
and rival to the Dru – the Tsangsar – and in the early phases of Nangchen’s 
development, the Dru had yet to emerge as the lineage of Nangchen kings 
(Depter Mukpo [The Maroon Annals], 321-322).
The subsequent Barompa ruler in the Tsangsar lineage was Jangchup 
Zhönnu (1254-1323), Lümé Dorjé’s nephew. It would seem that Jangchup 
Zhönnu’s early reign marked the last period of political and religious unity 
in the realm. During this overlord’s lifetime, preparations were being made 
to establish a Dru son as a rival ruler. It was a clan matter – the Tsangsar 
had been in power for two generations now, and the Dru had been waiting 
anxiously for the opportunity to seize power again and had been preparing 
to gradually settle Dru Chökyi Gyeltsen on the throne. Sources report that 
Dru Chökyi Gyeltsen was f irst proclaimed abbot of Kumbum by the Yuan 
emperor Temür Khagan (ruled 1294-1307) and that a little later, Sakya Khön 
issued a decree addressed at the monastic communities in Nangchen and in 
the Dru homeland of Trirapkha, which stated that the throne in Nangchen 
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should be occupied by someone with the title of chögyel, dharmarāja, 
which refers to the pan-Tibetan and Indic idea of an ideal sovereign who 
rules in accordance with Buddhist teachings (Barom Namthar, 262-263). 
Alternatively, Khamtö Logyü (II, 165) recounts that in 1294, a high-ranking 
off icial in the Sakya-Yuan hierarchy and a disciple of the influential Sakya 
master Ga Anyen Dampa (1230-1303), who went by the name of Sangha, issued 
an edict and seal that exempted Chökyi Gyeltsen from paying taxes (Khamtö 
Logyü II, 165). It is possible that the strong ties between the Dru clan and the 
Sakya rulers dated back to the time when Chögyel Pakpa visited Kumbum. 
However, some sources claim that the 1294 edict had in fact been issued 
even earlier and that it also granted Dru Chökyi Gyeltsen the right to rule 
over both Nangchen and his native Trirapkha (Gedrong Logyü [Chronicle 
of the Good Drongpa Clan], 99; Barom Namthar, 262-263). Other authors 
attribute the edict to Chögyel Pakpa himself (Khamtö Logyü II, 166).
Nonetheless, all local chronicles are unanimous: Dru Chökyi Gyeltsen 
ascended the Nangchen throne as chögyel in 1300. He received the right 
to collect tribute and corvée in the territory comprising Trirapkha and 
up to and excluding Kumbum. This local power centre was handed down 
to Jangchup Zhönnu and his transmission holders (Khamtö Logyü II, 165; 
Nangchen Gyelrap, 28). Given this state of affairs, Jangchup Zhönnu had 
no other choice but to build another castle to centralize the power he 
still exercised. Consequently, in 1302 the Tsangsar stronghold was built 
and Jangchup Zhönnu moved into the compound, which in 1323 was most 
probably where he died (Nangchen Gönkhak Jungwa [Origins of Nangchen’s 
Monasteries], 332).
Chökyi Gyeltsen had influential relatives: his maternal uncle, Be Jangchub 
Gönpo, and cousin, Yonten Pal, were both high-ranking off icials at the 
grand temple of Nangso Chenmo (Barom Namthar, 262; Khamtö Logyü I, 
39). During Jangchup Zhönnu’s lifetime the uncle had already intervened 
at the Sakya court in what I assume was a power struggle, and obtained 
an edict which proclaimed Yonten Pal, Chökyi Gyeltsen’s maternal cousin, 
the rightful heir to Tsangsar castle. The Barom Namthar (262-263) implies 
that this occurred in 1324. As a result, the realm was separated into two 
domains of equal status according to the Sakya-Mongol legal system: one 
territory under Dru Chökyi Gyeltsen, the Nangchen gyelpo, and another 
under his maternal cousin who governed from Tsangsar (Khamtö Logyü 
II, 166; Nangchen Gönkhak Jungwa, 332). To further emphasize the split in 
power, all the Barompa relics, precious objects as well as ritual implements, 
were relocated from Kumbum to Tsangsar (Barom Namthar, 233, Khamtö 
Logyü II, 48-49). This division was accompanied by a further fragmentation 
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of the Barom transmission of doctrines and rituals, which I have described 
elsewhere (Turek 2018).
Local sources recall in some detail these numerous factions, all bearing 
foreign edicts, and locate the power struggle in and among the three local 
centres of power: Kumbum, Nangso Chenmo, and Tsangsar. These monastic-
political institutions would at times have one overall steward, such as Chökyi 
Gyeltsen at Nangso Chenmo, and at other times two persons in charge, one 
to oversee the monastic and another to supervise secular affairs. Abbots, 
monastic administrators, and lay officials were all strongly bound by kinship 
ties and religious allegiances. This created a complex, shifting landscape of 
clan loyalties, marriage alliances, and religious f idelities, which provided an 
opportunity for outside authorities to issue mandates that were expected 
to solve inner conflicts of power. All this led to the formation of Nangchen 
as a polity and the emergence of Dru Chökyi Gyeltsen as the f irst king. But 
how do our sources represent the very f irst ruler as chögyel? Dru Chökyi 
Gyeltsen is described as being accomplished and learned in both secular 
and religious matters; he is also presented as someone who was a f igure 
of authority respected by both lay and monastic leaders (Khamtö Logyü 
II, 62-64, 165; Barom Namthar, 262-263). A ritual virtuoso and a well-read 
monk, who, like many luminaries at that time, had received his training at 
the Sakya capital in Central Tibet, Chökyi Gyeltsen became the transmission 
holder of the previous Barompa patriarch and ruler, Lümé Dorjé (Khamtö 
Logyü II, Barom Namthar, 262-263, Nangchen Gyelrap, 27).
The Dru, which was Chökyi Gyeltsen’s paternal clan, had already set a 
precedent for local power. Chökyi Gyeltsen’s father was the aforementioned 
Awu, who had acted earlier on as the secular myriarch in the local govern-
ment under the auspices of Goden Khan. Although there were several clans 
that competed for power at that critical time of Nangchen’s formation, in 
contemporary historical accounts, only the Dru are portrayed as the glorious 
bloodline endowed with a divine origin (Nangchen Gyelrap, 20-22, Dge 
‘brong lo rgyus, 42). The same passages also describe the Dru as arriving in 
Nangchen from outside.
To some extent, this theme of the external origin of the ruler is reminiscent 
of Marshall Sahlin’s (1985, 2008) interpretation of the ‘stranger-king’ concept 
that he originally developed about Indonesia and Oceania, and which could 
also be applied to describe the Central Tibetan Yarlung emperors. However, 
‘the potency of alterity’ (Sahlins 2008, 192) would mean that kings were 
the real power holders, when in practice, as some of Sahlin’s critics have 
observed, kings often enjoyed great prestige but little real authority (Oosten 
1988, 269). Even though the Dru dynasty had been attributed an exalted rank, 
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it was not the only contender for power. While their moral superiority and 
their claim to royal status were never challenged, over time their political 
authority waned.
During the Ming era in China (1368-1644) the king and local aristocratic 
estates remained independent of any foreign regimes, as Barom Namthar 
(256) mentions in passing. No further mention is made about the state of 
affairs in Nangchen during that period in any of the chronicles. The omission 
of facts has been linked to the empowerment of subalterns by overlooking 
inconvenient truths (Rowland 1993), but I strongly suspect that our sources 
did not f ind suff icient or adequate historical references, given a certain 
vagueness surrounding the same period in Central Tibet.
Local sources leap from the Mongol period to the year 1634 which saw 
the ultimate destruction of Kumbum when the Eastern Tibetan prince of 
Beri, eager to extend his scope of authority and to win territory for the Bön, 
invaded Nangchen (Nangchen Gyelrap, 38; Khamtö Logyü II, 3, 171). The 
aggressor was defeated by Quoxot forces in 1640, but the ‘Barom root’ and 
at the same time the royal seat and capital of the realm, was never rebuilt. 
The king managed to escape, but the utter destruction of Kumbum had a 
devastating effect on the development of the Barom school (Turek 2018).
The memory of Kumbum monastery is celebrated in all contemporary 
Nangchen chronicles as a basis for the organization of power which would 
eventually lead to the creation of a polity and territorial identity. In local 
writings, both the emergence of Kumbum and the rise of gyelpo, as the 
process of centralizing authority, are linked to Mongol supremacy over 
Tibet and vast areas of Asia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is 
possible that it was necessary for an external force from outside Nangchen 
to sanction the rise of a new local regime at that particular moment in time. 
However, the use of the Sakya-Mongol mandate in the narratives could 
further capitalize on a certain aspect of pan-Tibetan historical identity. 
In the self-image practised by many traditionally trained scholars and 
authors, the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries are known as the era when 
Mongol emperors revered and exalted their Tibetan preceptors. Reference 
to the Sakya-Yuan diarchy in local narratives has the effect of sanctioning 
the Nangchen state formation in the wider, Tibetan collective memory. 
This mnemonic technique also validates the legitimacy of local kingship 
by borrowing from a larger Tibetan cultural narrative.
Let us now return to our local history. Prior to the destruction of Kumbum, 
the Nangchen king waged war on the Beri armies and appealed to both 
the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) and Gushri Khan (1582-1655) for support. 
Subsequently, like most of the Tibetan world, Nangchen was included in 
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the greater Tibetan territories ruled from Lhasa by the Central Tibetan 
Ganden Phodrang government. In the early stages of his rule over Nangchen, 
Gushri Khan issued an edict conf irming the validity of the kingdom’s 
previous administrative division (Khamtö Logyü II, 171). In the 1640s, the 
Fifth Dalai Lama upheld the king’s right to rule over monastic and lay 
estates in Nangchen (Nangchen Gyelrap, 39). Tribute to Lhasa was enforced 
and introduced by means of a census. Later in history, the conversion of 
monasteries into Gelukpa provided the opportunity for Ganden Phodrang 
to encroach on Nangchen when it had become independent from Central 
Tibet (Turek, forthcoming a).
In 1724 royal authority was channelled into a new semi-mobile residence, 
the ‘Nangchen Encampment’ (Khamtö Logyü II, 3). A year later the kingdom 
was placed under the administration of a Qing amban who governed from 
Xining (Tuttle 2015), although the king remained directly responsible for 
political affairs and some religious matters in his realm. Here lies a major 
theme which is subsequently found again and again in all the sources 
mentioned herein. During the reign of the Yongzheng emperor, the Yun-
nan governor, Hao Yuling, summoned several representatives of Khampa 
kingdoms to Chamdo. An envoy of the eighteenth Nangchen king, Dorjé 
Tséwang (r. 1680-1734), also attended. On this occasion, the Nangchen king 
received the hereditary title of chanhu (Ch. qianhu, chiliarch, commander of a 
thousand men); lower-ranking officials obtained the title of behu (Ch. baihu, 
commander of a hundred men) and bechang (Ch. baizong, commander of fifty 
men). These titles were originally military decimal units in the Jurchen Jin 
state (1115-1234) and had continually been used along with the tusi system by 
China’s dynastic regimes since the Yuan era to exercise nominal or real power 
in borderland areas. Leaders of several Eastern Tibetan groups or polities, 
such as Choné, Hor, Golok and Repkong, had received the qianhu title during 
the Ming period (Tuttle 2015; Weiner 2012, 69). For the Manchu dynasty, the 
ranks of qianhu, baihu, and baizong became a way of integrating pastoral 
societies like Nangchen in the Qing empire – while among agricultural 
populations, such as Dergé, native authorities often received the rank of tusi. 
For the Nangchen king and his subjects, these new ranks merely endorsed 
the validity of the earlier local administration; an additional edict was 
issued to confirm the king’s right to rule over his realm (Barom Namthar, 
275). Although in theory the ranks implied the right to enforce levies on a 
specific number of families, the structure merely reflected an administrative 
hierarchy rather than provide precise information about taxation.
To give one example of how the new titles were a means of maintaining 
the status quo rather than reorganizing the kingdom, the Nangchen king’s 
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qianhu title meant that he had the right to tax 1000 families, while in fact 
he received tribute from 700 households. These obligations were divided 
according to the binary system of ‘monastic taxes’ (sertrel) and ‘lay taxes’ 
(kyatrel). All subjects, regardless of their rank or position (Khamtö Logyü 
II, 81, 86; Nangchen Gönkhak Jungwa, 410-411) were expected to pay these 
levies. However, there is some evidence to support the theory that by the 
nineteenth-twentieth centuries the king only taxed dependants who lived on 
his estates and that he lacked the leverage to make decisions concerning land 
use in his realm or even to negotiate during disputes over land. According to 
Yudru Tsomu (2006, 37), the Nangchen ruler had the right to allot land, but 
‘he did not enjoy the real power to administrate [these lands]’. Still, some 
monarchs are remembered for having issued edicts that relieved certain 
monasteries of f iscal duties. For instance, on one occasion, a royal prince 
was recognized as a reincarnation of an abbot; for this reason, the king 
granted his monastery tax exemptions (Nangchen Gönkhak Jungwa, 410-411).
In our sources, it is obvious that the Qing qianhu rank became a vital 
part of the local process of legitimating the monarch in the eyes of histori-
ographers. No author forgets to mention the title, and it is frequently used 
throughout the texts much the same as the title chögyel. Further on in this 
chapter I will elaborate on how the concept of chögyel was implemented in 
Nangchen, but here I wish to briefly discuss how the rank of qianhu is used 
in contemporary negotiations of the local past. Nangchen qianhu-kings were 
deliberately forgotten when history was ‘arrested’ during the Maoist era, 
when only one version of the past was authorized; all Tibetan matters had to 
be subordinate to China, hence the Nangchen king was relegated to the role 
of qianhu, which reflected the position of his realm as a dependent periphery 
of the Qing Empire. Such a one-sided presentation is a gross distortion of 
the local perception of the title. For the authors of contemporary chronicles, 
the rank of qianhu attests to recognition of the gyelpo and to his elevation 
above all other members of the local elite through the off icial approval by a 
foreign and much more powerful sovereign, even if we assume that the title 
merely connoted a peripheral or obsolete function in the complex imperial 
hierarchies. That the king may also have enjoyed special royal esteem even 
among Han and Hui traders passing through Nangchen is reflected through 
anecdotal evidence provided by the German traveller Albert Tafel, who 
passed through Nangchen at the beginning of the twentieth century. His 
travelogue relates the many diff iculties he faced while traversing Nangchen 
without the king’s knowledge and permission. He also reports (Tafel 1914, 
145) that Han merchants used the term wang (king) – a Chinese equivalent 
of the Tibetan title gyelpo – to refer to the Nangchen ruler.
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In other words, it is signif icant that local authors commemorate and 
celebrate in their writings the fact that the king was granted the rank of 
qianhu by China’s Manchu dynasty. Similarly, Nangchen historians highlight 
the role the Sakya-Mongol edict played in the enthronement of the f irst 
gyelpo and in the confirmation of his rights by the Fifth Dalai Lama’s regime 
in recollection of the foreign endorsement of the Nangchen kings. Ironi-
cally, since these very components also consigned the kingdom to larger 
political structures which, thanks to their historiography and cartography, 
appropriated the gyelpo’s territories with great skill and eloquence, they also 
became the primary reasons for Nangchen’s provincialization in the sense 
of its position on the periphery of Lhasa-centric and Sino-centric narratives. 
Today these memories of the foreign mandate play an important part in 
politics of representation designed to negotiate the past as a testimony to 
local power.
It is also important to understand that the local meaning of the Qing 
titles and insignia bestowed on the Nangchen elite typif ies the encounters 
between inside and outside in the ‘matrix’ of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, 
as Gros describes in his introductory chapter to this volume. The local 
reception of the qianhu rank, whether seen as hybridity or acculturation, 
constituted an internalization of an ‘external’ sign of inclusion. It was one 
of the many phenomena that made Nangchen and Kham an ambiguous, 
inconsistent space. Regardless of contemporary recollections of the king’s 
position in the local hierarchy, Nangchen rulers may have been granted 
legitimacy to be kings, but their rights to actually govern were either never 
universally recognized or short-lived. Nineteenth-century travellers inform 
us that the king had limited influence over secular and monastic districts: 
the power of the king was only effective in the immediate vicinity of the 
capital (Grenard 1904, 366), meaning the four districts around the capital 
represented by four baihu.
By the nineteenth century the gyelpo presided over 33 ‘inner’ administra-
tive districts, while the 25 headmen of ‘outer’ districts of Gapa were, it seems, 
self-governed from Jyekundo. The king’s four ministers (baihu selected from 
a larger number of off icials referred to by the same title) presided over 
the f iscal-administrative units that were characterized by varying levels 
of independence from the ruler. A Chinese survey carried out during the 
hegemony of Ma Bufang in Qinghai, and therefore also in the Jyekundo 
area, as quoted by Sperling (2003, 13-35), speaks of 175 local headmen who 
were linked to the king in different ways. Nangchen lacked both a political 
force that would dominate this intricate network and a coherent economic 
superstructure that could accommodate all local influences. For this reason, 
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I concur with Gruschke (2004, 105-108) and Yudru Tsomu (2006, 37) when 
they say that Nangchen was more of a federation of clans united under the 
royal banner than a centralized polity, and that loyalty to the king was borne 
out of a sentiment for him as ‘a moral and social institution’ (Gruschke 2004, 
108) rather than because he was recognized as a de facto leader.
A closer look at the socio-political structure of Nangchen reveals that its 
ideology of political power was borrowed from Indic mythology as was the 
case of many historical Hindu and Buddhist states of Southeast Asia. Stanley 
J. Tambiah explains that they were organized according to cosmological 
principles and based on the assumed correspondence between the superhu-
man macrocosm and the human microcosm:
The kingdom was a miniature representation of the cosmos, with the 
palace at the center being iconic of Mount Meru, the pillar of the universe, 
and the king, his princes, and ruling chiefs representing the hierarchy in 
Tavatimsa heaven […]. (Tambiah 1976, 109).
Nangchen Gar, which served as the capital from the early eighteenth century 
onwards, was topographically structured after the cosmological construct 
of the maṇḍala, with the king at its centre as both the ideal Buddhist ruler, 
cakravartin, and simultaneously cosmocrator, the ruler of the world. The 
maṇḍala model of four cardinal points placed around a focal point was 
mapped onto the ground plan of the capital and at the same time onto the 
structure of political functionaries and ministers. As mentioned above, the 
king had four ministers, whose land surrounded Nangchen Gar. Moreover, it 
is no coincidence that the 33 off icials and their districts, who were directly 
subordinate to the chögyel, correspond to the 33-unit configuration typical 
of Hindu and Buddhist cosmologies and religious-political compositions, 
which in the different variations on the model reflected the hierarchy in the 
divine realm of Trāyastriṃśa (lit. ‘thirty-three’): Indra, the four guardians of 
cardinal directions (lokapāla), and 28 subordinate gods.1 This Indic blueprint 
proved successful in distant Buddhist kingdoms, such as Java, Thailand or 
Burma, partly because it elevated the monarch to the holder of the sacred 
1 It is interesting to note that, as shown by Yudru Tsomu, the kingdom of Dergé had a similar 
structure (Tsomu, in this volume). There is no doubt that aside from the regular political alliances, 
there were many continuities in the organization of the two kingdoms and their topographies. If 
my assumption that the broader Asian cosmological paradigm found its way to Kham is correct, 
the question remains how that came about and if the regional source of its reproduction was 
Dergé, which had the reputation of the cultural center of Kham.
470 maria Turek 
teachings of the Buddha, a cosmocrator, and an intermediary between the 
realms of the divine and of humans (Tambiah 1976, 108-109).
The Indic cosmological model for organizing society and for the 
topographic layout of the capital illustrates the idea of ‘galactic polity’, 
a galaxy-like constellation of entities that are autonomous yet centred 
(around the f igure of the king) and f ixed in their trajectory (predetermined 
social order) (Tambiah 1976, 113). This concept has already been applied 
to describe Khampa principalities (Samuel 1995, 61-63) and, though the 
application of Tambiah’s model onto Kham has met with some criticism 
(Holmes-Tagchungdarpa 2010, 10-11; Tsomu 2006, 28), the critiques are based 
on historical examples of Lhatok and Nyarong, two Eastern Tibetan poli-
ties that were not organized around the principle of kingship. The case of 
Nangchen, as presented in modern chronicles, was unquestionably different 
and therefore offers a vivid example of Tambiah’s concept. Although the 
cosmocratic inf luence of its monarchs was greater than their political 
control, their exalted status and symbolic capital ‘extended beyond their 
ability to enforce it – thereby creating a far-reaching cultural subordination 
among hinterland peoples without the benef it of real-political coercion’ 
(Sahlins and Graeber 2017, 335).
The mnemonic practice of describing the political organization in 
Nangchen in ways which correspond to the concept of a galactic polity 
can also convey contemporary agendas, such as legitimizing the kingdom 
as a power centre in its own right, and assist in the reconstruction of local 
identity. Although decentralized in terms of their jurisdiction, the Indic 
cosmological components employed in Nangchen’s socio-political structure 
emphasized the focus on the king as the centre of the maṇḍala. Therefore, 
although the off icial state discourse locates the former kingdom in a 
peripheral, ‘borderland’ position, recollection of the moral and symbolic 
centrality of kingship lays emphasis on autonomy and self-referentiality, 
and shifts local awareness from the margins to its own centre. Given that 
cosmologies are narratives that focus on a sense of belonging, remembering 
the local past in terms of subjecthood to the Nangchen king could become 
an effective way of reconstructing local identity.
It was common for many Tibetan and Asian societies on the whole to 
identify kingship with the rule of law, which was associated with the Bud-
dhist doctrine in particular. In a recent piece of work, Charles Ramble 
(2008, 313-314, 325-326) states that this principle, according to which the 
monarch had to be associated with religion, was typically applied across 
Tibetan societies. A monarch protected his subjects with the authority of 
Buddha’s teachings which portrayed him as a true chögyel. It was, among 
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other elements, this image of pious fairness that elevated him above other 
lower-ranking leaders.
Throughout local histories, the Nangchen king is presented as the one 
who protected his realm and defended the faith; mention is often made of 
the idea that he ruled according to the law. Even if we have no evidence 
about the right of the gyelpo to exercise his rule over (or as it is phrased in 
our chronicles, ‘to protect’) a specif ic territory, territorial awareness did 
develop in Nangchen, as attested to by our sources (Turek, forthcoming 
a). The idea of a king as the protector of his realm is manifest in Nangchen 
Gyelrap (80) which reproduces a map based on a land record made by one 
of the gyelpo.
The map locates Nangchen inside Kham and next to Central Tibet and 
Amdo. Although geographically imprecise, it represents the major points 
inside the kingdom such as the royal capital, the trading town of Jyekundo 
and the four main rivers running through the kingdom (Drichu, Dzachu, 
Machu, and Chichu). The smaller, striped map at the bottom with the word 
‘Tibet’ written in Latin alphabet represents the location and perceived size 
of Nangchen in relation to Central Tibet and the Himalayan kingdoms of 
Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.
A Buddhist king who rules according to Buddha’s sacred teachings will 
typically also be known for protecting animals from hunters. Consequently, 
local histories relate how the Nangchen ruler passed laws to preserve wild-
life (Barom Namthar, 280; Nangchen Gyelrap, 22, 75). Today, recalling the 
strictness of the king’s law might be a way of attesting to the fact that, as a 
chögyel, the king met his people’s expectations by protecting his realm and 
defending the moral principles codif ied by Buddhism:
The king’s law [concerning] secular (srid phyogs) matters was very strict. 
If a man was slain, the perpetrator had to have his one eyeball gouged out, 
his one ear shorn off and one foot chopped off. If a yak was stolen, [the 
thief] paid nine measures [of barley, which] in reality amounted to ten. If 
a wild animal was slain on the holy Nyenpo mountain, the hunter’s right 
index f inger was cut off (Nangchen Gyelrap, 74-75; Gedrong Logyü, 92).
Another way in which religious themes are used to sustain or to add to 
the idea of Dru patriarchs being elevated beings worthy of royal status 
was based on the long-standing reputation of Nangchen as a ‘nest of the 
cotton-clad yogins, region of meditators’ (retsang gomdé). Throughout the 
history of contemplative lineages (drupgyü), Nangchen was famous not only 
for its number of convents, hermitages, and monastics but perhaps most 
472 maria Turek 
of all for the many exceptional masters of meditation who originated from 
or had been educated in the pastoral kingdom. In oral lore and in modern 
chronicles we still come across songs extolling Nangchen as the perfect 
environment for Tantric practices which even extended to the laity: ‘all 
men were meditators, all women were meditators’ (Khamtö Logyü II, 2-3). 
In keeping with the contemplative reputation of their realm, it is said that 
several notable members of the Dru dynasty became deeply involved not 
only in the royal business of founding and maintaining religious centres, 
but also in the pursuit of a personal, spiritual vocation. During the f irst few 
generations, Nangchen kings are remembered as ordained monastics. Later 
the dynasty became secularized and passed down royal authority from father 
to eldest son; they also lost their exclusive interest in the Barom school and 
embraced the doctrines and rituals of various schools and lineages.
Returning to the self-ascription of ‘Nangchen the region of medita-
tors’ (nangchen gomdé) briefly introduced above, the second part of the 
abbreviation-compound gomdé is worth some elaboration in the context 
of Kham as a heterotopic space in which multiple, contradictory or even 
mutually exclusive places coexist and compete throughout time (see Gros, 
this volume). The meaning of dé (‘region, district, section, faction, group, 
department’) relates to a regional entity which is both a social collective 
and a part of a larger body. The communal aspect of the designation dé 
Figure 13.2  Sketch map of Nangchen based on a narrative land record composed 
by one of the gyelpo
source: Nangchen Gyelrap, 80
reTurn oF The good king 473
may relate to the egalitarian style of Nangchen lamas, who, according to 
legend, famously imparted the most advanced teachings on meditation and 
mystic experience to anyone and everyone. But how can we understand 
the connotation of dé as a ‘region’ (or in terms of any other equivalent of 
the word dé which relates to a part of a larger whole) in reference to the 
Buddhist ‘kingdom of Nangchen’ (nangchen gyelkhap)? For anyone eager to 
categorize Nangchen as either an autonomous or a tributary realm, this emic 
inconsistency irritatingly complexif ies the local claims to territory and the 
reverence towards their native tradition of kingship. In a study of regionalism 
quoted in the current volume, Vicente Rafael problematizes the ‘region’ as a 
place of otherness that destabilizes and complicates the claims of powerful 
centres (Rafael 1999). Kingship and local identity in Nangchen were not 
formulated as political claims challenging larger powers dominating the 
region from the outside. Judging by the behaviour of several kings and other 
members of the local elite, they were rather pragmatist and opportunistic 
when it came to dealing with Quoxot warlords, the Qing, Ma Bufang, or 
the Ganden Phodrang. In an event of an interference or an invasion, the 
Nangchen ruling elite frequently bet on the winning horse, similarly to 
the Dergé strongman Jagö Topden. So, perhaps – precisely because they 
saw the precariousness of their own geopolitical position – by reiterating 
their self-chosen epithet ‘region of meditators’, the people of Nangchen 
realistically acknowledged that they were merely a ‘region’? However, they 
were no ordinary region, but one that united Tantric meditators. Thus, the 
proliferation of the legend of Nangchen gomdé could generate a utopian 
response to the dystopian visions of war or exploitative overtaxation. By 
proposing this interpretation, I am by no means claiming that Nangchen 
was a ‘kingdom’ for the insiders and a ‘region’ for the outsiders. As discussed 
throughout this volume, in Kham, the notions of inside and outside were 
notoriously interwoven and convoluted in space and time. A good example 
of this is the Nangchen gyelpo’s title of qianhu, an object of great local pride, 
but which placed the king among several other rank holders positioned on 
the margins of the Qing territories.2 However, the local esteem of the qianhu 
title was so great that it survived the empire well into the 1940s.
Even if the locally/regionally relevant discourses of power in Nangchen 
often took the form of a religious orientation of kingship and society, the 
2 Compare also the case of Ming dynasty titles bestowed on members of the Central Tibetan 
elite in the period between fourteenth-f ifteenth centuries. Although they were not titles of 
political recognition, they were used for competition among Tibetans themselves; see Schwieger 
(2009-2010).
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complexity of these discourses did not exclude regional politics. Thus, the 
presentation of Nangchen as a Buddhist society develops a horizontal and a 
vertical significance as the notion of the ‘region’ discussed by Vicente Rafael 
(1999). The image of Nangchen as an especially pious region seen from a 
lateral perspective could have been a way to highlight their special status 
among other Eastern Tibetan polities (‘regions’) subordinate to the same 
power. Thinking vertically, the ‘regional’ positioning of Buddhist kingship 
and society could have been a local strategy of injecting meaning into 
relations with a higher political power flowing from ‘outside’. The ‘region 
of meditators’ is thus rendered as a site and source of ritual power for the 
distant emperors or foreign rulers. Multiple historical precedencies for this 
type of thinking can be found in the histories from Central Tibet, in which 
the politics of the Mongol/ Manchu-Tibetan relations were sometimes 
imagined through the lens of the ‘priest-and-benefactor’ (chöyön) concept. 
According to this idea, various Tibetan hierarchs such as the Dalai Lamas 
embodied the ritual authority of the Tantric guru and of religion, more 
broadly, as towering over the worldly and as such, transient, rule of the khan 
or emperor they had links with. If the relations meant in practice that the 
Tibetan ecclesiastic was a local representative of the Qing and that Central 
Tibet was an extension of the Qing empire, changing the discourse from 
that of political subordination to ritual and religious supremacy meant 
asserting ownership of the discourse. I would like to propose the same 
type of Buddhist imagination working for the image of Nangchen as ‘region 
of meditators’. As one local chronicler describes Kyodrak, one of the most 
powerful monasteries in the realm, founded in fourteenth century with a 
donation of the last Yüan emperor:
Kyodrak monastery became the crown ornament among the sublime 
objects of veneration for the Hor, Lijang, Minyak kingdoms, and so on, as 
well as for the Chinese, Tibetans and Mongolians. (Kyodrak Shedra: 28)
The moral authority of the Nangchen king was linked to his commitment to 
support religious institutions in his realm. This translated into the physical 
realm when Tsechu monastery was erected next to the royal palace, calling to 
mind the tradition of the local religious-secular power centres of Kumbum, 
Nangso Chenmo, or Tsangsar (Nangchen Gönkhak Jungwa, 486-494). Perhaps 
the king also wished to style his capital on Dergé, where the royal palace was 
situated next to Gönchen monastery. Neighbouring Dergé was seen as the 
cultural heart of Kham, with which Nangchen enjoyed close yet constantly 
shifting relations, expressed through marriage alliances, wars, and unions. 
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Today, both Tsechu and Gönchen monasteries have been rebuilt, while their 
secular counterparts, the royal palaces of Dergé and Nangchen, lie in ruins 
that have either been intentionally concealed or rebuilt in form of a tiny 
temple. In the ethnic Tibetan areas of contemporary China, monuments 
to secular power can be reassembled through mnemonic practices such as 
narrative accounts that focus on ‘place memory’, and although Nangchen 
palace is mentioned in all local sources, only the one published in exile 
gives a description of it (Depter Mukpo, 125-128).
Elsewhere I mention (Turek, forthcoming a) how the chronicles describe 
a specific category of rituals dedicated to the Nangchen ruler’s longevity and 
which was called kurim; this was an obligation that certain monasteries, 
hermitages and lamas had to fulf il. The mutual benef it resulting from 
the ritual was meant to legitimize and in a way sanctify the king, while 
bestowing privileges on the institutions involved. Accordingly, kurim 
monasteries received the status of quasi-independent territories governing 
whole districts, including a large number of dependants. There may have 
been various reasons for elevating these particular monasteries, but the 
choice of different monastic schools once again styled Nangchen after 
Dergé where royal patronage over monasteries of various denominations 
had been the preferred line of action since at least the nineteenth century.
One particularly ceremonial type of kurim devoted to the long life of the 
Nangchen monarch is described as follows:
Annually, during the kurim ceremony, the precious Kangyur was com-
pletely read aloud for the king and a retinue of his subjects, who would 
travel to where the ritual was held. The monasteries were obliged to take 
turns [to carry out the ritual], and when theirs arrived, [the ceremony was 
performed by] around f ifteen lamas and monks. There was a custom: on 
the way, while travelling, the lamas responsible for kurim would lead the 
king’s mules, laden with his belongings, [while] it was required that the 
lamas’ caravan would be led by the chant master [of Tsechu monastery?] 
(Khamtö Logyü II, 85).
As longevity rituals are evoked in contemporary local history writing, 
their mnemonic potential can be harnessed as we follow the trail left 
by the pan-Tibetan heritage of the Yarlung Empire. In ancient Tibet, 
kurim rituals were carried out to protect the emperor’s divine body which 
served as a metaphor for his realm (Walter 2009, 166-174). As the ritual 
later spread throughout the Plateau, it was also performed in villages 
for the collective good of the community (Childs 2005). In Nangchen 
476 maria Turek 
the ceremony depicted the local political cosmology in which the body 
of the sovereign represented the land and the territorial identity of his 
subjects. That is why remembering this category of rituals today may be a 
way of contributing to local identity reconstruction. If we also agree with 
Samten Karmay (1998, 245) and Margaret Prins (2007, 194) that Tibetan 
rituals are reenactments of mythical narratives, then, by recalling rituals 
associated with kingship, the entire local tapestry of symbolic meanings 
and practices is recreated, which can be used for the reconstitution of 
place memory.
The social nature of kurim brings us to the major aspect of these kingship-
related rituals. Rituals in general and kingship-related rituals have a strong 
performative element which is often communicated to the audience through 
insignia of power. Contemporary local sources emphasize the special head-
gear worn by the monarch; a top hat decorated with red coral presented by 
a Xining amban. This was a sign of a qianhu, and lower-ranking members 
of the Nangchen ruling elite who enjoyed the rank of baihu also received 
buttons made of semi-precious stones, though coral was reserved for the 
qianhu. Together with the qianhu title, the hat was bestowed on native 
leaders on the periphery of the Qing Empire as a sign of their assimilation 
into the administration, but in the Nangchen narratives, the insignia marks 
the prestige of the one and only legitimate ruler.
According to our genealogies of kings, the monarch was at the centre of 
several rituals whose effectiveness relied on their power-oriented symbolism 
and theatricality. In addition to kurim – one example of a religious ceremony 
in the service of the king – secular rites and festivals took place in the royal 
palace grounds. Annual horse races and the protocol governing welcoming 
ceremonies for the monarch are particularly good examples of how vividly 
local chronicles recollect the performances of local identity and its political 
cosmology:
When the king returned home on horseback, four grey silk banners had 
to be raised before him one by one. [There were off icials] equipped with 
staffs, monastic robes and clay drums. Furthermore, twenty-five bechang, 
[representatives of] kurim monasteries, some f ifteen monks of the Tsechu 
convent presided by the four chamberlains and the behu all gathered 
at this place, [as well as] lay people and monks. Peacock canopies were 
raised for both Adé Rinpoche and for the king. On their both sides walked 
four lay people, bearing leopard-skin banners and two monks bearing 
canes. Behind, members of the court had to line up along with [them]. 
(Nangchen Gyelrap, 74-75, Gedrong Logyü, 92)
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Performances such as the one described above, which include symbolic 
implements of authority, have the capacity to linger in visual memory as 
de facto mnemonic devices that are effective in the restoration of what 
kingship looks and feels like and which can be used in the wider context 
of identity reconstruction.
To get back to the subject of the performativity of rituals dedicated to the 
king’s long life, as described above, a kurim ceremony included the recitation 
of the Kangyur, the canonical collection of scriptures believed to be the words 
of Buddha. Performed by alternating monasteries, the ritual emphasized the 
interdependence of prestige, moral obligation, and merit which is important for 
Tibetan societies and many Buddhist states across Asia. There were uniquely 
Tantric types of kurim in Nangchen and several reincarnated lamas or yogins, 
who were believed to be particularly powerful yogins, were paid from the 
king’s treasury to perform longevity practices for the king in ritual seclusion 
(Tulku Urgyen 2005, 171, 177). The fact that not only merit but also Tantric 
power was collected and utilized to sustain the monarch was a special feature 
of kingship in keeping with Nangchen’s reputation as ‘the realm of meditators’.
The king is said to have been personally highly involved in religious 
life. Oral tradition has recorded how some monarchs dwelt in meditative 
seclusion and, in order to fully embrace the life of a renunciate, passed 
on their function of chögyel to their eldest son. In other narrated scenes, 
subjects plead with the king, who is practising Tantric meditation in ritual 
seclusion, to resume his royal obligations for the sake of all the people in 
his realm. The king returns reluctantly – yet another element adding to the 
specif ically Tibetan image of an ideal monarch (Ramble 2008, 325-326).
A story that is still recounted again and again today in Yushu T.A.P. tells 
how the last king, Trashi Tséwang Dorjé, died while meditating in retreat in 
the vicinity of the Gyanak Maṇi pilgrimage site outside Jyekundo (another 
version of the same event, which comes from Nangchenmi in exile, stresses 
that the king’s isolation was not of a voluntary nature and that he had been 
sentenced to home arrest). Of course, remembering that the king’s virtues 
were in keeping with Buddhist teachings is important for reviving the specific 
Tibetan identity of his former realm and for reconstructing the interdependent 
identities of former subjects. In addition to this, I would like to highlight 
how the Nangchen kingship narrative, especially elements concerning the 
legitimacy of Dru kings, is enhanced by an association of kingship with Tantric 
meditation in seclusion and the ritual power believed to be collected through 
these practices. Emphasis on Tantric mastery as part of the Nangchenmi‘s 
mnemonic process serves to reconstruct the traditional mythical-religious 
make-up in the realm in the current process of identity revival.
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The Nangchen kings enhanced the charisma of kingship with the cha-
risma of meditation and mysticism. However, in twentieth century Kham 
the charisma of royalty itself was apparently important to the reputation 
of leadership, as we learn from Yudru Tsomu’s chapter in this volume. The 
Derge strongman Jagö Topden, while challenging the traditional model of 
hereditary kingship, also appropriated some of its charisma through adopting 
the title of the ‘hundred-year-king’ (gyalo gyelpo). It is interesting to note 
that the leader of the opposing faction which represented the traditional 
model of leadership and was intent on defending it, was the Nangchen king 
Trashi Tséwang Dorjé’s own sister.
The Demise of the Kingdom: Legitimacy and Conquest
From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, Kham became 
an area of increasing tension and unrest. In 1911, during the reign of king 
Wangdrak Tsering Lhagyel, Nangchen fell under the authority of the Hui Ma 
clan which ruled from Xining. This barely changed the actual status quo on 
the ground, with the king presiding over baihu and baizong as well as over 
the semi-independent monastic estates; this might be one of the reasons 
why the legacy of the most famous Ma warlord, Ma Bufang (1903-1975), was 
largely ‘forgotten’ in the Nangchen chronicles. Accounts of Ma Bufang’s 
much-feared punitive campaigns against monasteries or families with 
overdue f iscal payments are mostly oral.
During the reign of the last monarch, a new power emerged in China – 
communist forces defeated Ma Bufang and Xining fell in September 1949 
(Marshall and Cooke 1997, 1593). The early presence of Chinese communists 
is mentioned in our sources but, as we shall see, depending on whether the 
material was printed in the P.R.C. or in exile, it is represented in different 
ways.
In June 1950 Chinese troops spread further south and took over Jyekundo, 
where they established their temporary headquarters as a necessary base 
for the subsequent invasion of Central Tibet (Nangchen Gyelrap, 49). From 
Melvyn Goldstein’s interviews with Tibetan informants we learn that Lhasa 
failed to conspire with both the Dergé queen and the Nangchen king to join 
forces to drive away P.L.A. troops. After 5 October, Nangchen became the 
corridor through which the 154th Regiment of the People’s Liberation Army 
transited to Riwoche and further on to the strategically important town of 
Chamdo (Goldstein 1991, 681-682). After the fall of Chamdo, the P.L.A. were 
able to proceed to Lhasa which they conquered without much resistance.
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In another paper I pointed out how certain contemporary Tibetan au-
thors use myths in representing facts from recent Sino-Tibetan history to 
portray Chinese communist democratic reforms and their aftermath as an 
ideological and cosmological conflict rather than a political or ethnic one 
(Turek, forthcoming b). Nangchen Gyelrap accordingly credits the last king 
with a clairvoyant vision of the communist takeover, portraying him as a 
sage endowed with exceptional powers that emerge with the performance 
of prolonged and ritually eff icacious Tantric meditation in seclusion. At 
the same time, the passage from Nangchen Gyelrap presents the author’s 
interpretation of local history between 1950-1959:
What concerns oppression by the communist Chinese, the venerable 
king had a prophetic vision of the future and described them as enemies 
of the teaching and samaya-violators; [he saw how] three faces of the 
communist Chinese, drunk with three kinds of poison, would manifest 
three expressions:
First, there would be a time for [showing] a face of ignorance [wearing] a 
fake smile: they would call everyone ‘brothers and sisters’, paid one silver 
piece for a mere cup of cold water, would not collect the customary taxes 
and corveé labour. They would be very peaceful and gentle.
In the meantime, there would be a time for [showing] a red face of greed, 
beaming with delight: the Chinese would buy land at strategic points 
piece by piece and for surprisingly [high] prices, where they built roads 
and military barracks. They would be very cunning: under the disguise of 
opera shows, performances and pretending to have a friendly attitude, they 
performed medical experiments on humans and livestock, examined the 
amount of rainfall on wet f ields. Suspicions clearly emerged [in the vision]. 
Because they enticed individuals to conflict, endless family f ights broke 
out. They said that the oppression of the people was [now] eradicated and 
that weapon-making blacksmiths were no longer needed. The families 
who had swords were summoned and the weapons taken away.
Finally, there would be a time for [showing] a black face of anger, frowning 
terribly: land, possessions and cattle were collectivized. Several local lay 
people and members of the clergy were [invited for] inspection visits [to 
factories, etc.], [ideology] classes, and meetings. [But in reality,] district 
[authorities] tortured them [and they] died horrible deaths; the govern-
ment eliminated them. On the other hand, people were [also] killed 
through heavy military action. In short, these techniques of deception, 
trickery and cunning [which took place] between 1950-1959 became clearly 
apparent [in the king’s vision]. […] (Nangchen Gyelrap, 51-53)
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The three phases of local history that are referred to in this fragment 
are in fact a fairly adequate representation of what transpired in the 
1950s as we know it from Western scholarship on Central Tibet and 
parts of Amdo and Kham. The period in question has been the object of 
intense negotiations between publications sanctioned by the Chinese 
state and works published in exile. The above extract is taken from a 
source published in India, whereas for instance Khamtö Logyü (II, 211), 
produced in China, mentions the Nangchen king’s cooperation and his 
plans to re-establish the realm as part of new communist China. This 
contrasts with testimonies of Tibetan authors based in exile, who recount 
the armed struggles and atrocities committed in this f irst phase of the 
P.R.C.’s expansion into Nangchen. Thus, in 1950, according to Nangchen 
Gyelrap, after failed diplomatic attempts on the part of the king’s father, 
Wangdrak Tsering Lhagyel, struggles are reported to have broken out 
throughout the realm. Many desperate people were driven to commit 
suicide, the queen was captured, and the king forced to comply with the 
new government (Nangchen Gyelrap, 52-53).
The year 1951 saw the establishment of the ‘[Local] Government of the 
Tibetan People’s Autonomous District of Yushu or Upper Kham’ (Tib. Khams 
stod dam yu shul bod rigs sa khongs rang skyong mi dmangs srid gzhung, 
Ch. Qinghai sheng Yushu Zangzu Zizhi qu renmin zhengfu) with king Trashi 
Tsewang Dorjé as its nominal head (Khamtö Logyü II, 211). In the newly 
created Yushu Prefecture, the years 1950-1958 saw further preparations for 
socialist reforms envisioned by Mao. Along with lower-ranking Tibetan 
cadres, the Nangchen elite had to undergo compulsory training, which, as 
the central government in Beijing hoped, would reform their thinking. We 
do not learn this only from the excerpt above but also from photographs 
reproduced in Nangchen Gyelrap (81-82) and dated 1950, showing king Trashi 
Tsewang Dorjé with his ministers on ‘an invited sightseeing tour’ through the 
factories and monuments of China (see also Dáša Mortensen, this volume). 
The Year of the Earth Dog (1958) marked the final demise of what constituted 
the kingdom of Nangchen: the royal authority of the Dru dynasty that had 
been ruling since the beginning of the fourteenth century and the prestige 
of the eighteen monastic districts, which contained the realm’s rich religious 
culture. In all the recent histories of Nangchen, 1958 is remembered as a major 
traumatic milestone that brought about an irreversible change of society.
Since then, modern maps of the People’s Republic of China delineate a 
small fraction of the former Nangchen kingdom, which they call Nangqian 
County (Ch. Nangqian xian) within Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. 
The former centre of the galactic polity, Nangchen Gar, lies far off the beaten 
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track and consists of the reconstructed Tsechu monastery and a minute 
temple where the royal palace once stood. Today, the centre of Yushu 
Prefecture is Jyekundo, which was elevated to this position following the 
devastating earthquake in 2010. The need for a total reconstruction of the 
town after this disaster has provided the government with the opportunity 
of creating a new Shangri-La, a colonialist, urban fantasy about Khampa 
culture and history.
Conclusion
This contribution presents an overview of the revival of traditional history 
writing about the Eastern Tibetan kingdom of Nangchen, with special focus 
on the kingship narrative to which these new Tibetan-language histories 
give prominence. My understanding of the construction of the Nangchen 
kingship narrative is that the mnemonic process initiated to recollect the 
royal genealogy, legitimacy of rule and the socio-political organization in 
the kingdom draws on broader pan-Tibetan and Asian kingship narratives 
and cosmologies. These conceptions of kingship offer a tradition-sanctioned 
explanation of the structure, nature, meaning, and interdependence of the 
universe, society, history, place, state, and ruler. Indeed, the sudden suppres-
sion of the kingship narrative in Yushu T.A.P. in the 1950s destroyed the local 
sense of belonging, and the perception of tradition and of Nangchen Gar as 
a place where the authority of that tradition should be centred. Crediting 
kings once again with a divine status through historiographic practice has, 
at least in literature, the capacity to reverse or to stop the irreversible shifts 
that took place in Nangchen society.
Firstly, as Amy Holmes-Tagchungdarpa (2010) noted regarding Lhatok, 
royal genealogies have the potential to transfer local self-perception from 
a periphery of an external power centre to its own autonomous centre, and 
to represent this practice as a historical, and therefore authoritative process 
of renegotiation of the local past.
Secondly, I argue that remembering the Nangchen gyelpo in a close 
conversation with widespread Tibetan and Asian ideas of kingship – as the 
centre of a universe f illed with complex meanings and tropes – contributes 
to the reconstruction of local identity. This mnemonic practice can restore 
the identity of the Nangchenmi as subjects to their legitimate king. Through 
its cosmological aspect, the literary return of good kings also shows the 
potential to re-establish the broken connection with local tradition and to 
re-emphasize the value of the landscape as its container.
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Kingship can also potentially serve as an axis for an imagined pan-Tibetan 
community. That the kingship narrative is in great demand on both sides 
of the China-India border can be illustrated by an anecdote I heard in 
Jyekundo in the spring of 2015 – about a man who went to various Tibetan 
communities in India, introducing himself as ‘the king of Nangchen’ not 
without some success, even though he had no credentials to prove his claim.
Glossary of Tibetan and Chinese Terms
Adé Rinpoche A lde’u rin po che
Barom Kagyüpa ’Ba’ rom bka’ brgyud pa
Be Jangchub Gönpo ’Be byang chub mgon po
bechang be chang, (Ch.) baizong 百总






Chögyel Pakpa Chos rgyal ’phags pa
Chökyi Gyeltsen Chos kyi rgyal mtshan
chöyön chos yon
dé sde
Denma Jamyang Tsultrim Ldan ma ‘jam dbyangs tshul ‘khrims
Dergé Sde dge
Dorjé Tsewang Rdo rje tshe dbang
Drichu ’Bri chu





Ga Anyen Dampa Sga a nyan dam pa
Gesar Ge sar
Golok Mgo log
gyalo gyelpo rgyal lo rgyal po
Gyelrong Rgyal rong (Ch.) Jiarong 嘉绒
Gyanak Maṇi Rgya nag maNi
gyelkhap rgyal khab




Jagö Topden Bya rgod stobs ldan
Jangchup Zhönnu Byang chub gzhon nu







Kyehu Khorlo Zangpo Kye hu ‘khor lo bzang po
Lhatok Lha tog
Lümé Dorjé Lus med rdo rje
Machu Rma chu
Maṇi kabum Mani bka’ ‘bum
Minyak Mi nyag
Nangchen Nang chen
Nangchenmi Nang chen mi
nanglun nang blon
Nangso Chenmo Nang so chen mo
Nyenpo Gnyen po
qianhu (Tib.) chan hu, (Ch.) 千户
Repkong Reb khong
retsang gomdé ras tshang sgom sde
Riwoche Ri bo che
Repa Karpo Ras pa dkar po
Sakya Khön Sa skya khon
sertrel gser khral
Songtsen Gampo Srong btsan sgam po
Tenpa Tsering Bstan pa tshe ring
Tishi Repa Sherap Senggé Ti shri ras pa shes rab seng ge
Trashi Tsewang (Topgyel) Dorjé Bkra shis tshe dbang rdo rje





Wangdrak Tsering Lhagyel Dbang drag tshe ring lha rgyal
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Yarlung Yar klung
Yonten Pal Yon tan dpal
Yudröng Yu sgron
Appendix: List of rulers mentioned
Dru Driwo Awu (dates unknown) ruling with Répa Karpo (1198-1262)
Tsangsar Lümé Dorjé (1226-1292)
Tsangsar Jangchup Zhönnu (1254-1323)
Dru Chökyi Gyeltsen (r. 1300) – f irst in the line of kings
Dorjé Tsewang (r. 1680-1734)
Wangdrak Tsering Lhagyel (dates unknown)
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14 Yachen as Process
Encampments, Nuns, and Spatial Politics in Post-Mao Kham
Yasmin Cho
Abstract
This chapter examines a distinctive form of Buddhist space, called an 
‘encampment’ (gar), that is being built by Tibetan Buddhist nuns in 
Yachen. By ethnographically focusing on the nuns’ material engage-
ments, I show how the inherent incompleteness and inclusiveness of 
an encampment provide a space for the nuns to f lourish in a politically 
restrictive situation. I also explore the spatial politics occurring between 
the nuns and the Chinese state in and through Kham in the post-Mao 
era. I argue that Yachen is continually being made and transformed by 
various actants, including the nuns and their material activities, within 
the unique geopolitical malleability of Kham, and that the emergence of 
this encampment allows us to see Yachen as an unfolding process.
Keywords: encampment (gar), spatial politics, nuns, Tibetan Buddhist 
revival, Yachen Gar
Introduction
Few people visiting the eastern Tibetan plateau would fail to notice the 
ubiquitous presence of the massive grasslands where herds of yak graze 
freely, each animal maintaining a good distance from the others and from 
the herders’ tents that are scattered sparsely across the steppe. It is within 
this kind of nomadic landscape, deep within Kham, that Yachen Gar, a 
mega-sized Tibetan Buddhist encampment, can be found. More specif i-
cally, the encampment (gar) is located in the northwestern part of Sichuan 
province, not far from the provincial border of the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(T.A.R.). ‘Yachen’ is the name that nomadic people used to refer to this area 
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
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before the encampment was established. From a nearby hilltop in Yachen 
Gar, one can see a large residential area in the valley below with several 
thousand individual shacks built by Tibetan nuns.1 The zone f illed with 
these rough-hewn quarters is partially hemmed in by a river that makes the 
entire area resemble an island (see Figure 14.1). Many who visit Yachen for 
the f irst time do not expect a Buddhist ‘monastery’ to possess such a large 
shantytown within it and are often awestruck by this scene; this is why the 
nuns’ quarters have been a popular subject for photography.
Yet beyond its photogenic appeal, what makes this ‘island’ zone, and all 
of Yachen, truly astonishing is the way in which this enormous, if squalid, 
Buddhist enclave and the grand natural vistas that surround it invoke 
a sense of triumphant Buddhist spirituality in its earthly form. Among 
visitors and practitioners (both Tibetans and non-Tibetans), the challenging 
living conditions of the enclave are easily read as proof of the nuns’ f irm 
devotion toward their practices and their nunships; and the wild natural 
environment is often perceived as a necessary condition for containing 
and transmitting spiritual purity and sacredness. Even at a sensorial level, 
the devotees whom I encountered often told me that they felt a sense of 
spiritual and bodily purif ication just by walking around Yachen, eating 
and drinking there, and breathing its air (not to mention meditating or 
receiving teachings in Yachen). However, this fascination with Yachen does 
not arise only from such a heated religious ethos; in fact, in part, it arises 
from and is strengthened by a submerged, secular ‘mystery’ about how such 
a gigantic ethnic-religious community could emerge in a region of China 
where ongoing political (spatial) restrictions are the norm.
Securing firm and stable territorial boundaries is one of the quintessential 
components of the modern nation-state, and territorial sovereignty has 
been a ceaseless source of wars, disputes, and tensions. This issue is bound 
to be particularly acute for the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) since its 
massive border regions are occupied largely by ethnic minorities, many of 
whom may not entirely agree with their incorporation into the spatial and 
cultural project of Zhonghua, the Chinese nation. In particular, since their 
land was taken over by the Chinese army in 1951, Tibetans have continued 
to express their dissatisfaction with the state-led myth of a homogenous 
Chinese nation. (This dissatisfaction was expressed most recently in the 
protest in Lhasa in 2008 and the wave of self-immolations that followed 
1 In 2017, the number of nuns in Yachen exceeded 10,000. A smaller number of monks (no 
more than 2000) were settled on the upper side of the encampment. The monks also build their 
own huts, which are more spacious and made of much higher quality materials.
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after.2) Given the fact that Tibetan-populated regions in China constitute 
almost one fourth of the entire national territory of China, it is crucial for 
the Chinese state to secure a sense of territorial belonging from Tibetans, in 
other words, to achieve the ‘territorialization’ (Yeh 2013) of Tibetans to the 
motherland of China. For this reason, the Chinese state’s ethnic policies have 
been geared toward soliciting ethnic minorities’ recognition and submission 
of their ethnic territories as f irmly bounded under the P.R.C.’s sovereignty.
Within this particular geopolitical context, the emergence of Yachen Gar 
can be seen as an unusual instance of spatial dominance, or deterritorializa-
tion, exercised by Tibetans. By saying this, I do not mean that Yachen is a 
‘successful’ deviation from the Chinese control scheme or that it has achieved 
a static, independent position once and for all. The stories about Yachen that 
I will present in this chapter are much more complex. Since its inception and 
by its nature, Yachen has been undergoing a constant process of formation 
and transformation through the interventions of various actors, or ‘actants’ 
2 McGranahan, Carole, and Ralph Litzinger. 2012. ‘Self-Immolation as Protest in Tibet’. Hot Spots, 
Fieldsights, 9 April. https://culanth.org/f ieldsights/series/self-immolation-as-protest-in-tibet
Figure 14.1  The nuns’ residential sector in Yachen
photograph by yasmin cho 2010
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(Latour 1999): Tibetan lamas, monastics, Chinese lay disciples, the state’s 
policies, Buddhist devotion, the landscape, building activities, and so on. The 
structurally embedded uncertainty, openness, and unexpectedness of the 
landscape and the politics in Kham have crucially defined the present form 
of the encampment. This chapter is dedicated to showing ethnographically 
how the encampment is being formed and deformed through the Tibetan 
nuns’ material engagements – their hut building and migratory practices in 
particular – within the specif ic spatial and temporal process that is ‘Kham’.
Looking at the changing physical and residential (especially architectural) 
properties of the encampment of Yachen is useful for properly understanding 
‘Kham as a process’ (see Gros, in the Introduction). The studies discussed 
in this volume all point out, with different emphases and approaches, that 
Kham is not simply a background or a container of actions and histories that 
have unfolded; instead, Kham, with its own contested and elastic geopolitical 
and historical vectors, plays the role of an active medium through which vari-
ous participants seek to confront, challenge, and negotiate with one another. 
Yachen’s emergence and expansion, at least before the infrastructural and 
biopolitical interventions3 that the Chinese state has gradually made in 
recent years, owe a great deal to ‘the malleability of Kham’ as represented in 
the trope of ‘the Möbius strip’ that Gros aptly elaborates in the Introduction. 
More specif ically, in the emergence of Yachen, an extensive political and 
gendered repression, occurring both within Tibet and in relation to the 
Chinese state, is one of the fundamental conditions for so many Tibetan girls 
who migrate to this remote region of Kham. In other words, Tibet’s internal 
dynamics, tensions, and uncertainties as well as the external pressures and 
changing politics on the plateau play essential roles in the making of an 
active and unbounded Buddhist space (in de Certeau’s sense)4 at the outer 
rim of Tibet, and these complex entanglements return to and enhance the 
already conflated nature of Kham. I believe the notion of Kham-as-a-process, 
rather than simply Kham as the name of a region, has profound analytical 
value for helping us to likewise understand ‘Yachen as a process’. Only when 
we can see Yachen as a changing phenomenon or movement – and not as a 
bounded place, monastery, or religious site – will we be able to recognize and 
3 The Chinese authorities have initiated a large-scale demolition and rearrangement of the 
nuns’ quarters under the pretext of infrastructural and hygienic improvements for the residents. 
These include expanding the number of streets, dismantling huts, and removing the wild dogs 
that roamed the encampment.
4 Michel de Certeau argues that space involves mobile elements and variables: things occurring, 
the organizing of movements, not simply being-there (place). Therefore, to de Certeau, ‘space 
is a practiced place’ (1984, 117).
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see the nature of the encampment and what it entails: the specif ic forms of 
political tension and negotiation in its emergence and expansion, and, most 
important of all, the Tibetan nuns’ unique contributions to each of these.
After all, Yachen’s ‘island’ zone is spectacular not only because it is 
large and densely crowded, but also because it conveys a sense of inf inite 
potentiality in movement and growth. The zone literally merges with the 
vista of endless grasslands and by doing so, it can also embrace a sense of 
unbounded Buddhist spirituality. Borrowing from Tim Ingold’s contrast-
ing juxtaposition of ‘line and blob’ (2015), the ‘island’ zone, at f irst glance, 
resembles a blob consisting of mass, materials, and forms; yet in fact, the 
real spectacle of the zone lies in its unbridled – thus almost illegible and 
unexpected – paths, threads, and traces that produce many ‘lines’ (Ingold 
2007, 2015); for example, the routes of individual nuns’ migrations from their 
hometowns to Yachen, the life paths they choose and negotiate, the traces of 
the religious desires they follow, and the limitless material extensions (huts, 
roads, halls, etc.) they add to the encampment while living in Yachen. By 
using an ethnographic vantage point, in the f irst part of this chapter, I will 
detail the spatial effect of the nuns’ ongoing hut construction in shaping 
Yachen. To this end, the particular manner and politics in which the huts are 
built will be examined; and also, equally important, I will focus on how hut 
construction creates unruly pathways and routes across the encampment 
that make it harder for the Chinese authorities to read and control the space, 
as well as how the Chinese state has responded to this spreading illegibility 
of Yachen in recent years. In the rest of the chapter, I will address the spatial 
challenges the Tibetan nuns face when they exercise their mobilities.
The term ‘encampment’ (gar) suggests so much more than its functional 
proximity to a traditional monastery; it represents the movement, change, 
and unruliness that Yachen uniquely stands for and is based upon. Ultimately, 
I show how it has been possible in this environmentally challenging and 
politically conflicted region for the nuns’ ‘encamping’ to evade the P.R.C.’s 
sovereign mapping; and how Kham is a good-to-think-with category for 
recognizing a new kind of engagement with Sino-Tibetan spatial politics 
that has been initiated and continued by ordinary Tibetan nuns.
Encampment and Its Unruly Presence
What does it mean to have total physical control over one’s residential 
structure? What if one could be the designer, builder, and resident of a 
built-form all at the same time? It is quite unusual in modern urban settings 
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for an ordinary citizen to assume all three of these roles, yet it is often the 
norm in a religious encampment like Yachen. Beginning in the 1980s, over 
10,000 Tibetan nuns have migrated to this remote region of Kham and have 
remained there by building their own huts. The conditions for hut building 
have been challenging; construction materials are not easy to come by – one 
must either rely on limited market supplies or collect natural resources 
such as mud and gravel – and, until recently, few modern amenities, such as 
electricity, were available to make the construction process more eff icient 
(for example, some nuns now use electric-powered saws). Nevertheless, 
the nuns’ migration to Yachen has not been stopped and their building 
activities have increased; this is constantly redefining the spatial limits of 
the encampment.
When I f irst met Drölma in 2012, she had been in Yachen for almost 
f ifteen years. She and two other nuns had built their huts close together and 
later enclosed them using several large pieces of plywood to make a small 
communal yard for themselves. Since coming to Yachen, Drölma, like other 
fellow nuns, has ceaselessly repaired, remodelled, and rebuilt pieces of her 
hut and yard by utilizing all the available materials, tools, and skills at her 
disposal. The three nuns are very collegial, all are from the same village in 
Kham, and they share the same religious path and the hope of spending 
their entire lives practicing in Yachen. Despite such closeness and similar 
life experiences, however, they strictly respect each other’s individual spaces 
and rhythms. Nuns in Yachen usually do not share or merge their kitchen 
areas, not even for the sake of convenience. They prefer to set up small 
stoves and a few bowls and plates at the feet of their beds and to have their 
own spaces for cooking and eating, rather than creating a more properly 
sized kitchen and sharing meals. The fact that Yachen has over 10,000 small 
huts means that it has almost the same number of ‘mini-kitchens’.5 This 
is one reason why small-scale constructions by the nuns go on ceaselessly 
and are of such importance in Yachen.
Over the years of visiting Drölma’s hut, I noticed that she was constantly, 
albeit slightly, changing the structure of her room. On one occasion, she 
had moved the dividing wall between the room and the kitchen, sacrif icing 
space in the kitchen area to create more space in her main room. Drölma 
5 One person per hut is preferable because of the nature of the practices that Yachen promotes. 
These practices focus on solitary meditation for extended hours. Cooking and eating together 
might disturb the meditative f lows of individual practitioners. Yet as the quarters-shortage 
issue in Yachen has grown in recent years, more nuns are compelled to share their spaces with 
other nuns (usually siblings and relatives), but this measure is usually considered a temporary 
one and each nun seeks to procure her own space.
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used the same wallpaper and fabric to match the existing patterns of the 
interior of the room. She did such a good job that I could not locate even 
a trace of the original wall. It is obvious that tasks like moving a wall are 
simple enough for Drölma to accomplish, and her experience of over f ifteen 
years of residence in Yachen gives her relative expertise in dealing with 
various construction matters. Many Tibetan nuns with whom I talked 
would frequently share their upcoming plans for transforming their huts 
and, in most instances, they succeeded in making these happen. Over their 
years of living in Yachen, they learn, share, and transmit the knowledge of 
hut-building to one another; and in doing so, they are equipping themselves 
with total physical control over their material environment.
When I visited Drölma’s hut again at a later time, I found a new construc-
tion project being undertaken right next to her yard. This was a common 
scene given that the nuns were, almost by default, continually engaged 
in building or repairing their huts. Drölma told me that a Chinese nun 
would be moving in soon. Unlike Tibetan nuns, Chinese nuns usually hire 
carpenters from outside if they build a hut (they usually rent one). This is 
mostly because their numbers are not large enough to mobilize a group 
to do construction work, and they have little experience and few skills for 
building huts.6 As I passed two male carpenters working on the hut that 
day, I noticed that the construction site seemed too small for a residential 
hut. But the new hut had an innovative design that maximized the utility of 
the tiny piece of land it was built upon. The Chinese nun designed her hut 
to be a double-decker space (see Figure 14.2); she asked the carpenters to 
build a kitchen on the f irst f loor and an attic-style bedroom on the second 
floor. Interestingly, around the same time, I also found that in other sections 
of the nuns’ residential area, Tibetan nuns were increasingly adopting this 
double-decker system to deal with the hut-shortage issue.
The double-decker system is one good example of how the nuns have 
direct physical control over their residential structures and do not seek 
official approval or wait for the intervention of the authorities. Furthermore, 
this innovation reflects the unique ways that the residential environment 
is arranged in Yachen by the nuns themselves, and how they exercise and 
authorize spatial and architectural freedom – that is, the freedom, within the 
6 Some of the Tibetan nuns who can speak Chinese have good relationships with Chinese 
nuns. It was extremely rare to see any Chinese nuns speaking Tibetan or interacting with Tibetan 
nuns in Tibetan in Yachen. The number of Chinese nuns in Yachen is at most only a few hundred, 
and the kinds of activities and classes that these two groups participate in are largely separate; 
therefore, their daily interactions are usually limited, even though they live side by side.
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given circumstances, to design their own structures and to transform their 
physical living conditions as they choose. This does not mean that Yachen is 
a restraint-free space or a space in which anyone can exercise a right to build. 
In fact, the Chinese authorities have always expressed concern about Yachen’s 
rapid expansion and, as one of their control measures, they have encircled 
the nuns’ residential area with a cement ring road to mark the boundary of 
the community (see Figure 14.1). Any hut-building activities outside of this 
ring road have practically been prohibited (although as we will see below, 
the state itself is now expanding and rearranging the nuns’ community in 
the prohibited zone.) In addition to double-deckers, whenever the level of 
the state’s surveillance becomes loosened, the nuns also frequently seek out 
opportunities to secretly build other kinds of residential structures (tents, 
for example) in the supposedly prohibited zone. Both in and outside the ring 
road, the nuns continually design ways to maintain their nunships in Yachen.
The hut that was being built next to Drölma’s was near a narrow, winding 
passage that would not normally be suitable for a residential structure. But 
this unfavourable location turned out to be a lucky factor in its smooth 
completion. The site was too deep in the maze of huts for the Chinese 
Figure 14.2  The hut construction next door to Drölma’s hut
photograph by yasmin cho 2015
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authorities to be able to spot it and to immediately exert control over it.7 
Tibetan nuns usually take on the risk of building a hut by quickly mobilizing 
more than ten nuns at a time and f inishing the hut within a day or two. As a 
result of their nimble execution that eludes the Chinese authorities, the nuns 
literally and repeatedly make new passages, routes, and pathways, along with 
huts in new shapes and sizes, within their already intricate surroundings 
(see Figure 14.3); they are continually overlaying the old maze with a new 
one. If a cartographer were to try to map out the nuns’ residential area, she 
would have to redraw it every month, if not every week, and to accept that 
it will always be incomplete. What also stands out here is that the nuns’ 
hut-building in Yachen is an outcome of a collection of under-analysed 
and ignored forces, such as the nuns’ material and spatial needs, their 
construction techniques, their collaborative mindsets, and the micro-spatial 
politics between them and the Chinese authorities.
The encampment itself, in its inherent incompleteness, is therefore 
the outcome of these complex and ongoing entanglements around the 
nuns’ hut-building activities. In Yachen, nuns may need to wait before 
f inding open spots in which to build new huts (as the Chinese nun did 
in Drölma’s neighbourhood), but they do not wait for the head off ice to 
allocate residential cells to them, or for the government to send them permit 
papers as a precondition for admittance to the community. Upon their 
arrivals, with the help of fellow nuns, the nuns exercise direct control over 
their residential spaces; and this is signif icantly different from the spatial 
and bureaucratic thresholds typically imposed for initial admission to 
monastic communities in the more formal monasteries in the T.A.R. and 
elsewhere. Yachen’s distinctive spatial arrangement, with its self-organizing 
and improvisational nature, thus serves as extraordinary testimony to what 
an encampment can achieve that formal monasteries, which are structurally 
and politically associated with the characteristics of f ixity, f inality, and 
completeness, typically cannot.
Encampments and mountain hermitages have long existed as alternatives 
or complements to formal monasteries and have served to enrich Tibetans’ 
religious lives. Religious encampments (chögar) appeared in the fourteenth 
century in the Kagyu school (Terrone 2008), yet it seems that there are 
7 In many Tibetan monastic communities, there is a governing unit called the Work Team 
(Ch. gongzuo zu) that has been dispatched by the government. Its aim is to exert control over 
any issues that disturb the general social harmony. One of the Work Team’s main tasks in 
Yachen is to monitor new hut-building activities in the nuns’ area. Given the tension around 
the community at that time, the Chinese nun’s hut building might have been stopped and the 
hut destroyed if it had been caught by the Work Team.
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forms of outdoor teaching communities in remote regions that have an even 
older history than this.8 In many places in Tibet now, ‘encampment’ and 
‘monastery’ interchangeably refer to spaces where Buddhist teachers and 
practitioners live and practice together, and share the same rhythms and 
practices provided by the community. Thus, it is not entirely productive to 
scrutinize the similarities and differences of these two forms of community 
in Tibet since, regardless of what Yachen is called – a monastery (Ch. si, 
usually by Chinese disciples), a ‘quasi-monastery’ (Terrone 2009), or an 
encampment – it plays a role in the fullest sense of transmitting Buddhist 
teachings and knowledge to wider audiences.
However, we should be cautious about an insidious effect that is produced 
when one uncritically applies the term ‘monastery’ in the case of Yachen. 
When Yachen is understood as a (traditional) Tibetan Buddhist monastery, 
the focus rests on the founder’s or the authorities’ will and power, and on 
the symbolic representation of the community as a completed form with a 
f ixed role, rather than on the various processes, movements, and activities 
occurring in and around the community. In this regard, within a monastery 
framework, Yachen is tacitly presented as an already-planned structure that 
was foreseen centuries ago in the vision of its founding lama and is now 
fully instantiated in its f inal and static form (See Treasure movement).9 
Transformations, disorderly arrangements, and the explosive migration 
of nuns and the roles they play in Yachen are neither recognizable nor 
important in that framework. When Yachen is conceived as a crystalized, 
abstract, and conceptual edif ice – as it is in the sacred prophecies recorded 
in the biographies of lamas in Yachen, the soaring number of nuns and their 
activities goes unmentioned; we fail to raise – not to mention fail to recognize 
– questions about why and how so many Tibetan female practitioners have 
gathered there and why and how Yachen continues to change.
8 Based on a lecture given by Khenpo Tsultrim Lodro, entitled ‘The History, Role, and Re-
emergence of Tibetan Buddhist Encampments’, on 14 August 2017, at Columbia University, the 
beginning of encampments and outdoor teachings and practices nearly coincides with the 
beginning of monasteries.
9 The claim is made that Yachen is linked directly to the ancient master Padmasambhava’s 
or Guru Rinpoche’s prophecy. Guru Rinpoche’s prominent methods in transmitting Buddhist 
teachings in the purest form are known as the Treasure (Tib. terma) tradition, according to which 
teachings (written scriptures) and other sacred objects were hidden by Guru Rinpoche and are 
to be found by the right f igures in more peaceful times. In this way, Buddhism can once again 
be resuscitated in Tibet. Yachen’s founder, Achuk lama, was known to be one of the revealers 
(Tib. tertön) of the treasures; and Yachen’s spiritual basis therefore lies in the undisturbed, 
direct teachings from Guru Rinpoche in these revealed teachings. For more information about 
the Treasure movement in Kham, see Doctor (2005), Gyatso (1998), Germano (1998, 2002)
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In other words, the problem of seeing Yachen through the perspective of 
architectural f inality is that it prescribes to its members only f ixed roles that 
do not deviate from a high religious purpose. This perspective automatically 
and conveniently dismisses the enormous number of physical activities 
that make possible and maintain the system of religious practices and 
the continuation of the sacred legacies. As one would expect, the nuns in 
Yachen engage in various religious practices and follow the teachings and 
instructions given by teachers – they pray, chant, and meditate. And yet, 
quite unexpectedly, they also engage in a signif icant amount of physical 
labour throughout the encampment, from building and repairing their 
own huts to working on large communal projects such as stupas, halls, and 
roads.10 As Drölma and other nuns show, they constantly build and alter 
their rooms, cells, and pathways, thereby remodelling the physical shape 
of Yachen; creating new spaces from non-spaces; embracing new members 
despite the government’s controls; and in doing so, generate new spatial 
possibilities. These unexpected and piecemeal transformations that the 
nuns make on a daily basis have a direct impact on the unusual expansion 
of the encampment under repressive political conditions.
Michel Foucault (1977) discusses how regulatory power in modern society 
is deployed through the meticulous spatial layouts of buildings (schools, 
hospitals, prisons, etc.). He notes that ‘stones can make people docile and 
knowable’ (1977, 172); in other words, buildings, with their distinctive ma-
teriality, operate as an invisible mechanism for directing and regulating 
individual behaviours and minds. Yet, from the perspective of the nuns who 
directly create the spatial and material transformation of their huts, power 
is deployed in favour of the nuns in a way that makes them less docile and 
less predictable and thus less susceptible to the government’s controlling 
grip. In Yachen, how many small residential huts will end up being built, 
dismantled, and remodelled by the nuns through their circumvention of 
the Chinese off icials’ patrols and surveillance; how many more nuns will be 
moving in or moving out of Drölma’s neighbourhood; and what portions of 
Yachen are reconfigured and reshaped will therefore always remain open 
and undecided.11 The architectural properties of the encampment must be 
taken seriously not only because they allow the nuns to manoeuvre relatively 
10 The monks in Yachen are usually exempt from communal physical work.
11 By saying this, I do not mean to dismiss the essential vulnerability of ethnic religious 
communities under the P.R.C.’s regime. But given that the Chinese state may exercise a Machi-
avellian sovereign power over its subjects, it is all the more interesting to examine how Yachen 
has sustained and expanded itself. The undecidability and openness-to-transformation of the 
encampment have had a signif icant effect thus far.
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freely in their spaces, and to create, dissect, and merge these spaces based 
on their needs, but also because the encampment is a distinctive kind of 
arrangement that disturbs, in a subtle and insidious manner, the spatial 
control of the Chinese authorities.
What has been clear so far is that Yachen is a space that ‘occurs’, is ‘found’, 
or ‘produced’ (Lefebvre 1991) through the active material engagements of the 
Tibetan nuns who have sought out alternative paths in and through Kham. 
The existence of Yachen as a space is indebted, in part, to Kham-as-a-process.
Tibetan Nuns and Spatial (Im)Possibility
How does one join a monastic community in contemporary Tibet? How does 
one become a Buddhist nun in a Tibetan context? Given that Buddhism is 
so deeply integrated into Tibetan life, and given that monastics occupy a 
concrete social position that is very well recognized and respected in Tibet, 
it may at f irst seem absurd to pose such questions as these. In general, it 
appears that monastics, as well as nuns-to-be and monks-to-be, have more 
Figure 14.3  The maze-like pathways in the nuns’ residential sector
photograph by yasmin cho 2013
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or less full material and psychological support from their families and 
society; and therefore, for Tibetans, the process for joining a monastery is 
supposedly fairly straightforward. However, this general understanding of 
Tibetan monastics often obscures what typically happens when ordinary 
Tibetan women attempt to join a nunnery. Historical records regarding 
Tibetan female monastics and practitioners are rare when compared to the 
number of texts that exist about their male counterparts; but even among the 
handful of materials about women that are available, the focus is usually on 
f igures who have demonstrated extraordinary achievements or had unusual 
social and familial backgrounds.12 Therefore, the glimpses we have of the 
lives of ordinary Tibetan nuns are limited to understandings that are, at 
best, based on inferences and conjectures extracted from accounts of a few 
exceptional female f igures, the lives of monks, or from the words of male 
teachers. Now, however, with the emergence of Yachen, an encampment 
with an unprecedentedly large number of ordinary nuns, we have a crucial 
opportunity to acquire a better understanding of the hitherto ignored 
processes by which ordinary Tibetan females join monastic communities. 
Looking at Yachen from the nuns’ perspectives will provide insights into 
the lives of Tibetan nuns themselves and into the specif ic kind of space 
they are making, both of which have left a signif icant mark on the Tibetan 
Buddhist revival occurring in Kham over the past few decades.
Tibetan nuns in Yachen hail from all over the Tibetan plateau. Many 
are from remote regions in Kham while, at the same time and rather 
unexpectedly, nuns from Lhasa and its near vicinity are also frequently 
seen in Yachen.13 Given the general respect that Tibetans have for Lhasa, in 
particular the life-time desire popularly expressed by Tibetans living outside 
12 A few works, based on limited written records, about extraordinary female practitioners are 
available. For monographs focusing on a single f igure, see, for example, Allione (2000), Bessenger 
(2016), Diemberger (2007), Jacoby (2014), Schaeffer (2004); see also several articles by Hofer, 
Jacoby, Robin, and Schneider in a special issue edited by Schrempf and Schneider (2015). There 
are some ethnographic accounts of ordinary Tibetan monastics; see, for example, Grimshaw 
(1994), Gutschow (2004), Havnevik (1989), Makley (2005), and Shneiderman (2006). But these 
works, except for Makley, focus on female practitioners in the Himalayan region; there are very 
few studies in the English language on Tibetan nuns living in contemporary Tibet.
13 Although the record is rather outdated, Padma’tsho (2014) provided a survey, based on a 
governmental report produced in 2007, of the origins of the nuns in Yachen. In this report, 1711 
out of a total of 5070 nuns (at the time of her research) were from the T.A.R. It must be noted that 
it is tricky to track down precise population statistics for Yachen because of the dynamic daily 
movements of practitioners in and out of the community. In addition, the political pressure to 
limit the number of new admissions in Yachen often means that the real number of practitioners 
may not be disclosed by Yachen’s head off ice. Through various informal sources and my own 
estimates, I can say that the number of nuns was well over 10,000 as of 2017.
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Lhasa to visit and to spend time there, it comes as a surprise at f irst that 
some nuns give up the opportunity to remain in Lhasa and instead relocate 
themselves to a marginal region.14 Before going into detail about why these 
nuns do so, it is worth addressing some of the widespread experiences of 
Tibetan women when they attempt to join monastic communities. Among 
the various obstacles women face in becoming nuns, a particular kind of 
story repeatedly stood out over the years of my f ield research. Most of the 
nuns with whom I talked in Yachen told me that, at the beginning, they 
did not receive full support from their families. Based on my numerous 
interviews with nuns and the parents of nuns, I have come to see that familial 
disagreement originates largely from a deeply embedded misogynous belief 
in Tibetan society about females’ indeterminate minds and their lack of the 
spiritual capacity needed to carry out a lifelong religious commitment. In 
the dominant narratives in Tibetan Buddhism, the ideal form of the body 
for making a serious religious commitment is the male body. Those with 
female bodies, which are considered an insuff icient tool for achieving a 
lifelong commitment, may try to maintain such a commitment, but the 
effort will be longer and more arduous. In addition, the constant demand 
for female labour around the home is often a crucial factor in the initial 
familial rejection. Some girls, in responding to this domestic call, decide 
to remain at home as semi- or informal nuns who maintain celibacy while 
continuing to help in the household.15
Considering this unfavourable situation that is widely experienced by 
Tibetan nuns across regions, I would like to focus on the specif ic structural 
(political) conditions that the nuns from Lhasa, or the T.A.R. generally, face 
when they join Yachen, and look at how those conditions force or allow them 
to seek out this alternative spatial possibility. The permanent relocation 
from Lhasa to a nomadic region in Kham to fulf il one’s religious desire 
has not been a widely chosen path among Tibetans until recently. Yet the 
prolonged and intensif ied spatial and political repression in the T.A.R. by 
the Chinese state has given the malleability of Kham more visibility – this 
is particularly true for those Tibetans who are more vulnerable and more 
deprived of their space due to the recent political restrictions. Tibetan nuns 
14 See Katia Buffetrille’s discussion in this volume.
15 There are very limited accounts of the existence of this type of ‘household nuns’ – those 
women who maintain celibacy (either previously married or not), keep some basic vows, and 
remain at home to help with house chores for their entire lives. By accumulating merits in this 
way, they hope to gain a better rebirth and to join monasteries in their next lives. Ethnographers 
working in Tibet, including myself, recognize the presence of such female semi-monastics, with 
variances, across Tibetan villages. See Grimshaw (1994) and Makley (2005).
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in Lhasa are among those who have been active in seeking out an alternative 
space and opportunity for themselves in and through Kham. Chenco is 
one of the many nuns from nearby Lhasa whom I met in Yachen.16 Her 
initial goal was to join a nunnery in Lhasa, as other young nuns-to-be in her 
town often wish to do. Maintaining a short distance between the nunnery 
and one’s hometown is common in her village.17 However, when Chenco 
applied to join a nunnery in Lhasa, she learned that she would have to wait 
for several years before she could obtain a permit that would allow her to 
be a nun there. ‘I was told that there is a long waiting list of girls who want 
to be nuns, and I worried that I wouldn’t be able to obtain a permit for the 
next few years’, she told me.
The permit system, one of the many control policies imposed by the 
Chinese state on Tibetan Buddhism, was put into place when the monasteries 
in the T.A.R. were allowed to revive themselves after the devastating era 
of the Cultural Revolution (Goldstein 1998). Historically and symbolically 
important monasteries in the T.A.R., such as Drepung, are the primary 
targets of the system, and other monastic institutions in the T.A.R. are 
quickly affected as well. These monasteries have been assigned quotas for 
the number of members they are permitted, which results in communities 
that are signif icantly smaller than they used to be. Allowing the monaster-
ies to ‘revive’, yet at the same time limiting the number of admissions, 
demonstrates both the dilemma and the tactic of the Chinese state when 
dealing with Tibetan Buddhism in the post-Mao era. The Chinese state 
fundamentally fears allowing the important monastic centres to recuperate 
themselves and serve as main spaces for aggregating Tibetan dissent toward 
Chinese rule. But it is also unwise to entirely prohibit Buddhist activities in 
Tibet given that the state has decided to move away from a focus on ethnic 
political struggles and to concentrate instead on economic development. 
The state’s message is that monasteries can exist in the T.A.R., but they 
must show restraint in their role of providing religious, or other, inspiration. 
16 The nuns’ names used in this chapter are pseudonyms. In addition, the names of the natal 
towns of the nuns discussed here are not revealed.
17 In my research, Tibetan nuns and monks usually continue to maintain close relationships 
with their families after they join monasteries; they and their families support each other through 
ongoing spiritual and economic exchanges. Due to the lack of any support mechanisms other 
than their families, nuns usually rely on their families more than monks do. Also, in the case 
of smaller and more marginalized nunneries, the nuns are often mobilized for various labour 
needs in both their families and their monastic communities; therefore, the proximity between 
hometowns and monastic communities is preferable in many ways. See Kim Gutschow’s work 
(2004) on Tibetan Buddhist nuns in northern India where she argues that the nuns are traff icked 
between homes and monasteries.
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The state prefers that they serve as inert religious centres and lively tourist 
attractions.
In the case of nunneries in Tibet, the situation is worse. Since nunneries 
are in general much smaller and, compared to monasteries, less connected to 
lay communities, the revival processes have been slower and more onerous 
due to the diff iculties of raising donations, patrons, and other forms of 
social support that are needed to resuscitate these ruined communities. 
Girls who wish to be nuns in Lhasa end up having longer waiting times and 
thus face more uncertainty about their futures as nuns. Some of the girls 
who are on waiting lists live together temporarily in low-priced housing in 
the city until they can obtain permits. The idea is that girls who have the 
same goal can rely on one another to overcome the diff icult and uncertain 
waiting period. But these self-organized living arrangements often extend 
for several years, and the combination of prolonged waiting and the low 
odds of success in obtaining a permit, not to mention the f inancial burden 
of living in this way, cause many girls to look for other options. Chenco told 
me that, during this time, some girls are forced to abandon their initial 
decisions to become nuns, often due in part to growing pressure from their 
families about marriage and other obligations at home.
But while the Chinese state’s f ixed quotas for monastic admission 
surely have a dampening effect on the girls who wish to join nunneries, 
the extended waiting period is ultimately not the only or even the most 
important reason that pushes Chenco and other girls to leave Lhasa. Chenco 
and other nuns say that the real issues these days are the serious doubts 
that practitioners themselves hold about the eff icacy and true benefits of 
practicing Buddhism in Lhasa. The Chinese government not only regulates 
the size of the monastic communities in the T.A.R., it also controls the types 
and levels of religious activities – including rituals, initiations, and lamas’ 
lectures – that originally fell under monastic authority. Chenco perceives 
this situation to be much worse in the case of nunneries: ‘In Lhasa, there are 
many restrictions on what the lamas can lecture about and what teachings 
they can transmit in monasteries. The teachers cannot teach what they want. 
They are monitored. In the case of nunneries, it’s worse. Even fewer lamas 
wish to serve at nunneries and fewer religious activities are undertaken.’ She 
simply could not see any hope of freely and rigorously practicing Buddhism 
in the current religious environment in Lhasa.
Chenco’s statement touches on an old issue that nuns face in Tibetan 
Buddhism: a lack of spaces for practicing Buddhism and a lack of proper 
and durable social support. The lack of spaces, teachers, and mental and 
material supports for nuns is simultaneously both the outcome and the 
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cause of a deeply rooted misogynistic attitude, if not in principle then in 
practice, toward women in Buddhism. Kim Gutschow (2004) shows how the 
status of Tibetan nuns is considered lower than monks almost by default, 
and how this status operates and is constantly reproduced in Tibetan society 
through the unquestioned monastic order and tradition, as well as the nuns’ 
own acceptance of their lower status (see also Schaeffer 2004). Charlene 
Makley (2005) also argues that ‘monkhood’, the ultimate ideal of monastic 
embodiment, serves as a third gender in the gender-sex system in Tibetan 
society. Buddhism, in principle, liberates sentient beings from fundamental 
hierarchies; but as several studies show, in practice, it acquiesces to, if not 
actively promotes, gender asymmetries that are exercised in both monastic 
and lay lives.18 To state this more directly, the general lack of resources, and 
thus respect, for nuns has been taken for granted as a social fact in Tibet, 
so that the response given to me by most nuns and monks (and lamas) in 
answer to my simple question about the reason for such a lack usually went 
like this: ‘This is the way it has always been’.
Therefore, many nuns in Tibet have ended up walling themselves up 
in small, isolated, rundown nunneries – if and when they are admitted to 
one – with little support from outside other than from their kin groups. There 
are few active teaching and practice systems available, few donations made, 
and virtually no invitations given to nuns to perform rituals in villages. 
Performing various rituals in villages is a respectful way to generate income 
for seasoned monks. They can showcase their specialities and knowledge 
by serving the public in unique ways; and by doing so, they gain a warm 
reception, esteem, and material compensation. But villagers almost never 
invite nuns to do rituals because of the inferior capacity and education that 
the nuns usually possess, which is deemed to make them unqualif ied for 
doing such tasks. And the nuns themselves, even those who are properly 
educated and receive good teachings, have also been inculcated in the belief 
that the task of performing public rituals rightfully belongs to the monks. 
For many ordinary Tibetans, a self-evident question is: ‘Why invite nuns 
when there are so many monks are around?’
Given this situation, Chenco’s choice (and that of many other girls like 
her) to travel outside of the T.A.R. no longer appears odd. It has become 
obvious to Chenco that because of the long-standing repressive religious 
policies imposed by the Chinese government, Lhasa and the T.A.R. in general 
are no longer active religious centres for Tibetan Buddhist education in the 
same way that they used to be. And this especially affects the nuns and 
18 See also Grimshaw (1994), Havnevik (1994), Makley (2005), Willis (1989).
506 yasmin cho 
nuns-to-be in the T.A.R. Chenco had heard of a new place called Yachen 
that had no such quotas or waiting lists, and where several renowned lamas 
offered teachings to nuns and monks equally. She and many girls from the 
T.A.R. have thus turned their attention toward a place they once thought of 
as belonging to the margin, but which is now a place where they can f ind a 
large gathering of nuns, illustrious teachers, and the systematic support they 
have never had, nor even imagined (for a discussion of the larger context of 
this, see also Buffetrille, this volume).
Chenco’s story tells us that many of the nuns who join Yachen have 
experienced, all along, forms of gender discrimination that are structurally 
and culturally embedded in Tibetan society. Whether they conceive of this 
as unfair gender bias or as the outcome of unwholesome karma linked to 
female bodies, they hope to overcome these predicaments by seeking to f ind 
in Yachen the superior teachings and practices that have rarely been available 
to them. Contrary to what the existing literature implies, I do not view this 
unprecedented opportunity for the nuns as something simply provided 
by lamas or the Chinese government’s somewhat less restrictive policies 
in the 1980s. What makes this exceptional opportunity a viable one is, in 
signif icant part, the inherent inclusiveness and incompleteness of Yachen’s 
material status, i.e. encampment, and how the nuns utilize this for their 
own purposes. What Yachen most crucially offers to the nuns is therefore 
a spatial possibility (with its accompanying educational chances and other 
opportunities) that is brutally disappearing in the nunneries in Lhasa.
Yachen’s open-ended nomadic environment signals a virtually unlimited 
space for determined practitioners. As the number of nuns has continued 
to increase, the priority of the head off ice has slowly begun shifting to 
focus on the nuns’ education and their welfare. Yachen was not initially 
designed specif ically to improve the nuns’ welfare and education, but the 
ever-increasing population of nuns has made this a greater priority.19 This 
unruly space that the nuns are making and remaking in Kham has the effect 
of attracting a large number of socially disadvantaged people, because the 
form of encampment places few, if any, obstacles to entry into the com-
munity. In this space, the nuns have become an overwhelming majority, 
and they have acquired equal footing with monks in terms of education 
19 Some might say that ‘letting the nuns stay’ should be considered as an unusually gracious 
action by the previous head lama. However, even in the biographies about the lama that are 
produced by Yachen’s head off ice, the large number of nuns that have gathered is not recognized 
as a great feat or a compassionate action by him. Accounts usually treat the massive number of 
followers as androgynous, classless, and ethnicity-free anonymous bodies.
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and access to high-ranking teachers. In turn, such opportunities, which are 
rarely available elsewhere, have been a major source of attraction bringing 
even more girls to Yachen.
Emerging Geometrical Control
The spatial unruliness of Yachen serves as a way for the nuns to stealthily 
venture out and extend their presence both deep inside the encampment 
and at times even into the unbounded nomadic grassland beyond the ‘island’ 
zone – for a few years, a growing number of nuns living in tents outside 
the ring zone formed a tent city.20 But for the Chinese authorities, such 
unruliness invites confusions and illegibilities that require an alternative 
(and equally spatial) response. Recently, Yachen’s form has been substan-
tially altered, not by the small, daily material engagements of the nuns, 
but by large-scale infrastructural constructions authorized by the Chinese 
government. The extensive street repairs in both the nuns’ and the monks’ 
residential areas are the most noticeable of these.21 At a superf icial level, 
one might see this positively, as a sign that Yachen is modernizing and the 
standard of living is rising. In fact, the head off ice has been promoting these 
street constructions for years by saying that, with paved roads, practitioners 
will no longer become mired in the streets when it rains or snows. Most 
of the nuns with whom I have spoken seem to welcome the idea of having 
the main streets cleaned up and paved because this would no doubt make 
their mundane chores less exhausting. On the other hand, however, the 
construction processes have entirely upset the residential environment 
of some of the nuns. Those who lived in huts bordering the main streets 
were ordered to move out; their huts had to be removed because the newly 
constructed streets are twice as wide as the original dirt-f illed streets. 
The new streets are wide and straight enough to accommodate two lanes 
of minivans (see Figure 14.4 and compare it to Figure 14.1 taken in 2010).
20 The Chinese state allowed the tent city to grow for years because it did not see the tents 
as solid residential structures that fell under the category of surveillance. The new metal hut 
complex eventually absorbed the tent city, and the nuns who used to live in the tents moved 
into the complex. But for a time, the growth of the tent city literally redrew the legal boundaries 
of Yachen.
21 In the summer of 2019, as this chapter is going to press, there are new reports of demolitions in 
the nuns’ quarters by the Chinese authorities. The size of the demolitions needs to be confirmed, 
but it appears that the government’s infrastructural rearrangements have been extended to the 
nuns’ residential area.
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Here, a return to our focus on encampment points to an alternative 
perspective from which to understand these recent infrastructural construc-
tions taking place in Yachen. If we set aside for a moment the discussion of 
whether or how the streets improve the nuns’ daily lives as these straight, 
aligned streets appear in the middle of the nuns’ residential areas, the 
essential character of the encampment as a space, with its meandering 
pathways and routes created by the nuns, is slowly disappearing. What 
makes an encampment an encampment – that is, a distinctive Buddhist 
space in contemporary Kham – is lost as the maze-like routes and paths, 
the freely erected huts and cells, and the surprises and unknowns built into 
this ever-changing space are gradually incorporated into the realm of the 
visible and the knowable. We are now beginning to see geometrical street 
grids that run across the middle of the nuns’ residential area.
After years of negotiation between Yachen’s head off ice and the Chinese 
authorities, the nuns who had been displaced ended up moving to a complex 
of metal shacks located on the outskirts of the encampment where it had long 
been forbidden to build huts. The Chinese authorities brought in makeshift, 
rectangular, prefabricated metal quarters for the nuns who had lost their 
quarters because of the road construction. In addition to the displaced 
nuns, newly arrived nuns and those who had no space of their own and were 
Figure 14.4  The nuns’ residential sector in Yachen in 2016
photograph by yasmin cho 2016
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staying with other nuns were also moving into metal shacks. Facing the 
endlessly growing number of nuns and their never-ending secret hut-building 
activities, the Chinese state seemed to be responding by making the nuns’ 
residential arrangements more open and visible, even if this meant forgoing 
the original spatial prohibitions on hut-building.
These prefab metal units are arrayed in straight lines like an army com-
plex; each has an identical layout, divided inside into a room and a kitchen 
(see Figure 14.5). The nuns’ reactions are mixed. With the exception of their 
distance from the main halls and the main market areas, these quarters 
are considered by some nuns to be as good as, or even better than, the 
huts the nuns themselves build. The rooms are spacious, the ceilings are 
high, and the quarters mostly come with front yards. Some (young) nuns 
even intentionally gave up their existing lumber- and mud-built huts and 
moved into these metal quarters. Other nuns hold the opposite view; they 
dislike these metal quarters because metal transmits both heat and cold 
too quickly into their indoor spaces, making it especially diff icult to endure 
the highland’s cruel winter season.22
22 When a nun voluntarily decides to move into a prefab unit, she either rents out her original 
hut or sells it. (All hut-related transactions are strictly monitored by the head off ice, and the 
prices are decided by the off ice as well). The head off ice requires the nuns to pay half of the 
price of the unit (about 10,000 RMB) when they move in. They can stay there without making 
further instalment payments as long as they maintain their nunship in Yachen. But if the nun 
decides to leave Yachen, she must pay the rest of house’s price to the head off ice.
Figure 14.5  The complex of prefabricated metal quarters
photograph by yasmin cho 2015
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At the time of my f irst visit to Yachen in the summer of 2010, there were 
no prefab metal quarters, no wood-and-mud quarters built in lines and 
rows, and the streets were serpentine, dirt-f illed, organically created routes. 
I used to f ind the locations of the huts of nuns with whom I was acquainted 
by memorizing the detailed architectural traits of their quarters and the 
material environments of their neighbourhoods: the shapes of doors, the 
types of materials and fabrics used for the exteriors of the huts, the number 
and forms of cells on the roofs or yards, the patterns of the pathways that 
linked their huts, and so on. Since each hut had its own distinctive individual 
features that had grown out of numerous repair and rebuilding activities, 
this was almost the only possible way to recognize them. Yet, locating huts 
in this way remained challenging. No matter how carefully I inscribed the 
peculiar features of the huts into my brain, I often failed to f ind the one 
I was looking for because of the nuns’ constant rebuilding and repairing 
activities. I would f ind myself drifting along the streets or wandering in the 
wrong area and being chased by the wild dogs that were guarding the area 
from strangers. The nuns’ residential zone was a maze with few signposts 
or markers.
In the areas of Yachen that one was most familiar with, even a small task 
like fetching water required multi-sided and multisensory attentiveness. 
When fetching water in Yachen, even though the route from my hut to the 
well was relatively f ixed and known, I had to meticulously check various 
things on the way: I needed to examine the conditions of the streets on that 
particular day to avoid stepping into water holes, mud holes, and dog stools; 
take care not to hit my head on the untrimmed construction materials jutting 
out from huts and walls; and avoid other new obstacles. Walking through 
Yachen to do chores and to visit friends or lamas resembled the experience 
of wayfaring in a new place without having a map or reliable information 
in hand. Michel de Certeau reminds us of the embodied role of walkers in 
cities: ‘They are walkers […] whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of 
an urban “text” they write without being able to read it’ (1984, 93). These 
walkers claim new spaces and terrains that are not shown on the maps and 
itineraries; their unexpected and unplanned bodily presences, equipped 
with cautions and curiosities, produce new texts and new stories for urban 
spaces. In 2010, at least, before the new streets and metal quarters, before 
the governmental spatial controls were established, the nuns and visitors 
in Yachen were like the walkers in de Certeau’s description.
In 2016 then, when I visited an old friend of mine in Yachen and attempted 
to locate her hut by recalling my memories of the physical traits of the hut 
and its surroundings, I realized there was no longer a need to memorize 
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every detail in order to f ind what I was looking for. After the new streets 
were completed, I did not need to pay attention to the changing curves of 
the ground or the routes that I used to use. When I visited a nun living in 
the metal quarters’ area, I found myself checking the house number that 
marked each living quarter instead of memorizing specif ic features as 
I used to do. The metal quarters are virtually identical, with few visibly 
distinctive traits and few indications that transformations are occurring. 
The distinctive physical features of individual huts have been replaced with 
lifeless numbers, lines, and markers. In the complex of metal quarters, the 
f low of the nuns’ movements is visible and predictable. There is no need 
for multisensory attentiveness when passing through the complex. The 
routes are f ixed and unmovable, the concrete streets require little attention 
from those who walk along them; there are few water holes, mud holes, or 
animal excreta.23
Since the completion of the new streets and the complex of metal huts, 
the geometry of the nuns’ residential area is slowly transforming into a more 
legible form, in echo of James Scott’s (1998) analysis of the technologies of 
‘simplif ication’ deployed by the state to tame a space and ensure spatial 
control. The f lows of the nuns’ daily movements are more regulated and 
arranged than before. Less time is spent on the streets, and chores can be 
done more eff iciently. Some might say that the overall environment for 
practicing Buddhism in Yachen is much improved because the nuns can 
now spend more time focusing on their practices instead of dealing with 
daily chores. The stories and reactions among the practitioners about the 
new streets and the metal quarters are complex and segmented, and are 
currently still unfolding and evolving. What is certain is that now there is 
less space left in Yachen for the nuns to freely reconfigure their own living 
structures, and more space that forces the nuns to move along f ixed and 
planned routes. There is now less space for the nuns to ‘write’ their own 
texts and stories, and more space for the authorities to ‘read’ the nuns. The 
sheer physicality of the nuns’ hut-building is reduced, and Yachen is now 
becoming more of a static and abstract ‘monastery’ with less texture or 
movement involved. Yet, interestingly, Yachen’s monasticization this time 
23 Almost all the wild dogs have been removed from Yachen under an order given by the 
Chinese authorities in 2016. The local governments in Tibetan regions have begun slaughtering 
a massive number of wild dogs over the past few years under the pretext of improving the level 
of hygiene in local communities. The order was made in 2016 that all dogs in Yachen, which 
had numbered three to four thousand, must be slaughtered. As a Buddhist community, Yachen 
could not allow such massive killings to take place on their watch. In the end, the head off ice 
negotiated with the government not to slaughter the dogs but to send them away.
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is being executed by the state’s specif ic projection of geometrical control 
onto the community, rather than through the high-ranking lamas’ visions 
and prophecies.
Conclusion
I have argued that an encampment is a space that is being made – in response 
to the nuns’ needs (both religious and secular) and through their active 
material engagements – in ways that are not easily recognizable, legible, 
or predictable to the authorities. The dominant approach to perceiving 
Yachen has not been conducive to properly assessing the nature of ‘encamp-
ment’ as a crucial architectural feature that makes possible Yachen in its 
current form. The intense focus on a handful of celebrated male lamas and 
their spiritual capacities, including their extraordinary prescience and 
political sensibilities, has overwhelmingly determined the ways in which 
the Tibetan Buddhist revival, as well as an encampment like Yachen, are 
typically understood. As a result, not only the vital activities of the nuns 
that shape the encampment but also the malleable politics of Kham that 
crucially facilitate Yachen’s emergence are dismissed.
I have shown that the large number of Tibetan nuns in Yachen is neither 
accidental nor incidental; the unusually active level of female involvement 
is closely related to the emergence of this particular form of Buddhist space 
in and through Kham. In other words, the encampment in contemporary 
Kham is not a mere backdrop to stories about Yachen, but is the principal 
mechanism that allows this Buddhist space to grow through architec-
tural freedom and material manoeuvrability, despite the unstable political 
environment.
Focusing on the nature of encampment also enables us to develop an 
alternative perspective for understanding the kind of political control 
executed by the Chinese state. From this perspective, the tensions that 
exist between Yachen and the Chinese state can be seen as fundamentally 
spatial in nature. The Chinese authorities continue to make efforts to ‘read’ 
their subjects through spatial control by imposing upon the encampment 
a geometrically measurable order; while the nuns constantly endeavour 
to escape this spatial control by creating new huts, pathways, and routes 
that undermine it. In Yachen, seemingly simple spatial rearrangements, 
whether created by the nuns or by the state, are, after all, a reflection of the 
political tensions and asymmetrical confrontations between the nuns and 
the Chinese government out of which Yachen continues to arise and evolve.
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Glossary of Tibetan and Chinese Terms









Yachen Gar (Tib.) Ya chen sgar, (Ch.) Yaqing si 亚青寺
Zhonghua 中华
References
Allione, Tsultrim. 2000. Women of Wisdom. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion 
Publications.
Bessenger, Suzanne M. 2016. Echoes of Enlightenment: The Life and Legacy of the 
Tibetan Saint Sèonam Peldren. New York: Oxford University Press.
De Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Diemberger, Hildegard. 2007. When a Woman Becomes a Religious Dynasty: The 
Samding Dorje Phagmo of Tibet. New York: Columbia University Press.
Doctor, Andreas. 2005. Tibetan Treasure Literature: Revelation, Tradition, and 
Accomplishment in Visionary Buddhism. Ithaca , New York and Boulder, Colorado: 
Snow Lion Publications.
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: 
Pantheon Books.
Germano, David. 1998. ‘Re-Membering the Dismembered Body of Tibet: Con-
temporary Tibetan Visionary Movements in the People’s Republic of China’. 
In Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, 
edited by Melvyn C. Goldstein and Matthew T. Kapstein, 53-94. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press.
—. 2002. ‘History and Nature of The Collected Tantras of the Ancients’. The Tibetan 
& Himalayan Library. 25 March 2002. http://www.thlib.org/encyclopedias/
literary/wiki/history%20of%20ngb.html. (Accessed22 March 2019)
Goldstein, Melvyn C. 1998. ‘The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung Monastery’. In 
Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, edited 
514 yasmin cho 
by Melvyn C. Goldstein and Matthew T. Kapstein, 15-52. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Grimshaw, Anna. 1994. Servants of the Buddha: Winter in a Himalayan Convent. 
Cleveland, Ohio: The Pilgrim Press.
Gutschow, Kim. 2004. Being a Buddhist Nun: The Struggle for Enlightenment in the 
Himalayas. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University 
Press.
Gyatso, Janet. 1998. Apparitions of the Self: The Secret Autobiographies of a Tibetan 
Visionary. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Havnevik, Hanna. 1989. Tibetan Buddhist Nuns: History, Cultural Norms, and Social 
Reality. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
—. 1994. ‘The Role of Nuns in Contemporary Tibet’. In Resistance and Reform in 
Tibet, edited by Robert Barnett and Shrin Akiner, 259-266. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Ingold, Tim. 2007. Lines: A Brief History. New York: Routledge.
—. 2015. The Life of Lines. London and New York: Routledge.
Jacoby, Sarah H. 2014. Love and Liberation: Autobiographical Writings of the Tibetan 
Buddhist Visionary Sera Khandro. New York: Columbia University Press.
Latour, Bruno. 1999. Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell.
Makley, Charlene E. 2005. ‘The Body of a Nun: Nunhood and Gender in Contem-
porary Amdo’. In Women in Tibet, edited by Janet Gyatso and Hanna Havnevik, 
259-284. New York: Columbia University Press.
McGranahan, Carole, and Ralph Litzinger. 2012. ‘Self-Immolation as Protest in 
Tibet’. Hot Spots, Fieldsights, 9 April. https://culanth.org/f ieldsights/series/
self-immolation-as-protest-in-tibet. Accessed 7 June 2019.
Padma’tsho. 2014. ‘Courage as Eminence: Tibetan Nuns at Yarchen Monastery in 
Kham’. In Eminent Buddhist Women, edited by Karma Lekshe Tsomo, 185-194. 
Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Schaeffer, Kurtis R. 2004. Himalayan Hermitess: The Life of a Tibetan Buddhist Nun. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schrempf, Mona, and Nicola Schneider, eds. 2015. ‘Women as Visionaries, Healers 
and Agents of Social Transformation in the Himalayas, Tibet and Mongolia’. 
Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines, no. 34 (Special Issue).
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press.
Shneiderman, Sara. 2006. ‘Living Practical Dharma: A Tribute to Chomo Khan-
dru and the Bonpo Women of Lubra Village, Mustang, Nepal’. In Women’s 
Renunciation in South Asia: Nuns, Yoginis, Saints, and Singers, edited by Meena 
yachen as process 515
Khandelwal, Sondra L. Hausner, and Ann Grodzins Gold, 69-94. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Terrone, Antonio. 2008. ‘Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery: Revelation and 
Identity in rNying Ma Communities of Present-Day Kham’. In Images of Tibet in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries, edited by Monica Esposito, 2:747-779. Paris, France: 
École française d’Extrême-Orient.
—. 2009. ‘Householders and Monks: A Study of Treasure Revealers and Their Role 
in Religious Revival in Contemporary Eastern Tibet’. In Buddhism Beyond the 
Monastery: Tantric Practices and Their Performers in Tibet and the Himalayas, 
edited by Sarah Jacoby and Antonio Terrone, 73-110. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Willis, Janice Dean, ed. 1989. Feminine Ground: Essays on Women and Tibet. Ithaca, 
N.Y: Snow Lion Publications.
Yeh, Emily T. 2013. Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the Gift of Chinese 
Development. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
About the Author
Yasmin Cho is a postdoctoral research scholar in the Department of An-
thropology, Columbia University, U.S.A. She is currently completing a book 
manuscript that addresses the political subjectivity and the mode of life led 
by young Tibetan Buddhist nuns in the mega-sized Buddhist encampment 
of Yachen Gar in northwestern Sichuan province.

 Afterword




What does Chinese settler colonialism look like? More precisely, what 
does Chinese communist settler colonialism look like? In this essay, I 
consider contemporary Chinese empire in Tibet as a structure of both 
dispossession and domination, including the loss of state sovereignty. As 
in situations of empire elsewhere, Tibetan responses to colonization range 
from consent to new hegemonic politics to outright refusal of them. Given 
structural limits for cultural and political expression in China, consent, 
resistance, and refusal necessarily coexist. While this may be true for 
peoples throughout the People’s Republic of China, the burden of empire 
places additional forms of oppression on Tibetans. Identifying these forms 
of oppression as imperial, rather than simply those of a multi-ethnic state, 
enables a historical precision commensurate with peoples’ experiences 
of empire under socialism.
Keywords: Kham, settler solonialism, empire, frontiers, self-immolation
The Chinese are like kind parents
The silver dollars rain down upon us
– Local saying
One person’s frontier is the centre of another person’s world. Kham is 
such a place. It is the eastern territory of Tibet, one of the country’s three 
historical regions – Amdo, Kham, and Ü-Tsang. Kham is both centre and 
frontier, and for many people it is a homeland that precedes and thus 
transgresses borders and the nations and empires that def ine them. Kham 
Gros, Stéphane (ed.), Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amster-
dam, Amsterdam University Press 2019
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is a place of diversity and contrast, and like all places, of contradictions. 
In the current political period, Kham’s contradictions are especially 
relevant for they illuminate Chinese and Tibetan histories in important, 
overlooked ways.
In the 1950s, in an imperial move of aggression led by Mao Zedong, the 
People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) invaded and took over Tibet. In eastern 
Tibet, the Chinese soldiers were initially kind, offering ordinary Tibetans 
so many silver coins that these actions were memorialized in the above 
ditty that older Tibetans still remember today. The government of Tibet, 
including its leader the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, protested, but to no avail. 
Although a sovereign state, Tibet was not a member of the United Nations, 
and thus no country substantively came to Tibet’s defence. These events 
unfolded during the era of the Cold War and of European decolonization. 
As countries around the world demanded and gained independence, Tibet 
ironically lost its independence and became a colony of the communist 
P.R.C. In Tibet, including Kham, a key aspect of Chinese communist empire 
is settler colonialism.
What is settler colonialism? Imperial territorial acquisition followed by 
ongoing dispossession and oppression through colonial administration 
and settlement. Canadian Indigenous political scientist Glen Coulthard 
defines settler colonialism as follows: ‘A settler-colonial relationship is one 
characterized by a particular form of domination; that is, it is a relationship 
where power – in this case, interrelated discursive and nondiscursive facets 
of economic, gendered, racial, and state power – has been structured into 
a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that 
continue to facilitate the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands 
and self-determining authority’ (2014, 6-7, emphasis in the original). To 
settle includes to dispossess others of their land and autonomy. As explained 
by U.S.A.-based Mohawk anthropologist Audra Simpson (2014, 2018), it is 
more than other people settling on native land, but also the unsettling of 
native practices and beliefs. It is to attempt to unmake existing worlds 
and replace them with imperial ones. In the case of Tibet, it is to replace 
Tibetan worlds with Chinese ones. In Tibet, Chinese colonial goals include 
economic and resource extraction, political administration, settlement 
incentives, the renaming and dividing of lands, cultural assimilation, and 
(thus far unsuccessful) efforts to eliminate religion in favour of an idealized 
atheistic socialism.
Imperial formations know no boundaries. They are not limited to certain 
parts of the world or time periods or types of polities. Thinking of empires 
as always in formation rather than as steady or coherent states enables 
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needed comparisons across cases in addition to appreciation of their 
specif icities (Stoler 2006; Stoler and McGranahan 2007). Acknowledging 
that an imperial formation is as likely to be Chinese, communist, and of 
the twentieth or twenty-f irst centuries as it is to be English, capitalist, 
and of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries is both a historic reality 
and an analytic argument (McGranahan 2007). It is also a political claim. 
Claiming the People’s Republic of China to be an imperial polity rather 
than (only) a multi-ethnic one is to assert an anti-imperial politics and 
to centre a colonized perspective. Given Tibet and China’s long tenure as 
neighbouring polities, their shared political history ranges wildly. It has not 
always been a story of colonialism. Telling the story of Chinese colonialism 
in Tibet requires assessment of how empire is not only implemented but 
also how it is lived. Even in the most authoritarian of periods, people rarely 
respond to or experience colonialism in a singular way. As a structure 
rather than an event (Wolfe 1999), settler colonialism has shared features 
but not total coherence across Tibetan areas. Tibetans are colonized by 
China, but this structural reality has discrete geographic, historic, and 
political components to it.
Tibet’s imperial realities are multiple. For the twentieth century alone, 
they are quadruple, including imperial relationships with British India, 
Qing China, the P.R.C., and the U.S.A. Going further back, they include the 
period when Tibet itself was an empire during the seventh through the 
ninth centuries, ruling over many of its neighbours, including portions of 
China, as well as territories further af ield (Beckwith 1993). A genealogy of 
imperial formations related to Tibet over the last millennia thus includes 
a range of polities, including Tibet itself. The eighth-century arrival of 
Buddhism in Tibet effectively ended Tibet’s imperial structure and activity. 
Governance, including relations with neighbours, was recalibrated within 
Buddhist frameworks. Across a vast territory that Tibetans often speak 
of as historically stretching from Ladakh in the west to Dartsedo in the 
east, Tibet was a patchwork of social, political, and religious institutions. 
Such variation was the norm. For example, depending on the village or 
town in which one lived in Kham, one could be under the administration 
of a monastic leader, a chiefly family, or a royal family. People living in 
border areas were sometimes under the influence or even direct rule of 
neighbouring non-Tibetan rulers and vice versa. Local power relations 
existed alongside other relations of trade, sociality, and religion. The latter 
was key for Tibet: Buddhist religious ties bound peoples through practices of 
patronage, pilgrimage, and devotion. Religious institutions and f igures were 
omnipresent in Tibetan economic, social, and political domains. Indeed, 
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the common term for Tibetan systems of governance was chösi, or ‘religion 
(and) politics’. This combination of religion and politics is a continuing and 
constant tension for Chinese empire today.
Studying Chinese colonialism in Kham is to ask questions about 
frontiers, empire, and sovereignty. As Stéphane Gros argues, the eastern 
Tibetan region of Kham presents a ‘categorical challenge’ to what we 
think we know about both China and Tibet (this volume, Introduction). 
Analysing Chinese colonialism in Kham challenges denials that the P.R.C. 
is an imperial polity. Instead, it insists on categorizing current Tibetan 
relationships to China as colonized, and asks what changes when we 
do so. Borderlands, for example, have never been neutral political sites 
of cultural and economic exchange, but are instead areas of political 
possibility distinct from metropole locations. In this sense, Kham has 
long been a site for Chinese workings out of imperial policy (Coleman 
2002; Frank, this volume; Giersch, this volume; Jagou 2009; Lawson 2013; 
Lin 2006; Relyea, this volume, 2015; Sperling 1976, 1998; Tsomu 2013, 2014; 
Tuttle 2005; Wang 2011). For Tibet, centring history and society in Kham 
is to de-centre Lhasa, Tibet’s capital. Challenging the idea of Lhasa as 
national centre forces attention to the historical place of regions such as 
Kham, Amdo, Ngari, or more provocatively perhaps, areas such as Bhutan 
(druk yül), in relation to central Tibet. It also forces a conversation on 
sovereignty.
Tibetan claims to state sovereignty, and thus to Chinese imperialism 
in Tibet, can be as productively grounded in Kham as in Lhasa (McGrana-
han 2003a, 2003b). Kham is a region long associated with a f ierce sense of 
independence, and people there have continued that tradition in response 
to the P.R.C. Since the 1950s, a consistent Tibetan response to Chinese 
political change has been resistance. As with colonized peoples elsewhere, 
Tibetan responses to empire exist along a spectrum from consent to refusal, 
including periods of more active or more passive reactions. Reconfigurations 
of everyday life under colonialism include consenting to new hegemonic 
policies and expectations to outright refusal of them (Simpson 2014). Given 
structural limits for cultural and political expression in China, consent, 
resistance, and refusal necessarily coexist. While this may be true for 
peoples throughout the P.R.C., the burden of empire places additional 
forms of oppression on Tibetans as well as Uyghurs and other colonized 
peoples (Bovingdon 2002, 2003; Byler 2019; Cliff 2016; Hillman and Tuttle 
2016). For some individuals and communities, consent and refusal might 
be simultaneous, if contradictory practices of survival. This is part of the 
story of the contemporary Tibetan borderlands in Kham.
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Settler Colonialism with Chinese Communist Characteristics
Empires take many forms. Settler colonialism is one form, elastic rather 
than rigid across cultural and historic contexts (Veracini 2013). It consists of 
the settling of others’ land by the colonizer with the intention of displacing, 
replacing, or otherwise eliminating the natives of the colonized territory 
(Wolfe 1999). Classic examples of settler colonialism are Australia, Canada, 
and the United States of America. In each instance, there exist drastic 
policies of both assimilation and destruction, including of native peoples 
as well as of their historical beliefs, practices, and claims to land. Settler 
colonialism may be one of several strategies or forms an empire takes. 
While it is often linked to European colonialism and also white supremacy, 
it – like empire in general – is not solely a European or white phenomenon. 
Settler colonialism is a possible feature of all imperial formations, including 
that of China.
Is China an empire? If many China Studies scholars have been hesitant 
to call the P.R.C. an empire, Tibetan Studies scholars have not hesitated to 
do so. From political science and international relations (e.g., Anand 2019; 
D. Norbu 1985; Smith 1996, 2008) to anthropology, geography, and history 
(e.g., Carrico 2018, Hansen 2003, Lokyitsang 2017; McGranahan 1995, 2007; 
Yeh 2013), many Tibetan Studies scholars portray Tibet’s relationship with 
the P.R.C. as imperial. However, not all scholars do. Some prefer the term 
‘occupied’, a term that calls attention to the problematic and violent nature of 
Tibet’s relationship with the P.R.C. but that falls short of the term ‘colonized’. 
This dilemma of naming the socialist state an empire is not limited to 
China, but also exists within Soviet Studies. Given the development of 
colonial and later postcolonial studies from within Marxist frameworks, 
non-capitalist empires such as the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. did not f it scholarly 
imperial models (Annus 2012; Chari and Verdery 2008; McGranahan 2007; 
Stoler and McGranahan 2007; Verdery 2002). While there are similarities 
in the two cases, the scholarly literatures on these two socialist empires 
has unfolded differently.
In much of China Studies empire is past-tense, with important studies 
focused on the Qing or further back (e.g., Crossley 1999; Hostetler 2005; 
Leibold 2007; Perdue 2007, 2009). Why is this? Avoiding labelling China as 
imperial draws on a range of possible reasons, including the following: 1) 
scholarly fears of criticizing the government, and thus potential persecution 
or loss of research access (Makley 2009; Milward 2011); 2) Marxist ‘radical 
reductionism’ or ideological aff iliation with or apology for the Chinese 
communist government (Yeh 2009); 3) a myopic focus on European empire 
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(Stoler, McGranahan, and Purdue 2007); and, 4) pervasive ‘discourse[s] 
of Chinese victimhood at the hands of Western empires’ (Shih 2011, 709). 
Within China Studies, one important recalibration of the study of empire is 
through Sinophone Studies (Shih 2011, 2012; Shih, Tsai, and Bernards 2013) 
or the domination of the Chinese language.
Sinophone communities are one way to recognize Chinese empire. Liter-
ary scholar Shu-mei Shih identif ies three historical processes of imperial 
consolidation: ‘the continental colonialism of Manchu and Han Chinese 
empires that produced internal colonies in today’s China; Han settler co-
lonialism in select places such as Taiwan, Singapore and colonial Malaya; 
and (im)migration out of China that produced minoritized Sinophone 
communities in different parts of the world such as Australia, Europe, and 
the Americas’ (2012, 5; on Taiwan, see also Chen 2010; Hirano, Veracini and 
Roy 2018; Sugimoto 2018). In this formulation, language is central. This 
holds true in some but not all ways for Tibetan colonial experiences in the 
P.R.C. A focus on language misses important historical and theoretical 
conversations about sovereignty that necessarily ground discussions and 
experiences of empire in Tibet. In the Tibetan language, the conceptual 
and imperial Other is China (gyanak) and the Chinese (gyemi), not the 
Chinese language nor the ‘Han’ Chinese. Thus, in addition to a genealogical 
connection to an imperial formation grounded around language, i.e. the 
Sinophone, in the case of Tibet, we also need a Tibetan-centred historical 
and political perspective.
Following World War II, China and the U.S.A. both used anti-imperial 
Cold War rhetoric to reframe empire as something else; for example, to posit 
imperialism as development or as the liberating spread of either socialism or 
democracy (McGranahan 2007, 2018). In the case of China, the consolidation 
of the People’s Republic of China as socialist empire used and also retuned 
longstanding Chinese tropes of barbarians outside the gates of civilized 
society as well as new political strategies for and justif ications of empire. 
When the People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet, the initial justif ication 
was the need for socialist liberation from feudalism and religion. Later the 
Chinese Communist Party added a historical justif ication to the earlier 
ideological one: the claim that Tibet was always a part of China. Ironically, 
this historical argument is itself only several decades old. For Xinjiang in 
addition to Tibet, anthropologist Kevin Carrico argues that such rhetorical 
shifts over time maintain the colonial project: ‘the ideological application 
of the euphemism of development is particularly pressing in the current 
western areas of China, where from the Maoist rhetoric of “liberation” to the 
post-Maoist rhetoric of “development” a process of unrelenting Han Chinese 
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colonization has been insistently represented as anything but colonization’ 
(2018, 640; see also Fischer 2013; Yeh and Wharton 2016). Whom does a denial 
of colonialism serve? Mostly, but not only, those in power.
Under socialism, the Chinese civilizing project has been one of forging 
national unity and ethnic harmony (Harrell 1995). In Tibet, one example of 
this is the ongoing Education Aid for Tibet project where Chinese citizens 
travel to Tibetan areas to work as teachers. This labour is seen as moral and 
part of a civilizing saviour complex familiar to colonial situations elsewhere 
(Yang 2019). Moral justif ications for the programme rest on stereotypical 
narratives such as ‘the Han [i.e., Chinese] are superior, central, civilized, and 
safe and the ethnic minorities [i.e., the Tibetans] are inferior, peripheral, 
barbaric, and unsafe’ (Yang 2019, 5; see also Carrico 2017). In her ethnographic 
research with teachers in the programme, scholar Miaoyan Yang (2019) found 
they understood their participation to be not so much about education for 
its own sake, as education in the service of ethnic unity, national stability, 
and national integration. Underlying this discourse is the argument that 
Tibetans are not integrated into the Chinese state, and that this is a problem 
to be f ixed. Instead of unity and harmony, Tibetans thus potentially present 
problems of ‘separatism’ and ‘splittism’ to a benevolent imperial state.
Tibet is not an internal colony of China. To call it an ‘internal colony’ 
would support the f iction that Tibet was historically part of China. An 
internal colony is a territory inside a state which is administered in a colonial 
fashion, or for which there exists massive economic inequality between 
it and the state centre (Hechter 1975). In the P.R.C., there are places and 
peoples whose relation to the state is that of an internal colony (Gladney 
1998; Oakes 1995). These are mostly non-Han ethnic areas and groups, but 
not necessarily ones that had a sovereign state as did Tibet. All non-Han 
peoples are nonetheless grouped into one ethno-political category, that 
of ‘minority nationalities’ or minzu, in a way that def ines this grouping as 
natural or inevitable, that is such that ‘these peoples are off icially described 
as always already a part of China, as if they somehow naturally belonged on 
this map and did not end up as part of China by being conquered’ (Fiskesjö 
2017, 7). Anthropologist of China Magnus Fiskesjö argues that this historical 
revisionism has stark political repercussions: ‘One formidable effect of this 
formulation is that it equalizes all the minorities and thereby erases the 
differences between those who built their own states and empires in the 
past, such as Tibet, which could easily, like Mongolia, fulf ill the criteria for 
being recognized by the modern world as independent states with their own 
seat in the United Nations and on the other hand, those minority peoples 
who never engaged in any such state-building in the past’ (Fiskesjö 2017, 7).
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Tibet’s eighteenth-nineteenth-century imperial relations were with the 
Qing (Manchu) empire, which was a non-Han empire of China. Buddhism 
bound the Qing emperor and Tibetan Dalai Lama together in a ‘patron-
priest’ relationship that Tibetans understood as a relation of equals, not 
one of subordination (Jagou 2009; Schwieger 2015). Being in an imperial 
relationship was not the same as being in a colonial one. During the same 
period, for example, British India also considered Tibet to be in its imperial 
interest; however, these Great Game politics were not an indicator of loss 
of sovereignty. In 1913, following the fall of the Qing empire and efforts of 
the new Republican government in China to assert claims to Tibet, the 
Thirteenth Dalai Lama proclaimed Tibet’s independence. Tibet never came 
under the imperial or colonial administration of the Republican government 
of China. What then does current Chinese settler colonialism look like?
Instructions on how to be civilized. Exclusions from certain programmes 
and possibilities. Inclusions in other programmes and possibilities. Require-
ments to perform gratitude, to embrace aspects of socialism, to reject local 
beliefs and practices, including religious ones – Buddhism in Tibet and 
Islam in Xinjiang. A visible security presence, and invisible but known 
surveillance methods. State policies based on misunderstandings of native 
peoples, such as nomadic pastoralists (Tan, this volume). Alongside these, 
however, is everyday life. People f ind ways to live in empire, to live alongside 
colonizers, to survive and even thrive within limits. Strategies for doing so 
are multiple.
Within the P.R.C., at times Tibetans creatively push back on their state 
ethnic (minzu) categorization, and other times they operate within proscribed 
limits (Germano 1998; Grant 2017, 2018; Hillman and Henfry 2006; Jinba 2013; 
Keogh 2015; Makley 2007; Smyer Yü 2103; Yeh 2007). Poetry, literature, art, and 
song are all important genres for Tibetan cultural and political expression, 
often with risks of imprisonment and abuse for artists, intellectuals, and 
even community members (Buffetrille, this volume; Gayley 2016; Jabb 2013, 
2019; Morcom 2015; Thurston 2017; Warner 2013). Changes in government 
policies for nomads, farmers, and urban residents have created new forms 
of inequality and struggle between Tibetans (Bum 2018; Gyal 2019; Sulek 
2019; Yeh and Makley 2019; Zhaxi 2019). Tibetan experiences of nationalist 
modernity within China are shared across regions. For example, short stories 
written in Amdo are read by people in Kham. Songs performed by Khampas 
are beloved by people in Amdo. Poems composed in honour of historical 
events in Lhasa circulate among Tibetans in all provinces via social media 
(Jabb 2019). In the digital era, people have new ways to connect and com-
municate, including to ‘undermine political authoritarianism’ (Jabb 2019, 51).
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Tibetan experiences with Chinese neighbours long precede contemporary 
empire. Traders, intellectuals, monks, and others regularly travelled to 
China and other neighbouring countries such as India and Nepal, and 
resided there sometimes by choice and other times as forced exile (Jagou 
2013; McGranahan 2017; Stoddard 1985; Yongdan 2019). The city of Chengdu 
in Sichuan, for example, has long had Tibetan residents, and is currently 
being reimagined anew as a Tibetan place within China (Xu, Kou, and 
Wall 2018). While Kham and other Tibetan regions each have historical 
and administrative specif icities, shared cultural sensibilities and forms 
have new uses under colonial rule. Understanding Kham thus requires 
understanding Tibet and vice versa.
Kham: Borderlands, Centre, Home
Where is Kham? It is north of Arunachal Pradesh and Burma and Yunnan, 
south of Amdo, east of Lhasa, and west of Sichuan and China. For Khampa 
Tibetans in exile, Kham is where they are not. Kham is a dreamt-of homeland, 
a place kept alive through memory and WeChat. Borders of Kham are not 
just with China; this is not simply ‘the Sino-Tibetan borderlands’. Instead, 
borders of Kham and Tibet are also with a range of other peoples (Atwill 2014; 
Bhutia and Holmes-Tagchungdarpa 2019; Gros 2016b; Guyot-Réchard 2017; 
Roche 2016). An orientation toward China is only one way to situate Kham, 
albeit a very potent way given the current geopolitical situation. However, 
borders are not only geographic, they are also conceptual and cultural. For 
example, religious borders in the form of different Buddhist sects stratify 
much of Tibet and provide impetus to overcome the limits of single sectarian 
approaches or dominance (Gardner 2009). Environmental borders of rivers, 
passes, elevation, and so on challenge and shape human possibility, as do 
linguistic borders. Kham is an area of religious, environmental, and linguistic 
diversity, and histories plural that match this diversity. Just as Tibet is not a 
singular cultural f ield, neither is Kham. The southern district of Gyelthang 
is an excellent example of this in terms of a distinct, and even at times 
indifferent, relation to Kham (E. Mortensen, this volume). When and how 
people identify as Khampa is situational and strategic. Nonetheless, in times 
of loss and change, geopolitical singularities can possess new meanings for 
people. The current moment is one such time.
A list of possible identities for any individual is always graduated. For 
an individual in Kham, geopolitical identities are layered and split. One 
has Tibetan geopolitical identities and now also Chinese administrative 
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ones. Historically, Kham was one of the chölkha (regions) of Tibet, and 
was comprised of many phayül (fatherlands) or districts. Each phayül had 
a central town and many villages and monasteries within its domain. 
Different Tibetan dialects and even languages are spoken throughout the 
region, some mutually unintelligible. Under Chinese rule, Tibetan terms 
were replaced with Chinese administrative units of prefectures, counties, 
cities, and townships. Nyarong is now Xinlong. Chaktreng is Xiangchen. 
Gyelthang is Shangri-La or Xianggelila (Hillman 2003). The names shift 
as the language does, the places reassemble with new boundaries and 
sensibilities. For some people, the two naming systems co-exist; for others, 
one fades in the face of the other. If your phayül is Nyarong and chölkha is 
Kham, your county is now Xinlong in the Chinese-established Ganzi Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province. Colonizing a place, settling 
a territory, includes renaming and reshaping its land. This is not a neutral 
act. The Tibetan and Chinese languages are not related. They jointly head 
the Sino-Tibetan language family, but Chinese is the current language of 
empire (Shakya 1994). Resistance to this is ongoing.
Insistence on the use of Tibetan languages is one nationalist form of 
resistance. We see this in numerous projects and forms of activism in the 
eastern Tibet regions, from the building of schools and creation of language 
programmes to the Lhakar (‘White Wednesday’) movement’s pledge to 
speak only Tibetan on Wednesdays. Such actions are considered counter-
revolutionary by the Chinese government. In May 2018, three years after 
appearing in a New York Times video discussing his work to support the 
teaching and preservation of the Tibetan language, Tashi Wangchuk was 
sentenced to f ive years in prison for ‘incitement to separatism’. His story 
dissolves important borders: he is from Jyekundo in the historic Tibetan 
region of Amdo, now known by its Chinese name of Yushu in the province 
of Qinghai. But his story of linguistic activism and of the state violence 
that accompanies it could be that of someone in Kham or central Tibet. 
Becoming visible to the state for advocating for things Tibetan – language, 
dress, religion, rights – is to take a risk. Even ostensibly safe ways to publicly 
present and perform Tibetan identities through, for example, ‘ethnic’ song 
and dance, always include such dangers. Negotiating the risks of state 
violence is something required under settler colonialism, even for things 
that on the surface seem apolitical.
How can one be unknowable to the state? At Yachen Gar, a religious 
community of nuns in Kham, women seek ways to be unknowable to, and 
thus uncontrollable by the state (Cho, this volume). This is a project in 
constant motion, as the nuns build huts in manners and formations designed 
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to deter, confuse, and refuse state mandates to be knowable. Remembering 
past resistance efforts against the state is also a political project. In exile 
as in the P.R.C., there are prohibitions against narrating histories of the 
Kham-centred citizen Chushi Gangdrug army that fought against the P.L.A. 
for almost two decades (McGranahan 2005, 2010). Also discouraged are 
histories that challenge either Chinese or Tibetan ideas of Kham or even 
of specif ic phayül as marginal places, rather than centres of their own 
(Turek, this volume). The historiography and scholarship produced under 
such conditions is partial and also political.
Histories written in service to the state, or as a form of international 
relations, f latten the complexities of actual people and the often compli-
cated lives they live. For example, the experiences of an individual such as 
Khampa Tibetan communist Baba Püntsok Wangyal cannot be reduced to 
his relationship to socialism or Buddhism or with Mao or the Dalai Lama 
(Goldstein et al. 2004; Stoddard 1986; Takla 1969; Wangyal 2007). Some 
beliefs are held constant across a lifetime and others necessarily change 
over time. Acknowledging the range of subject positions of an individual 
such as Wangchuk Tempa – monk, bandit, strongman, resistance f ighter, 
communist party member, and Tibetan trying to navigate a Chinese political 
world – enables a fuller portrait of life in the borderlands, including the 
sometimes oppositional array of life choices available to individuals (D.P. 
Mortensen, this volume). In the twentieth century alone, numerous Khampa 
Tibetans participated in national political projects, from locations both 
inside and outside of Kham. Some families and individuals gained power 
through religious rank and accomplishment, others through trade success, 
and still others through education and literacy (in both Chinese and/or 
Lhasa Tibetan) which enabled access to and aff iliation with new ideological 
worlds of democracy, nationalism, and/or socialism.
Political possibility in the borderlands has long been strategic rather than 
stable. Relations with Lhasa, with Amdo, with China, changed over the 
centuries and also varied across different places and for peoples of Kham. 
There was no one Khampa perspective or experience. At times, individuals 
and groups actively worked to effect political change. They agitated to 
change relations with neighbouring districts or phayül. They agitated for 
respect and power in relations with others deemed senior to them in terms 
of either religious or secular authority. Boundaries between districts could 
be fiercely defended by one generation, and productively blurred by the next. 
One area could declare its autonomy from any overlord, accept being under 
another polity, or reject external claims of subordination and instead proffer 
its own geopolitical preferences. The latter is the case of the kingdom of 
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Trokyap, which in the 1930s-1940s rejected new Chinese and Kham political 
aff iliations in favour of maintaining an older political bond with the state 
of Sichuan (Jagou, this volume). In this same period, others organized to 
forge a pan-Kham polity with strategic links to existing Tibetan and Chinese 
powerholders (Peng 2002; Tsomu, this volume). These efforts were predated 
by those of Nyarong chief Gönpo Namgyel, about whom stories are still 
told in exile as well as in Kham. A f igure who commanded both fear and 
respect, Gönpo Namgyel successfully conquered neighbouring districts 
and almost created a politically united Kham (Tsering 1985; Tsomu 2014). 
Writing histories of the present as well as of these often confusing pasts is 
also a matter of sources and accessibility.
Writing a history of Kham as a borderlands is to posit multiple centres 
elsewhere. These centres – be they Tibetan, Chinese, Indian, or otherwise 
– tell different stories of their margins. Some are familiar. The Tibetan state 
considered its borderlands as places to be both defended and civilized (Buf-
fetrille, this volume). This language is echoed in Chinese colonial language 
found in contemporary education and development projects (Yang 2019; Yeh 
2013) as well as in both European and Asian Christian missionary discourse 
in Tibet from the nineteenth century through to the present-day (Bray, 1991, 
this volume; Galipeau 2018; Gros 1996; Horlemann 2013; King and Klassen 
2015; Zenz 2014). Sources for imperial histories of Kham exist in multiple 
languages and archives with varying degrees of access throughout the world. 
Sources for Kham-centred histories exist wherever Khampas are in the world. 
They are orally narrated, and written and published by Khampa individuals 
and communities inside Tibet and also in exile. From hagiographies and 
local histories to diaries and political testimonies and more (e.g., Galli, 
this volume; Hartley 2013; McGranahan 2017; J. Norbu 1986; Pemba 2017; 
Schwieger 2002; Thargyal 2007; Wangmo 2017), available sources are not 
always accessible inside Tibet. Many documents were destroyed during 
the 1950s-1960s. Access to Tibetan archives is controlled by the Chinese 
government, as is permission for f ield research. Access to non-archival 
sources is limited by fear of imprisonment and abuse for the researcher, 
the individual speaking and writing, or both. This is a reality of research 
in a settler colonial region.
Scholarly studies of Kham fall under both Tibetan and Chinese Studies. 
As such, they may have different orientations, research questions, and 
understandings of Kham in relation to both Tibet and China rather than 
to only one of the two polities (Epstein 2002; Gros 2016a; Van Spengen and 
Jabb 2009). Over the centuries, Kham’s relations to Tibet and China were not 
commensurate. Kham was not a part of China. It was a part of Tibet. This 
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is a cultural, religious, and historical claim. Prior to the twentieth-century 
rise of the nation-state around the world, most peoples expressed and 
recognized identities in locally meaningful ways. People in Kham and 
throughout Tibet – all regions, not just the Chinese-designated Tibetan 
Autonomous Region – considered themselves connected to each other 
through religion and other cultural markers. They were nang pa (insiders), 
meaning practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism. This term exceeded politics, 
as did another one still in use today: tsampa eaters, people who eat roasted 
barley flour. As historian Tsering Shakya explains, ‘If Buddhism provided the 
atom of Tibetanness, then tsampa provided the sub-particles of Tibetanness. 
The use of tsampa transcended dialect, sect, gender, and regionalism’ (1993). 
Kham is home to tsampa eaters. Yet, as scholar Katia Buffetrille asks about 
Kham (this volume), what happens to the periphery when the centre is gone? 
For if all Tibetans were tsampa eaters, the heart of the Tibetan world in 
recent times was Lhasa and the Dalai Lama. One answer to her question is 
that in the periphery, people have created new practices to re-centre what 
has been lost.
Bodies and Borders: A Conclusion
Tibetan brothers and sisters unite. Independence for Tibet. Long life to the 
Dalai Lama. Dalai Lama return to Tibet. Each of these statements is one 
made by a Tibetan self-immolator, and repeated again and again by others 
who have self-immolated. As of July 2019, 164 Tibetans have self-immolated. 
One person self-immolated in China, three in Nepal, and seven people have 
self-immolated in India; the rest have done so inside Tibet. 164 individuals 
have chosen to end their lives by pouring petrol over their bodies, or into 
their bodies, and lighting a match. They have done so consistently as a 
form of protest against Chinese rule in Tibet. We know this because of the 
oral and written testimonies they prepared before the act, as well as by 
the things they say while they are burning. Of the 153 Tibetans who have 
self-immolated in Tibet since February 2009, the great majority have done 
so in ‘the Sino-Tibetan borderlands’. Six self-immolations have taken place 
in Central Tibet. In contrast, 147 self-immolations or 96 per cent of the total 
inside Tibet have been in eastern and northeastern Tibet, in the historic 
regions of Amdo and Kham, and the current Chinese provinces of Gansu, 
Qinghai, and Sichuan. Among this group, the majority of the self-immolators 
are doing so at the borders of Kham and Amdo, near Kirti Monastery in 
Ngaba, Sichuan. In Ngaba alone there have been 39 self-immolations, or 25 
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per cent of all self-immolations inside Tibet. At this Tibetan border, at a 
monastery where monks come from different areas of Tibet, a new practice 
of resistance and offering is centred.
Self-immolation is a twentieth-century form of political protest. It does 
not have a history in Tibet until now (Buffetrille and Robin et al. 2012; Dorjee 
2019; McGranahan and Litzinger 2012; Woeser 2016). It is now a method – a 
drastic, bold method – used by Tibetans to speak in a new way to a situation 
they f ind untenable. To self-immolate is to kill oneself, but Tibetans widely 
consider these deaths to be sacrif ices rather than suicides. New terminology 
had to be invented for the act of self-immolation. It is referred to as self-
burning in f ire (ranglü mesek), self-offering (ranglü chöbül), self-offering 
in f ire (ranglü mechö), or self-giving and burning (ranglü jingsek). Acts 
of self-immolation are framed as religious offerings in the historic sense 
of f ire offerings, of the f lame that is always lit on family and monastic 
altars. They are pleas to the Tibetan community to remain united to defend 
country and religion, and use the same language to make these pleas that 
resistance f ighters used in the 1950s. And, they are protests against the 
ongoing oppression and violence of Chinese colonialism.
Chinese governmental reactions are predictable. They blame self-
immolations on the Dalai Lama and the exile community. They claim the 
self-immolators are disturbed individuals. They deny they happened at all. They 
arrest self-immolators (those who did not die during their attempt) and some-
times also arrest their families. They create policies against self-immolation 
and launch anti-immolation programmes. According to a 2013 report in the 
Gansu Daily, the messages of anti-immolation re-education campaigns are that 
‘Tibet is an inalienable part of China’ and that Tibetan citizens must ‘uphold 
the leadership of the Communist Party of China and protect social stability 
and economic development’ (TCHRD 2013). At the same time, other forms 
of protest continue. Detentions continue for all sorts of activism including 
linguistic activism, environmental activism, for displaying the Tibetan flag or 
possessing a photo of the Dalai Lama, for circulating certain songs or for writing 
them, or for offering condolences to the family of a self-immolator. However, 
amidst the imperial logics of surveillance and detention, life continues in 
Kham and throughout Tibet, including at its borders. Sometimes too, when 
the Chinese government permits, research also takes place.
Academic questions of empire and borderlands are lived by actual peoples. 
They are not abstractions. Borders and borderlands are thought to be places of 
possibility, where mixture is possible but where centres and claims to purity 
are also most strongly defended or illuminated at times (Stoler 1991, 2002). 
Historically, political practices and possibilities in Kham were not the same 
aFTerword 531
as in Central Tibet, just as political practices and possibilities in Tibet were 
not the same as those of China. Today, these Khampa and Tibetan practices 
and possibilities continue to pose challenges. They challenge specif ic ideas 
of nation and empire; they challenge specif ic structures of power and the 
people who implement them. In contemporary Tibet, these challenges unfold 
in a ‘settler-colonial present’, a ‘deeply unequal scene of articulation’ in which 
people must both live their lives and structure their resistance while also 
insisting on and acting from another possible understanding of the political 
(Simpson 2016). In other words, there is a constant tension between consent 
and refusal (Simpson 2013, 2016). In Tibet, current Chinese rule is imperial. 
Self-immolation is one response to imperial rule. It is a refusal to live life in 
a certain way, a commitment to Tibetan ideas of life plural, and a reminder 
to all of the impermanence of things including, eventually, empire.
Glossary of Tibetan and Chinese terms
chölkha chol kha
chösi chos srid





ranglü mesek rang lus me bsregs
ranglü chöbül rang lus mchod ‘bul
ranglü mechö rang lus me mchod
ranglü jingsek rang lus sbying bsregs
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